Horses or unicorns: can paying for performance make quality competition routine?

The competitive benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) financial incentives are widely assumed. These incentives can affect health care through several mechanisms, however, not all of which involve competition. This insight has three implications. First, federal antitrust enforcement should continue to scrutinize P4P arrangements. Second, government needs to play a larger role in P4P than through antitrust oversight. Third, widespread enthusiasm for a particular health policy reform does not relieve policy makers of the obligation to understand its theoretical basis.     

The political management of managed care: explaining variations in state health maintenance organization regulations

In the 1990s, strong incentives for managed care organizations to control costs, once regarded as a fortuitous confluence of interests, came to be seen as antithetical to consumers' interests in quality of care. In response to this change in political climate, many states have greatly increased their regulatory control of managed care organizations since the mid-1990s. This activity is surprising in an era when public policy on health care issues is usually described as frozen, gridlocked, and/or stalemated as a result of intense activity on the part of organized interests. We take advantage of the variation in state regulations of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to discover why some governments are able to address policy problems that are often perceived as intractable in a political if not in a true policy sense. From the history of HMOs, the backlash against managed care, and state responses to that backlash, we first extract a number of hypotheses about state regulatory activity. We then test these hypotheses with data on regulatory adoptions by states during the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Last, we discuss the findings with special attention to the role of politics in health care.     

Managed competition versus industrial purchasing of health care among the Fortune 500

The theory of managed competition has found favor with many health policy analysts and academic economists alike. Three characteristics--consumer choice, defined contribution, and dissemination of information--signal managed competition strategy. By requiring private employers to provide their employees with a choice of health carriers, a fixed-dollar strategy (defined contribution), and quality information to make appropriate choices among carriers, managed competition offers to remedy imperfections in both the consumer and provider sides of the market for health insurance. In an extensive survey of health care purchasing practices among Fortune 500 companies we found that major companies are not using the managed competition approach to health care purchasing. Instead, most of the companies surveyed are purchasing health care in the same way as they do other inputs to production--a pattern we call industrial purchasing.     

The Hermann Hospital closing agreement. Is informal guidance better than no guidance at all?

Creating barriers to communications between the IRS and the tax-exempt health care community is particularly troubling in this time of fundamental change. As exempt hospitals around the country gear up to provide service in a managed care environment, they are becoming involved in new forms of integrated delivery systems for which there is an utter lack of guidance. If the IRS is to formulate effective policy on questions involving the creation of these new health care entities, it needs to be aware of the dynamics and economic incentives at work in a managed care environment and how these incentives and dynamics differ from those in a fee-for-service context. The Hermann Hospital experience seems altogether contrary to these objectives.     

Preferred providers and the credible commitment problem in health insurance: first experiences with the implementation of managed competition in the Dutch health care system

We investigate the impact of the transition towards managed competition in the Dutch health care system on health insurers' contracting behaviour. Specifically, we examine whether insurers have been able to take up their role as prudent buyers of care and examine consumers' attitudes towards insurers' new role. Health insurers' contracting behaviour is investigated by an extensive analysis of available information on purchasing practices by health insurers and by interviews with directors of health care purchasing of the four major health insurers, accounting for 90% of the market. Consumer attitudes towards insurers' new role are investigated by surveys among a representative sample of enrollees over the period 2005-2009. During the first four years of the reform, health insurers were very reluctant to engage in selective contracting and preferred to use 'soft' positive incentives to encourage preferred provider choice rather than engaging in restrictive managed care activities. Consumer attitudes towards channelling vary considerably by type of provider but generally became more negative in the first two years after the reform. Insurers' reluctance to use selective contracting can be at least partly explained by the presence of a credible-commitment problem. Consumers do not trust that insurers with restrictive networks are committed to provide good quality care. The credible-commitment problem seems to be particularly relevant to the Netherlands, since Dutch enrollees are not used to restrictions on provider choice. Since consumers are quite sensitive to differences in provider quality, more reliable information about provider quality is required to reduce the credible-commitment problem.     

Legislative responses to managed care pressures

Changes brought about by the increasing presence of managed care have sparked responses in a number of states. While proponents of managed care contend that it fosters competition and allows the market to influence its nature and functioning, the legislators' responses call into question the notion that managed care will bring greater freedom to insurers and providers and, at the same time, will benefit health care consumers.     

Physicians' conflicts of interest in Japan and the United States: lessons for the United States

Japanese health policy shows that even with physician ownership and the absence of for-profit, investor-owned health care, physicians' conflicts of interest thrive. Physician dispensing of drugs and ownership of hospitals and clinics were justified in Japan as ways to avoid commercialization of medicine. Instead, they create physicians' conflicts and fuel patient overuse of services. Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) has responded by introducing per-diem payment, thereby creating incentives to decrease services in ways similar to those of American managed care organizations, but with none of their benefits, such as coordination of care, oversight of physicians practices, and quality assurance. Although the United States and Japanese health care systems are organized and financed differently there is convergence in the source of their physicians' conflicts and the way they are addressed. The United States is starting to integrate institutional and physician payment and align their incentives, in a traditional Japanese way. In so doing, the United States creates new physicians' conflicts and reduces the role of countervailing incentives and power, an advantage of previous policy. Japan, in turn, has combined incentives to increase and decrease services, thus moving closer to the U.S. policy.     

The politics of managed competition: public abuse of the private interest

The doctrine of managed competition in health care sought to achieve the social goals of access and efficiency using market incentives and consumer choice rather than governmental regulation and public administration. In retrospect, it demanded too much from both the public and the private sectors. Rather than develop choice-supporting rules and institutions, the public sector has promoted process regulation and benefit mandates. The private health insurance sector has pursued short-term profitability rather than cooperate in the development of fair competition and informed consumer choice. Purchasers have subsidized inefficient insurance designs in order to exploit tax and regulatory loopholes and to retain an image of corporate paternalism. America's health care system suffers from the public abuse of private interests and the private abuse of the public interest.     

Nondecision making and inertia in Portuguese health policy

Despite there having been a positive context for initiating health care reforms in Portugal in the past fifteen years (accompanied by political consensus on the nature of the structural problems within the health care system), there has been a lack of reform initiatives. We use a process-based framework to show how institutional arrangements have influenced Portuguese health care reform. Evidence is presented to demonstrate inertia and nondecision making in three critical areas of Portuguese health policy: clarifying the public-private mix in coverage and provision, creating financial incentives and motivation for human resources, and introducing changes in the pharmaceutical market. Several factors seem to explain these processes, namely, problems in the balance of power within the political system, which have contributed to a lack of proper policy discussion; a lack of pluralism in the formation of health care policies (with low participation from citizens and high mobilization among structural interest groups); and the low priority of health care in public sector reforms. Portuguese politicians should be aware of the pitfalls of the current political system that constrain participatory arrangements and pluralism in policy making. In order to pursue health care reform, future governments will need to counterbalance the strong influence of structural interest groups.     

Media framing and political advertising in the Patients' Bill of Rights debate

The purpose of this article is to assess the influence of interest groups over news content. In particular, I explore the possibility that political advertising campaigns affect the tenor and framing of newspaper coverage in health policy debates. To do so, I compare newspaper coverage of the Patients' Bill of Rights debate in 1999 in five states that were subject to extensive advertising campaigns with coverage in five comparison states that were not directly exposed to the advocacy campaigns. I find significant differences in coverage depending on the presence or absence of paid advertising campaigns, and conclude that readers were exposed to different perspectives and arguments about managed care regulation if the newspapers they read were published in states targeted by political advertisements. Specifically, newspaper coverage was 17 percent less likely to be supportive of managed care reform in states subject to advertising campaigns designed to foment opposition to the Patients' Bill of Rights. Understanding the ability of organized interests and political actors to successfully promote their preferred issue frames in a dynamic political environment is particularly important in light of the proliferation of interest groups, the prevalence of multimillion-dollar political advertising campaigns, and the health care reform debate under President Barack Obama.     

Why some market reforms lack legitimacy in health care

Market-oriented health policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s generally included five kinds of proposals: increased cost sharing for patients through user fees, the separation of purchaser-provider functions, management reforms of hospitals, provider competition, and vouchers for purchasing health insurance. These policies are partly derived from agency theory and a model of managed competition in health insurance. The essay reviews the course of reform in five countries that had a national health service model in place in the late 1980s: Italy, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Special consideration is given to New Zealand, where the market model was extensively adopted but short lived. In New Zealand, surveys and polls are compared to archival records of reformers' deliberations. Voters saw health care differently from elites, and voters particularly felt that health care was ill suited to commercialization. There are similarities across all five countries in what has been adopted and rejected. Some market reforms are more legitimate than others. Reforms based on resolving principal-agent problems, including purchaser-provider splits and managerial reforms, have been more successful, although cost sharing has not. Competition-based reforms in financing and to a lesser extent in provision have not gained legitimacy. Most voters in these countries see health care as different from other parts of the economy and view managerial reforms differently from policies that try to make health care more like other sectors.     

Determining health care rights from behind a veil of ignorance

Should our society establish positive rights to health care that each citizen could claim, as many health policy analysts believe? Or should it provide only background rules of contract and property law and leave the provision of health care to the free market, as Richard Epstein advocates in Mortal Peril? In this article, Professor Korobkin argues that this question should be addressed from the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" perspective. That is, the question should be answered by asking what kind of society would individuals agree to form if they had no knowledge of their individual skills or endowments; if they did not know whether they were rich or poor, healthy or sick, weak or strong. Professor Korobkin contends that individuals behind such a veil of ignorance would balance their inherent risk aversion (which favors a safety net of "rights") against the inefficient incentives created by rights regimes that would reduce net social wealth (which favors a free market). Whether they would choose to establish rights to health care or not is ultimately an empirical question that turns on how inefficient any particular right would be. The question thus requires a case-by-case analysis of proposed rights. The article then considers the policy issues of (1) community rating of private health insurance and (2) the mandated provision of emergency medical care. It concludes that in these cases the inefficient incentives created by establishing rights are probably smaller and/or controllable enough to lead individuals behind the veil of ignorance to favor a regime of positive rights.     

Physicians' decisions to limit Medicaid participation: determinants and policy implications

Although most primary care physicians participate in state Medicaid programs, they may accept all Medicaid patients, or they may choose to limit their participation. This decision allows physicians to adjust their Medicaid caseloads to a desired level, and it has important implications for the access of low-income patients to health care. Surveys of pediatricians in 1978 and 1983 indicate that the proportion of pediatricians limiting their Medicaid participation increased significantly from 26 percent to 35 percent (p less than .001). In addition, in both 1978 and 1983, limited participants saw significantly fewer Medicaid patients than full participants. This paper describes a number of strategies available to federal and state policymakers for fostering full Medicaid participation. Multivariate analyses indicate that increasing reimbursement levels is an important strategy for encouraging full Medicaid participation. In addition, full participants will increase their Medicaid caseloads in response to a variety of Medicaid policy incentives, while limited participants are found to respond to fewer policy incentives. The authors conclude that caution will be needed to ensure that health care cost-containment strategies such as capitation or selective contracting do not inadvertently discourage participation among both full and limited Medicaid participants.     

When methods meet politics: how risk adjustment became part of Medicare managed care

Health-based risk adjustment has long been touted as key to the success of competitive models of health care. Because it decreases the incentive to enroll only healthy patients in insurance plans, risk adjustment was incorporated into Medicare policy via the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. However, full implementation of risk adjustment was delayed due to clashes with the managed care industry over payment policy, concerns over perverse incentives, and problems of data burden. We review the history of risk adjustment leading up to the Balanced Budget Act and examine the controversies surrounding attempts to stop or delay its implementation during the years that followed. The article provides lessons for the future of health-based risk adjustment and possible alternatives.     

The use of expensive health technologies in the era of managed care: the remarkable case of neonatal intensive care

The use of neonatal intensive care (NIC) continued to rise rapidly in the 1990s despite the concerns of observers about its cost effectiveness and its successes being mostly in facilities with high volume and capabilities. The objective of this study is to test the effects of insurance type, competition among hospitals, and market pressure from managed care plans on the supply and cost of NIC. The analysis uses logistic and linear models with techniques to avoid bias from (a) market area definitions based on actual patient flows and (b) self-selection of hospitals by patients with unmeasured risk of needing NIC. The data source contains all births in short-term hospitals in New Jersey during 1990 and 1994. Both the number of days and charges for NIC are reported. Key findings are that the decision of a hospital to offer NIC was associated with teaching status, the proportion of infants in the market area with documented high risk, and the market concentration of major competitors. The market share of managed care plans and the concentration of enrollment were not associated with either NIC being offered or with the standardized charges. Whether a particular patient was given to a NIC depended on patient risk factors and whether a NIC unit was present, but not on payer group. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that young insured parents (with the advice of their obstetricians) prefer hospitals with NIC and also are relatively profitable enrollees for health plans. In conclusion: using the results here and in other research, public and private policy makers may consider several ways to strengthen the incentives for health plans to contract for cost-effective birth-related services. The results also raise questions for a number of regulatory and payment policies and call for better public data on costs and outcomes for NIC.     

Leading the health policy orchestra: the need for an intergovernmental partnership

The past decade provides a useful window through which to examine whether states are likely to provide health care leadership. During this era, states were given increased discretion to set health care policy, they had the financial resources to encourage innovation, and their administrative capacity was at its strongest ever. Despite the favorable conditions, however, states were reluctant to spend their own funds on programs for the uninsured, their efforts to make private insurance more affordable for the small business community were disappointing, and their efforts to regulate the managed care industry fell short. At the same time, though, the most promising innovations over the past decade were in programs financed primarily with federal dollars, administered primarily by state officials, and advanced by an intergovernmental partnership in which administrators at different levels of government prod each other to try and do more. This sort of intergovernmental partnership provides the best model for innovative health policy leadership.     

The changing process and politics of health policy in Korea

Korea recently introduced three major health care reforms: in financing (1999), pharmaceuticals (2000), and provider payment (2001). In these three reforms, new government policies merged more than 350 health insurance societies into a single payer, separated drug prescribing by physicians from dispensing by pharmacists, and attempted to introduce a new prospective payment system. This essay compares the three reforms in Korea and draws important lessons about the country's changing process and politics of health care policy. The change of government, the president's keen interest in health policy, and democratization in the public policy process toward a more pluralist context opened a policy window for reform. Civic groups played an active role in the policy process by shaping the proposals for reform-a major change from the previous policy process that was dominated by government bureaucrats. The three reforms also showed important differences in the role of interest groups. Strong support by the rural population and labor unions contributed to the financing reform. In the pharmaceutical reform, which was a big threat to physician income, the president and civic groups succeeded in quickly setting the reform agenda; the medical profession was unable to block the adoption of the reform but their strikes influenced the content of the reform during implementation. Physician strikes also helped block the implementation of the payment reform. Future reform efforts in Korea will need to consider the political management of vested interest groups and the design of strategies for both scope and sequencing of policy reforms.     

Reform and remembrance: the place of the private sector in the future of health care policy

Although the nation failed during the past decade to enact large-scale, structural change in government health policy, it has seen health care in the private sector remodeled dramatically during the same period. In this article I argue that a new round of equally significant changes is quite possible, this time at the hands of the national government. More specifically, I argue that for a variety of reasons, both enduring and more recently born, support for the private sector and the market in health care is relatively weak: that given likely trends in costs, demographics, and inequalities, it is likely to get even weaker; and that in the potential coming crisis of the health care system. there will be a real opportunity for seizing the agenda and winning policy battles on the part of would-be reformers pushing large-scale, public sector-oriented changes that go well beyond the recent reform efforts directed at managed care and HMOs.     

The patient protection and affordable care act: the victory of unorthodox lawmaking

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was a major legislative achievement of the 111th Congress. This law structurally reforms the US health care system by encouraging universal health care coverage through regulated competition among private insurance companies. When looking at the process for reform, what strikes an observer of US health care policy in the first place is that the Democratic majority was able to enact something in a political field characterized by strong resistance to change. This article builds on that observation. Arguments concentrate on the legislative process of the reform and support the idea that it may be partly explained by considering an evolution of US legislative institutions, mostly in the sense of a more centralized legislative process. Based on approximately one hundred semidirected interviews, I argue that the Democratic majority, building on lessons from both President Bill Clinton's health care reform attempt and the Republicans' strategy of using strong congressional leadership to pass social reforms, was able to overcome institutional constraints that have long prevented comprehensive change. A more centralized legislative process, which has been described as "unorthodox lawmaking," enabled the Democratic leadership to overcome multiple institutional and political veto players.