Dulles’s second visit to Japan: The Tokyo talks of 1951

In January–February 1951, intensive negotiations were conducted in Tokyo between the Japanese and American governments about Japan’s roles in American strategy in Asia. The United States expected Japan to play two vital roles in the cold war. The first was that Japan could act as a potential offensive base from which to mount warfare against Soviet Russia and communist. China. the second was that Japan would serve as a supplementary balancer in the maintenance of the balance of power in Northeast Asia through the reactivation of her defense forces. This article, examining the Japanese government’s preparations for the Tokyo talks, discusses Japanese-American negotiations on a bilateral base arrangement and rearmament. It is argued that, although the United States succeeded in securing Japan as a major strategic base in the cold war by obtaining Japanese agreement to the U.S. proposal for stationing requirements for post-treaty American bases and troops, it failed in having Japan accept a U.S. plan for the revitalization of Japanese power because of the Japanese government’s reservation about rearmament.     

The Price of Nostalgia: Menzies, the "Liberal" Tradition and Australian Foreign Policy

This article surveys some of the key contributions to the secondary literature on Australia's foreign and defence policy during Robert Gordon Menzies' two prime ministerships (1939–41, 1949–66), and seeks to identify Menzies' place in a "Liberal" and Liberal Party tradition through a reading of this work. Via a study of Menzies' imperialism, British race patriotism, nationalism, and attitudes towards Asia and the United States of America, it argues that the prime minister stands in an ambiguous relationship to the transformation that occurred in Australia's international orientation between the 1930s and 1960s. In the 1950s the Australian government's cold war foreign policy, and the political language that Menzies used in private and public to articulate it, were largely successful in balancing the competing claims of Britishness, Australianness and the newly-formed "American Alliance". By the early 1960s, however, his nostalgia for a dissolving imperial order was sufficiently pronounced that it contributed powerfully to a symbolic and rhetorical defeat for his side of politics, allowing Labor to claim the mantle of Australian foreign policy modernity.     

The Menzies Government and the Grand Alliance during 1939

This article is a study of the Australian government's exchanges with the Chamberlain government over the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a Grand Alliance between the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union during 1939. Robert Menzies and Stanley Bruce carefully weighed the arguments for and against before deciding to support the proposal for an Alliance. Yet there was considerable ambivalence about their support as evidenced by Bruce's panicky response to the Molotov‐Ribbentrop Pact. In its own very small and distant way the Menzies government contributed to the inertia that marked the British Empire's failure to secure a Grand Alliance in 1939.     

Difficult Partners: Indo‐Australian Relations at the Height of the Cold War, 1949–1964

This article aims to make a long overdue re‐examination of Indo‐Australian relations in the early Cold War years. By drawing on available secondary sources, it reassesses the existing literature on Australian engagement with Asia. In so doing, it seeks to understand the reasons why the Menzies government found it so difficult to forge a close partnership with India. Canberra's rather frosty relations with New Delhi during the Menzies‐Nehru years had little to do with Menzies' alleged condescension towards the Asians or his personal antipathy towards Nehru. Rather, it had to do with the two leaders' different readings of Cold War politics as well as their responses to the structural changes taking place at the international level following the end of the Second World War.     

Engaging with Asia: the Chifley Government and the New Delhi Conferences of 1947 and 1949

This article is a study of the Chifley government's foreign policy towards Asia, in particular India and Indonesia, as evidenced by Australia's attendance at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1949 New Delhi Conference on the Indonesian‐Dutch conflict. Australia's presence at these two conferences provides an ideal opportunity to examine the Chifley government's response to the momentous changes that occurred in post‐war Asia as a result of the dismantling of the European colonial world order. Through detailed examination of the archival material and contemporary accounts generated from Australia's involvement in the New Delhi conferences, this article will argue that despite significant political constraints, the Chifley government did adopt a distinctive and innovative policy towards the emergent nations of Asia in the immediate post‐war years.     

《雅尔塔秘密协定》背后的中、美、苏关系透析(Ⅱ)

1944年中国正面抗日战场的溃败造成美国太平洋战略的调整和中美关系的恶化,由此大大限制了蒋介石对苏联在未来中国的重要影响的应有认识和与之进行适当外交,导致损害中国主权的《雅尔塔秘密协定》的产生。之后,中国的外交重点依然锁定美国,极力“邀请”美国政府介入中苏关系并影响未来的中苏谈判。然而,出于对苏联追求东亚利益的实力与决心、对苏联参加太平洋战争的需要以及对自身缺乏足够抗衡苏联手段和资源等方面的权衡,美国政府没有接受中国的外交“邀请”,反而协同苏联政府迫使中国直接派团前往莫斯科完成中苏谈判。但中国政府的外交并非没有对美国产生影响,实际上,部分由于中国持续“邀美抗苏”的努力,最终促成了紧随其后在中苏谈判以及未来东北等问题上美国政府公开出面支持中国反对苏联,成为中国内战和东亚冷战爆发的一个起源。     

《雅尔塔秘密协定》背后的中、美、苏关系透析(Ⅰ)

1944年中国正面抗日战场的溃败造成美国太平洋战略的调整和中美关系的恶化,由此大大限制了蒋介石对苏联在未来中国的重要影响的应有认识和与之进行适当外交,导致损害中国主权的《雅尔塔秘密协定》的产生。之后,中国的外交重点依然锁定美国,极力“邀请”美国政府介入中苏关系并影响未来的中苏谈判。然而,出于对苏联追求东亚利益的实力与决心、对苏联参加太平洋战争的需要以及对自身缺乏足够抗衡苏联手段和资源等方面的权衡,美国政府没有接受中国的外交“邀请”,反而协同苏联政府迫使中国直接派团前往莫斯科完成中苏谈判。但中国政府的外交并非没有对美国产生影响,实际上,部分由于中国持续“邀美抗苏”的努力,最终促成了紧随其后在中苏谈判以及未来东北等问题上美国政府公开出面支持中国反对苏联,成为中国内战和东亚冷战爆发的一个起源。     

“Men who smell of fear”: The Menzies Government and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence

This article uses international archival sources to examine Australian policy on the problem of Rhodesian independence during the 1960s. It demonstrates that until November 1965 the Australian government led by Sir Robert Menzies followed a finely balanced policy that was broadly supportive of Britain but also sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front. However, the Australian response to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) revealed increasing bureaucratic conflict in Australian policy‐making and exposed the limits of Australian support for Britain in dealing with the international consequences of the UDI. Analysis of Australia's decision to not attend the Lagos Conference in January 1966 demonstrates the Menzies government's anxiety about the implications of racial issues for Australian domestic and foreign policies. This suggests that historians should pay more attention to the significance of Africa in Australian foreign relations during the Menzies era.     

MAPS OF TIME,CLOCKS OF SPACE

When Asia was conceptualized as Europe's “other,” it was also cast as a temporally delimited concept: once capitalist modernity—assumed to operate evenly across the globe by conservatives, liberals, and the left—spread to eastern Eurasia, the differences between two unequal halves of the continent were expected to evaporate. The persistence of differences long after “Asia” was incorporated into the capitalist world-economy has led to a cartographic definition of the continent. Such definitions do not allow for historical processes that reshape relations between peoples, forging new links and severing old ones. This article traces the changing imaginaries of Asia historically. Since there are no indigenous conceptions of the continent, the author argues that the changing imaginaries of Asia are linked to wider geopolitical processes. When eastern Eurasia was subordinated to the drives of the capitalist world-economy, existing linkages were severed and territories were linked to, or through, colonial metropoles. After a brief period of autarkic development after decolonization, states along the Pacific coasts were increasingly integrated through production and procurement networks leading to a new imaginary of Asia. Since the end of the cold war and the emergence of independent states with large hydrocarbon resources in Central Asia, countries that were once excluded from cold war imaginaries of Asia—as well as India—are being integrated through newer imaginaries that reflect the greater prominence of China and India today as well as the rise of Islamic militancy and new ethnic conflicts.     

The Menzies Government,the American Alliance and the Cuban Missile Crisis

This paper questions the traditional view of the Australian‐American relationship: that Australian dependency entailed unequivocal support for American foreign policy. It uses a particular Cold War event — the Cuban Missile Crisis — to examine the extent to which the reaction of the Australian government conformed to the general perception of immediate and absolute endorsement of the Kennedy administration's position. The paper will argue that the actual response of the Menzies government, as distinct from its public pronouncements, was constrained rather than unconditional, considered rather than reflexive, and shaped by strategic calculations of Australian interests.     

Translation,Modernity, and Women in China

The end of the cold war witnessed the emergence of a commercial web sprawling from the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in western China and extending into Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Pakistan, and Russia. Running parallel to the state-managed exchange in hydrocarbons, raw materials, technology, and infrastructure, this new Eurasian trade had an informal component as everyday consumer items manufactured in China were imported into neighboring countries, bypassing formal regulatory mechanisms. This inter-Asian trade began as shuttle trading by itinerant merchants for local markets; by the mid 1990s, shuttle trading was overshadowed by largescale export for national markets in neighboring countries without losing its informal character. This informality extending across national boundaries defined the post–cold war commerce in innermost Asia; at the same time, it also signaled a return to pre-cold war trading structures. Moving away from the “retreat of the state” thesis that found traction following the cold war, the author attributes informality in this inter-Asian trade to three factors: (1) a restructuring of state power where informal trade was a new comparative advantage sought in an evolving geopolitical climate; (2) the actors in this inter-Asian trade—party and regional officials in China, along with traders and intermediaries—who found and exercised agency through this exchange; and (3) a chain of inter-locking, commercial macro-regions, which are economically sustainable and which transcended international boundaries. Working in conjunction, these factors constitute a dynamic inter-Asian trade and challenge static state imaginaries of a “New Silk Road” or “Eurasian Continental Bridge.”     

Humanitarianism from the Suburbs: Australian Refugee Relief and Activism during the 1971 Bangladeshi Liberation War

The Bangladesh Liberation War against West Pakistan in 1971 triggered an exodus of ten million refugees, the deaths of approximately 1.5 million people and widespread destruction of villages, crops and infrastructure. Preoccupied with the Cold War and domestic politics, powerful nations such as the US and UK did not intervene directly and reluctantly provided aid. The Australian government, for its part, was particularly slow to offer aid, trailing efforts of New Zealand and most Western European governments. While the McMahon administration remained indifferent, Australians from diverse backgrounds engaged with this conflict by raising public awareness, fundraising and lobbying the Australian government to increase its aid contribution to Bangladeshis displaced by war. At a time when Australian government policies focused on the war in Indo‐China, Cold War politics and development in south‐east Asia and the south Pacific, I consider the ways Australian individuals offered aid to Asian, non‐Christian refugees, some of whom held Maoist views. Using archival materials, historical newspapers and census data, this article argues that, paradoxically, it was individuals with little political capital who spearheaded Australian efforts to aid Bangladeshi refugees. In short, the Bangladesh Liberation War provoked a groundswell of suburban activism that acted independently of government policies.     

The Liberals and Vietnam1

How did the Menzies Governments of the early to mid 1960s arrive at the position of sending Australian troops to Vietnam? During the 1950s, Menzies, and especially his External Affairs Minister Richard Casey, developed an appreciation of the strategic significance of Indochina, but struggled to view the conflict in Vietnam in ways other than through Cold War lenses. By the 1960s too, Britain's capacity to demonstrate a lead for Australia in foreign policy for the region was diminishing with its power, and the Menzies Governments were mindful of the need to support an American preparedness to intervene in Southeast Asia against communist‐led forces. This logic became more compelling in the face of Indonesia's “Confrontation” with Malaysia from 1963. As a result, the Liberals were not reluctant to support US military intervention in the region, in Vietnam.     

GEORGE W. BUSH AND ASIA: IN THE SHADOW OF 11 SEPTEMBER

Traditionally seen as a President consumed by the war on terror, George W. Bush is frequently portrayed as being relatively uninterested in Asia, and unable to outline a vision or a strategy to China, America’s Asian allies and Asian multilateral mechanisms. This article will revisit Bush’s policy on Asia and show a president who guided the United States with a policy that balanced the need to combat global terrorism and locate a focus on Asia. He faced the dilemmas of building cooperative relations with a rising China while trying to foster American alliances and partnerships in Asia, and managing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Utilizing qualitative content analysis as the main research method, the article will demonstrate that the Bush administration had not a lack of focus on Asia and that Bush’s diplomacy to Asia should be recognized as one of the most significant achievements of his presidency.     

Britannia waived the rules: The Major government and the 1994 Rwandan genocide

Ten years after the 1994 Rwandan genocide occurred, seriousquestions remain about the circumstances of the British government'sresponse. This article critically evaluates the response ofJohn Major's government to the genocide. It does so in fourstages. The first section provides a brief overview of the Majorgovernment's international agenda in 1994, focusing on Britishpolicy towards the war in Bosnia and the African continent ingeneral. The second section deals with the substance of Britain'sRwanda policy, while the third discusses the ways in which thispolicy has been almost totally omitted from mainstream accountsof this period. The final section provides a critical evaluationof some of the tactics that British officials employed to avertcriticism of their government's policies. Based on the evidencepresented we conclude that the British government displayeda deeply troubling indifference towards the victims of Rwanda'sgenocide.     

菲美安全合作及其对中国安全环境的影响分析

菲律宾是第一个表示支持美国反恐斗争的亚洲国家,反恐战争使双方之间的安全合作关系迅速升温,用美国总统布什的话说,美菲在反恐战争中已经是"军事同盟".本文分析了菲美安全合作关系迅速升温的原因、影响,并针对菲美安全合作对中国安全环境的影响提出了一些政策建议.     

Chinese security as Asia evolves: Constraints and ambiguities

Beijing’s weapons modernization, arms transfer, and arms control policies reflect priorities and internal and external constraints established in previous decades. Although Chinese perceptions of the evolving security environment in Asia have prompted some adjustments, PRC policies remain constricted by a security structure originally formed during the cold war, domestically driven security policymaking, and non-security factors, including economic and technological limitations imposed by the global market, the domestic economy and budgetary resources, and technological developments. Constraints notwithstanding, it is China’s policy ambiguities and opaque intentions that fuel suspicions throughout Asia that the PRC seeks to dominate the region.     

State Response to Transnational Asset Accumulation: The Case of Argentina

Using the asset accumulation framework, and relying on interviews with civil servants working in the department of migrations for the Argentine government, this article addresses the response of the Argentine state to the accumulation and transfer of capital among Argentine emigrants. Contextualising the situation of Argentina in the ‘Latin American context', our primary focus is on four asset categories: financial, human, social and political. This inquiry identifies recent initiatives developed to approach Argentines residing abroad as well as some of the challenges faced by the Argentine state to ‘reconnect’ with emigrants.     

Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz

Although realist theory did not predict the end of the cold war, prominent realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Kenneth Waltz did give some thought to the conditions under which the cold war might be settled. Both Aron and Morgenthau characterised the cold war as a combination of traditional power politics and ideological competition, but they differed on the relative weight of each component. For Morgenthau, a diplomatic settlement would deactivate the unsettling potential of the ideological conflict; for Aron, only the disappearance of the ideological conflict could pave the way to some lasting diplomatic settlement. For Waltz, ideology had little impact; the bipolar structure of the international system was the main variable on which both the cold war and its end depended.     

Domestic–External Linkages and the Cold War in 1953 and 1989: Using International Relations Theory and Comparative Politics to Explain the End of the Cold War

Drawing on theories of international relations (IR) and comparative politics, this article explains why the cold war ended in 1989 rather than 1953. Numerous scholars have used IR theory to discuss the end of the cold war, but most of the circumstances they highlight were also present in the spring of 1953, right after the death of Joseph Stalin. This article presents three broad theoretical approaches that deal with the connection between domestic politics and international relations, and it then shows how these approaches can help us understand the similarities and differences between 1953 and 1989. In particular, the article emphasises the importance of time. In the spring of 1953, the window of opportunity was very brief—only a few months, which was insufficient for the two main cold war antagonists to overcome their deeply entrenched suspicions and make far-reaching adjustments in their policies. In the latter half of the 1980s, by contrast, the sweeping reorientation of east–west relations occurred over several years, giving policy-makers on both sides sufficient leeway to adapt and to 'learn' new ways of interacting.