The Morality of Lying and the Murderer at the Door

Law and Philosophy - The article engages with some of the main claims in chapter 1 of Seana Shiffrin’s book Speech Matters. There, Shiffrin sets out a case for a general moral prohibition on...     

Is Sincerity the First Virtue of Social Institutions? Police,Universities, and Free Speech

In the final chapter of Speech Matters, Seana Shiffrin argues that institutions have especially stringent duties to protect speech freedoms. In this article, I develop a few lines of criticism. First, I question whether Shiffrin’s framework of justified suspended contexts is appropriate for institutional settings. Second, I challenge the presumption that the knowledge-gathering function performed by police is necessarily compromised by insincere practices. Third, I criticize Shiffrin’s characterization of the university as involving a complete repudiation of enforced consensus, and I express doubts about the close connection between education and democratic legitimation that Shiffrin endorses. Finally, I raise a problem with the book’s overall argument: even if one agrees that speech freedoms are necessary for moral development, they also may be threatening to moral development. The upshot is that the protection of speech should be modulated in order to account for the potential conflicts between sincerity and other valuable ends, rather than being oriented above all to sincerity.

     

Lying as a Political Wrong

Law and Philosophy - In Speech Matters, Seana Shiffrin claims that certain lies should be tolerated on grounds of political inclusiveness. If political equality requires perfect compliance with...     

Business Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: Exploring the Global Criminalisation of Business Cartels

Over the last dozen years or so there has been a burgeoning of criminal law for purposes of dealing with business cartels in a number of jurisdictions (for instance, the new ‘cartel offence’ introduced under the Enterprise Act 2002 in the UK). The discussion here provides first of all some account of this process of criminalisation, mapping it in terms of jurisdictions and the legal character of this category of cartel offending. It then seeks to explain and account for the phenomenon and more particularly to determine the extent to which it may be seen either as an element of more forceful prosecution strategy, or alternatively as a sea-change in moral perception and evaluation. Put another way, is this a development led by legal policy, or a genuine shift in outlook, which has produced a new legal policy? It will be argued finally that, in a more pragmatic perspective, the success of the criminalisation project in any case depends on the emergence of a genuine sense of ‘hard core’ delinquency, without which effective regulation by means of criminal law is unlikely to be achieved. In this respect, a manufactured sense of moral censure, fostered by prosecutors to facilitate leniency programmes, may (outside the US) eventually prove to be a point of vulnerability in such strategies.     

Provisional concepts and definitions of fact

The paper explains and differentiates the concept of ‘fact’ in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct may be questions of law. Issues of fact and opinion, fact and comment, relative to freedom of speech, defamation etc: no clear distinction available. Legal problems concerning absence of workable distinctions.

     

Hate Speech and the Epistemology of Justice

In ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ Waldron’s most interesting and ground-breaking contribution lies in a distinctive epistemological role he assigns to hate speech legislation: it is necessary for assurance of justice, and thus for justice itself. He regards public social recognition of what is owed to citizens as a public good, contributing to basic dignity and social standing of citizens. His claim that hate speech in the public social environment damages assurance of justice has wider implications, I argue: for hate speech conducted in private; for pornography; and indeed for any speech that thwarts knowledge of what justice requires.     

法律与道德：正义的法哲学及其发展——以瑞特纳帕拉法学思想研究为核心

正义的概念和范畴,在持不同理论立场的思想家眼中呈现出不同的样态,引发了人们对正义是否是一个值得法理学研究的对象这一问题的深刻思考。瑞特纳帕拉(Suri Ratnapala)通过对法律是什么、为何以及如何遵守法律的法哲学演进的梳理和追问,独创性地区分"依法的正义"和"法律的正义"两种概念,对于法律与道德以及正义的法哲学内核做出了当代诠释和发展。所谓"依法的正义",是指法律是实现正义的手段和工具;"法律的正义",则指特定法律的正义性或道德正当性。但是,只有个体间认知的耦合,才会导致关于正义行为的道德规则的汇聚和产生,因而正义的实现其实就是对以人类经验积累的方式得以建立的基本行为规范的遵守。不同正义理论的建构,旨在使我们共同走向一个美好的理想——运用法律手段建构一种适于人类生活和自由全面发展的社会秩序。     

Lying,Reciprocity, and Free Speech – A Reply to Eight Critics

Law and Philosophy - In this article, I reply to eight critics of my book Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law. The topics include lying, promising, reciprocity, free speech, and the...     

Lying,Speech and Impersonal Harm

Law and Philosophy - Should the law punish the mere utterance of lies even if the listener has not been deceived? Seana Shiffrin has recently answered this question in the affirmative. She argues...     

The Restricting Claims Principle Revisited: Grounding the Means Principle on the Agent–Patient Divide

In an earlier article, I introduced the “restricting claims principle” (RCP) to explain what is right about the means principle: the idea that it is harder to justify causing or allowing someone to suffer harm if using him as a means than if causing or allowing harm as a side effect. The RCP appeals to the idea that claims not to be harmed as a side effect push to restrict an agent from doing what she would otherwise be free to do for herself or others, given an appropriate account of her baseline freedom. Claims not to be harmed as a means are not in that way ‘‘restricting.’’ The original RCP relied on a counterfactual account of the agent’s baseline freedom: What could the agent permissibly do if the patient were not present? I argue here that that counterfactual baseline fails. The revised RCP relies instead on a ‘‘toolkit baseline’’: Do the patient claims concern the property the agent needs to use? This toolkit baseline reflects the different ways that agents relate to others: as fellow agents with whom they divide up the resources of the world, and as patients who might be affected by their actions. The toolkit baseline, resting on this agent-patient divide, provides a superior account of an agent’s baseline freedom, and a better account of the moral ground for the means principle     

The One-System View and Dworkin’s Anti-Archimedean Eliminativism

Many of Dworkin’s interlocutors saw his ‘one-system view’, according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law ‘properly’ belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin’s view can be understood as a version of ‘eliminativism’, a growing trend in legal philosophy.

     

The Origins of the ‘Nonmarket Economy’: Ideas,Pluralism & Power in EC Anti‐dumping Law about China

‘Market’ and ‘market economy’ exercise a powerful, even magnetic grip on our collective imagination. But what do we mean by ‘market economy’? Does it make sense to speak of a ‘nonmarket economy’, and if so, what does it mean? How are the ideas of ‘market economy’ and ‘nonmarket economy’ related? Focusing on EC anti‐dumping law, this article seeks to answer these questions. It argues that the legal concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law has been socially constructed, by means of relations among a plurality of institutional and normative sites, as part of a changing configuration of legal ideas in specific historical circumstances, and in contexts of political, economic, social, and symbolic power. This argument is articulated in three parts. First, the concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law, though drawing on earlier elements, had its main roots in the early Cold War. Second, starting in the 1960s, the GATT multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the game, but a variety of more localised processes played essential roles as forces of change. Of special importance were, first, the tension between legislative rules and administrative discretion in the United States, and, second, the Europeanisation of foreign trade law in the course of European integration. Third, the EC law concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ was born in the late 1970s. The main reasons were changes in the international anti‐dumping law repertoire, specific ideas in Europe about comparative economic systems, and the perceived emergence of new economic threats, including exports from China.     

The Limits of Critique and the Forces of Law

Three recent publications evidence a growing interest in critical jurisprudence with materiality, technology, affect and atmosphere. These approaches pose fundamental challenges to existing traditions within legal critique, spurning a focus on the ideology of legal reasoning and exploring instead the unique practices through which the law binds subjects through material, affective and atmospheric manipulations. Through either Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s ‘lawscape’ or Kyle McGee’s ‘jurimorphs’ these innovative theoretical projects pluralise the ‘forces’ which account for the law’s normativity, disavowing the notion that such forces can be reduced either to a transcendental form (like sovereignty) or to notions of structural or symbolic violence. These approaches address a ‘democratic deficit’ in legal philosophy that has generally excluded the realm of the material in its theorising and allows us to attend to the multiple forms that allow for the passage of law.     

Desperately Seeking ‘Justice’ in Classical Chinese: On the Meanings of Yi

This essay sets out to search for an equivalent Chinese word to the English word ‘justice’ in classical Chinese language, through ancient Chinese philosophical texts, imperial codes and idioms. The study found that there does not seem to be a linguistic sign for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, and further, yi resembles ‘justice’ in some ways and has been used sometimes to translate  ‘justice’, but yi is a complex concept in traditional Chinese philosophy with multiple meanings and it is dissimilar to ‘justice’ in their semantic and pragmatic meanings in Chinese and English legal culture. While ‘justice’ is a keyword and fundamental to Western law, yi is not a legal word or concept in classical Chinese in traditional China. Given its complexity, yi does not have a one-to-one equivalent in English. It sometimes carries a sense of ‘righteousness’ and occasionally ‘justice’, but yi and ‘justice’ are not equivalent. In view of these, it becomes understandable that the translations of yi in contemporary Chinese usage vary ranging from ‘friendship and justice’ to ‘greater good’, among others. The meaning of yi is still uncertain and context sensitive as it was two thousand years ago.

     

Beyond Otonomy, or Beyond the Law of Law's Ear

Can the relationship between law and literature be thought in terms of conversation? Can the law still ‘hear’ the voice of a writing that has come before it, yet outside the frame of the ‘hearing’ and the rules of ‘standing’? And when literature speaks, what does it say? Perhaps what the law has always known …     

Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair: the Influence of Scholastic Moral Theology on Stair's Account of Restitution and Recompense

This article examines the impact of scholastic moral theology on aspects of Stair's Institutions of the Laws of Scotland. It is argued that both Stair's general concept of justice and his account of the ‘obediential’ obligations of restitution and recompense were influenced by Aristotelian philosophy and Thomist moral theology. The complex interaction in Stair's thinking of Presbyterian religion, scholastic philosophy and a commitment to the rational natural law are sketched in order to shed light on the historical and cultural context within which he wrote. The result is a more complex picture of the influences which informed the writing of the Institutions.     

No way out: crime,punishment and the capitalization of power

The United States is often hailed as the world’s largest ‘free market’. But this ‘free market’ is also the world’s largest penal colony. It holds over seven million adults – roughly 5 % of the labour force – in jail, in prison, on parole and on probation. Is this an anomaly, or does the ‘free market’ require massive state punishment? Why did the correctional population start to rise in the 1980s, together with the onset of neoliberalism? How is this increase related to the upward redistribution of income and the capitalization of power? Can soaring incarceration sustain the unprecedented power of dominant capital, or is there a reversal in the offing? The paper examines these questions by juxtaposing the ‘Rusche thesis’ with the notion of capitalism as a mode of power. The empirical analysis raises an enigma: it suggests that the Rusche thesis holds under the normal circumstances of ‘business as usual’, but breaks down during periods of systemic crisis. During the systemic crises of the 1930s and the 2000s, unemployment increased sharply, but crime and the severity of punishment, instead of rising, dropped perceptibly.     

Gangs and governance in Russia: the paradox of law and lawlessness

ABSTRACT

The paper addresses the nature of gang governance. It questions the notion that gangs regulate social and economic transactions and create stable orders in certain territories. It shows that, while presenting themselves as upholders of the ‘law’ in their territory, the gangs also create a climate of uncertainty and fear. The gangs manipulate their own unwritten rules and set up traps for residents and businessmen. These traps are designed to deprive non-gang civilians of presumed rights and identities and extort their money. The paper uses Schmitt’s notion of ‘state of exception’ and Agamben’s idea of ‘bare life’ to explain how gangs function.     

Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart’s Account,and an Alternative Proposal

What is a social rule? This paper first notes three important problems for H.L.A. Hart’s famous answer in the Concept of Law. An alternative account that avoids the problems is then sketched. It is less individualistic than Hart’s and related accounts. This alternative account can explain a phenomenon observed but downplayed by Hart: the parties to a social rule feel that they are in some sense ‘bound’ to conform to it.

     

Responsive Adjudication and the ‘Social Legitimacy’ of the Internal Market

This article is concerned with the social legitimacy of EU free movement adjudication. What does social legitimacy entail within the multi‐level ‘embedded liberalism’ construction of the internal market? How can the objective of free movement (market access) and a commitment to social diversity both be pursued without one necessarily trumping the other? This article seeks to contribute to these questions on the basis of a discussion of what has come to be known as the argument from transnational effects and the development of an adjudicative model that can be termed ‘socially responsive’. On the basis of an ‘ideal types’ analysis of the case law of the Court, it is concluded that responsiveness to Member State social context is lacking in any coherent form in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, a responsive model of adjudication can be (re)constructed by streamlining the identified ideal type adjudicative rationales. In the midst of this process of discovery, an operational rationale to establish the substantive (social) scope and reach of the internal market shall be submitted.