Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World

The future of globalization is the crucial issue facing naval planners in deciding future mission priorities and programs. Around the world, we are witnessing a slow shift from traditional “modern” preoccupations to less familiar “postmodern” ones. This is producing navies with different assumptions, sets of missions and acquisition programs. But how long this can continue and how deep it can go remains unclear. Tackling the naval implications of this issue depends on how planners read the future of globalization. Will it survive and prosper, or will it decay, forcing us to revert to older, more familiar patterns of naval behavior?     

Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration's Policy towards Sudan

In contrast to the Clinton administration, which tried to isolate Sudan, George W. Bush initiated a dialogue with Khartoum and followed a “constructive engagement” policy. Three factors explain this radical change in U.S foreign policy: the influence of American evangelicals, the significance of the war on terror, and economic interests, particularly the oil lobby. However, each of these factors led Washington to opposite directions.     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

The Alienated Frontier: Why the United States Can’t Get Osama bin Laden

Since the Russian-supplied Afghan army overthrew progressive President Daud in 1978, the nation has endured the long Soviet-Afghan war, the Taliban, and the arrival of U.S troops. These military actions have only heightened the historical alienation of the Pashtun tribes who overspread the long-contested border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are the people who are almost certainly sheltering Osama bin Laden. The Alienated Frontier is a centuries-old problem that must be solved if we are to win the war on terror, and solving it will require rebuilding the infrastructure, developing alternatives to poppy cultivation, and solving the “Pashtunistan” question. The capture or elimination of given individuals will achieve little if the conditions that allow radicals to thrive are not addressed     

Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion

A rising and influential tide of opinion is pressing for the United States to take major steps towards actually realizing “a world without nuclear weapons,” including by taking steps towards dismantling its nuclear arsenal. This article argues that a world without nuclear weapons, and particularly American nuclear weapons, is not desirable nor is real and effective nuclear disarmament possible. Therefore, while non-proliferation is an important objective, the United States should not abandon or move substantially towards the abandonment of its arsenal in pursuit of nuclear abolition. Instead, the United States should seek the worthy goal of preventing and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons while maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, a policy that can be followed by de-linking non-proliferation from disarmament.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post-World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

Financial Warfare

This paper brings together the key dimensions of financial warfare and places them in a larger policy framework. Its major conclusions are that financial warfare will be a much more important issue because of the astounding growth in international finance itself. In addition, financial warfare allows for more precise targeting than conventional economic warfare. Much like “precision strike” technology in arms, it gives more control over sanctions, but by no means perfect control. Finally, financial warfare's larger policy framework should draw on escalation and de-escalation theory because it is likely to be most effective when combined with other forms of pressure. This article does not “advocate” financial warfare. But it does argue that, since this type of conflict is emerging as an increasingly likely possibility, it needs to be thought through carefully. The worst outcome is to use it, without thinking about it, which, the author argues is where we are today.     

Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference

“He [Wilson] was more than just an idealist: he was the personification of the heritage of idealism of the American people. He brought spiritual concepts to the peace table. He was a born crusader.”

Herbert Hoover ¹

The issue of the Japanese plea for race equality at the Paris Peace Conference is generally seen as a secondary issue for American delegates. Most accounts see Wilson as being bullied into rejecting the proposal by the Dominion delegates — most notably Australia's Billy Hughes. Analyzing his views on race and its intricate connection with immigration and examining his own and his advisers response to political allies and opponents at home and in Paris over these issues, this piece will argue that Wilson responded as much to domestic pressures as external forces in his eventual compromise with the Japanese in Paris.     

Middleman in the Middle East: America's Flawed Approach to the ‘Peace Process’

President Bush professes optimism that an Arab-Israeli peace accord can be reached before he leaves office. Hamas, which presumably senses his urgency, has recently proposed a temporary truce with Israel in Gaza, with an option to extend it to the West Bank. This initiative is eerily reminiscent of Soviet behavior during the Cold War. Hamas essentially advocates a short-term period of peaceful coexistence to bide time while it strengthens its forces and lulls Israel into a false sense of security. If the United States accedes to this proposal or pressures Israel to do so, it will demonstrate once again the Cold War-style attitudes and perceptions that still characterize its approach to the “peace process.”     

Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response

The displacement of thousands of U.S. Gulf Coast residents in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is emblematic of a human migration challenge that will likely become more severe in the years and decades ahead. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that climate change will manifest in dramatic ways-extreme weather events, droughts, heat waves, increased cyclone (hurricane, typhoon) activity, sea level rise, etc.-and some of these effects may induce large scale human migration, both within and among countries. The increasing trend of environmental migrants is clashing with widespread anti-immigrant sentiment in both developed and developing countries around the world. Some countries are describing migration-and particularly unauthorized international migration-as a “security threat” and are turning to military forces to deter or manage the human flows, a trend that is likely to grow.     

Mending the “Unhinged Alliance” in the 1970S: Transatlantic Relations, Public Diplomacy, and the Origins of the European Union Visitors Program

This article examines in depth the foundation of the EU's one explicit example of public diplomacy, the European Union Visitors Programme. The narrative covers the historical background to the EUVP, the main individuals involved, and its significance for the development of the EU as an international actor. Public diplomacy relies on personal contacts, and the intention here is to demonstrate the importance of this petit histoire. The contribution of the EUVP towards establishing a transatlantic “community of values,” as demonstrated by the support it received from the U.S. diplomatic representation in Brussels, is an important extra dimension. The article concludes that the EUVP, while offering a potential model for the EU to project its “soft power” and world-view internationally, remains limited in scope and unable to fulfill its potential.     

The Historical Mind and Military Strategy

As important as the study of history for military strategists is the acquisition of the historical mind—that is, a way of thinking that uses history as a mode of inquiry. From practical cases to inspiration, history can help with U.S. military decision-making. The historical mind will detect differences as much as similarities between cases, avoiding false analogies, and look for the key questions to be asking. It will look for continuity but also for more important discontinuities; it will look for linkages between data points, but not be too quick to attribute causation. It is a well-traveled mind that appreciates the variability of people and places, conditions and problems; it avoids over-reliance on “lessons learned.” For that reason, the historical education of civilian and military strategists is more, not less, important in an age of rapid change.     

“Brighter Futures, Better Times”: Britain, the Empire, and Anglo-American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898-1920

This article examines Anglo-American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo-American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Diversionary cheap talk: economic conditions and US foreign policy rhetoric, 1945-2010

ABSTRACT

This study explains how the economy affects the foreign policy rhetoric used by American presidents. When economic conditions deteriorate, presidents criticize foreign nations to boost their approval ratings. Presidents use this “diversionary cheap talk” in response to the misery index of unemployment plus inflation, which poses a unique threat to their popularity. They target historical rivals, which make intergroup distinctions most salient. Diversionary cheap talk is most influential for and most frequently used by Democratic presidents, whose non-core constituents prefer hawkish foreign policy but already expect it from Republican presidents. I test the observable implications of the theory with the American Diplomacy Dataset, an original record of 50,000 American foreign policy events between 1851 and 2010 drawn from a corpus of 1.3 million New York Times articles.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966-1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

From Commitment to Independence: Greek Foreign Policy and the Western Alliance

This paper examines the troubled relationship between Greece and the western alliance following the collapse of the military regime in Athens and the invasion of Cyprus. U.S. Congressional reports and the Greek parliamentary proceeding reveal the geopolitical significance of Greece to the western alliance and the frustration of the government in Athens regarding its foreign policy objectives. The Greeks might have questioned the benefits of being part of an alliance; however, it is evident that Greece's diplomatic isolation compelled her leadership to strengthen her links with the western camp. Hence, the present study assesses the attitude of the Greek government toward the Atlantic alliance and the US over the issues of NATO membership and the military installations in Greece and challenges the notion of “independence,” or else the need for detachment from the western alliance.     

Some Men Named William Hunter

The Hunter family of Rhode Island produced two important American diplomatists of the nineteenth century. The elder William Hunter served for nine years as the American envoy to Brazil, where he exerted positive influence over the young emperor, Dom Pedro II. The younger William Hunter entered the Department of State in 1829 and spent fifty-seven years there under twenty-one Secretaries of State. For decades the department's third-ranking officer, he became its “mentor and authority.” The overlapping careers of Hunter and his two successors helped guide American diplomacy until 1937.     

“A Projected New Trusteeship”? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo-American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo-American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo-American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

How Grand was Reagan's Strategy, 1976-1984?

This article disputes the assertions of the new Reagan literature. Drawing upon radio broadcasts, speeches, correspondences, and documents from his presidential library, as well as recently published diaries from his White House years, it argues that Ronald Reagan had no grand strategy in the years 1976-1984. Indeed, throughout this period, he possessed two less-than-grand strategies I label “peace through strength” and “a crusade for freedom.” Each of these contained its own respective set of goals and employed its own corresponding set of tactics. Yet there was no grand strategy for ending the Cold War.