构建政府采购的反腐败监督链制度

政府采购腐败是政府采购各利益主体“合谋”的产物,其根本原因在于市场经济条件下的利益寻租所致。无论在非制度或者在制度条件下,政府采购腐败现象均不可避免,所以需要构建政府采购的监督制度。按照委托代理理论,政府采购的活动形成“三方”监督链,在此基础上构建以政府采购的利益组织与行为层次为结构的反腐监督链制度体系。     

委托—代理关系中的政府决策

委托—代理关系一直是新制度经济学研究的重点,以此理论为基础和视角来分析在政府决策过程中一对特殊的委托—代理关系,即公民与政府的角色互动,试图以全新的视角,实现公民与政府的良性互动,以推进政府决策的科学化、民主化和法制化。     

行政问责制中主客体关系的平衡——基于委托一代理理论视角的分析

行政问责主体与客体的关系是行政问责制的基本问题,二者关系的平衡对于行政问责制的整体运行效果至关重要.对行政问责主客体平衡问题的考察,可从委托一代理理论的视角展开,行政问责主客体间委托-代理关系的本质是行政问责主客体之间通过以行政责任为具体内容的政治契约或管理契约,在委托一代理式的良性互动中共同保证行政责任有效实现的机制.正是公民-政府、权力机关-行政机关、上级行政机关-下级行政机关、行政机关-行政人员、行政领导-一般公务员之间委托-代理关系的失衡导致了行政问责主体与客体关系的失衡.对此,可从规范问责主体与客体间委托-代理关系的思路出发,通过构建作为委托者的问责主体对于作为代理者的问责客体进行问责的有力依据、有效途径和有利环境,来实现行政问责主客体关系的平衡,进而促进行政问责制臻于完善.     

官僚制组织的两副面孔

官僚制组织具有两副面孔.官僚制组织的经典面孔是由权威—义务、责任—规则等概念共同谱绘出来的,其目的是为了保障组织目标的实现.代理理论则用委托—代理、激励—动机等概念为我们描绘出了官僚制组织的另一副面孔,且人们根据这种描述而对官僚制组织进行改造的结果,就是将组织实践变成了所有组织成员合力蚕食组织剩余的活动.自人际关系学派兴起以来,如何对待组织实践中“人的因素”成为了组织管理的核心议题.传统官僚制理论在这一问题上无所作为,导致组织实践总是受困于官僚自利性的问题.代理理论正视了这一问题,却给出了错误的解决方案.当代组织理论必须对如何对待组织实践中的“人的因素”的问题做出新的回答.     

委托代理行政法律责任分析

委托代理行政,由谁承担法律责任,无论是理论上还是法律规范上都较为笼统,这给实践带来了困难。委托代理行政所产生的法律责任的原因是多方面的,只有对具体情况进行分析,并依据一定的标准原则才能确定法律责任由谁来承担。依据主客观统一归责原则,在客观条件确定下,主观“过错”就成为了分析委托代理行政法律关系中法律责任主旨原则,并根据这一原则精神对委托代理行政法律关系中委托主体的责任、受委托主体的责任和行政相对人的责任进行分析,可以确认三方在委托代理行政中各承担什么责任。     

委托代理理论下高管薪酬研究的新进展

经典的委托代理理论认为委托人为了良好地控制代理人的行为,谋求自身利益的最大化,应该将代理人的收入与其产出联系起来,并且当外界环境风险增大时,应该减小激励强度并采用相对绩效评估.这些结论被认为是现代股份制公司中高管人员薪酬设计的核心思想,然而大量实证研究并没有发现这些关系的存在.许多西方学者围绕这一悖论进行了探索,深刻剖析了股东和公司高管人员之间复杂的委托代理关系,揭示出凝聚在高管薪酬上的众多矛盾.     

从国家主导到双向赋权:我国政社互动行为研究的检视、反思与拓展

政社关系一直是理解中国政治改革、政府治理方式、国家与社会关系的重要切入口。在20世纪90年代,公民社会与法团主义一度成为被广泛用于解释政社关系的竞争性理论框架。而近些年围绕政社关系的研究逐渐打破静态的结构论争,开始迈向了“行动分析”,更加切实地关注行动者与正式制度之间的复杂互动逻辑。既有文献通常以政社力量的平衡性与否为依据,选择社会组织作为经验洞察的窗口,形成了从“国家主导”到“双向赋权”的研究取向。“国家主导”的视角强调国家在权力格局中的主导地位,聚焦于作为能动性的国家与社会组织的互动关系,以及探究更为具体的国家治理结构下社会组织权宜性的回应举措;“双向赋权”则从平衡角度出发,关注于国家与社会力量之间的合作行为,以及由此所达成的良性互动和协同发展的目标。为进一步拓展政社互动行为的研究,可以引入政党中心主义的视角,关注国家、社会与市场三者之间的逻辑关联,以及探讨技术治理变革所带来的深刻影响。     

国有产权代表制度新探

现代企业制度是建立在出资者所有权与法人财产权相分离的产权关系基础上的 ,由此形成了企业出资者与经营者之间的委托 -代理关系。降低委托代理成本 ,确保其效率最大化 ,是现代企业制度研究中的重要课题。近年来 ,我国在以建立现代企业制度为目标的国有企业制度创新过程中 ,也遇到了上述问题。2 0世纪 90年代以来 ,作为改革试验场的深圳市在这方面进行了积极的探索 ,逐步形成了规范国有出资人与企业经营者之间委托 -代理关系的国有产权代表制度。这种探索 ,具有非常重要的理论价值和实践意义。其实施时间虽然不长 ,但它代表了国有企业深化产…     

督查何以发生:一个组织学的分析框架北大核心CSSCISSCI

督查机制的激活已成为近年来国家治理实践的显著性特征,其启动频率、组织规格及运作范围均超越以往。督查何以发生?何以在特定治理场域发生?何以在特定时段发生?基于委托-代理理论的组织学视角,构建一个分析框架,尝试从功能、场域及时间三维度考察督查机制的发生逻辑。在复杂的治理情境下,制度环境、控制成本与治理变迁共同构成了督查的重要解释因素。最后对督查机制的功能、局限性及政策意蕴做了进一步讨论。     

社会养老服务供给主体间关系解析--基于委托代理理论的视角

人口老龄化趋势迫使我国养老服务体系建设的步伐不断加快,养老服务供给模式由家庭养老逐渐向社会养老转变,供给格局由分散化、封闭性向互动合作转变.以委托代理理论为分析框架,应对社会养老服务委托代理关系面临的困境,可从厘清主体间责任关系、健全激励机制和问责机制、嵌入信任关系、多方增权与协同治理等方面优化社会养老服务供给关系.     

Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union

This paper examines discriminatory membership in the European Union from a game-theoretical perspective. I argue that discriminatory membership enables the enlargement of international organizations with heterogenous member states. EU members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected EU members as to render expansion pareto-efficient. The empirical findings of a probit analysis on the EU accession negotiations and outcomes of all five EU enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim. The EU grants acceding states restricted membership rights if distributional conflicts emerge. Moreover, the candidate’s bargaining power and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes influence the enlargement outcomes.     

多维视角下的国际非政府组织

国际社会活跃着大量不同类型的国际非政府组织,而目前只有为数不多且限于从事赈灾扶贫、文化教育、卫生和环保等领域工作的国际非政府组织允许进入我国。持续的对外开放将会有更多的国际非政府组织进入中国,部分国际非政府组织有可能给中国带来非传统安全威胁,但更多的组织能起到信息沟通和协调作用。国际非政府组织所强调的公平与正义价值观对于构建和谐社会有一定的启迪和促进作用,而国际非政府组织与中国本土非政府组织的互动将极大地影响到后者的发展趋势。应充分了解国际非政府组织的特性,在合理利用其观念和资金的同时,尽可能地把它们所带来的负面影响减少到最低程度。     

Who participates in global environmental governance? Partial answers from international relations theory

An important current of research in international environmental affairsdeals with the roles of non-state actors in international environmentalgovernance. For many, the growing influence of non-state actors is a welcometrend because these actors, especially non-governmental organizations,facilitate environmental negotiations between states and perform keyinformation-gathering, dissemination, advocacy, and appraisal functions thatstates are either unwilling or unable to do. For the student of internationalrelations (IR), examining the roles and responsibilities of non-state actorsin global environmental affairs is a departure from the ordinary concern ofthat field – namely, the study of interstate behavior. But for the studyof global environmental problems, particularly those problems that aresimultaneously global and local, the investigator must map the influence ofan even broader assemblage of actors. Little is known about how local levelinstitutions or ordinary citizens fit into global environmental policyprocesses. Understanding what motivates public demands for globalenvironmental quality is an especially important research task, especially forthose pervasive environmental problems like global climate change and complexexhortations like sustainable development that require the attention andacquiescence of ordinary citizens.     

Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?

Abstract

This essay argues that the new global regime of R2P bifurcates the international system between sovereign states whose citizens have political rights, and de facto trusteeship territories whose populations are seen as wards in need of external protection. Under the direction of the UN Security Council, the International Criminal Court has become an integral part of the international R2P regime by allowing for the legal normalization of certain types of violence (such as Western counterinsurgency efforts), while arbitrarily criminalizing the violence of other states as ‘genocide’. In place of this unequal global regime, the essay concludes by arguing for an internally-driven process of political reform and legal reconciliation, as pioneered in South Africa.     

Representation beyond people: Lobbying access of umbrella associations to legislatures and the media

Lobbying access to policy discussions determines how political interests are voiced and potentially exert influence. This article addresses whether access to the national legislature and the media favors umbrella organizations, which represent interests of their member groups. It theorizes that the role of umbrellas goes beyond signaling a large individual membership or constituency of people, but that umbrellas are distinct in transmitting interests from other organizations. This function is expected to be valuable in exchanges with legislators who seek efficiency, input legitimacy, and policy implementation, but less valuable in the media arena. Using a new data set on lobbying by 286 groups on 12 issues in the United Kingdom and Germany, the article serves support for this theory: Umbrellas enjoy higher legislative access, but lower media access than groups without member organizations, irrespective of their individual membership or claimed constituency. The findings have implications for how we understand and study political representation.     

Making sense of the legal and judicial architectures of regional trade agreements worldwide

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) constitute one of the most important elements of the international economic order. Researchers have accordingly embarked on comparative analyses of their design. Yet one fundamental question remains unanswered: how have officials in different RTAs responded to the challenge of regulatory misalignments among the member states? In this article, I turn to 10 of the most established RTAs in the world and document three types of responses. Some RTAs rely on the principle of mutual recognition or references to existing international standards; the same agreements also rely on technical dispute resolution mechanisms. Other RTAs, by contrast, make use of extensive harmonization and permanent courts charged with interpreting law. Yet a third group exhibits a hybrid design. This heterogeneity in legislative and judicial design invites explanation. I show that there is a remarkable correspondence between the legal traditions of the member states (common vs. civil law) and the design of RTAs. This correspondence undermines the claims of world polity theorists about the nature of the international order, but is consistent with other strands of sociological institutionalism and certain elements of rationalist and neoliberal institutionalism. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of different RTA designs for the regulation of everyday life in the member states, the World Trade Organization as an international regulatory body, and national sovereignty and democracy.     

The Monitoring Capacity of Civil Society Networks: A Social Network Analysis in the Case of Gender Equality Policy

The role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as a watchdog in the implementation process is widely acknowledged. However, little is known about what determines their capacity to monitor EU policy implementation and how it differs across member states. This article accounts for social capital as well as human and financial capital to determine the monitoring capacity of CSOs. To capture sources of social capital, a network analysis is applied in a comparative case article on the monitoring networks of national platforms of the European Women’s Lobby across eight EU member states. The analysis reveals that CSOs in western member states are rich in human, financial and social capital, while CSOs in CEE member states compensate for this lack of resources by linking up with the Commission.     

Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis

The analysis covers 27 international organizations in the years 1950–2001. From the first to the last year, staff increased at a compound average rate of 3.2% per annum, while the number of member states rose by only 2.5%. The pooled analysis of 817 observations (including task proxies and organization dummies) reveals that (i) the elasticity of staff to membership is much larger than unity (1.36), (ii) United Nations organizations have significantly more staff, (iii) international organizations in the United States and Switzerland have significantly less staff, (iv) heterogeneity in terms of per capita income limits the size of an international organization and that (v) its staff is larger if its membership comprises many industrial or (former) communist countries. In a reduced sample, the financing share of the largest contributor in combination with the party or programmatic orientation of its government has a significantly negative effect on staff because the size of the largest financing share determines the incentive to monitor. U.S. exit from an international organization reduces its staff significantly. Most of these results depend on the condition that the non-stationary component of staff size is not taken account of by time dummies or trends.     

Defending the European court of human rights: Experimental evidence from Britain

As nationalist sentiments gain traction globally, the attitudinal and institutional foundations of the international liberal order face new challenges. One manifestation of this trend is the growing backlash against international courts. Defenders of the liberal order struggle to articulate compelling reasons for why states, and their citizens, should continue delegating authority to international institutions. This article probes the effectiveness of arguments that emphasise the appropriateness and benefits of cooperation in containing preferences for backlash among the mass public. We rely on IR theories that explain why elites create international institutions to derive three sets of arguments that could be deployed to boost support for international courts. We then use experimental methods to test their impact on support for backlash against the European Court of Human Rights in Britain (ECtHR). First, in line with principal-agent models of delegation, we find that information about the court's reliability as an ‘agent’ boosts support for the ECtHR, but less so information that signals Britain's status as a principal. Second, in line with constructivist approaches, associating support for the court with the position of an in-group state like Denmark, and opposition with an out-group state like Russia, also elicits more positive attitudes. This finding points to the importance of ‘blame by association’ and cues of in/out-group identity in building support for cooperation. The effect is stronger when we increase social pressure by providing information about social attitudes towards Denmark and Russia in Britain, where the public overwhelmingly trusts the Danes and distrusts the Russians. Finally, in contrast to Liberal explanations for the creation of the ECtHR, the study finds no evidence that highlighting the court's mission to promote democracy and international peace contains backlash. We show that the positive effects of the first two arguments are not driven by pre-treatment attitudes such as political sophistication, patriotism, internationalism, institutional trust or political preferences.     

The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations

Scholars have long argued that international organizations solve information problems through increased transparency. This article introduces a distinct problem that instead requires such institutions to keep information secret. We argue that states often seek to reveal intelligence about other states' violations of international rules and laws but are deterred by concerns about revealing the sources and methods used to collect it. Properly equipped international organizations, however, can mitigate these dilemmas by analyzing and acting on sensitive information while protecting it from wide dissemination. Using new data on intelligence disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency and an analysis of the full universe of nuclear proliferation cases, we demonstrate that strengthening the agency's intelligence protection capabilities led to greater intelligence sharing and fewer suspected nuclear facilities. However, our theory suggests that this solution gives informed states a subtle form of influence and is in tension with the normative goal of international transparency.