Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy

Abstract: In a series of rulings, beginning with the notorious Shrimp/Turtle dispute, the high court of the WTO, the so‐called Appellate Body, has ruled that it, as well as the panels of first instance, may, on a discretionary basis, accept and consider amicus curiae briefs from, inter alia, non‐governmental organisations and private individuals. This has been highly controversial and subject to wide and intense criticism by trade diplomats who are the political representatives of WTO Member states in Geneva; the officials have reacted with anger and hostility to the notion that governments are not exclusive gatekeepers of access to the WTO dispute settlement tribunals. This article shows that the decision that amicus briefs are admissible at the discretion of the adjudicator has a sound basis in the legal framework for WTO dispute settlement, as well as conforming to trends in the practice of international courts and tribunals more generally. The article examines various ‘due process’ issues concerning the modalities for acceptance and consideration of amicus briefs and how they have been so far dealt with by the Appellate Body, as well as how they are handled in certain proposals for reform of the legal framework of WTO dispute settlement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).     

Completing the Analysis in WTO Appeals: The Practice and its Limitations

Since its creation in 1995, the Appellate Body of the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) has gradually constructed a consistentapproach to completing panels’ analysis where the circumstancespermit. The need for this practice stems from the limitationof WTO appeals to issues of law and the absence of remand inWTO disputes. The Appellate Body can be seen to complete a panel’sanalysis in two different scenarios: to deal with a claim thatthe panel failed to address; or to apply a different legal interpretationto the facts of the case, where the Appellate Body has reversedor modified the panel’s legal interpretation. In decidingwhether to complete a panel’s analysis, the AppellateBody appears to consider three criteria: the existence of uncontestedfacts to resolve the matter, the connection between the legalissues to be addressed in completing the analysis and thoseconsidered by the panel, and the due process rights of the partiesto the dispute. Where these criteria are not satisfied, theAppellate Body is unable to complete the analysis, and the disputemay go unresolved. This is an increasing problem, highlightingthe need for WTO Members to agree on a suitable remand mechanism.     

经济主权在中美WTO裁决执行实践中的应用研究

经济主权是国家主权的重要组成部分,经济全球化的客观现实对经济主权的内涵产生了重大影响.以美国为代表的西方发达国家以经济主权为“藉口”,拖延甚至不执行WTO裁决,中国作为WTO成员中发展中国家的代表,严格执行裁决,在维护本国经济主权的同时,树立负责任的大国形象.本文通过对美国和中国在WTO裁决执行中的实践研究,讨论两国的经济主权现,得出WTO成员既要维护经济主权又要执行裁决的结论.     

WTO争端解决中的可诉性问题释微——基于成案的视角

GATT/WTO争端解决的判例显示,WTO成员的立法行为本身、尚未生效的法规措施、没有法律约束力的行政指导在WTO体制中都具有可诉性。已失效的法规措施通常不具有可诉性,但若相关措施是在进入专家组程序后失效的,专家组或上诉机构仍可能对之作出裁决。以上行为具有可诉性体现出了多边贸易体制保护竞争条件的精神。     

The Amicus Brief Issue at the WTO

The near-exclusive attention which many commentators have givento the importance of analysing the amicus brief issue in termsof transparency and accountability, often accompanied by accusationsof a lack of democratic status on the part of the countriesthat have objected to the admission of such briefs, is misplaced.The World Trade Organization (WTO) Members that have objectedmost strenuously to amicus brief submissions have been developingcountries—ironically, the most vocal proponents of anindependent, strong "trade court". Why should developing countriescomplain if the issue is really one of strategic and politicalinterests? After all, a "court" that takes it upon itself toaccept amicus briefs despite the protestations of the majorityof the WTO Membership is, in this sense, a "strong court". Whatthis article aims to provide is a very close account of theviews of the Members in the political debates on this issue.On that basis, it seems that abstract arguments based on thepositive role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) canplay are unlikely to assuage developing countries' concerns.They only address the supposition that developing countriesare morally mistaken in their political views, or are sufferingfrom a false consciousness of the (real) threat of trans-boundarynon-governmental moral entrepreneurs. Instead, the concernsof these and other Members have to do with estimations aboutthe likely impact of WTO Appellate Body activism on the misapplication(and consequent unpredictability) of negotiated trade rules.These concerns should be taken seriously, for they go to theoriginal intent at Uruguay of having an impartial body whichwould impartially apply negotiated rules, with an eye towardsthe avoidance of political controversy. According to this view,fundamental gaps in trade regulation should be resolved by theMembers—not the Appellate Body.     

WTO专家组和上诉机构举证责任分配标准的合理性分析

WTO专家组和上诉机构为了完成其迅速而有效地解决争端的义务,在DSU没有对举证责任分配规则做出任何规定的情形下,在判例中基本采用了谁主张谁举证的原则,同时,也发展了一些举证责任分配规则和标准。遗憾的是,专家组和上诉机构的实践表明,他们并没有严格遵守其形成的相关举证责任分配规则,其形成的相关标准也缺乏合理性:传统的谁主张谁举证原则由于忽视了实质公平,在WTO审理实践中容易被滥用;例外规定与排除规定之间存在区别的分析多此一举;重要性等级标准缺乏合理性及例外规定作为举证责任分配的标准既没有法律依据,其合理性也受到质疑。这必然削弱了WTO争端解决机制的权威性,因此,对WTO专家组和上诉机构所形成的举证责任分配规则和标准实行必要的改革,已成为当务之急。     

Catch Me if You Can: An Analysis of "Measures Taken to Comply" under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

The objective of the compliance procedure is to ensure promptcompliance with the Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB) recommendationsand rulings through an expeditious procedure. In their assignment,the compliance panels are faced with competing considerationsof, on the one hand, ensuring Members the right of a "reasonableperiod of time" for implementing the DSB's recommendations andrulings and, on the other, ensuring prompt compliance. Compliancepanels have to pay due respect to the fact that an Article 21.5proceeding is not a new proceeding, which limits the scope ofwhich claims may be raised in those proceedings and restrictsthe determination of which measures are "measures taken to comply".In order to achieve those overall aims, compliance panels andthe Appellate Body have accepted that claims other than thoseraised in the original proceedings may be presented in complianceproceedings. Due process principles form an integral part ofthe Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The delicate taskof the panels and Appellate Body is to determine which claims,not raised in the original proceedings, are admissible in anArticle 21.5 proceeding. Compliance panels and the AppellateBody have established several limitations in order to limitthe ambit of potential claims and measures that may fall withinan expeditious Article 21.5 proceeding. However, the embracedapproach to determining which new claims, not raised in theoriginal proceedings, are to be considered in Article 21.5 proceedingsand which measures fall within the realm of measures taken tocomply bears the common characteristics of being subject toan extensive interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU.     

WTO争端解决中的案例法方法

判例法这一用语在不同的语境下具有不同的含义。判例法是普通法法律制度中的一种传统,该传统是经由长期的司法实践形成的,而非来自于立法的强制性要求。严格意义上,判例法的突出特点是遵循先例,案件相同裁决相同。在一般意义上,判例法具有指导作用。在WTO争端解决中,无论是上诉机构的观点,还是上诉机构和专家组的实际做法,都体现出明显的案例法的指导作用的特点。与普通法制度不同的是,WTO的案例都是依据WTO规则的解释形成的,并非独立于WTO协定的法律渊源。     

诚信原则在WTO争端解决机制中的适用评析

诚信原则作为各国民法中最重要的原则,已经成为国际法中的一般法律原则,越来越频繁地应用在WTO争端解决中。由于诚信原则存在明显的不确定性,难以在实践中适用,专家组和上诉机构在诸多案例中对诚信原则的含义及其解释法律和弥补法律漏洞的司法职能进行了确认,并成功地解决了不少争端。遗憾的是,上诉机构的司法限制制约了专家组的有益探索,过分谨慎。当前国际国内经济与法律的发展为专家组和上诉机构进行更大胆的探索准备了良好的条件,WTO争端解决机制应充分发挥诚信原则的司法职能,确立成员方诚信履行WTO实体法律的独立的义务,这将有利于弥补WTO的相关法律漏洞,迅速有效地解决争端。     

The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement

This article analyses in detail the fact that there has beenalmost no dissent in World Trade Organization (WTO) disputesettlement reports. Only a handful of articles have noted thisphenomenon, even in passing. The article first examines theempirical data with respect to dissenting and concurring opinionsat both the panel and Appellate Body levels. Fewer than 5% ofpanel reports and 2% of Appellate Body reports contain separateopinions of any kind. Second, it shows that the WTO is in factactively discouraging dissents and discusses why this mightbe the case. The article argues that dissents are valuable ingeneral and assesses whether more dissents would be a positivefor the WTO. It then reviews the few dissents that have beenpublished and demonstrates that 50% of the arguments raisedin dissents at the panel level were adopted in whole or in parton appeal by the Appellate Body, thus illustrating dissentscan and do make a difference. The article concludes that keepingthe lid on dissents may ultimately erode the strength of thedispute settlement system and hinder the ability of the WTOMembers to make appropriate changes to the Agreements.     

赢多输少还是输多赢少?——WTO争端解决机制申诉方败诉案件解析

利用WTO争端解决机制处理的国际贸易纠纷中申诉方完全败诉的案件占专家组处理案件的10%强,主要原因是申诉方未能完成举证义务,申诉方没有正确提出诉请,被申诉方政府的声明使得专家组不支持诉请。     

Precaution, Scientific Development and Scientific Uncertainty under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body has noted that the precautionary principle will be relevant to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in various ways, although the Appellate Body has declined to determine the status of the precautionary principle for international law or to find that it has been written into the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body's awareness of precaution, the dynamics of scientific research and the nature of scientific uncertainty is to be welcomed. This awareness is helpful in dealing with new and emerging issues, such as the question of when a risk assessment relied upon by a WTO member becomes outdated by virtue of subsequent scientific developments. If maintained, an overly rigid approach to risk assessment, with a tight temporal focus, will inadequately acknowledge the natural processes of flux in the development of scientific knowledge.     

WTO争端胜诉方"申请授权报复"的程序问题研究——"世贸组织争端解决规则与程序的谅解"第21.5条和第22.6条之间的顺序问题

WTO争端解决机制(Dispute Settlement Mechanism)是乌拉圭回合谈判的一个重要成果,而WTO争端解决机制比起GATT时代的争端解决程序的优越性主要在于它对执行裁决的监督上。体现在"WTO争端解决程序与规则的谅解"(DSU)中,就在于第21条"履行措施的合法性审查"和第22条"申请授权报复"的规定。这两条规定在WTO司法实践中已经成为WTO法执行的砥柱规则,使多边贸易体系解决纠纷的法律体系功能更为强大。但是,WTO的立法和任何立法一样,在具有前瞻性、预测性的同时,不可避免地具有一些滞后性,甚至在立法的当时受各种利益因素的制约,在立法上留有一些空白。针对DSU第21条和第22条规定的内在冲突,从分析WTO以往发生的案例入手,综合WTO专家小组对此问题的解释,结合各国提出的建议,对此问题进行论述。     

非WTO法在WTO争端解决中的适用

在分析WTO专家组和上诉机构具有充分的理由适用非WTO法的基础上,结合DSB解决争端的实践,认为非WTO法在WTO争端解决程序中具有广泛的效力。非WTO法不仅可以使专家组中止管辖权,甚至在更多的情况下使专家组拒绝管辖,而且非WTO法能有效的证明某些违反WTO规则的做法具有正当性。     

Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement

African countries have largely been absent as players at theWTO dispute settlement system in its first decade. In recentliterature, this has been attributed to a number of factors,among them, the low volume of trade with an export base oftencharacterized by single unprocessed commodities, a complicatedand expensive dispute settlement system, inadequate legal expertiseand a less litigious approach to possible disputes particularlywhen major trading and donor partners are involved. By showinghow and to what extent African countries have participated inGATT and WTO disputes, as well as in the DSU review negotiationsand other related processes, the present article argues thatthis weak participation by large sections of the WTO membershipis a danger to the long-term "predictability" function of theWTO, and could undermine the usefulness of the entire processeventually. It closes with various proposals on how the problemmay be addressed.     

非WTO法在WTO争端解决中的适用

WTO专家组和上诉机构具有充分的理由适用非WTO法,DSB解决争端的实践表明非WTO法在WTO争端解决程序中具有广泛的效力。非WTO法不仅可以使专家组中止管辖权,甚至在更多的情况下使专家组拒绝管辖,而且非WTO法能有效地证明某些违反WTO规则的做法具有正当性。     

上诉机构停摆后的WTO争端解决

世界贸易组织(WTO)上诉机构的停摆虽然对WTO产生了巨大的影响,但并不意味着其争端解决机制的终结。我们不应该扔掉整个皇冠,即使它上面的宝石出现了裂缝。通过对上诉机构停止运作后将主导WTO争端解决机制的若干方案及其利弊的考察分析可见,WTO上诉机构的停摆对于目前及未来发生的贸易争端将意味着,WTO争端解决尤其是如何处理专家组报告将从一揽子、统一适用的模式进入到多元化、碎片化的模式。当前,在贸易保护主义、单边主义抬头,“逆全球化”浪潮时隐时现,多边贸易体制处于风雨飘摇之际,如何继续保证WTO规则的一致性和捍卫以规则为基础的多边贸易体制,将是摆在WTO成员面前的迫切课题。中国需要与其他成员一起,通过必要的革新和改进,致力于为上诉机构重新恢复运转寻求永久且迅速的解决方案。     

Canada loses appeal of WTO panel ruling on minimum patent terms

In the last issue, we reported on a ruling of a Panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that Canada was in breach of the international Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement). The Panel found that Canada's Patent Act does not provide the minimum patent terms required by the trade agreement. Canada appealed that decision, but on 18 September 2000 the WTO Appellate Body upheld the Panel ruling.     

WTO争端解决程序中的举证责任

世界贸易组织的相关协议对争端解决程序中的举证责任几乎没有规定,相关举证责任规则是由处理争端的专家组和上诉机构发展起来的。在世界贸易组织争端解决程序中,谁主张谁举证是举证责任规则的基本要求,其标准是初步证明(证据)标准,这种标准实质上是一种推定技巧,而非终局的证明标准。提供充分的证据并说服专家组是举证责任的内在要求。不同诉因、不同条款可能影响争端方举证责任的分配。争端方是否满足了举证责任的要求,由专家组最终评估、认定,专家组在这方面享有相当大的裁量权。     

Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes: A Critical Analysis

This article argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO)jurisprudence on the allocation of the burden of proof is ina confused state. Panels and the Appellate Body have failedto produce a consistent line of cases, which can be used asa predictable model to solve future cases. Furthermore, thejurisprudence has also created artificial differences betweensimilar provisions, raising questions about the relevance ofthe criteria employed to distinguish provisions that must beproved by the defendant from those that must be proved by thecomplainant. The analysis undertaken in this article suggeststhat it may be time to reflect upon the basic question of whythe burden of proof should be allocated to a given party. Thearticle explores alternatives and suggests courses of action.