Kant with Freud: Derrida’s Analysis of the Ancient Dream of Self-Punishment

During his 2000–2001 seminar on the death penalty, Jacques Derrida argues that Kant is the most ‘rigorous’ philosophical proponent of the death penalty and, thus, the thinker who poses the most serious objections to the kind of philosophical abolitionism that Derrida is trying to develop in his seminar. For Kant, the death penalty is the logical result of the fundamental principle of criminal law, namely, talionic law or the right of retaliation as a principle of pure, disinterested reason. In this paper, I demonstrate how Derrida attempts to undermine Kant’s defence of the death penalty by demonstrating both its internal contradictions (the tenuous distinction between poena forensis, that is, punishment by a court, and poena naturalis, natural punishment) and its strange affinities with the law of primitive peoples (as understood by Freud in Totem and Taboo). I argue that Derrida’s repeated returns throughout the seminar to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals suggest that Kant’s seemingly rational defence of the death penalty is ultimately motivated by interests that belie the supposed disinterestedness of modern law and by a notion of natural justice that at once subtends and subverts all criminal law.     

Gardner on Legal Reasoning

In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is a distinction (suggested originally by Joseph Raz) between two forms of legal reasoning, namely, reasoning about the law and reasoning according to law. In this paper I intend to describe and evaluate Gardner’s account. Among the critical remarks that will appear in the paper is the claim that Gardner’s concept of reasoning according to law is overly inclusive.     

Exploring the Sources of Authority Over the Word Meaning in Transgender Jurisprudence

This paper looks at transgender identities and the law in the context of marriage in common law jurisdictions. It particularly focuses on the nature and sources of authority over word meaning as well as the role of language and definition in classifying transgender individuals into a legal category. When it comes to the legal question of who may marry whom, and what the terms “man” and “woman” actually refer to, there is no statutory definition of the terms “man”, “woman”, “male” and “female”. This has put the onus on judges, especially those who needed to decide whether a transgender person can marry in his/her affirmed sex, to interpret these terms. Two lines of cases in transgender jurisprudence are examined so as to have a close study of how the courts construed these terms and classified transgender people into a category. The first concerns United Kingdom cases, namely Corbett v Corbett (1971), Bellinger v Bellinger (2003) and the Hong Kong case W v Registrar of Marriages (2010), (2011) & (2013). The second consists of Australian cases such as Secretary, Department of Social Security v State Rail Authority (1993) and Re Kevin (2002). This paper discusses these issues by analyzing and comparing different cases in transgender jurisprudence as well as examining how these issues play out in contemporary Hong Kong.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Alice’s Adventures</Emphasis>, Abductive Reasoning and the Logic of Islamic Law

How does a Muslim jurist think the law and how, accordingly, he judges a fact? Using Alice in Wonderland as hermeneutical device to explore the logic of fiqh, this article identifies a divergence between Western and Islamic legal thinking in the application of abduction as key form of inference in the law of Islam. In particular, looking at the fact/law relation in symbolic terms, the article highlights how, while a dichotomy between fact and law characterizes Western legal thinking, fiqh upholds a connection between the “real” and the “right” (?aqq), where the effort (ijtihād) in understanding sharī‘ah postulates the actualization of the “rule” (?ukm) in God’s creation. Thus, if sharī‘ah pre-scribes the Law, not only is the rule discovered through the sources (u?ūl), but the right has to be justified through a verdict de-scribing the fact, for the law to be validly stated for the given situation. In this sense, abduction as explanatory “hypothesis” (Peirce) and “inference to the best explanation” (Harman) of sharī‘ah provides an account for the probabilistic nature of fiqh, its ramification (furū‘) through verdicts, as well as for the epistemic and narrative function of the tradition as core aspects of the logic of Islamic law. At the same time, doubts can be raised about the compatibility between this logic and the deductive logic of modern state law, as a sub-product of Western legal thinking.     

Freedom of association in labour relations in the context of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Maqasid</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">al</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Shari’ah</Emphasis> principles

Labour relations are an important chapter in economic and industrial development. Labour relations are divided into personal employer-employer relationship and collective relationship between employer and trade union. The collective relationship forms the core of the employees’ right to freedom of association. This article discusses the right of employees to freedom of association including the right to strike from the Islamic perspective. The Islamic principles applicable in this context are Maqasid-al-Shari’ah (the higher objective of Islamic law), Haqq and Jama’ah (the functional concepts in Islamic law). Freedom of association in labour relations which is basically a western concept suits the three Islamic principles and the Islamic principles are in line with the ILO standards and European law. This article is written by using pure legal research method, i.e. adopting a content analysis approach with the Islamic sources such as the Qur’an and Hadith as a point of reference.     

His Dark Legalities: Intellectual Property’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Psychomachia</Emphasis> in Philip Pullman’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">His Dark Materials</Emphasis> Trilogy

This article will explore the vastest, most terminal, and—at least in the natural law tradition–most legal of spaces: namely, the home of the divine sovereign, Heaven. Specifically, I am interested in the contemporary (re)depiction of heavenly space as a ‘Miltonic’ theatre of war, as represented in Philip Pullman’s fantasy trilogy, His Dark Materials. This spatial mise-en-scene, as spectacular as it is, is a peculiar choice for an avowed atheist and anticlerical like Pullman. For it would seem to confirm than confront the verities of theology and the very structures of belief that Pullman seeks not only to critique but to overthrow. Namely, that Heaven exists, though as an absolute monarchy rather than (as Pullman plugs for) a republic. I will argue, however, that Pullman’s neo-Blakean vision of Heaven-as-Hell (ruled over by the tyrannical Metatron, as regent for a senescent ‘Authority’, i.e. God) is a metaphor: a metaphor for legal rather than theological space. And the legal space that Pullman metaphorises, I will argue, is nothing less than the imaginary of millennial intellectual property rights, an ideo-juridical inner space more and more projected upon and underpinning spatial notions like the ‘Commons’. The war in Heaven, then, is an elaborate allegory for struggles over the contol of knowledge under the conditions of Global Capital, with Lord Asriel, Lyra and Will functioning as Lessig-style activists, colonizing the new technologies (anachronised here as ‘amber spyglasses’, ‘subtle knives’, ‘alethiometers’ etc.) to topple ‘The Authority’ of intellectual property law and institute a democracy of digitality in which ideas are free to circulate in that most unreal and Real of spaces, the internet.     

Reproducing Whiteness: Feminist Genres,Legal Subjectivity and the Post-racial Dystopia of <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Handmaid’s Tale</Emphasis> (2017-)

This article investigates the critical potential of a contemporary dystopia, The Handmaid’s Tale (Miller 2017-), a U.S. television series adapted from a popular novel by Canadian author Margaret Atwood (1985). The text is widely understood as a feminist intervention that speaks to ongoing struggles against gender oppression, but in this article I consider the invitations that the show offers its viewers in treating race the way that it does, and consider what it means to refuse these invitations in pursuit of a critical feminist understanding of authority, legal subjectivity, and violence. Drawing on the recent turn to genre, my reading focuses on how whiteness is reproduced through this cinematic text and its inculcation of particular ways of seeing, modes of identification and attachment. The Handmaid’s Tale’s post-racial aesthetic means that its thematic engagement with gender, sexuality and resistance actively disavows national and international histories of racist state violence and white supremacy. Its problematic feminism is thus uniquely instructive for understanding how whiteness is reproduced in contemporary (neo)liberal configurations of legal subjectivity and state authority.     

Post-secular Messianism Against the Law: Judith Butler on Walter Benjamin and ‘Sacred Life’

This essay focuses on Judith Butler’s configuration in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism (2012a) of sacred life from the mystical motifs that traverse Walter Benjamin’s writings as the pivot of an anti-identitarian ethics committed to non-violent resistance. To gain critical leverage on Butler’s post-secular stance, my analysis turns to Talal Asad’s ‘Redeeming the “Human” Through Human Rights’ chapter from Formations of the Secular (2003), where he enunciates a disparity between a ‘pre-civil state of nature’ and the notion of ‘inalienable rights’ that informs the subject’s rights under secular law. In underscoring the secular state’s inability or refusal to ascribe sacredness to ‘real living persons’ over and against ‘“the human” conceptualized abstractly, or imagined in a state of nature’ as presumed by natural law, Asad indirectly articulates what is at stake in Butler’s explication in Parting Ways of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’. In this context, Butler unpacks Benjamin’s remarks about the sixth commandment’s non-coercive disposition and the inner struggle its provisional applicability prompts. A conception of ‘sacred life’ crystallizes through Butler’s emphasis on the open-endedness of this struggle, which encourages us to abandon a solipsistic investment in our own suffering in the process of acknowledging its eternally transient rhythm. I argue that Butler supplements this motif by drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s grounding of the political in cohabitation. My contention is that while ‘sacred life’ forms the backbone of Butler’s affirmation of civil disobedience, Arendt empowers Butler’s ethics to transcend Benjamin’s Jewish-messianic melancholy by radicalizing the passivity that refracts it.     

Postmodern Jurisprudence: Contesting Genres

It has become a common place of contemporary legal theory, particularly postmodernist legal theory, to reject modernist jurisprudence’s assumption of law’s disciplinary autonomy. Within this enthusiasm for interdisciplinary approaches to law, what is less common is detailed analysis of precisely how interdisciplinarity is figured, rhetorically and epistemologically, in the discourse of contemporary legal theory. It is with a view to detailed analysis of this kind that this paper emerges. Its aim is to explore in detail how interdisciplinarity might be figured, and with what consequences, in the jurisprudence of postmodernity. The particular site of this exploration will be Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington with Shaun McVeigh’s Postmodern Jurisprudence: the Law of Text in the Texts of law. Published in 1991, this text remains widely influential – it has become a contemporary classic in its genre. It is not the intention of this paper, however, to represent this text as exemplary. Rather, this paper intends to read this text in its particularity, to focus on its particular vision of postmodern jurisprudence. Specifically, this paper argues that Postmodern Jurisprudence figures interdisciplinarity in terms of genre; and that this understanding of interdisciplinarity is problematised by the unacknowledged contradictions between the different conceptions of genre – one associated with Jacques Derrida and the other associated with Jean-François Lyotard – which the text invokes. This paper argues that the project of postmodern jurisprudence – as title and as label – appears rather differently if it is imagined, on the one hand (following Derrida) according to the logic of the passe-partout and, on the other hand (following Lyotard), according to the logic of the differend. The paper concludes that this internal tension should at least give us pause for thought when approaching the complex phenomenon of interdisciplinarity in postmodern legal scholarship more generally.     

Defending <Emphasis Type="Italic">Why</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Law</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">Matters:</Emphasis> Responses to Commentaries

Why Law Matters examines various legal and political institutions and procedures and argues that the desirability of these institutions and procedures is not contingent and does not hinge (only) on the prospects that these institutions are conducive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter as such.     

“Give me some space”: exploring youth to parent aggression and violence

A small scale qualitative project, undertaken by an interdisciplinary domestic violence research group involving academic researchers and research assistants, with colleagues from Independent Domestic Abuse Services (IDAS), investigated youth aggression and violence against parents. Following the literature review, data was generated through several research conversations with young people (n = 2), through semi-structured interviews with mothers (n = 3) and practitioners (n = 5), and through a practitioner focus group (n = 8). Thematic analysis and triangulation of the data from parents, practitioners and young people, elicited interconnected and complex overarching themes. Young people could be both victim and perpetrator. The witnessing or experiencing of domestic aggression and violence raised the concept of ‘bystander children’. The impact of young people experiencing familial violence was underestimated by parents. For practitioners, the effects of working with domestic violence was shown to be significant - both positively and negatively.     

Legal Subjectivity and the ‘Right to be Forgotten’: A Rancièrean Analysis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Google</Emphasis>

This article discusses the right to be forgotten. The landmark Google ruling of the European Court of Justice gave this ambiguous right new weight and raised several urgent questions. This article considers what kind of person is presupposed and constructed when somebody invokes their right to be forgotten. The aim is to engage in an experimental reading of the ruling in the framework of contemporary political theory, namely, the philosophy of Jacques Rancière. The analysis shows that even though the right to be forgotten is a new legal and rhetorical instrument, there are good grounds for being critical of its underlying logic and sceptical of the novelty thereof. The judgment can be understood as a reiteration and consolidation of the same impotent human rights thinking that law often seems forced to contend itself with, no matter how radical our intentions may be.     

The Horizons of the Constitution: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Politeia</Emphasis>, the Political Regime and the Good

How do we think about the word politeia when this involves a reaching back to the past? The response, pursued in this paper, is that in the classical understanding of politeia there is a significant connection between the question of the ‘good’ and the constitution; a connection which has become occluded or obscured by modern constitutional thought. In support of this understanding of politeia it must be acknowledged that what is meant, in this paper, by ‘good’ is very different from that conventionally found in contemporary constitutional, legal or political theory. In an effort to disclose how politeia unravels this novel sense of ‘the good’ the paper will closely consider the philosophical work of Hans-Georg Gadamer on Plato. The paper claims that this largely neglected work is of importance to contemporary constitutional philosophy, particularly in so far as it focuses, as in this paper, on classical traditions or origins within constitutional thought.     

Law,the Digital and Time: The Legal Emblems of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Doctor Who</Emphasis>

This article is about time. It is about time, or more precisely, about the absence of time in law’s digital future. It is also about time travelling and the seemingly ever-popular BBC science fiction television series Doctor Who. Further, it is about law’s timefullness; about law’s pictorial past and the ‘visual baroque’ of its chronological fused future. Ultimately, it is about a time paradox of seeing time run to a time when time runs ‘No More!’ This ‘timey-wimey’ article is in three parts. The first part looks to a hazy remembered past of the legal emblem tradition as presented in Peter Goodrich’s Legal Emblems and the Art of Law to learn visual literacy and also to glimpse the essential elements of modern legality with authority, decision and violence. The second part maps how these images and icons of modern legality are manifest in the Doctor Who fiftieth year anniversary special ‘The Day of the Doctor.’ The third stage looks beyond these first order meanings to understand the chronological chaos of ‘The Day of the Doctor.’ The technicity of the image as a portal through time and space that the narrative revolves around charts the implications for the digital end of time for law.     

The Indeterminacy of an Emergency: Challenges to Criminal Jurisdiction in Constitutional Democracy

In this contribution I address the type of emergency that threatens a state’s monopoly of violence, meaning that the state’s competence to provide citizens with elementary security is challenged. The question is, whether actions taken by the state to ward off these threats (should) fall within the ambit of the criminal law. A central problem is the indeterminacy that is inherent in the state of emergency, implicating that adequate measures as well as constitutional constraints to be imposed on such measures cannot easily be determined in advance. This indeterminacy raises two interrelated issues. Firstly, the issue of whether it makes sense to speak of criminal jurisdiction when the existing jurisdiction is challenged as such. To what extent does the indeterminacy call for inherently unlimited powers of the state, implying there can be no such thing as criminal jurisdiction during a state of emergency? Second—if criminal jurisdiction is not in contradiction with the state of emergency—the issue of what criminal liability could mean in such a state needs to be confronted. To what extent does the indeterminacy inherent in the state of emergency jeopardise criminal liability because such indeterminacy engenders severe legal uncertainty regarding the standards against which the relevant actions are to be judged? Both issues will be discussed from the perspective of constitutional democracy, assuming that what is at stake in times of emergency is both the competence to sustain the monopoly of violence and the possibility to constrain the powers of the state.     

Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Among Latinas Through the Moms’ Empowerment Program: an Efficacy Trial

Although intimate partner violence (IPV) is a particularly prevalent public health concern among Latina populations, the evidence-based treatment options for Latinas who experience IPV are limited. The present study tested the efficacy of the Moms’ Empowerment Program (MEP), an intervention for Spanish-speaking Latina mothers who had recently experienced IPV. Participants (N?=?95) were assigned to a Treatment (n?=?55) or a waitlist Control (n?=?40) condition, and those in the Treatment group completed a 10-week intervention designed to address the problems associated with IPV. Intent-to-treat analyses using multiple regression revealed that Latinas’ participation in the MEP was associated with reductions in IPV exposure. These findings provide preliminary evidence that the MEP may reduce exposure to physical violence among Spanish-speaking Latinas.     

The Preferences of al-Kisāʾī (d. 189/805): Grammar and Meaning in a Canonical Reading of the Qur’an

The Qur’an has been transmitted as both a written text and an oral recital. This has led to the development of a reading tradition that permits numerous different vocalisations to be made upon the basic skeletal text of the established ?Uthmānī codex. Ibn al-Jazarī (d. 833/1429) chose ten early readers whom he felt were most representative of this tradition and whose readings are treated as canonical up until this day. One of these, the Kufan linguist al-Kisā?ī (d. 189/805) has been characterised in the literature as more focused on the grammar of the Qur’an than his reader peers. This article explores al-Kisā?ī’s process of ikhtiyār (preference) when deciding between various possible readings. The sample for analysis consists of Kisā?ī’s tafarrudāt, the approximately fifty cases in which his reading differs from the other nine readers. By comparing his reading with the comments of early scholars of Qur’anic linguistics, especially his near-contemporary al-Farrā? (d. 208/822), it is possible to construct a typology of the suspected principal reasons for al-Kisā?ī’s tafarrudāt. Not only are many of these based on grammatical preferences, but they demonstrate a significant degree of consistency. Furthermore, analysis of a cluster of readings with implications for the interpretation of the sharī?a (divine law and moral code) provides evidence for a subtle exegetical dimension to al-Kisā?ī’s work as a reader-grammarian.     

Ambiguity and Conflict in the Implementation of Evidence Law in Criminal Matters: a Study of the United Arab Emirates Jurisprudence

Due the lack of the law of evidence in criminal matters in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it is important to address the issue of the rules of evidence in the UAE where Sharia criminal law is applied along with enacted law of Criminal Procedural Law. The courts’ decisions contradicted each other because of the differences of opinions among the law schools exist in Islamic law in one hand and between the Sharia criminal law and enacted law in the other hand. Further, the Criminal Procedural Law does not state the rules of evidence in clear manner to judges and individuals. The lack of stated rules and procedures and what evidence could be accepted and what cannot are not definite in the UAE legal system. The article will argue that because of the differences in the opinions related to the admission and acceptance of the evidences exist among the Islamic law schools and between the Sharia law and enacted law, the court decisions have contradicted each other and create ambiguities in the field of the evidence in criminal law. The Islamic jurists have different opinions about evidence in fornication crimes, Qasama evidence in qisas, and women and non-Muslim testimonies. Such differences affect the Union Supreme Court decisions. Therefore, the UAE legislator must enact the law of evidence in criminal matters in order to reduce the contradiction between judges’ opinions, clear ambiguities, and protect individual rights as it did with civil and commercial matter.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">Plato’s Pharmacy</Emphasis>

In this essay, one of Derrida’s early texts, Plato’s pharmacy, is analysed in detail, more specifically in relation to its reflections on writing and its relation to law. This analysis takes place with reference to a number of Derrida’s other texts, in particular those on Freud. It is especially Freud’s texts on dream interpretation and on the dream-work which are of assistance in understanding the background to Derrida’s analysis of writing in Plato’s pharmacy. The essay shows the close relation between Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s texts and Freud’s study of the dream-work. The forces at work in dreams, it appears, are at play in all texts, which in turn explains Derrida’s contentions in relation to the pharmakon as providing the condition of possibility of Plato’s texts. The essay furthermore points to the continuity between this ‘early’ text of Derrida and his ‘later’, seemingly more politico-legal texts of the 1990s. A close reading of Plato’s pharmacy, with its investigation via ‘writing’ of the foundations of metaphysics, and thus also of the Western concept of law, is obligatory should one wish to comprehend how Derrida attempts to exceed the restricted economy of metaphysics through his analysis of concepts such as justice and hospitality.