Opening Pandora's Box: Protecting Children Against Torture or Cruel,Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment*

Children are rarely perceived as torture victims, although they may be easier targets. International inertia is compounded as not only torture, but also ‘other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ is prohibited. Some of these occur in the private sphere, which traditionalists erroneously assume outside of international human rights law. Children may also be unprotected because they suffer from trauma in different ways from adults. Jurisprudence of human rights fora based principally on adult victims, despite some dicta to the contrary, risks international standards being inappropriately applied to child victims. This promotes an analysis which fails to address the particular vulnerabilities of children and their role as social actors.     

Prohibition of Torture and Other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Some Remarks on the Operative Solutions at the European Level and their Effects on the Member States. The Case of Italy

This paper analyzes European measures against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in order to verify their effectiveness, especially in terms of the values that are actually being protected. First, it examines the distinction between the external and internal action of the European Union, highlighting ways in which the EU appears to be more attentive to combat practices of torture in third countries than to domestic incidents and the proposals to legalize torture made at a political level in some Member States. Then, it examines the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in the Cestaro versus Italy case, focusing specifically on the fact that Italy was in breach of its obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because the framework does not recognize torture as a crime and does not provide instruments of deterrence to effectively prevent the execution and the recurrence of such acts. Currently, the Italian Parliament is discussing a draft amendment to the Criminal Code and aims at introducing the concept of torture as a crime; however, in light of the comments made by the European Court of Human Rights, this project questions whether the proposed solution will be able to prevent a repeat of events similar to those that occurred in 2001 after the G8 Summit in Genoa.     

残忍、不人道和有辱人格的待遇或处罚：几组概念的辨明

由于残忍、不人道和有辱人格的待遇或处罚这些概念本身的抽象性,在各相关人权条约中都没有对其内涵和外延予以界定。欧洲人权法院和联合国人权事务委员会等人权条约机构通过个案对其中的行为性质或事件的严重程度作出判断,并综合考虑案件的各相关因素,如受害者年龄、性别、健康状况等。总的看来,其判断标准都要求所涉行为必须达到一定的严重程度,残忍、不人道和有辱人格三者之间是包容关系和严重程度上的递减关系。残忍的和不人道的待遇或处罚的构成要求存在主观上的故意,在客观上存在造成他人肉体或精神上遭受一定程度疼痛或痛苦的客观结果;有辱人格的待遇或处罚则不要求主观上的故意,但在客观方面要求存在相当程度的羞辱或贬低结果。显然,对严重程度的认定具有很强的主观性,裁判者的自由裁量权较大,但不能以此为由而抹杀禁止其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚的合理性。     

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment,Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber's judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment's profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.     

Adoption,Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: Gas and Dubois v France

On 15 March 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its first judgment addressing the differential treatment of same‐sex and opposite‐sex couples in respect of the adoption of a child. 1 The Court held that excluding same‐sex couples in civil partnerships, who have no legal right to marry, from adoption provisions available to married opposite‐sex couples does not violate rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). I argue that the Court's reasoning in Gas and Dubois v France is unpersuasive and unsustainable in light of its wider case law.     

分歧与共识:《残疾人权利公约》禁止非自愿收治?

各国精神卫生法的主要功能是对非自愿住院与治疗进行规制,而《联合国残疾人权利公约》要求完全废除非自愿收治制度。本文梳理了国际人权法如何处理精神障碍者权利,并分析了《残疾人权利公约》对非自愿收治问题的具体要求。本文也讨论了对全面禁止非自愿收治立场的批判,以及众多学者对此争议进行调和的努力,并指出发展非强制性精神卫生服务、减少非自愿收治的使用是激烈分歧中的共识,并以此增进对相关国际讨论的理解,为我国《精神卫生法》的研究与实践提供参考。     

Comparative Institutional Analysis,the European Court of Justice and the General Principle of Non‐Discrimination—or—Alternative Tales on Equality Reasoning

The general principle of equality in European law is often held to be inconsistently applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and insufficiently supported by methodology. Contrary to this assessment, this paper argues that there is substantial coherence and theoretical underpinning to the court's equality reasoning. First, it shows that the respective case‐law can be subdivided into three groups, depending on the level of scrutiny applied. Second, it establishes that the prevailing accounts have difficulty in explaining the court's choice of scrutiny due to their limited selection of analytical parameters. Third, it concludes that comparative institutional analysis offers an alternative framework to make the ECJ's testing approaches in equality matters more intelligible.     

Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?

This article compares three frameworks for legal regulation of the human body. Property law systematically favors those who use the body to create commercial products. Yet contract and privacy rights cannot compete with the property paradigm, which alone affords a complete bundle of rights enforceable against the whole world. In the face of researchers' property rights, the theoretical freedom to contract and the meager interest in privacy leave those who supply body parts vulnerable to exploitation.     

刑罚轻缓、人权保障与《刑法修正案(八)》——以相关国际公约为蓝本的分析

对照《公民权利与政治权利公约》分析,《刑法修正案(八)》在死刑改革方面的进步值得肯定,但与公约要求的、逐步限制死刑适用以最终废除死刑的目标仍有距离;参照《北京规则》、《美洲人权公约》等分析,新修正案对未成年人、老年人犯罪适用刑罚增加了从宽处理的规定,实现了对弱者的人权保障,但该修正案在建立未成年人及成年人前科消灭制度等方面仍有不足;比照《东京规则》等国际公约分析,其以社区矫正入刑化为代表的非监禁刑之完善,体现了我国对国际公约相关要求的积极回应。     

Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Strasbourg's Discourse on the Justified Use of Force

This article discusses the discourse on the justified use of force in the Strasbourg Court's analysis of Article 3. With particular focus on the judgment in Güler and Öngel v Turkey, a case concerning the use of force by State agents against demonstrators, it addresses the question of the implications of such discourse, found in this and other cases, on the absolute nature of Article 3. It offers a perspective which suggests that the discourse on the justified use of force can be reconciled with Article 3's absolute nature.     

Right to Experimental Treatment: FDA New Drug Approval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public's Health

On May 2, 2006, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a startling opinion, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, held that terminally ill patients who have exhausted all other available options have a constitutional right to experimental treatment that FDA has not yet approved. Although ultimately overturned by the full court, Abigail Alliance generated considerable interest from various constituencies. Meanwhile, FDA proposed similar regulatory amendments, as have lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in Congress. But proponents of expanded access fail to consider public health and consumer safety concerns. In particular, allowing patients to try unproven treatments, outside of controlled clinical trials risks both the study's outcome and the health of patients who might benefit from the deliberate, careful process of new drug approval as it currently operates under FDA's auspices.     

NGOs,international courts,and state backlash against human rights accountability: Evidence from NGO mobilization against Tanzania at the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

When nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) encounter state resistance to human rights accountability, how do NGOs use international courts for their human rights advocacy strategies? Considering the overlapping phenomena of shrinking civic space within authoritarian, hybrid, and democratically backsliding regimes, and state backlash against international courts, NGOs navigate two potential levels of state backlash against human rights accountability. Building on the interdisciplinary scholarship on legal mobilization, we develop an integrated framework for explaining how states' two-level (domestic and international) backlash tactics can both promote and deter NGOs' strategic litigation at international human rights courts (IHRCs). States' backlash tactics can influence NGOs' opportunities, capacities, and goals for their human rights advocacy, and thus affect whether and how they pursue strategic litigation at IHRCs. We elucidate the value of this framework through case studies of NGOs' litigation against Tanzania at the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, an understudied IHRC. Drawing on an original data set, interviews, and documentation, we process-trace how Tanzania's various backlash tactics influenced whether and how NGOs litigated at the Court. Our framework and analysis show how state backlash against human rights accountability affects NGOs' mobilization at IHRCs and, relatedly, IHRCs' opportunities for influence.