Negotiating a New Social Contract for Work: An Online,Distributed Approach

A massive open online course (MOOC) entitled “Shaping the Future of Work” (offered through MITx, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's online learning division) has been the context for a multiparty simulation designed to produce classroom negotiation results that will have social impacts. After running the course in the MOOC context three times and in face‐to‐face settings eight times, we noticed that key themes emerged. Participants have brought their own workforce perspectives to their simulation roles as employers, worker representatives, elected officials, and educators. They have called for reciprocal agreements centered on fair treatment and representation in the workplace, improved organizational performance, investments in skills and capabilities, aligned rewards and benefits for workers, and work–life balance in communities. We continue to use the simulation in the classroom and are exploring ways to expand its use. In the meantime, in this article, we discuss how the insights gleaned from this simulation could be used to crystallize and advance a new social contract at a time when the public policies, institutions, and organizational practices governing employment relations have not kept up with the dramatic changes taking place in the workforce, nature of work, and overall economy.     

Negotiating in the European Council: A Model European Union Format for Individual Classes

This paper demonstrates the use of an in-class simulation to model negotiations in the European Council. Simulations are an increasingly popular way to teach the complex processes of policymaking and negotiations in the European Union (EU) where institutional procedures are difficult to understand and where intergovernmental and supranational issues often conflict. Advocates of active learning promote simulations to get students more involved and to reach an increasingly diverse student body. The simulation presented here has three separate sessions, each covering a different issue and lasting for a week (two class days) each. Modeling the European Council allows students to experience the intergovernmental side of policy decisions in the European Union while at the same time learning about the issues facing EU policymakers. It is a useful tool for teaching about the EU presidency and a worthwhile exercise for studying the national aspects of European integration. Student surveys indicate that students process the information they gain by role-playing better than information they receive in the traditional classroom. A simulation of the European Council gives students a base for understanding issues of European integration and can serve as a springboard for further study of EU institutions.     

The Polish Blitz,More than a Mere Footnote to History: Poland and Preventive War with Germany, 1933

The January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany marked the beginning of the end of the fragile post-war peace throughout Europe. The Polish leadership had good reason to fear his threats of revising the Treaty of Versailles. Realising that Hitler was too dangerous to remain in power, the Polish leadership led by Marshal Józef Pi?sudski prepared for a preventive war against Germany. Unfortunately, the appeasement policy among the Western Powers condemned this plan to failure and forced Poland into signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934; thus dooming Poland's existence. To test his premonitions about Hitler, Pi?sudski created several international “incidents” concerning the Free City of Danzig, designed to test both Germany and whether the Western Powers would fight to uphold the Treaty of Versailles. Pi?sudski's efforts offer proof that Poland deserves more credit for its determination to deal with a rising tide of Nazi Germany.     

A 'missed opportunity' for peace? Harold Wilson, British diplomacy, and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war, February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American 'hawks', as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war - the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam - which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem

Vasquez's (1996) rivalry escalation theory stressed territorial disputes as the principal focus for a two-path explanation of war. Neighbors fight over adjacent space and non-neighbors sometimes join ongoing wars between neighbors. But major powers are also much concerned with positional issues. Expanding the war motivation focus to encompass both spatial and positional issues facilitates the development of a new, more elaborate theory from which several new hypotheses can be derived, in addition to the older ones. Testing of the new theory can also proceed with rivalry data not based on dispute density measures, different types of contiguity can be assessed, and the presence of spatial-positional issues can be measured directly, as opposed to relying on a proximity proxy. The empirical outcome strongly supports the two-path, two-issue theory. In the major power subsystem, noncontiguous rivals outnumber contiguous rivals, dyadic wars are scarce, and war joining has been the norm. Spatial issues alone would have a hard time accounting for this pattern. Variable mixes of spatial and positional issues are able to account for it and a number of derived hypotheses reasonably well. This is not the last word on rivalry escalation to war but it appears to be an additional step in the right direction.     

Curzon, Lloyd George and the control of British foreign policy, 1919-22: A reassessment

This article reappraises the complex relationship between Lord Curzon and Lloyd George in the years between the former's appointment as Foreign Secretary and the latter's fall from office as Prime Minister in 1922. It argues that the widely held view that Lloyd George held Curzon in contempt and marginalized him in the conduct of foreign affairs is not accurate. Their relationship is presented as being one of mutual respect and significant levels of cooperation. The article thus questions the extent to which the Foreign Office suffered an 'eclipse' in this period.     

"欧洲化":欧盟研究的一个新视角

近年来,"欧洲化"一词在欧盟研究文献中出现频率颇高,被很多学者认为是研究当前欧盟及欧洲政治的一个重要概念。"欧洲化"概念的出现反映出欧盟研究学者的关注点从欧盟层次向成员国国家层次的转移,特别是在20世纪90年代后,越来越多的人开始关注欧盟层次的发展对其成员国及准成员国国内制度、政策及政治文化所造成的影响。     

“A Projected New Trusteeship”? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo-American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo-American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo-American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helping the powers to agree. Great power consensus broke down when Britain and France imposed a peace settlement on the Dutch in 1832. Yet the Belgian case—like Iraq's 1991 expulsion from Kuwait—shows that collective security can sometimes succeed against cross-border aggression.     

Invading Europe: The British army and its preparations for the Normandy campaign, 1942-44

The combat capability of 2nd British Army during the Normandy campaign has been much deprecated. This article tries to shed new light on these criticisms by examining three neglected aspects of the army's preparations for the campaign. It examines how the army was created from formations drawn from both Home Forces and 8th Army; it explores how its formations were trained in Britain before D-Day; it considers how senior commanders were selected to lead the army; and finally it demonstrates how athese issues had a significant influence on the combat capability of British troops in Normandy.     

The red air force in Italy, 1944: A case study in the formation of British Policy to the Soviet Union in world war II

In March 1944, the Soviets requested permission to base some aircraft in southern Italy. As the area was under Anglo‐American control, this raised some significant issues concerning wartime cooperation with the Soviets. Once it was set up, the base (at Bari) was used to send an unannounced mission to the Communist part of the Greek resistance movement. This paper considers the development of British attitudes towards these Soviet activities and demonstrates how the issue throws light on the making of British policy towards the USSR at this time: the conflicting views in different departments concerning the best method of handling the Soviets and the strategic significance of Soviet activities in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.     

The red air force in Italy, 1944: A case study in the formation of British Policy to the Soviet Union in world war II

In March 1944, the Soviets requested permission to base some aircraft in southern Italy. As the area was under Anglo-American control, this raised some significant issues concerning wartime cooperation with the Soviets. Once it was set up, the base (at Bari) was used to send an unannounced mission to the Communist part of the Greek resistance movement. This paper considers the development of British attitudes towards these Soviet activities and demonstrates how the issue throws light on the making of British policy towards the USSR at this time: the conflicting views in different departments concerning the best method of handling the Soviets and the strategic significance of Soviet activities in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.     

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe: A New Approach to a Regional Problem

The European Data Protection Directive is often considered the Internet Privacy Global Standard, but this in only partially true. While the European Union sets a formal global standard, the 1995 Data Protection Directive has two loopholes that Internet companies exploit to set the effective global standard for internet privacy. The United States and Ireland have become safe harbours for Internet companies to collect and process Europeans’ personal data without being subject to the stringent laws and regulations of some continental European countries. Companies, and not the European Union or governments, are the ones that set the effective global standard of internet privacy.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943-45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.