The changing character of EUFOR Althea: power politics or learning?

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU’s longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.     

Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective

This article will work towards a multi-level collective action approach for understanding the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operations. It is multi-level because it uses three levels of analysis: firstly, the international level, where events that create threats to certain values catalyze the process leading to the deployment of an operation; secondly, the national level, where EU governments formulate their national preferences towards prospective deployments based on utility expectations; and thirdly, the EU level, where EU member states negotiate and seek compromises to accommodate their different national preferences. The strength of the model will be demonstrated through empirical case studies on the deployment processes of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU NAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. The article will also provide an overview of the existing theoretical literature on the deployment of CSDP military operations.     

The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Abstract

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO.     

New threats – different response: EU and NATO and Somali piracy

When the European Union (EU) launched its first military naval mission, EU NAVFOR Somalia, Atalanta, the states who are members of both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made a political choice: to prioritize the EU over NATO in their multilateral military efforts to fight piracy and its consequences. Thereby, Atalanta challenges the conventional assumption that EU security cooperation will remain limited. It also challenges the widely held belief that the European states will chose to act through NATO if dealing multilaterally with international security issues. How can we explain this decision? This analysis suggests that it can be explained in two phases where different mechanisms were at work. In the first phase, which can be accounted for from a neo-realist perspective, France, who held the Presidency, used particular favorable geopolitical conditions to put an autonomous EU operation on the agenda. However, agreement on the EU option cannot be explained as a result of strategic bargaining. Instead, in a second phase and in line with an alternative hypothesis building on the theory of communicative action, the EU member states came to support the French suggestion due to legitimacy considerations regarding the legal framework of the two operations.     

Networked Cooperation: How the European Union Mobilizes Peacekeeping Forces to Project Power Abroad

Abstract

How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU missions.     

Interdependence,asymmetric crises,and European defence cooperation

Although international crises are often believed to represent windows of opportunity to strengthen European defence cooperation, recent crises have not seemed to produce a clear convergence of European Union (EU) member states’ security interests. This article seeks to address this puzzle by arguing that European defence cooperation is a response to crises that place European states in a situation of military interdependence. Conversely, asymmetric crises, i.e. crises that affect European states unevenly, encourage those states to maintain their autonomy of action. This theoretical argument is supported by two case studies: the failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s and the current difficulties experienced by the EU’s military operations. These two cases illustrate a striking continuity in that, because of (neo)colonial ties in particular, European states are often unevenly affected by international crises, which tends to make defence cooperation less effective.     

Who wants to pay more? The European Union's military operations and the dispute over financial burden sharing

In 2014, the European Union (EU) launched the sixth review of the Athena mechanism that finances the common costs of military operations launched in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the run up to the review, there were expectations that it would improve financial burden sharing in CSDP operations by expanding common funding for them. However, these hopes were disappointed; the review became a diplomatic tug of war between France, the strongest supporter of expanded common funding, and the UK, its strongest opponent. In the end, France agreed to the UK's terms to ensure that the existing level of common funding would not decrease. This article analyses the Athena review from a neoclassical realist perspective. It argues that the review's outcome was due to the imbalance of influence among EU member states and the diverging preferences of their Foreign Policy Executives (FPEs). These factors caused the Athena review to remain in the hands of a small group of member states that had diverging utility expectations and ideological preferences. Thus, the article shows that a surprisingly intense burden-sharing dispute has emerged within CSDP.     

Does European defence really matter? Fortunes and misfortunes of the Common Security and Defence Policy

This article examines how the defence component of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been revisited over the last few years. It argues that while the CSDP has grown predominantly as a security – rather than defence – policy, the latest developments that include the creation of a military headquarter, the launching of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the new role for the European Commission in defence funding, attest to an evolution towards a more central EU defence policy. In the meantime, the article points to some structural impediments to the materialisation of European defence. The momentum says little about the form and finality of military operations that EU states will have to conduct so as to give a meaning to defence in a European context. Moreover, persisting divergences in the EU member states’ respective strategic cultures and institutional preferences – notably vis-à-vis NATO – are likely to continue to constrain European defence self-assertion.     

EU Civil–Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organised Crime: Lessons to be Learned from the Bosnian Example

Abstract

Civil–military coordination between missions with the same top end of command and belonging to the same organization should increase the effectiveness of both missions even more than in a traditional interaction between military and civilian organizations. Nevertheless, the two EU missions in Bosnia, EUPM and EUFOR, which were both engaged in the fight against organized crime, had to undergo a difficult process until a decent level of cooperation was achieved. The article tries to describe the problems encountered and to address key factors, such as different concepts of operation, problems in the chain of command, a lack of accountability and—most importantly—the human factor, that hampered this cooperation.     

State–defence industry relations in the European context: French and UK interactions with the European Defence Agency

While many have noted that EU member states have different preferences over the prospect of an integrated EU defence, analyses that specifically explore state–industry relations in the definition of EU defence-industrial issues, and in the evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy in general, are lacking. This is surprising, given that different configurations of government–industry relations have represented a persistent impediment to European defence-industrial cross-border collaboration. This article investigates how state–defence industry relations impact on member states’ preferences towards the EU defence-industrial framework. Based on the case studies of the interaction of France and the UK with the European Defence Agency, this analysis focuses on the difference between public and private defence firms’ governance settings as the crucial explanatory variable accounting for diverging member states’ preferences in this domain.     

Towards a relationship with the Mediterranean countries

Fifteen years ago, the European Union (EU) launched a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since then, the CSDP has been the focus of a growing body of political and scholarly evaluations. While most commentators have acknowledged shortfalls in European military capabilities, many remain cautiously optimistic about the CSDP’s future. This article uses economic alliance theory to explain why EU member states have failed, so far, to create a potent common defence policy and to evaluate the policy’s future prospects. It demonstrates, through theoretical, case study-based and statistical analysis, that CSDP is more prone to collective action problems than relevant institutional alternatives, and concludes that the best option for Europeans is to refocus attention fully on cooperation within a NATO framework.     

Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

Why do some states deploy troops to support UN missions while others do not? Although short from war, peacekeeping entails a military dimension of foreign policy in which uniformed personnel is deployed to accomplish diplomatic and political means. As such, decisions to commit troops to UN operations must have the implicit support of the armed forces in order to take place. Yet, military backing for peacekeeping participation is not universal; some military institutions are more willing to join such missions than others. This article accounts for variations in terms of peacekeeping commitments by focusing on security doctrines and the degree of integration between military and foreign policy roles. It hypothesizes that countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries with national security doctrines and segregated military and foreign policy roles. Using evidence from the Latin American region, the paper suggests that the decision to engage in UN operations is the result of doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting.     

Alternatives to the Resident Embassy: Intra-EU Diplomatic Networks in the Twenty-first Century

Increasingly integrated in a common political entity, the European Union’s member states are exploring new avenues to shape and maintain their mutual relations. This analysis describes three alternatives to the traditional resident embassy by which ministries of foreign affairs within the EU attempt to maintain diplomatic networks. The models discussed are secondments within member states’ capitals, visiting ambassadors, and co-location and co-operation. In other words, with regard to different modes of representation, member states can consider diving in, stepping back, or pooling and sharing. These developments shed light on the ways in which the diplomatic machineries of the member states are trying to adapt to the demands of a “post-Westphalian” environment such as that of the EU.     

EU-oriented bilateralism: evaluating the role of member state embassies in the European Union

The European Union (EU) constitutes an evolving diplomatic milieu characterized by high levels of interconnectedness among the politico-administrative apparatuses of member states. The article assesses whether the continued presence of member state bilateral embassies in the EU is residual and largely emptied of function, or whether they are adapting their role to new requirements in the EU policy environment. An analytical framework is developed conceptualizing diplomatic representation around three variables—function, access and presence—and two scenarios of change dynamics in the structures of bilateral diplomacy in the EU are proposed. These are then utilized to evaluate empirical evidence gathered in embassies of six member states in London and Vienna. The findings reveal a process of gradual ‘re-gearing’ of embassy functions towards EU matters, shifting patterns of communication and access, and ‘domestication’ of diplomatic presence in terms of personnel and agenda. Overall, this amounts to a shift towards EU-oriented bilateralism.     

Explaining institutional Europeanisation in security and defence: the German administration under Schröder and Merkel

Abstract

Participating in EU crisis management operations has affected institutional actors on various levels. As the main deliverers of civilian and military resources to EU operations, national ministries and agencies have been particularly confronted with the need for administrative adaptation. A big member state like Germany is expected to make substantial contributions, but it also faces a rigid administration. This article uses a combined hypothesis of historical institutionalism and organisational learning to explain administrative Europeanisation in German government institutions involved in civilian and military crisis management deployments. The empirical data on the German administrative trajectories under Schröder and Merkel show an explanatory link between political learning and overcoming institutional path dependency.     

How can perception help us to understand the dynamic between EU member states? The state of the art

The paper reviews literature on perception within the international relations and the European Union (EU) studies in order to find out whether and how this concept can help us shed some light on the mutual relations between the EU member states. It examines the utilisation of perception as an analytical tool within the international relations where it was predominantly included into the foreign policy analysis approaches (image and role theory). Moreover, it was used for examining the views of the EU by other actors at not only bilateral but also multilateral level. Most studies analysed the perception of Asian countries, however, other areas, including Africa, were studied. Perception was utilised also at the EU level, when it was used for scrutinising different EU policies (foreign and security policies, enlargement), examining preference formation and influence of member states or investigating elite and public support for the European integration. The results show that perception is a valuable concept that can help us to analyse mutual relations between the EU member states in the enlarged and changed EU in several ways.     

The European public sphere and the debate about humanitarian military interventions

Studies on the democratic control and legitimacy of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have thus far mostly focused on formal institutions. However, a comprehensive analysis requires including the ‘sociocultural infrastructure’ in which such formal institutions are embedded. Students of democracy have argued that the public sphere is a crucial dimension, if not a precondition for all mechanisms of democratic control in general. This paper investigates whether and in which ways Europeans participated in transnational European communication on humanitarian military interventions (1990–2005/2006). The paper analyzes a full sample of 108,677 newspaper articles published in leading newspapers of six EU member states, and the US as a comparative case. It demonstrates that the ‘national’ arenas of political communication are intertwined and allow ordinary citizens to make up their minds about common European issues in the highly controversial and normatively sensitive realm of humanitarian military interventions.     

EU politics on labour migration: inclusion versus admission

Two European Union (EU) directives on labour migration were adopted in 2009 and 2011. The EU scheme to attract highly qualified migrants, the so-called ‘Blue Card’ directive of 2009, allows member states broad flexibility in implementation. In contrast, the directive on a single permit for migrant workers and their rights of 2011 is far less flexible. It does significantly reduce the scope for derogations at a national level to a minimum. How can this variance in output be explained? Institutional rules are shown to be a key factor. The involvement of the European Parliament as co-legislator alongside the Council limited member states’ influence on legal outputs. The comparison of policy outputs between the two cases points to differences in actor orientations: rather than seeking to increase labour migration into the EU by defining expansive admission conditions, the common EU policy seeks to include migrant workers by defining their rights.     

EU-Turkey Trade: A Case of Deep Integration

The EU’s self-definition as an integrating civilian, democratic and legal space of political norms and economic regulation, without any significant military power structure, profoundly affects the conception of its neighbourhood policies. It tries to promote with its neighbours what it has achieved itself at home. While the EU has one explicit neighbourhood policy, there are no less than 13 concentric circles of graduated neighbourhood relationships surrounding its territory, with a continuous blurring of categories between them. The EU can be described as engaging in a policy of Eurocentric normativism. But does trying to make neighbours ‘become like us’ amount to an effective strategy? There is widespread agreement that although the enlargement process for accession of new member states has proved impressively transformative, the official ENP, sometimes called ‘enlargement-lite’, has not. Nevertheless, while the conditionality mechanism has proved weak in the absence of the accession incentive, the alternative of Europeanisation by socialisation might still work gradually in the longer term in the outer neighbourhood.     

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.