A program to improve analytic methods related to strategic forces

In an effort to improve the strategic assessment capabilities of the U.S. Department of Defense, contractors were asked to integrate advanced wargaming techniques with other analytic approaches. This paper sets out the deficiences in past and current analysis methods which the project sponsor wished to have the contractors address.     

兵团农产品绿色营销战略探析

农产品绿色营销发展成为世界农产品市场营销新动向.兵团要大力发展绿色农业,在农业领域必须贯彻绿色营销观念,才能不断提升兵团农业的持续竞争力,实现农业可持续发展.本文分析了兵团农产品绿色营销现状与意义,提出兵团农产品兵团农产品绿色营销战略及措施.     

Transitioning policy: co-production of a new strategic framework for energy innovation policy in the Netherlands

This article describes policy–science interactions in a transition process in which we were involved as scientists. We describe the interactions that occurred in a project for the fourth National Environmental Policy Plan in the Netherlands. The project was successful in that it produced a new concept and set of principles for policy to deal with persistent problems such as global climate change, which were used in the national policy plan. The new concept was that of transition and the principles were: policy integration, long-term thinking for short-term action, keeping multiple options open and learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning. Retrospectively, we ask ourselves: what factors facilitated the acceptance of the first ideas about transition management? Reconstructing the events and drawing on interviews with key individuals involved, we have tried to find the key factors for the adoption of the ideas developed in the project. Finally, we reflect upon our role as scientists-advisors and the role of others in the development of a new story line and set of principles for policy. Our own assessment, 8 years later, is that we were engaged in boundary work.     

General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch

The Colonel Blotto game captures strategic situations in which players attempt to mismatch an opponent’s action. We extend Colonel Blotto to a class of General Blotto games that allow for more general payoffs and externalities between fronts. These extensions make Blotto applicable to a variety of real-world problems. We find that like Colonel Blotto, most General Blotto games do not have pure strategy equilibria. Using a replicator dynamics learning model, we show that General Blotto may have more predictable dynamics than the original Blotto game. Thus, adding realistic structure to Colonel Blotto may, paradoxically, make it less complex.     

Sincere and strategic voters: An Israeli study

The theoretical literature on voting behavior has shown that a rational voter may sometimes decide to vote for a candidate or party that does not constitute his or her first preference. Such voters are traditionally called strategic voters, in contrast to voters who act sincerely, i.e., those who always vote for their first preference regardless of how others are likely to vote. After discussing some of the problems associated with the definition of these two types of voters and suggesting a new operational definition, some attitudes and characteristics of these two types of voters are investigated. It was found that strategic voters constitute a very small percentage of the entire electorate, that their education level is significantly higher than that of sincere voters, that they tend more often to believe that polls influence voters' decisions and hence tend to delay their own final voting decision, that they tend more often than sincere voters to support small parties but do not tend more often than sincere voters to switch the party they decide to support from one election to the next, and that there is no significant difference between them and sincere voters regarding which governing coalition should/will form following an election.     

Overcoming strategic weakness: The Egyptian deception and the Yom Kippur War 1

Analysis of the Egyptian deception on the eve of the October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War serves to illuminate operational rationale, which may guide future strategic deception models and processes. The Egyptians used deception to neutralize two Israeli ‘strong points’ that might jeopardize the crossing of the Suez Canal: the capacity for a preemptive strike and deployment in strength in the Canal region. The deception aimed to minimize Israel's ‘early warning space’, delaying the moment of decision-making and slowing down the IDF's operational response. Implementing a dual technique of concealing and misleading, the deception lulled the Israeli early warning system, the linchpin of its security doctrine, into accepting the (wrong) alternative option. The deception gained the upper hand because it corresponded – even if unintentionally – with the fundamental perception maintained by the victim, contributing to winning the first round of the surprise attack.     

Symposium: Policy analysis for congress. Policy analysis for congress: Lengthening the time horizon

Policy analysis for the Congress is a timely subject. Several policy initiatives have emerged recently from the “first branch.” Others have demonstrated an independent capacity for analysis that is impressive by historical standards. This article introduces a practitioner symposium of three related works on policy analysis for Congress, with appropriate commentary by a distinguished veteran. It argues that because timing is crucial in the congressional policy process, anticipation and advance preparation are central to the effective use of analysis. The other articles illustrate the stages of advance preparation—of the policy analyst, the congressional environment, and the Member for voting—in the form of case studies.     

Elections and the strategic use of budget deficits

We present a model in which a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending can strategically run a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from choosing high public spending if elected, and possibly also to ensure his own reelection. We find that the incumbent never manipulates the opposition candidate??s public spending if he can ensure his own reelection; and that a conservative incumbent who runs a budget deficit to ensure his reelection may somewhat paradoxically choose high public spending before the election.     

Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament

The Norwegian parliament uses a sequential voting procedure. After some general remarks on how the legislature can avoid strategic voting by choosing an appropriate voting order, and an exposition of the rules whereby the agenda is determined in this particular parliament, voting order manipulation is examined. A manipulative actor tries to bring about voting sequences in accordance with his interests, but contrary to the putative will of other actors. An example illustrates how manipulation may take place in practice, but it is stressed that the realm of manipulation easily escapes empirical analysis. To grasp the different types of manipulation in legislative voting, models are needed that are rich in institutional detail.     

Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer

Laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent-defending activity on rent-seeking auction outcomes. In part, Nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide: As predicted, more rents are dissipated in perfectly-discriminating auctions, where the high-bidder wins, than in lotteries, where relative bids determine the chance of winning. Also as predicted, the introduction of a rent-defending buyer reduces social costs. Nevertheless, the social costs of rent-seeking consistently exceed predicted levels. Moreover, individual bidding, especially by buyers, deviates markedly from Nash predictions.