THE OBLIGATION TO SPEND: Presidential Impoundment of Congressional Appropriations

Abstract. A recent major controversy has arisen over the habitual impoundment (a term herein defined) of Congressional appropriations by the President through the O. M. B. President Nixon, who made unprecedentedly frequent resort to the practice, claimed both constitutional and statutory authority as well as citing historical precedent. These claims are successively examined, and almost wholly rejected (as indeed they already have been by the federal courts). Rather, impoundment appears as a device whereby President Nixon substituted his own legislative priorities for those of the Congress. The latter therefore strictly limited the practice by statute and sought, as a counterpoise, to improve its own budgetary procedures. This recent reform is in turn evaluated, and the balance of responsibility as between President and Congress in this fiscal area is weighed.     

Congressional Partisanship and Presidential Success: The Case of the Clinton and Bush Presidencies

Recent scholarship has documented the increased cohesion and influence of the congressional parties. In this new context, the status of the government as either unified or divided should function as an independent variable in determining presidential success rates. Occurring in just such a period, the Bush and Clinton presidencies can be used to test whether presidential success rates vary according to whether the national government is unified or divided. All the relevant data and comparisons confirm the hypothesis. In addition, a comparison of the presidential success rates for Carter and Nixon's first four years indicate that in the preceding period of less cohesive congressional parties there was a much weaker relationship between presidential success and the status of government as either unified or divided.     

Congressional rationality and spatial voting

It is very difficult to demonstrate that representatives employ sophisticated cost-benefit calculations in evaluating constituent benefits when making many legislative decisions. This is because most modern American legislation is ambiguous about which constituencies will receive particularized benefits. This paper examines a series of locational rollcall votes in which the benefits going to constituents were obvious. In such cases representatives balance increases in voter support within their congressional districts and potential increases in their political power within Congress to be gained by vote trading. If constituency benefits are great, representatives overwhelmingly support legislation to provide such benefits. As the benefits decline, vote trading increases.     

Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment

This paper examines state interest in the nine bases of congressional seat apportionment considered for the House of Representatives as part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. We ask, what if voters preferred apportionments that delivered larger vote shares to their state? We then show that among all states, one basis of apportionment was a weak Condorcet winner, while the others were in a vote cycle. In both chambers of Congress, however, pure majority voting created orderings of the nine bases and a different Condorcet winner. Ironically, Congress did not select either Condorcet winner. Instead, a population-based apportionment was reported out of committee and passed both chambers as a consequence of agenda control and lack of pairwise voting. Our analysis provides an example of how agenda setting with incomplete information unintentionally can produce undesirable outcomes for a legislature.

     

Congressional tenure: Myth and reality

Congressional tenure is longer now than in earlier times, but it is largely a myth that the era of the professional politician is a modern phenomenon. Here, tenure is compared between the 57th and 86th Congresses. Tenure is linked to a simple median voter model. Increased tenure is associated with an increased ability to transfer government expenditures to the political unit. The increased size of government at the time of the 86th Congress compared to the 57th Congress, largely explains the greater length of time in office. The higher tenure of southern legislators is linked to lower per capita incomes.     

Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance

States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew more quickly during the 1953–1990 period than states that were represented by more junior congressional delegations. States with a large fraction of politically competitive House districts also grew faster than average. The first finding is consistent with traditional legislator-based models of distributive politics, the second with partisan models. We cannot detect any substantively important association between seniority, state political competition, and the geographic distribution of federal funds, so higher district- specific federal spending does not appear to be the source of the link between state economic growth and congressional representation.     

Congressional Response to Mandate Elections

Elections from time to time are widely believed to carry a mandate, to express a message about changed policy preferences of the electorate. Whatever the accuracy of such beliefs—a matter about which we are skeptical—perceptions of a mandate should affect the behavior of actors in government. Politicians lack the scholarly luxury of waiting for careful analyses. They must act in the months following elections. We postulate that many will act as if the mandate perceptions were true, veering away from their normal voting patterns. This is driven by election results and interpretations that undermine old calculations about what voters want. As the flow of information gradually changes these perceptions, and the election becomes more distant, members of Congress return to their normal position. We first ask, how would members observe an emerging consensus of mandate? And then we model the duration of the change in behavior in an event‐history framework. That permits a depiction of important movements of the median member and, from this, inferences about policy impact.     

Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission

This study examines the unfair trade decisions of the InternationalTrade Commission (ITC) and how they have been affected by Congress.It begins by identifying the means Congress can use to influenceITC decisions and then estimates both the extent to which thesemeans have been used and the extent to which they have shaped theITC's behavior. The study reaches two conclusions. First, Congresshas tried to shape the ITC's behavior, but it has not tried tomicromanage this behavior. Second, while the ITC's behavior hasbeen influenced by Congress, congressional influence is not asimportant as other factors, such as statutory criteria.     

The Case for Congressional Budgeting

William Howard Taft and Frederick A. Cleveland’s vision of executive budgeting clashes with the unique status of the U.S. Congress among the world’s legislatures, and its proponents may exaggerate the potential for presidents to act as fiscal guardians. This article advocates more congressional budgeting by reinstituting effective fiscal rules and strengthening the role of the budget committees. These mechanisms would enhance fiscal discipline and aid consolidation.     

Congressional Voting on Term Limits

Between 1990 and 1995,twenty-three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations toCongress. In 1995 the House ofRepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of Congress. Only weeks later, theSupreme Court struck down the individualstate laws. In 1997 the House againbrought the issue to a vote, which alsofailed. This paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest-group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents. The game foremost predictsthat members from term-limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote. The empirical section employsprobit, multinomial logit, and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses. Among otherresults, in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a `yea' on thefirst vote and a subsequent `nay' on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self-imposedterm limits. The results are robust tomodel specification, estimator, andalternative sampling. Implications areproposed in the concluding comments.