Respect for Persons in Bioethics: Towards a Human Rights-Based Account

Human rights have increasingly been put forward as an important framework for bioethics. In this paper, it is argued that human rights offer a potentially fruitful approach to understanding the notion of Respect for Persons in bioethics. The idea that we are owed a certain kind of respect as persons is relatively common, but also quite often understood in terms of respecting people’s autonomous choices. Such accounts do however risk being too narrow, reducing some human beings to a second-class moral status. This paper puts forward a political approach to our standing as persons and a strongly pluralistic account of human rights that lays the ground for a more broadly applicable conception of Respect for Persons. It is further argued that this model also provides an example of a more general approach to philosophical ethics, an approach which is here called taxonomical pluralism. When it comes to Respect for Persons specifically, this principle is developed in terms of five distinct core concerns (autonomy, dignity, integrity, privacy, and vulnerability).     

Political rights,republican freedom,and temporary workers

I defend a neo-republican account of the right to have political rights. Neo-republican freedom from domination is a sufficient condition for the extension of political rights not only for permanent residents, but also for temporary residents, unauthorized migrants, and some expatriates. I argue for the advantages of the neo-republican account over the social membership account, the affected-interest account, the stakeholder account, and accounts based on the justification of state coercion.     

Fictitious Freedom: A Polanyian Critique of the Republican Revival

Prominent republican theorists invoke anonymous orders such as the market as mechanisms that secure freedom as non‐domination. Drawing on Karl Polanyi's account of fictitious commodities and demonstration of the impossibility of a just and rational market society, this article critically scrutinizes neo‐republican assumptions regarding the market, develops an alternate social theory within which to situate the ideal of non‐domination, and illustrates the importance of this reconfiguration for the kind of collective agents and political strategies that can be expected to advance republican freedom in the economy.     

Republican liberty and border controls

This article examines the normative status of border controls from a neo-republican perspective, grounded in the value of freedom as non-domination. It makes use of Philip Pettit’s account of this kind of freedom and discusses Pettit’s own remarks on the status of border controls. Against Pettit, it argues that the domination generated by border controls is ineliminable given existing political institutions, because such controls cannot avoid subjecting non-citizens to coercion in ways that are not forced to track their interests. The article also argues for an alternative neo-republican account of border controls that does not deny their coerciveness but allows for certain border control policies in non-ideal circumstances.     

Freedom and Opportunity

The article discusses recent attempts in rational choice theory to take account of the opportunity aspect of freedom, i.e., the value of alternatives, in measuring freedom. It is argued that each of these approaches (in terms of fixed preferences, of possible future preferences and of the preferences of reasonable persons) fails to solve important conceptual problems. Furthermore, we argue that differences between measures of opportunity freedom reflect different moral standards for the quality of alternatives, not different conceptions of freedom as such. Hence, we propose to separate discussions about the meaning of the concept of freedom from the issue of determining the value of opportunity sets.     

One Concept of Liberty

In this paper I argue in favour of a single conception of liberty, that picked out by Berlin as negative liberty. However, Berlin's defence of liberty so understood seems to rest on a view not open to the moral realist.
The first half of the paper explains this and suggests an alternative defence compatible with such a moral position. The defence rests on an account of why we value freedom. In the second half of the paper this negative conception is defended against recent criticism from Charles Taylor. His appeal to qualitative distinctions within freedom is queried, as is the conception of the self that seems required for his outlook.     

Generational Accounting and the Saving Rate Decline, 1960–2000

Government agencies in 26 countries construct generational accounts, defined as the present value of remaining lifetime net taxes that a generation can expect to pay. This paper calculates generational accounts for the United States, 1960–2000, and finds that generational account changes do not coincide with the abrupt decline in the saving rate that began in the mid‐1980s. First, transfers to the elderly, as reflected in changes to the generational accounts, increased gradually after 1960. Second, the fiscal burden placed on future generations, measured both in real terms and relative to newborns, was no higher in 2000 than in 1960.     

Weber and ‘legitimate domination’: a theoretical critique of Weber's conceptualisation of ‘relations of domination’ ∗

In this paper it is argued that Weber cannot provide a consistent account of the maintenance of systems of ‘legitimate domination’. This argument is based upon an examination of Weber's fundamental concepts of ‘actio’ and ‘behaviour’ and their theoretical relation to Weber's ‘ideal-typical’ approach to the phenomenon of ‘domination’. Through this examination it may be seen that Weber fails to determine the specific ‘natural’ and ‘social’ conditions of forms of domination. Furthermore, Weber's theoretical position can be seen to result in an implicit attempt to combine irreconcilable ‘natural’ and ‘ideal’ forms of determination.     

Economic freedom, culture, and growth

How do economic freedom and culture impact economic growth? This paper argues that culture, as measured by the World Values Surveys, and economic institutions associated with economic freedom are both independently important for economic prosperity, but the strength of their impact can be better understood only when both are included in the growth regression. Our results indicate that economic freedom is more important than culture for growth outcomes, suggesting substitutability between the two. We posit that culture is important for growth when economic freedom is absent, diminishing in significance once economic freedom is established.     

The functioning and regulation of escrow accounts

Abstract

About 40 million Americans have mortgages serviced by escrow accounts. Yet escrow accounts are rarely covered by an explicit agreement between borrower and lender and are often poorly understood. As a result, escrow accounts have become the subject of growing controversy. Federal regulation of escrow accounts has become increasingly detailed and intrusive during the past two decades, and the subject is under almost continuous regulatory review. In the 1990s, the attorneys general of at least 10 states have sued large escrow account servicers over administration of accounts.

The purposes of this article are to explain briefly how escrow accounts work, benefit relevant parties, and are regulated by federal agencies, and to evaluate alternative regulatory programs. Most of the legitimate social goals of federal regulation could be achieved by requiring an explicit escrow agreement at the time of closing on a mortgage. A second‐best requirement would be that interest be paid on escrow balances.     

Hegemony and Autonomy

This article analyzes the concept of hegemony and examines its relationship to power and autonomy. Refuting the conventional belief that it is ideology that distinguishes hegemony, the article argues that it is autonomy that constitutes the distinguishing characteristic. Although hegemons tend to evolve into imperialists, hegemony involves leadership of an alliance, not domination by coercion. It is impossible to conceptualize hegemony without also including autonomy. In this conceptualization, the primary source of autonomy lies in a specific hegemonic system of domination that itself embodies the notion of autonomy for both the polity and its citizenry, a limiting construction that hinders the tendency toward imperialism. Such a system includes one type of autonomy that can be designated as autonomy within hegemony. In addition, the article discusses two other types of autonomy: counterhegemony and a largely power-based opposed hegemony. Thus, the article concludes, hegemony is a complex concept, with several types of manifestation, that can more usefully be understood in connection with autonomy and power than as a stand-alone concept.     

The formation of an ‘Islamic sphere’ in French Colonial West Africa

One of the most unintended consequences of colonial rule in French West Africa was the Islamization of large parts of it. Islamic movements have often been interpreted in specifically plitical terms, as instances of ‘collaboration’ with or ‘resistance’ to colonial domination. They can better be understood in terms of the emergence of a qualitatively new ‘Islamic sphere7rsquo; conceptually separate from ‘particular’ affiliations such as ethnicity, kin group membership or salve origins, as well as from the colonial state. This paper considers two cases in detail: the Hamawiyya, a branch of the Tijani Sufi order whose leader was exiled by the French and which was brutally repressed in the 1940s; and the ‘Wahhabiyya’, an anti-Sufi movement which emerged after World war II.     

Technocracy and democracy as spheres of justice in public policy

There is a long-standing debate about the proper application of democratic versus technocratic approaches to decision-making in public policy. This paper seeks to clarify the debate by applying Michael Walzer’s notion of “spheres of justice,” wherein both democracy and technocracy could be seen as distinctive approaches to justice that need to be protected from the domination of the other. The paper shows how the debate on democracy versus technocracy has evolved in both theoretical and applied settings in a manner that reflects the “domination” of one approach by the other. It elaborates the argument through several concrete examples drawn from comparative politics, public policy, and public management. It then explores how the “spheres” approach implies the need for an interpretive mechanism in order to mediate the competing notions of justice in particular policy issues.     

The Politics of Financial Regulatory Reform in Britain and Germany

Over the past decade, Britain and Germany have both made fundamental changes to their financial regulatory regimes with the creation of single powerful regulators. In both cases, this meant either ending or severely limiting the regulatory role of central banks. This article argues that the creation of these new regulatory actors cannot be understood without reference to the preferences of domestic political actors responding to the increased political salience of financial regulation as a policy issue. The result was distinct partisan differences about institutional design and responsibilities with centre-left parties seeking regulatory actors clearly accountable to government and parliament. Such an account of institutional change is in contrast to previous accounts of the evolution of financial regulation that are largely exogenous to domestic politics.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Forum Internum</Emphasis> Revisited: Considering the Absolute Core of Freedom of Belief and Opinion in Terms of Negative Liberty,Authenticity, and Capability

Human rights theory generally conceptualizes freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief as well as freedom of opinion and expression, as offering absolute protection in what is called the forum internum. At a minimum, this is taken to mean the right to maintain thoughts in one’s own mind, whatever they may be and independently of how others may feel about them. However, if we adopt this stance, it seems to imply that there exists an absolute right to hold psychotic delusions. This article takes the position that this conclusion is ethically problematic from the perspective of psychiatric treatment and the rights of persons with psychosis. The article reflects on this particular challenge and sets forth an understanding of freedom in the forum internum that might apply to situations where for various reasons it is not, necessarily accurate to maintain that persons have an absolute right to their own thoughts. For the purpose of proposing such an understanding, the article engages with current debates within human rights theory and political philosophy and analyzes discussions about psychotic delusions and the way in which involuntary treatment is justified. Based on this analysis, this article in turn conceptualizes freedom in the forum internum as ‘negative liberty’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘capability’. This article suggests that when forum internum is redefined as encompassing a right to certain internal capabilities, the right remains meaningful for persons with psychotic delusions as well.     

Does retirement education teach people to save pension distributions?

As defined contribution pension plans have become increasingly common over the past two decades, so have lump sum distributions from those plans. Employees who elect such a distribution take the balance of their pension account with them when they leave a job. They can then choose to maintain the funds in accounts designated for retirement, invest them in other saving vehicles, or spend them. If spent pension distributions are not replaced by other savings, however, the future elderly are unlikely to be able to maintain a desirable standard of living. With employee-funded pensions expected to play an increasingly important role in financing Americans' retirement, saving these funds in essential. This article is the first to examine the relationship between retirement education--specifically, meetings sponsored by employers or by public and private institutions--and the saving of lump sum distributions. Two definitions of saving are used: one that includes reinvestment only in tax-deferred saving vehicles, and a broader one that includes tax-deferred vehicles, general saving vehicles (stocks, bonds, savings accounts, and so on), and paying off debt. The analysis also evaluates the effects of retirement education on specific groups identified in previous research as being less likely to keep their pension distributions in tax-deferred accounts: namely, women, younger persons, and persons with less than a college education. The same groups tend to be less financially secure in retirement, making the effects of retirement education on them particularly relevant. With an econometric model using ordinary least squares and data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, the analysis finds that retirement education does not affect the overall likelihood that employees will save their distributions, whether in tax-deferred or non-tax-deferred vehicles. The picture is more complicated for subgroups of employees. Attending a retirement meeting is associated with an increased likelihood of saving among persons age 40 and under but a decreased probability of saving among college graduates and women. No effect was found for men, individuals over age 40, or persons who did not graduate from college. The finding that retirement education increases the likelihood of younger persons' saving a distribution is reassuring, for these workers are America's future retirees. However, the finding that attending a meeting does not increase saving among some of the most financially vulnerable groups is a matter of concern to policymakers. Further study of the long-term effects of spending pension distributions is needed.     

An indirect legitimacy argument for a directly elected European Parliament

Can a directly elected European Parliament help deliver standards by which the European Union can be indirectly legitimated through its component national democracies? This article argues that the Union can be indirectly legitimate where it helps member state democracies meet their own obligations to their own publics. The Union can do just that by managing externalities in ways needed to secure core values of justice, democracy and freedom from arbitrary domination within member states. Yet that poses a predicament: for if any one member state has an interest in imposing negative externalities or in freeriding on positive externalities provided by another, then so may its voters and democratic institutions. The article argues a directly elected European Parliament can help manage that predicament both by identifying externalities and by ensuring their regulation meets standards of public control, political equality and justification owed to individual national democracies.     

Citizenship and disability: incommensurable lives and well-being

This paper explores a new political consensus promoting ‘active’ as opposed to ‘passive’ conceptions of citizenship, emerging from the late 1970s onwards, and marking the post-settlement/post-Marshellesque era of the welfare state. Reflecting this consensus, the disability rights movement critiques ‘passive’ conceptions, which are, it is claimed, supported by the medical model of disability and so-called objective accounts of ‘special needs’ and well-being – that is, accounts provided by non-disabled professionals and carers who frequently diminish the rights of disabled people to live autonomously. In contrast, ‘active’ conceptions cohere with the social model of disability supporting the values of agency and self-determination – derived, in part, from equalizing opportunities for disabled people’s social participation compared with non-disabled people; but also by promoting subjective accounts of well-being which are often incomparable or incommensurable, both between persons and across one person’s life.     

Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the 'New Localism'

Most studies of local autonomy and local democracy fail to distinguish adequately between the two terms. As a consequence, there is an assumed bilateral relationship between them in which changes in one are always deemed to affect the other – particularly in policy formulations. This article develops a stronger analytical distinction between them by considering local autonomy in three separate ways: as freedom from central interference; as freedom to effect particular outcomes; and as the reflection of local identity . Each of these conceptualisations raises different challenges for local democracy and its relationship to broader forms of democratic practice. When used to analyse the recent emergence of the 'new localism' as a policy approach within Britain, this separation also shows significant limitations in current policies towards democratic renewal and central policies that are supposedly focused on outcomes rather than processes. Although localities are being afforded some autonomy, most initiatives are not supporting the enhancement of local democracy.     

Models of liberty: Berlins's ‘Two Concepts’

According To Sir Isaiah Berlin; (a) freedom is an essentially ‘negative’ concept; (b) one's freedom can only be limited deliberately, by another person or persons; (c) the impersonal operation of a natural force, such as gravity, cannot be said to limit freedom; (d) the impersonal operation of a market force cannot be said to limit freedom. I argue that all four claims are false and that (b), (c), and (d) are logically incornsistent with (a). There would be less point to inevitably somewhat ‘picky’ exercise were it not for the fact that Berlin's account of freedom exemplifies a well-entrenched and influential orthodoxy. The fact is made particularly apparent by the prominent role played by assumption (d) in defences of the ‘free market’. I go on to discus this.