Toleration without Liberal Foundations

The author's aim is to find principles grounding and limiting toleration that are sufficiently sensitive to the variety of distinct settings in which concrete problems arise, and to produce principles which can appeal both to liberals and to non-liberals. The range of settings is covered by fixing the nature of three distinct species of the genus right to toleration. Once these rights are analysed, an attempt is made to see what agreement about them can be reached by liberals and non-liberals if they have a common commitment to democracy. A definition of democracy is produced that, it is argued, liberals and non-liberals would have difficulty rejecting. It is then explored as a definition that has definite consequences over the three rights to toleration, putting the opponents before a choice: either to accept their preferred content for the right to toleration, or to support a democratic policy.     

Some Remarks on the Concept of Toleration

The paper contains a conceptual analysis of "act of toleration" and the property of "being tolerant". Being tolerant is understood as a dispositional property of persons manifested in what the author calls the "circumstances of toleration". The main circumstances distinguished are: a tendency to prohibit a certain behaviour and the competence to determine the deontic status of the behaviour in question. An act of toleration, then, consists in not prohibiting (or cancelling the prohibition of) that behaviour. It is argued that this requires the existence of two different normative systems, the "basic system", and the "justifying system". Acts of toleration must be based on reasons coming from the latter. This insight enables one to establish a difference between reasonable and unreasonable toleration, as well as between toleration and related concepts like indifference, acquiescence, etc. The analysis also introduces the distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal" toleration. Acceptance of this last category implies that toleration does not necessarily require hierarchical relationships between those who tolerate and those whose actions are tolerated.     

Toleration and the Law in the West 1500–1700

Before the emergence of the concept of individual rights, in the eighteenth century, toleration was conceded by states only to the corporations that constituted the state. Many states that, like France after the Edict of Nantes, conceded a form of toleration, did so without accepting the principle of toleration. The recognition or toleration of rights for individuals first became possible only in a wholly secularised society such as that of colonial north America.     

Tolerance and War: The Real Meaning of an Irreconcilability

Starting from the distinction between concept and conception, the author proposes a pluralistic view of toleration focussed on the equality of individuals and cultures and on legal-rational control of social relationship. Analyzing the basic marks of toleration (toleration and power, the costs of toleration, toleration and value) the author shows how the option for toleration is a choice for subjecting social relations to reason and rules (law) instead of passions and violence (war).     

Contemporary Pluralism and Toleration

The author outlines a conception of toleration as recognition of differences which she argues to be more adequate than current liberal views in order to face issues arising from contemporary pluralism. The liberal conception of toleration as freedom from government's interference in certain areas is appropriate if pluralism is conceived of as a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. By contrast, if pluralism is understood as the plurality of groups and cultures, asymmetrically situated in democratic society, then the issues underlying toleration are seen as the contested claim of minorities for asserting their different identity in the public space. Public toleration of differences is thus viewed as a symbolic public gesture of inclusion of the different identities and their bearers into democratic citizenship on an equal footing as members of minority groups. The argument supporting public toleration is so founded on reason of justice.     

Tolerance of the Intolerant?

In the first part of the essay, the author analyzes the difference and the relation between two different ideas of toleration, the passive and the active meaning. While the former is related to opportunistic and prudential purposes, the second is grounded in an ethical framework and presupposes the individual's freedom of conscience. This second meaning appears to be very important in a multicultural society: On its basis it is possible to develop toleration both as a plurality of contexts of choice and as a priority rule between conscience and culture in Rawlsian terms. In the second part, starting from the case of O. Preminger Institut v. Austria , the author examines the relation between this idea of toleration and freedom of speech.     

Toleration, Liberalism and Democracy: A Comment on Leader and Garzón Valdés

Leader and Garzón Valdés are correct to link toleration to democracy rather than liberalism. However, it is the democratic character of society and the process of democratic decision-making that give rise to a genuine practice of tolerance, not an abstract and regulative ideal of democracy, such as they appeal to. Whereas the latter approach collapses into the standard liberal accounts of toleration both rightly find wanting, the former fits with a republican notion of deliberative democracy. This perspective corresponds to the circumstances of toleration and promotes tolerance as a virtue that is intrinsic both to the nature of democratic debate and to the securing of uncoerced agreement amongst people possessing different beliefs and values. As such, it proves more compatible with pluralism, and hence with toleration, than liberalism.     

物权立法中七个疑难问题之我见

我国未来物权法,对于不动产登记簿的开放对象应当有所限制,但对于开放内容不应有所限制;物权人的返还原物请求权不应当适用诉讼时效;应当建立取得时效制度,并应区分一般动产、准不动产、未登记不动产而规定不同的成立条件;在动产的转让人为无权处分而受让人为善意的情况下,转让人与受让人之间的合同是否有效不应当以"无权处分"为条件,只有在转让合同无效的情形下,受让人取得标的物的所有权才是依善意取得制度的取得,此时的取得是原始取得;在共同共有的情形下,原则上处分共有物应当经共有人全体一致同意,但应容有若干例外;不应当规定居住权;动产抵押的公示方式问题无法彻底解决,如果规定动产抵押,应当实行登记要件主义,适于烙印、打刻或贴标签的动产,应当采取烙印、打刻或贴标签的方式,其他无法解决公示方式的动产应当禁止抵押;主债权履行期届满后,抵押权人行使抵押权,原则上不应当有一个时间限制,但抵押人非为债务人时可容有例外;在债务人不偿债时,抵押权人不能直接让抵押人交出抵押物,实现抵押权,但可以持抵押权登记簿副本直接申请法院拍卖抵押物.     

The Role of Perceived Deservingness in the Toleration of Human Rights Violations

Based on evidence that people have a strong need to see that individuals get what they deserve, we reasoned that people will tolerate a human rights violation to the extent that they believe the target of the violation deserves severe treatment. Thus, we expected that variables that influence the perceived deservingness of a target (i.e., “contextual cues” to deservingness) should influence toleration of a violation of the target’s rights, mediated by perceptions of the target’s deservingness. We also expected that the effect of a contextual cue to targets’ deservingness on toleration should occur even for people who support the violated right in the abstract. Across two studies, using student versus community samples, we measured participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment. We then presented participants with scenarios about a target who was tortured (a violation of the right to humane treatment), and manipulated a contextual cue to the targets’ deservingness for severe treatment—the moral reprehensibility of the targets’ past behavior. Participants tolerated a target’s torture more if he had engaged in highly morally reprehensible (vs. less reprehensible) behavior and, thus, was perceived to deserve more severe treatment. Participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment did not moderate the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration. Our findings highlight the importance of perceived deservingness in the toleration of human rights violations and have implications for reducing such toleration. Our research also extends literature on deservingness to an important global issue.     

The Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World

The author identifies four possible attitudes of tolerance toward groups with different ways of life: resignation, indifference, curiosity and enthusiasm. He explores the potential for these attitudes and concludes by discussing the role of boundaries within communities in modernism and postmodernism. The author is not going to focus on toleration of eccentric or dissident individuals in civil society; he is interested in individual rights primarily when they are exercised in common—in the course of voluntary association or religious worship or cultural elaboration—or when they are claimed by groups on behalf of their members.     

Pierre Bayle, the Rights of the Conscience, the "Remedy" of Toleration

Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) is often considered one of the staunchest defenders of toleration, especially in the domain of religion. His Commentaire philosophique , published in 1686, one year after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, argued for a broad idea of toleration, to be extended with no exceptions to all sects and religions. However, his thought can hardly be reduced to an exaltation of the "rights of the conscience," for he realized very soon that such an exaltation risks bringing forth religious fanatism, which in turn is the cause of religious wars and acts of violence. Toleration, in these conditions, is only a political remedy for the sickness of the human mind.     

Why Tolerate Conscience?

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.     

Democracy: A Convergent Value? Comments on Sheldon Leader and Ernesto Garzón Valdés

In this paper, the author contends that Leader's attempt to ground the value of toleration on a common understanding of democracy faces a number of fundamental obstacles. Such obstacles could only be overcome if both liberals and their opponents were to reach an agreement on the value of democracy and thereby converge in their support of toleration. The author shows that far from providing a common ground that liberals and their opponents can share, the so-called "shareable understanding" of democracy appeals primarily to liberals. The author also argues that Garzón Valdés's thesis that democracy is the system best suited to the flourishing of toleration faces the same kind of difficulty, namely, that not every group in a liberal constitutional regime can be convinced of the priority of democratic principles over their other fundamental value-commitments.     

Multiculturalism

In rejecting the liberal claim to the universality of morals, some contemporary philosophers insist on the danger of reducing the human being to an abstraction. This paper goes beyond this debate. The theoretical core of multiculturalism is the recognition that these universalistic claims can be realised in different ways in different cultures, so as to require a re-conception of the liberal thesis of the well-being and dignity of people. This interpretation of morality cannot be understood within the ideology of nationalism. Replacing nationalism as the common bond of society is thus one of the main political challenges facing multiculturalism. However, any specific policy must presuppose a new social sensitivity: Societies are not made up of majorities and minorities, but of a plurality of cultural groups. This is why the notion of toleration is not enough. 1 Abstract by Antonio Rotolo.
     

Political Journals in Germany

Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries possessed a wealth of monthly political journals. The period after the Second World War saw a renaissance of monthly journals, which offered orientation to a populace disoriented by National Socialism and war. Today there is a limited number of monthly political journals and their total circulation does not exceed 100,000. But their readership constitutes the small group of citizens who take an interest in politics and in political discourse. Their quantitative influence cannot be measured, their qualitative influence cannot be overestimated. The article focuses mainly on the magazines Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte and Die Politische Meinung. The former is supported by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the latter by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.     

Toleration and Recognition

The author asks: Is there a case for redefining toleration as the recognition of excluded identities? He is inclined to answer no. Liberal democratic states, should of course recognise disfavoured groups by registering the normality of their members and the justice of their claims but must resist recognition in any stronger sense. Appropriate recognition consists in confronting the live contemporary issues of exclusion and of ethnic and national injustice by compensatory policies and constitutional innovations.     

INFORMAL CONTROL AND ILLICIT DRUG TRADE*

Antidrug legislation and enforcement are meant to reduce the trade in illegal drugs by increasing their price. Yet the unintended consequence is an increase in informal control—including retaliation, negotiation, avoidance, and toleration—among drug users and dealers. Little existing theory or research has explored the connections between informal control and drug trading. This article uses the rational choice and opportunity perspectives to explore the question: How and why does the frequency and seriousness of popular justice—as a whole or for each form—affect the price and rate of drug sales? The proposed theory is grounded on and illustrated with qualitative data obtained from drug dealers. This article concludes by discussing the scholarly and policy implications.     

Locke on Toleration and Inclusion

As the product of liberalism's first encounter with the theoretical problems posed by legal discrimination and unequal treatment of minority groups, Locke's argument for religious toleration foreshadowed contemporary democratic theory's emphasis on non‐coercive discussion of diverse rights claims and broadly inclusive public deliberations. This study tries to illuminate the democratic dimension of Locke's toleration theory by focusing on his crucial account of the church as a voluntary association. Here Locke presented discursive possibilities for the articulation of diverse beliefs and interests that he believed would not only benefit both society as a whole and the minority religious groups contained in it, but also weave principles of contestation and deliberation into the very fabric of the liberal polity.     

Exorcising excision: medico-legal issues arising from male and female genital surgery in Australia

Genital surgery is one of the most controversial and contested practices, yet it is frequently described and referred to with little or no attention to cultural and social context. This article examines the practice, performed on both men and women, and the extent to which it clashes with issues of consent and capacity, as well as multicultural concepts of toleration for minority group practices. It then questions why female genital surgery, unlike male genital surgery, is legally prohibited in Australia. It argues that such legal gender bias stems from a liberal conception of "tolerance" and the limits of consent in Australia, placing female genital surgery in an "unacceptable" category and male genital surgery in an "acceptable" category.     

Understanding intra-family inequalities: The Montes de Pas,Spain, 1700–1900

This article deals with the family organization of labor in a peasant community in Northern Spain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It uses this case study to review some of the assumptions with which peasant family history is being written, namely, the idea that from historical evidence of family members “working together,” a vision of families as cooperative, i.e., egalitarian units, can be deduced. Contrary to this idea, the article argues that coresidence cannot be taken as an indicator of equal economic status for all family members. The article proposes a method to identify inequalities between family members, based on a comparison between each member's working contribution to the household and access to family resources, including income generated by each member's own work.