行政裁量与判断过程审查方式

本文以探究行政裁量的司法审查方式为目的,结合我国的判例材料,对日本的"判断过程审查方式"进行考察.判断过程审查方式立足于"行政裁量等于法律的程序性实体拘束"这一行政裁量观念(发展了的裁量一元论),对行政裁量进行程序性实体审查.它作为"行政裁量问题的大陆法范武",对我国构建行政裁量论具有重要的参考意义.     

行政协议实质标准的判断方式——最高人民法院行政协议典型案例第1号评析

行政协议案件典型案例第一号大英县永佳纸业有限公司案对行政协议实质标准提出了新的判断方式,最高院认为,所有要素中,是否行使行政职权、履行行政职责是本质要素,目的 要素是判断是否行使行政职权的辅助要素.对"行使行政职权"的判断,是以行政机关具有作出单方行政行为的法定职权为依据的,行政协议是对单方行政行为的替代.当行政协议订...     

作为过程的行政决策——在一种新研究范式下的考察

行政决策是一种重要的行政活动,传统行政法学研究范式因没有对法律效果的形成过程予以足够的关注,显现出行政决策研究的不足。按照"行政过程论"的研究范式,行政决策可以被定性为以动态方式实现行政目的、具有独立价值的"一般性制度",进而将其纳入法治的考量范围。对其实体规制主要体现在对行政决策的法律依据和法律意义的考察;而程序规制应以"行政参与"与"行政公开"理念为核心,并辅之以其他相关程序制度规则,形成一套完善的程序规则体系。     

目前我国行政立法监督机制研究

很长一段时间,我国没有统一的行政立法程序,行政机关一般都按照自己制定的程序进行行政立法.我国目前没有统一的监督行政立法的法律规定,只是通过批准和备案两种监督方式对行政立法进行监督,除此之外.再没有"事前"和"事后"的监督措施,我国目前也还没有建立对行政立法的司法审查制度.因此,我们有必要对目前我国行政立法监督机制进行探讨.     

浅析管理信息系统对现代政府的影响与要求

管理信息化是当代社会的显著特点,管理信息系统是管理信息化的主要内容和具体表现形式.政府管理信息系统的发展对诸如行政管理方式、行政组织、行政人员、行政决策、行政效率将产生深远的影响;同时也对现代政府提出了更高的要求,要求政府全面提高行政人员的信息意识,转变政府信息工作职能,注重培养高素质的"复合型"信息人才,实现政府工作程序化、简化、量化和现代化.     

论“社会权”的给付行政保障

"社会权"系与"个人自由权"相对应的新兴人权,是当代"福利国家"人权的重要内容。"社会权"的国家保障在行政领域主要体现为给付行政。给付行政行为作为一项授益性行政行为,体现为"国家生存照顾"之积极义务,其范畴涉及提供基础设施之行政、社会行政、促进(助长)行政、资讯行政等领域。给付行政行为适用"重大事项保留"原则,主要通过公法和私法协力的方式实施。     

“有奖发票”法律性质之探析

"有奖发票"是我国税收征收管理的一种新方式,因此,"有奖发票"的法律性质尚未明确。"有奖发票"是行政行为,而非民事行为;"有奖发票"不同于行政奖励,是行政指导行为,税务机关的兑奖行为属于行政事实行为。明确其法律性质对于行政相对人权益的保护是重要的。     

行政行为公定力的内涵与类型化分析

公定力是行政行为独有的效力,行政行为公定力是行政行为做出机关对行政行为作出的有效性评价。行政行为公定力具有推定性、对世性、抽象性、恒定性、否定方式的法定性等特点。行政行为公定力范围应当采用"有限公定力说"。负担行政处分是行政行为公定力的研究基点,授益行政处分也具有公定力,抽象行政行为和准行政行为不具有公定力。无效行政行为因为行政相对人行使宪法上的抵抗权而不具有公定力,一般违法行政行为不具备抵抗权行使的条件,因而具有公定力。     

论行政相对人义务之认赎

执法方式的改进和创新是我国法治政府及和谐社会建设的迫切要求。认赎是一种全新的执法方式,透射出鲜明的时代精神,彰显"以人为本"的执法理念。表现在当行政相对人履行义务发生客观困难时,可用其他相同的义务赎抵或替换原义务的履行,但有严格的限制。前提是该义务具有可替换性,且基于行政相对人自愿主动提出,行政主体为实现行政目的,在法定职权范围内依据一定程序对该申请予以认诺作出。     

论作为行政执行罚的“加处罚款”——基于《中华人民共和国行政强制法》

《行政强制法》第12条和第45条不仅将"加处罚款"设定为行政执行罚方式之一,而且对它作了普遍性授权。但"加处罚款"在法律文本和实务操作中不易与作为行政处罚的"罚款"相区别,同时也不易与同属于间接强制执行方式的征收"滞纳金"相区分。加之在《行政处罚法》首次使用"加处罚款"之后的不少法律法规所设定的"罚款",恰恰介于作为行政处罚的"罚款"与作为行政执行罚的"加处罚款"之间,使得《行政强制法》上的"加处罚款"面临理论上的定位选择。除了定位上的问题,还有诸如"加处罚款"本身的罚款额标准,对加处的"罚款"如何征收,以及行政相对人对行政机关的"加处罚款"决定不服如何救济等问题,都值得探讨。     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ayam aham asmīti</Emphasis>: Self-consciousness and Identity in the Eighth Chapter of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Chāndogya Upanişad</Emphasis> vs. Śankara’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Bhāşya</Emphasis>

The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara’s bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read through Śan-kara’s Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary but will also reveal an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of ‘dreamless sleep’ and ‘transcendental consciousness’. Suşupti is described here as ‘one step too far’, as a ‘break’ or discontinuity in one’s consciousness; whereas turīya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is no ‘world’ nor ‘me’, and which is described through Indra’s character as ‘total destruction’ (vināśa); in turīya, the world ‘comes back’, or rather the ‘renouncer’ returns to the world. Sankara’s position, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with ‘coming back to the world’, since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages’. The article is dedicated to Prof. Daya Krishna (1924-2007).     

The law and the sublime: Rethinking the self and its boundaries

Christine Battersby has argued that it is Kant (and not Descartes) who provides the paradigm model of what it is to be a self in modernity. The Kantian self is established in opposition to its other. The body is commonly envisaged as a container, with selfhood as something that is defended against the outside. In contrast, she proposes a feminist reworking of such a model of selfhood, applicable to both men and women, in which the self and other emerge over time through patterns of relationality. This paper introduces Battersby’s work by focusing upon her early analysis of Kantian aesthetics, in particular the sublime. The aim is to draw out some of the legal and political implications of her work, particularly with regard to the common law’s developing conception of privacy. This is carried out by distinguishing her ontological position from the psychology of Carol Gilligan and then by considering the overlapping concerns of Jennifer Nedelsky in the area of legal theory.

Credit card fraud under Chinese criminal law

Credit card fraud is a new type of fraud amended into the Criminal Law of China in 1997. The “credit card” under credit card fraud is interpreted as a very board concept, which includes debit card and virtually all electronic payment cards used in ordinary payment, credit loan, transfer and settlement of account, cash deposit and withdrawal. Therefore, it is necessary for the legislature to revise “credit card” under this special fraud into “electronic payment card,” and “credit card fraud” into “electronic payment card fraud,” which will be understood easily and precisely. “Use” and “fraudulent use” of credit card under this fraud is defined as ordinary use of credit card, including withdrawal cash with authentic or forged credit card from ATMs. It is unreasonable to define “malicious overdraft” as a form of credit card fraud under the Chinese Criminal Law. In the future amendment, this kind of criminal conduct shall be separated as independent named as “malicious overdraft” or “abuse of credit card” under the Criminal Law with less stiff statutory punishment than that of credit card fraud. Besides, under the Chinese Criminal Law, stealing credit card and using it is held as “theft,” which is neither reasonable nor logical. Therefore, it should be revised in the future criminal law.     

Hans Kelsen's Normativist Reductionism

Abstract. This paper discusses Kelsen's attempt at reducing the concept of subjektives Recht (what is subjectively right) to that of objektives Recht (what is objectively right). This attempt fails, it is argued, because in Kelsen's theory the concept of subjektives Recht survives concealed within the concept of individual norm (individuelle Norm), a norm that, pace Kelsen, is not a case of what is objectively right (objektives Recht) but is precisely what is subjectively right (subjektives Recht): We could call it “what is individually right.”     

Rethinking the presumption of innocence

This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable.

Craniometric analysis of the modern Cretan population

Despite the fact that sex assessment using craniofacial characteristics is commonly made worldwide, a lack of such investigation is noted in the Balkan area and in Greece in particular. The aim of this study is to develop a sex determination technique using osteometric data from skeletal remains of a contemporary Cretan cemetery population.A total of 90 males and 88 females are measured according to standard osteometric techniques. Age differences are not significant (mean age for men = 68.94 ± 13.41, N = 66; for women = 73.21 ± 16.77, N = 66). A total of 16 dimensions taken from the craniofacial skeleton are used and data are analyzed using SPSS subroutines. A comparison is made with other contemporary populations, including Americans (Terry collection) and South Africans (Dart and Pretoria collections), as well as an archaeological sample (Middle and Late Helladic) from Crete.Results indicate that males are statistically significantly greater than females in all dimensions. Bizygomatic breadth is the most discriminatory single dimension and can provide an accuracy rate of 82% on average. Using a stepwise method involving five dimensions (bizygomatic breadth, cranial length, nasion–prosthion and mastoid height and nasal breadth), accuracy is raised to 88.2%. Interestingly, cranial length is selected as the first discriminating variable by the stepwise analysis when only the neurocranium is available for measurement.     

Finding cover: Legal trauma and how to take care of it

As law originates in violence, it is always haunted by its constitutive trauma. Recourse to law's origin, which is implicitly or explicitly sought in (constitutional) adjudication, thus requires a way to deal with law's trauma. What is needed is a cover, to be provided through (legal) interpretation. Four such interpretive ‘cover up’ operations, all necessarily somewhat duplicitous, are discussed. The first three represent main currents in legal theory. First, the standard legal view, which denies the trauma but relies on traditional authority to cover it. Second, a ‘neurotic’ solution, in which trauma is also denied but nevertheless cover is produced through collective interpretation. In the third, ‘perverse’ solution, trauma is admitted, and even enjoyed; on the other hand, it is denied that cover can be produced by any interpretive authority. The fourth option provides an alternative: recognition of law's trauma, covering it through the collectively shared practice of interpretation. It is shown that an example of such a collective effort can be found in the Dutch practice of gedogen, the deliberate under-enforcement of law, which is capable of creating an ‘informal rule of law’ that deals with intractable social problems more successfully than attempts formally to enforce applicable law. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Some technological implications for ascertaining the contents of contracts in web-based transactions

This paper points out some unexpected relationships between specific aspects of contract law and specific Internet-related technologies. The discussion is not about the interplay between “Law” and “Technology,” or the “Law” and the “Internet.” The aim is modest: to identify some theoretical chokepoints created by the technologies involved in web-based commerce and to point out the legal uncertainties persisting in this area. The analysis is confined to the process of contract formation, not to matters of substantive law. It is during this process that parties assume their contractual obligations and the contents of a contract crystallize.     

The Problem with Pretending: Rāmānuja’s Arguments Against <Emphasis Type="Italic">Jīvanmukti</Emphasis>

In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve.