The Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy

This article continues with a discussion of what the author calls the argument from transnational effects. It says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for each other. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. This article examines the argument critically at a general level. The situation under consideration concerns all cases in which, regardless of whether there is movement or not, the acts of one democracy adversely impact on the interests of others. The article tries to identify instances where the harm is tied to a failure of representation in a transnational context and not caught by the harm principle, broadly understood. In order to calibrate the argument's scope the article resorts to the principle of universalisation. The guiding intuition is that so long as the act of one democracy is morally justified on the basis of this principle, the argument from transnational effects does not apply. Hence the argument is of no avail where the impact of one democracy on another is perfectly legitimate. This would be the case, for example, when the effects are too insignificant to require any debate. Determining the range of legitimate impact is a core question of transnational constitutional law. Any such determination presupposes mutually shared interest definitions. More often than not, however, the relevant interest definitions underlying universalisation are debatable. Therefore, it appears to be inevitable, at first glance, to have relations of transnational interdependency matched by transnational democratic processes. The article then goes on to identify three different types of universalitation with reference to what can be regarded as their respective anchor. Simple universalisation is based upon shared interest definitions. Reflexive universalisation involves common views of oneself (and others). Self‐transcending universalisation is grounded in the desire to live in a free society. Reflexive universalisation requires to extend mutual sympathy. From this perspective, transnational democratic processes are tantamount to nation‐building. However, one would commit a sentimentalist fallacy if one were to conclude that mutual sympathy in and of itself engenders an expansion of mutual responsibility. The article argues that with regard to the third type of universalisation the institutionalisation of transnational democratic procedures cannot be justified. It would threaten to undermine various conceptions of a free society. It is argued that for the sake of the realisation of equal citizenship the argument from transnational effects actually needs to endorse the existence of bounded democratic communities. Unbounded transnational democracy would exercise an adverse effect on citizenship. It also turns out that the argument from transnational effects, in its uncorrected form, remains haunted by the dilemma that the type of democracy that is envisaged by it becomes easily absorbed by administrative processes. The article concludes that the argument from transnational effects, correctly understood, has a more modest import than its proponents would have us believe. Rather than supporting the release of democracy from its national bounds, it helps to explain why the co‐existence of bounded democratic polities remains essential to equal citizenship. More forceful versions of transnational integration graft onto political societies elements that are not genuinely democratic and strangely reminiscent of different forms of rule. These are forms of rule that Aristotle would not have called ‘political’, for they do not involve the exercise of power by equals over equals.     

The rule of law as a catalyst for sustainable democracy in Nigeria

Democracy and the rule of law are the pillars of sustainable development and the guarantee of fundamental freedoms in any society. The rule of law is one of the prerequisites to creating an enabling environment that supports socio‐economic growth and political development. The future of democracy rests with the ability of democratic governments to observe the rule of law. The rule of law is the fulcrum of democracy and the pillar upon which the structures of democracy stands. This article examines the crucial importance of the rule of law as a catalyst for the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria.     

中国法治的人文道路

现时代需要一种融合中西人文主义之精髓、兼济人的认知理性与道德理性的新人文主义。从人文主义的视角看,道德人文维度与民主政治维度是构建中国法治需要着力加强的两个方面。在法治发展道路上,中国需要协调好法治的道德、功利、政治与行政四个层面,沿着自身的文化传统,打造政治和社会的理性与道德基础,开拓一种具有厚重人文底蕴的"道德的民主法治",实现仁义道德与自然权利、民主法治在现代的历史衔接。     

论以民主为基础的社会主义法治建设

民主是社会主义法治国家建设的目标,法治对社会主义国家的民主、稳定和发展发挥着重要的作用。本文分析了法治内部的整体性和外部联系,阐明了社会主义民主与法治建设的内在联系及我国建设以民主为基础的法制国家的艰巨性。探讨了推进我国民主法治建设的路径。     

法治国家下的少数人的特别权利

“多数与少数的关系”是民主理论、民主政治和法治国家的核心论题。满足不同的民族、族裔、宗教和语言群体的愿望并确保属于少数群体的人的权利,是法治国家的基本要求。现代民主政治体制和法治国家下促进和保护属于少数群体的人的权利的规定包括禁止歧视和少数人的特别权利。这些基于现代民主政治和法治国家下的平等理念已经成为国际社会的共识而在国际条约中得到了具体体现,集中体现在《在民族或族裔、宗教和语言上属于少数群体的人的权利宣言》。     

法治与人性尊严——从实践到理论的反思

作为现代民主宪政社会不可或缺的生活形态,法治的意义及其核心价值,不论在具体法律实践或抽象理论阐述上,却依然存在着极大争议。"大法官会议"以人性尊严为本的法治观点,毋宁是一种"自由民主宪政秩序"的法治观点。无论是形式合法性或民主程序的法治要件,均无法在法治的具体实践上,保证执政者或立法者不会借助法治的形式要件,来追求满足其政治野心或个人私欲的不正当目的。法治理想的追求,应当着重法律实质内容的道德论证质量。就人性尊严的内涵来说,德沃金提出的两项人性尊严原则,内在价值原则与个人责任原则,确实是值得我们反思借镜的理论资源;特别是,他对人的内在价值的诠释,亦即人具有由自然与人类共同创造的神圣、不可侵犯的客观价值,适足以填补大法官人性尊严观的论述盲点。     

Promoting Whole-Process People’s Democracy Following the Rule of Law

Whole-process people’s democracy profoundly reflects the features of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics, and comprehensively and systematically reveals the concept of people’s democracy as providing important mechanisms of national and social governance. Based on the traditional democratic understanding of democracy as majority rule, whole-process people’s democracy emphasizes the universality and extensive range of democratic governance, but also has the natural value defects of democratic value itself. Therefore, we must organically combine democracy with the values of the rule of law and human rights, to build a well-defined governance order based on people’s democratic value. The whole process in the “whole-process people’s democracy” has really resolved the situation of people’s “absence” from many links of state power operation caused by over-emphasizing the election-democracy in the Western capitalist democratic system. Through the people’s extensive participation and effective supervision, the state power operation mechanism based on the fundamental political system, the people’s congress system, has been ensured to be always in the framework of people’s democratic governance. This effectively realizes the people’s sovereignty and is consistent with the declaration that “all power in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) belongs to the people,” stipulated in the Constitution of China. To improve the governance efficiency of whole-process people’s democracy in practice, we must bring it onto the rule of law, and use the rule of law philosophy and methods to reasonably and effectively resolve all kinds of theoretical and practical problems.     

The Rule of Law and Authoritarian Rule: Legal Politics in Sudan

Mark Fathi, Massoud . 2013 . Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan . Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxii + 265. $109.99 cloth, $34.99 paper. Does the rule of law guarantee peace and democracy, as so many people in the development and governance field believe? What are the historical and sociocultural conditions that shape the way rule of law mechanisms work in practice? Mark Massoud's monograph tracing the changing dimensions of the rule of law in Sudan from its colonial period to the present offers an important perspective on these questions, casting doubt on the simple argument that the rule of law produces democracy and peace. Instead, he shows how colonial and authoritarian rulers used the rule of law to consolidate power and legitimate their rule. In Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan, Massoud develops the concept of legal politics, arguing that the way the rule of law works varies with the political system in which it is embedded. He concludes that the forms of legal politics that reinforce the power and authority of legal institutions are more likely to sustain an authoritarian state than to bring democratic rule. His analysis is a valuable caution to those who promote the rule of law as the salvation for all. Taking a sociolegal perspective, he shows how it works in practice.     

The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy

The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom.     

领导、法治与政治文明建设

党的领导、人民民主、依法治国是社会主义政治文明的三个基本要素。在我国政治文明体系中 ,党的领导是前提 ,人民民主是核心 ,依法治国是保证。这三个要素是不可分割的。它们共同构成了社会主义政治文明建设的有机统一的整体。     

The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Freedom of Movement

This article and its sequel examine an argument that has become a shibboleth for the European pro‐attitude towards international and supranational legal arrangements. I call it the argument from transnational effects. The argument says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for one another. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. Since the argument favours normative limitations on national political processes it seems to lend strong support to the introduction of transnational constitutional discipline. In this article and its sequel it is claimed that the argument, correctly understood, cannot support the creation of transnational democracy. Rather, in a critically recalibrated form, the argument, paradoxically, provides strong backing for the existence of bounded political communities without, for that reason, succumbing to ontologically questionable beliefs about the essence of national communities. Hence, the argument is really as much about the limits set to transnational integration as it is about their legitimacy. This explains why it is of central relevance to constitutionalism in a global age. The opening sections of this article offer an interpretation of John Hart Ely's constitutional theory. Examining the latter helps to articulate adequately the democratic sensibility expressed in the argument. It is argued that Ely's theory exceeds the scope of a mere theory of judicial review. It presents, indeed, a theory of constitutional authority, which is highly relevant to an analysis of the argument from transnational effects. The article then distinguishes and discusses two different readings of the representation‐reinforcing task that Ely attributes to constitutional legality. According to one reading, representation is secondary and only ancillary to the realisation of equality. According to another reading, equal participation is prerequisite to the success of representative democracy whose aim is to discover common ground. It is concluded that the first reading is easier to accommodate in a transnational setting. It will be seen that Ely's theory—at any rate, the first reading of it—is basically concerned with the problem addressed by the argument from transnational effects. This article's discussion of the argument distinguishes two different types of situation. A third, more general type will be dealt with in a subsequent article. The first situation affects people who realise that they would be better off if they were to benefit from the laws of a different democracy. Hence, they would like to have these laws imported. It is argued that their interests do not find support in the argument from transnational effects. The second situation concerns someone who encounters obstacles when moving from one democracy to another. Such obstacles can emerge either as a result of discrimination against non‐nationals or from the sheer fact that laws between and among bounded societies are different. The antidote against the latter is to submit national legislation to a proportionality test. Even though reinforcing representation prima facie seems to support this conclusion, the article claims that virtual representation, correctly understood, actually restricts the sweep of constitutional control to cases of behavioural discrimination. Extending the scope of control would actually violate the respect that it is owed to national democratic autonomy pursuant to the principle of virtual representation. It is also shown that only by limiting its sweep the argument from transnational effects can be prevented from endorsing neoliberal political goals.     

新权威主义、立宪政体与东亚法治转型

20世纪70年代东亚国家的新权威主义政体在政治集权、经济自由、开放意识形态的基础上实现了经济飞跃和社会发展。虽然新权威主义政体并不排斥民主和法治,且宪法均获得了名义上的权威,但由于经济发展和社会稳定的优先战略,东亚国家政治结构呈现出民主工具主义和"国家主义法治"的症状。在20世纪末期的第三波民主化浪潮中,东亚各国通过立宪主义的方式实现了民主主义的政治转型。     

陶行知治校实践中的民主与法治思想论略

为培养学生参与未来民主政治的能力,陶行知强调学校要实行民主管理.同时,陶行知也认为,学校管理中的民主与法治是不可分的.在育才学校的创办和治理实践中,陶行知从保障学校成员的权利和立法、行政、司法相制衡的角度考虑学校中管理机构、权力分配和工作程序的设计,体现了民主与法治相结合的原则.陶行知的这种治校的民主与法治思想对于当前我国提倡的依法治校实践具有多方面的启示.     

政府与议会间立法互动关系之评价标准

政府与议会间的立法互动关系问题,不仅是一个立法问题,而且是一个宪政问题.评价政府与议会间立法互动关系的标准有三,即宪政民主的基本价值标准、产生良法的能力的标准和实效标准.其中宪政民主的基本价值主要包括:人权、民主、法治和控权;产生良法的能力的标准要求能产生基于可靠的信息基础性,具有及时性、融贯性、有效性和回应性的良法;实效标准,即实践检验标准,是指一种制度安排是否在现实中有效地运行,并实现其原初设计之功用和目标.     

Liberalism and Minority Rights. An Interview

The interview focuses on Kymlicka's major area of research, i.e., the issue of minority rights. Kymlicka explains why the rights of national minorities have been traditionally neglected in the Western political tradition. He argues that these rights promote individual freedom, and so should be seen as promoting liberal democratic principles. The interview covers many issues including the relationship between ethno-cultural groups and other forms of "identity politics"; how to individuate cultural groups with legitimate claims to minority rights; whether something like a "cosmopolitan view" can seriously challenge the need for minority rights; what are the dangers of building transnational political institutions such as the EU for democratic citizenship; what are the bases of social unity in multination states and what are the limits of toleration of illiberal minorities.     

论西方法治政府的理念逻辑及其借鉴价值

西方法治政府理念具有人类普遍的进步性,它保护人权以申张个人自由,实行民主政制以维护公民政治权利,实行法治以匡正政府权力界限。西方法治政府理念历经共和主义、民主主义、自由主义、法治主义到服务主义的演进过程。其中,共和主义确立政府形式,民主主义解决主权归属和政府合法性,自由主义表征政府目的,法治主义护佑公民权利,服务主义标明政府行为理性。这些理念对我国的法治政府建设具有重要的借鉴价值。     

Criminal Justice in a Democracy: Towards a Relational Conception of Criminal Law and Punishment

This article starts from the observation that in classical Athens the discovery of democracy as a normative model of politics has been from the beginning not only a political and a legal but at the same time a philosophical enterprise. Reflections on the concept of criminal law and on the meaning of punishment can greatly benefit from reflections on Athenian democracy as a germ for our contemporary debate on criminal justice in a democracy. Three main characteristics of the Athenian model will be analysed: the self-instituting capacity of a democracy based on participatory and reflective citizenship, political power as the capacity of citizens for co-operating and co-acting with others, and the crime of hubris as one of the key issues in Athenian criminal law. These analyses will lead to the conclusion that one of the key issues of a democratic legal order lies in its capacity of recognizing the fragility of the human condition and of developing workable and effective standards of justice in that context. A relational conception of criminal law and punishment, based on proportionality, reflexivity, mutual respect and responsibility fits best with a democracy under the rule of law.

宪政视域下的党内民主

党内民主具有丰富的内涵,从宪政视角来看,就是在宪法法律框架内,全体党员都有权按照民主的程序和形式,平等地直接或间接地决定党内一切重大事务。将党内民主纳入宪政视野,对于巩固执政党的地位、建设法治国家都具有十分重要的意义,因此在宪政视域下加强党内民主建设,就要坚持和改善党的领导制度、保障党员主体地位和民主权利并进一步健全和完善党内民主的制度体系。     

Balancing Security and Democracy, and the Role of Expertise: Biometrics Politics in the European Union

What is the relationship between security policies and democratic debate, oversight and rights? Does coping with security threats require exceptions to the rule of law and reductions of liberties? The inquiry that follows tries to answer such questions in the context of the European Union and takes the case of biometric identification, an area were security considerations and the possible impact on fundamental rights and the rule of law are at stake. Some hypotheses are explored through the case study: “securitisation” and “democratisation” are in tension but some hybrid strategies can emerge; the plurality of “authoritative actors” influences policy frames and outcomes; and knowledge is a key asset in defining these authoritative actors. A counter-intuitive conclusion is presented, namely that biometrics, which seems prima facie an excellent candidate for technocratic decision-making, sheltered from democratic debate and accountability – is characterised by debate by a plurality of actors. Such pluralism is limited to those actors who have the resources – including knowledge – that allow for inclusion in policy making at EU level, but is nevertheless significant in shaping policy; it explains the central role of the metaphor of balancing security and democracy, as well as the “competitive cooperation” between new and more consolidated policy areas. The EU is facing another difficult challenge in the attempt at establishing itself as a new security actor and as a supranational democratic polity: important choices are at stake to assure that citizens’ security is pursued on the basis of the rule of law, respect of fundamental rights and democratic accountability.     

Common Wealth

After reviewing developments in human rights law and international law – in particular the domestication of international human rights law and the rise of the democratic norm in international law – the importance of these developments for the Commonwealth and for its member states is highlighted and linked to many of the programmes and policies that the Commonwealth Secretariat has recently launched. This paper discusses these developments and others in order to stress the wealth of potential advantages for Commonwealth member states and their citizens that flow from a common commitment under the rule of law to human rights and democracy. The authors endeavour to show that such wealth is more than mere economic benefit – as important as that undoubtedly is – and that citizens stand to reap a moral system of government, one which expands the opportunities for popular participation in political processes and puts an end to social practices that marginalise some citizens and empower others.