Election campaigns and the cyclical nature of emotions—How politicians engage in affective polarization

Do politicians get emotional during an election campaign? We examine the existence of changes in partisan in-group favoritism and partisan out-group hostility among political elites by evaluating the degree to which they fluctuate before, during and after election campaigns. The lack of elite level panel data has prevented scholars from studying the dynamics of politicians' emotions around the most emotionally intense political event in democracies: elections. We focus on Sweden around the 2014 election and follow more than 700 Swedish politicians before, during and after a national election campaign using a unique three-wave panel survey. The results reveal that politicians' emotions towards other parties are affected during the election, but less so for their own party. Our study adds to the body of recent evidence that campaigns mobilize partisan identities and increase partisan animus.     

Keeping the left at bay: Delegate selection system choice in US Democratic presidential nominations

In the modern era of US presidential nominations, every election cycle we witness around 20% change in delegate selection system types. This variance remains unexplained and for the most part unexplored. At the same time, prior formal and empirical models offer contradicting expectations of party leader behavior in their choice of system. This paper looks to bridge this divide. We argue state party leaders use delegate selection systems to select candidates favorable to their own ideological position. When the median partisan is ideologically left relative to the position of state Democratic leaders, the leaders of the Party will open up the delegate selection system to dilute the voices furthest on the left. We employ maximum likelihood estimation as a method to show that left positioning of citizens relative to state Democratic leaders increases the likelihood the state Democratic Party will use a primary system as opposed to a caucus.     

The relationship between bias and swing ratio in the Electoral College and the outcome of presidential elections

In this paper, I assess how the outcomes of presidential elections are affected by the presence (or lack) of partisan bias in the Electoral College. There have been three instances (1876, 1888 and 2000) since the end of the Civil War where the party that lost the popular vote won the Electoral College. These instances raise the question of whether partisan bias consistently influences presidential election outcomes? I answer this question by first measuring partisan bias and then using these estimates to assess how partisan bias affects a party's odds of winning a presidential election. I find that the presence of partisan bias provides a sizable, but not insurmountable, obstacle for the disadvantaged party.     

The electoral connection in Australia: Candidate roles,campaign activity,and the popular vote

Studies of representational roles usually examine elected representatives rather than election candidates and make little attempt to link roles with either behavior or the popular vote that candidates attract. In this paper, we use 1990 Australian data to examine all major party election candidates, and show that candidates identify with three types of representational roles:locals, who focus on articulating local concerns and interests;partisans, who see their role in party political terms; andlegislators, who emphasize the parliamentary role of an elected representative. Incumbents, especially party leaders, focus on the partisan role. Candidates in each of these three types have different views of the qualities that a candidate should possess and emphasize different forms of campaign activity. In turn, these roles have a modest impact on the popular vote that candidates attract, net of other factors. In Australia, incumbents rely on national partisan forces for reelection, while challengers rely much more on their own efforts.     

The Partisan Usage of Parliamentary Salaries: Informal Party Practices Compared

It is widely acknowledged that political parties in European democracies have become increasingly dependent on state resources, most notably direct state funding. Yet cross-national studies on parties' usage of state resources that are not earmarked for partisan purposes, which require the assessment of informal, intra-organisational practices, are still rare. This article looks at one such practice across 33 parties in five European democracies: namely the ‘taxing’ of national MPs' salaries. Under this practice, candidates who enter elected office on a party ticket are obliged regularly to donate a fixed share of their public salaries to party coffers. The empirical analysis shows that the presence of a taxing rule is more likely in parties with a strong extra-parliamentary organisation, while a leftist ideology facilitates the collection of high salary shares from parliamentarians. Moreover, where party entanglement with the state is particularly pronounced, the partisan usage of parliamentary salaries is easier irrespective of their organisational dispositions. Finally, while in unitary systems national headquarters are usually able to monopolise control over national MPs' contributions, in federal systems regional party executives are able to insist on their share of these payments.     

Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties’ Policy Statements During Elections

Although extensive research analyzes the factors that motivate European parties to shift their policy positions, there is little cross‐national research that analyzes how voters respond to parties’ policy shifts. We report pooled, time‐series analyses of election survey data from several European polities, which suggest that voters do not systematically adjust their perceptions of parties’ positions in response to shifts in parties’ policy statements during election campaigns. We also find no evidence that voters adjust their Left‐Right positions or their partisan loyalties in response to shifts in parties’ campaign‐based policy statements. By contrast, we find that voters do respond to their subjective perceptions of the parties’ positions. Our findings have important implications for party policy strategies and for political representation.     

Partisan Elites as Culprits? How Party Cues Shape Partisan Perceptual Gaps

Partisanship often colors how citizens perceive real‐world conditions. For example, an oft‐documented finding is that citizens tend to view the state of the national economy more positively if their party holds office. These partisan perceptual gaps are usually taken as a result of citizens' own motivated reasoning to defend their party identity. However, little is known about the extent to which perceptual gaps are shaped by one of the most important forces in politics: partisan elites. With two studies focusing on perceptions of the economy—a quasi‐experimental panel study and a randomized experiment—we show how partisan perceptual differences are substantially affected by messages coming from party elites. These findings imply that partisan elites are more influential on, and more responsible for, partisan perceptual differences than previous studies have revealed.     

Electoral Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy: the Evidence from Canada

The partisan advantage and incumbency advantage versions ofthe rational partisan business cycle model are tested. Bothmodels assume agents form weighted averages of partisaninflation rates during an election period, and differ only inhow the weights are formed which alters the form of businesscycles. The partisan advantage assumes fixed weightsdesignated for both major parties in each election, whereasthe incumbency advantage model assumes fixed weights forwhichever is the incumbent and opposition party in eachelection. The symmetric representation assumes each electionis a toss-up. Strongest support is found for a temporarysymmetric effect on the level of output, but none of themodels are supported for temporary electoral changes in growthor unemployment rates.     

The dimensionality of partisan strength and political independence

This study explores the dimensionality of partisan strength and independence by analyzing the relationships between the traditional four-point partisan strength scale, a strength of independence scale, and other relevant variables in the 1980 and 1984 NES/CPS election studies. In particular, the investigation centers on the possible different explanations for independence. The findings tend to support explanations for independence that concern party attachment and civic responsibility. The data show that partisan strength and independence are separate components of party identification. Previous findings based on the use of the traditional partisan strength scale may therefore need to be reconsidered.     

The Basic Arithmetic of Legislative Decisions

Despite the huge number of possible seat distributions following a general election in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, there are far fewer classes of seat distribution sharing important strategic features. We define an exclusive and exhaustive partition of the universe of theoretically possible n‐party systems into five basic classes, the understanding of which facilitates more fruitful modeling of legislative politics, including government formation. Having defined a partition of legislative party systems and elaborated logical implications of this partition, we classify the population of postwar European legislatures. We show empirically that many of these are close to critical boundary conditions, so that stochastic processes involved in any legislative election could easily flip the resulting legislature from one type to another. This is of more than hypothetical interest, since we also show that important political outcomes differ systematically between the classes of party systems—outcomes that include duration of government formation negotiations, type of coalition cabinet that forms, and stability of the resulting government.     

Using Creative Assignments to Help Students Integrate Their Learning in a Campaigns and Elections Class

The ability to integrate learning—to make connections across classes or even within a single class—is integral to students becoming better learners, and to growing their capacity to perform as civic actors. We discuss an upper-level Campaigns and Elections class in which the course structure and assignments were set up to encourage students to integrate their learning. As part of the class, students played the role of state party committees during the 2016 presidential election, at first making arguments to devote more national party resources to their state campaign and then reporting back to the national party on how the election went in their state, and what the party must do to maximize its future success. Through coding of student final exam essay questions, we explore the degree to which students were able to achieve the integrative learning goals we had set for them, and examine factors that might help predict which students achieved these learning goals. We conclude by generalizing from our experience to discuss best practices for achieving integrative learning in our courses.     

Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil's 2002 Elections

In new democracies party systems are often young, so partisan cues and roots in the electorate tend to be weak. The results, in many instances, include volatile campaigns with comparatively high degrees of short-term preference change among voters. We explore the mechanisms of voter volatility and, more broadly, the ways in which citizens learn about issues and candidates in weak-party systems. We claim that citizens in such settings rely heavily upon persuasive information gathered from their immediate social contexts. Utilizing a unique panel survey implemented during Brazil's historic 2002 presidential election, we demonstrate the importance of political discussion within social networks and neighborhood context for explaining preference change during election campaigns. We also demonstrate the concrete political consequences of social context by showing how candidate momentum runs can be driven by waves of discussion.     

Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina

Scholars disagree about the nature of party attachments, viewing partisanship as either a social identity or a rational maximization of expected utility. Empirically, much of this debate centers on the degree of partisan stability: findings of partisan fluctuations are taken as evidence against the social‐identity perspective. But drawing such conclusions assumes that the objects of identity—parties—are fixed. If we instead allow party brands to change over time, then partisan instability is consistent with a social‐identity conception of partisanship. To demonstrate this, I develop a branding model of partisanship in which voters learn about party brands by observing party behavior over time and base their psychological attachment to a party on these brands. The model suggests that convergence by rival parties, making their brands less distinguishable, should weaken party attachments. I test this implication using a survey experiment in Argentina and find evidence consistent with the model.     

Short term forces and changing partisanship

This research stemmed from the growing realization that party ID is not purely the long-term force originally conceptualized. The current conception is that it is a combination of a standing decision and responses to political events. The research addresses two questions: For what proportion of partisan changers is party ID a lagging, stable attachment to be changed only after a period of disaffection from one's party? What is the relative power of the various time 1 short term forces to alter party ID time 2? Among the short term forces, time 1voting behavior showed the strongest relationship to future change in ID. Criteria were established to identify changers whose change was based in past attitudes or behavior. For these criteria a typology was created to categorize the possible time 1 reasons and motivations for changing partisanship. The distribution of changers among categories illustrated that past voting behavior is the major instrument of partisan change. Only a small percentage were motivated by attitudes alone. Thus, overall the distribution confirmed the conception of party ID as lagging and stable. However, a substantial minority, 31 percent, showed no prior signs of partisan change.     

Short-term forces and partisan change in Canada: 1974–1980

The theoretical attractiveness of party identification derives in large measure from its presumed stability at the level of the individual voter. Recent studies conducted in Great Britain and the United States suggest, however, that partisan attachments are less stable than originally believed, and respond to the impact of shortterm forces. This paper uses newly available, national panel surveys to consider the Canadian case. Between 1974 and 1980 party identification in this country is characterized by aggregate stability and individual change. The latter is not confined to particular groups of voters and is not strongly associated with time-related reinforcement effects, but rather reflects variations in party leader and party/issue preferences. Further, interaction effects suggest that extent of political interest and patterns of partisanship across levels of the federal system condition processes of partisan change.     

Sources of Split-ticket Voting in the 1988 American Elections

Divided partisan control of the American national government is not a new phenomenon. Of the 41 presidents from Washington to Bush, 20 saw the House of Representatives under the control of the opposing party. While divided control of government is nothing new, however, its recent causes are. Before 1955, divided control was due to election reversals in the off year - easily interpretable in terms of negative retrospective judgements or switched policy choices on the part of the electorate. After 1955, on the other hand, four of the seven presidents were elected with a House of Representatives controlled by the opposing party. By analysing data collected during the 1988 national elections, we distinguish between congressional and presidential ticket-splitting and find their causes to be complex. It is caused, in part, by congressional incumbency and ballot formats, but wider social forces are also responsible for ticket-splitting.     

The Welsh Liberal Democrats: From Government to Opposition and Then Back Again?

For over 50 years from 1945 onwards, the Liberal Party and then the Liberal Democrats were either in decline in Wales or struggling to survive from election to election. Since 1997, however, there has been a steady evolution in the party's electoral and political strength. Over this past decade, the Welsh Liberal Democrats, as a state party, have experienced a change in electoral fortunes that has on occasions put them into national political power well in advance of their federal counterparts in England. As an autonomous state party within a federal structure, the Welsh Liberal Democrats have been able to take like a duck to water to the arrival of devolution in the form of the Welsh Assembly. This article examines how the evolution of the party has occurred and, in particular, the role that has been played by the Welsh Liberal Democrat Assembly Members in Welsh politics. The article also explores not only the strengths but also the weaknesses that still dog the Welsh party as it seeks once more to become a major force in Welsh politics.     

Misleading ballot position cue: Party voting in Korea's nonpartisan local elections

In this study, I present evidence that ballot order can provide a misleading cue to voters. In South Korea, nonpartisan municipal legislative elections were held concurrently with other partisan local elections until 2002. The ballot order of the candidates running in nonpartisan elections was randomly determined, whereas it was determined according to a party's number of seats in the national legislature for candidates running in partisan elections. Therefore, if voters are fully informed, the vote share for the candidate listed first in the nonpartisan ballot should not be correlated with the vote share for the party listed first on the partisan ballot. However, I find that the vote share for a first-listed candidate increases when the first-listed party's vote share increases. I also find that the presence of an incumbent does not significantly reduce the degree to which voters mistakenly use ballot position as a party cue.     

Toward a social indicators model of aggregate American political behavior: 1948–1976

Using time series data from 15 post-World War II congressional elections, a nine-equation social indicators model of aggregate American political behavior is estimated. Six exogenous social and economic conditions and nine endogenous political variables are linked in a schematic flow across three sectors of the national polity. Findings indicate that relatively short-term social and political conditions exert greater effects on election outcomes than do long-term partisan alignments. The party composition of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government affects defense expenditures as a proportion of all budgetary outlays, but has only weak impact on health and education expenses. Criticisms and suggestions for future work are discussed.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association Meetings in San Francisco in August 1975.     

Packed primaries and empty caucuses: voter turnout in presidential nominations

In presidential nomination contests, the number of voters participating in selecting the presidential candidates varies considerably across states. In the same election year, turnout in presidential nomination contests ranges from less than 1 % of party supporters participating in some caucuses to record breaking turnout levels upwards of 50 % in primaries in other states. This variation is attributable, in part, to the electoral rules, which vary across states, years, and parties. In this paper, I provide a comprehensive examination of the extent to which party and state rules affect voter turnout in nomination contests from 1980 to 2012. Using the normal partisan support score as the voter turnout denominator, I find that primaries, open contests, and proportional representation rules result in higher levels of turnout. I also show that within the window of competitiveness, turnout is higher in states that hold contests later in the nomination season. Overall, my analysis provides insight into the institutional structures that influence the number of people who participate in the presidential nomination process and enhances understanding about the factors that affect voter turnout.