The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation*

According to contemporary legal positivism, law claims to create obligations. In order for law to be able to create obligations, it must be capable of having authority. Legal positivism claims that for law to be capable of having authority, it only has to meet non‐moral or non‐normative conditions of authority. In this paper it is argued that law can only be capable of having authority if it also meets certain normative conditions. But if something must meet certain normative conditions in order to be capable of having authority and if it must be capable of having authority in order to be law, then it is only law if it is conceivable that it meets these normative conditions and this can only be ascertained by means of an evaluation. Therefore, legal positivism's claim that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations (the separation thesis) is incompatible with its claim that law must be able to create obligations. Further, an analysis of Hart's concept of law shows that it is not only possible that the identification of the law depends on moral evaluation, as Hart claims, but that it is conceptually necessary that it does.     

司法确定力的形成逻辑

司法确定力是与法院的宪法地位密切相关的,宪法对法院的独立地位以及解决纠纷、救济权利和发展法律的功能定位,是司法确定力的权威渊源;司法确定力来自于司法的管辖权威,法院在法律规定的范围内、在自己的能力范围内受理案件,运用法律知识、司法理性和司法经验,按照司法规律对案件事实和法律适用问题进行权威判断,为司法确定力提供了前提;司法确定力源于司法的整合权威,法院在审理案件过程中,通过对立法时的民意与法律适用时的民意、普遍正义与个别正义、法律正义与社会正义的有机结合建构了司法的整合权威,为司法确定力提供坚实的基础;司法确定力依赖于裁判的执行权威,当事人自觉履行生效判决的文化意识和国家强制执行生效判决的权威能量为司法确定力提供坚强的保障。     

Treatment of procedural irregularities in Nigerian courts and the need for a principled approach: Yaki v Bagudu (2015) in retrospect

The courts are usually stuck in between the need to do substantial justice to litigants and the strict observance of procedural rules. The article considers this issue in Nigerian legal system using the Supreme Court’s decision in Yaki v Bagudu as a signpost. The article argues that the absence of any clear-cut guidelines on procedural irregularities often leads to legal uncertainty and unpredictability of results. Drawing on experiences from other jurisdictions, the article suggests a principled approach which distinguishes between irregularities affecting the substantive jurisdiction of courts and those which do not as a panacea.     

Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU

Against the background of the reinforcement of the EU executive pursuant to the post‐2008 economic and financial market regulatory reforms, this article deconstructs the prevailing distinction between an executive body's discretion to make policy choices and its discretion when conducting technical assessments. This distinction, which arises out of the current judicial paradigm for discretion, has contributed to the re‐allocation of executive authority within the EU (sanctioned in UK v Parliament and Council and Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag). The article traces the distinction's roots in legal conceptions that have shaped legal‐administrative thinking since the early days of the Etat de Droit or Rechstaat. It proposes a public‐interest‐regarding conception of discretion where, in an institutional context where courts’ reviewing role may be limited, discretion's relationship to law is a matter of how legal norms may operate in the spheres of discretion that they attribute to decision‐makers, rather than how courts may review an exercise of discretion.     

我国环境审判专门化的探索与发展——基于环保法庭的法律分析

环境审判专门化在生态文明建设的大背景下具有正当性和必要性。我国设立的各种环保法庭是对环境审判专门化的有益探索。但是我国的环保法庭还存在审判模式不统一、管辖权缺少法律依据、组成人员不专业等问题。环境审判专门化的制度建构应该从合理确定环保法庭的管辖权和受案范围、放宽原告诉讼资格推进环境公益诉讼、实现环保法庭组成人员的多元化、促进环保法庭诉讼与非诉讼程序的衔接等方面进行。     

Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia

This essay articulates the contributions of Mitra Sharafi's study of Parsi legal culture to colonial legal studies. Situated at the intersection of the literature on legal pluralism and legal institutions, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture, 1772–1947 (2014) uses a range of new legal sources and case law to recover a remarkable history of collective identity that emerged via the medium and infrastructure of law. The Parsis' active participation in colonial legal institutions not only reshaped their normative worlds but also de‐anglicized imperial law.     

Just 'Cause You're Smarter than Me Doesn't Give You a Right to Tell Me What to Do: Legitimate Authority and the Normal Justification Thesis

Joseph Raz's famous theory of authority is grounded in threeclaims about the nature and justification of authority. Accordingto the Preemption Thesis, authoritative directives purport toreplace the subject's judgments about what she should do. Accordingto the Dependence Thesis, authoritative directives should bebased on reasons that actually apply to the subjects of thedirective. According to the Normal Justification Thesis (NJT),authority is justified to the extent that subjects are morelikely to comply with right reason by following the authority'sdirectives than by following their own judgments about whatright reason requires.¹ In this article, I consider a number of ways in which NJT mightbe construed as a justification for authority. First, I evaluateNJT construed as a principle that would provide a practicaljustification for an individual to accept or recognize a particularperson or persons as a preemptive authority. Second, I evaluateNJT construed as a principle that describes the conditions underwhich a state or legal system is morally legitimate. I arguethat NJT is true under none of these interpretations.²     

Rethinking Law and State Building in Sub‐Saharan Africa

Massoud, Mark Fathi. 2013 . Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan . Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. x–277. ISBN: 9781107440050. Paper $34.99 This essay is a response to Mark Massoud's Law's Fragile State, and through comparative inquiry argues that highly contextualized analysis of courts is critical to gaining an understanding of judicial decision making and judicial empowerment. As Massoud demonstrates, focusing on the legal complex is a particularly worthwhile endeavor in fragile states. Although we may understand the sociology of the legal profession, we do not fully understand how professional networks, career paths, and identities truly impact the institutional pathways of the courts and the legal system as a whole.     

法律论证中的权威与正确性——兼论我国指导性案例的效力

法律论证既需要运用权威理由,也需要运用实质理由来证立法律命题。法律渊源是最重要的权威理由,它通过说明法律命题之来源的方式来证明后者的初步有效性。制定法与先例构成了法律论证之权威性框架的主要部分,制定法属于规范权威,而先例属于事实权威,它们在司法裁判中一般只需被指明。同时,法律论证的正确性宣称决定了法律论证也必须运用有效的实质理由,即对法律命题内容的正确性进行证立。这种论证既可以是法律体系内的论证,也可以是超越体系的论证。法律论证旨在于平衡权威与正确性,其中权威论证具有初步的优先性但并非不可推翻,权威性的强度与相关正确性论证的负担成正比。以此来分析,我国的指导性案例介于规范权威与事实权威之间,它的效力是一种"准制度拘束力"。     

现代司法理念下的检察权——司法改革背景下检察权的定位

从现代司法理念出发,认为作为法律监督权的检察权与审判权一样在司法过程中处于重要地位.检察机关的基本职能是法律监督.检察机关与法院一样肩负着推进司法公正的重任.     

法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

Fighting Discrimination with Discrimination: Public Universities and the Rights of Dissenting Students

This article discusses recent legal conflicts between state universities and conservative religious students in the United States, focusing on Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. In recent years, several universities have denied recognition to religious student organizations that discriminate on the basis of religion or sexual orientation. I argue that scholars on both sides of the issue have failed to recognize the full scope of the privilege that the universities demand. If the courts accept the universities' demands, then the courts dangerously expand the government's authority to suppress dissenters. No proponent of civil liberties should welcome this change.     

法律权威与行动理由——基于拉兹实践哲学进路的考察

权威可以分为理论权威与实践权威、事实权威与合法权威,拉兹讨论的是合法的实践权威。权力与承认这两个概念都无法有效地界定合法的实践权威,在一定意义上可以说,拉兹的实践权威理论批判性地借鉴了权力论的分析模式并用行动理由作为基本分析概念。法律主张合法权威是法律的一个本质特征,法律规范也是一种强制性的行动理由,即一种内容独立的排他性理由。     

The Weak Natural Law Thesis and the Common Good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.     

Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of Administrative Justice

This article assesses the power of judges in Russia (on courts of general jurisdiction, arbitrazh courts, and military courts) in dealing with cases in which the government or one of its officials is a party. Power, that is, the resources of judges to make binding decisions, is understood as including jurisdiction, discretion, and authority to ensure compliance. The article analyzes the dramatic growth of jurisdiction and caseload in administrative justice in post-Soviet Russia to the year 2002 and examines how the courts have performed in handling the review of actions by officials (including in the military), tax cases, electoral disputes, and the legality of normative acts (both regulations and laws of lower governments), especially in the late 1990s. High rates of success for persons bringing suits against the government suggest that judges were able by and large to adjudicate fairly and rule against the state. To a considerable degree (but not always), those decisions were implemented (more often than were constitutional and commercial decisions). Interestingly, citizens who challenged the actions of officials in court had much more success than those who brought complaints to the Procuracy. Finally, the article develops an agenda for future research that would deepen understanding of the significance of administrative justice in the Russian Federation and the power of judges.     

Skype Technologies SA v Joltid Limited and others [2009] EWHC 2783 (Ch). Anti-suit injunction: Clarification of effect of English exclusive jurisdiction clause in worldwide technology licensing contract

The Court's discretion in granting an anti-suit injunction has been clarified further by the recent decision of Mr Justice Lewison in Skype Technologies SA v Joltid Limited and Others [2009] EWHC 2783 (Ch). Ruling on the Court's willingness to grant an anti-suit injunction where an exclusive jurisdiction clause had been breached, Mr Justice Lewison held that “standard considerations that arise in arguments about forum non conveniens should be given little weight in the face of an exclusive jurisdiction clause where the parties have chosen the courts of a neutral territory in the context of an agreement with world-wide application. Otherwise the exclusive jurisdiction clause would be deprived of its intended effect”. It follows that contracting parties who deliberately select the English courts as a neutral forum in an exclusive jurisdiction clause will not be allowed to “wriggle out” of their agreement, unless the party seeking to commence proceedings in an alternative forum can establish exceptional reasons, outside of ordinary forum non conveniens arguments, to justify why the exclusive jurisdiction clause should be displaced.     

A Separate Peace? The Politics of Localized Law in the Post‐Revolutionary Era

Law is often seen as peripheral to Southern life before the Civil War, and the South as an outlier in the American legal history of that era. In The People and Their Peace (2009), Laura Edwards demonstrates the profoundly legal nature of Southern society and takes an important step toward integrating the legal history of the South with that of the nation. Edwards identifies two dueling legal cultures in North and South Carolina between 1787 and 1840—the law of local courts, which she terms localized law, and the state law of professionalized lawyers and reformers. She argues that white women, slaves, and the poor fared better in localized law—which was based on notions of popular sovereignty and the flexible rubric of restoring “the peace”—than in state courts, which were steeped in a national culture of individual rights that led to more restrictive results. This essay questions Edwards's dichotomy between local law and state law and her depiction of the popular content of localized law, while building on Edwards's innovations to suggest a new direction for Southern legal history.     

The Weak Reading of Authority in Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law

Authority qua empowerment is theweak reading of authority in Hans Kelsen's writings.On the one hand, this reading appears to beunresponsive to the problem of authority as we know itfrom the tradition. On the other hand, it squares withlegal positivism. Is Kelsen a legal positivist?Not without qualification. For he defends anormativity thesis along with the separation thesis,and it is at any rate arguable that the normativitythesis mandates a stronger reading of authority thanthat modelled on empowerment. I offer, in the paper,a prima facie case on behalf of a stronger reading ofauthority in Kelsen. I go on to argue, however, thatthe textual evidence weighs heavily in favour of theweak reading. Both nomostatics and nomodynamics arepervasive points of view in the Pure Theory of Law,and both reflect species of empowerment as theendpoint of Kelsen's reconstructions.