Why do “teeth” need “voice”? The case of anti‐corruption agencies in three Australian states

Interactions between horizontal accountability agencies (e.g., anti‐corruption agencies [ACAs]) and social accountability actors (e.g., journalists, civil society activists, and complainants/whistleblowers) are recognized as important to horizontal agencies’ performance, but the reason(s) is not clear. This study therefore explores why horizontal accountability agencies need social accountability actors in performing their functions. The study analyses data from 30 key stakeholders in Australia, including ACAs staff members, social accountability actors, and other observers to report on the specific support roles social actors play to ACAs’ activities and operations. Through the conceptual lens of social accountability, evidence show that social actors play four key types of support roles to ACAs’ activities and operations: activate ACAs’ investigations; “amplify” ACAs’ operations; guard ACAs’ activities and operations; and defend ACAs’ independence and powers. These findings support the need for interactions and, also, affirm the potential for research into how these support roles can better be provided for effective anti‐corruption outcomes. The research is of value to public accountability agencies in Australia, and internationally.     

Whither Power in Public Administration? Attainment,Dissipation, and Loss

Norton Long's 1949 essay, “Power and Administration,” has a complicated legacy. First, analysis reveals both support for and important refinements of Long's arguments since the article's publication. Second, Long's claim has proven problematic that competition among agencies for power would bring more coordination and a cross‐agency sense of purpose to the federal government. Third, the bureaucratic pluralism that he explained and defended produced special interest biases that were off‐putting to large segments of citizens and thus helped create an unsupportive political environment for needed capacity building in the federal government. Fourth, by not considering how institutions “coevolve,” Long failed to warn that “horizontal power” building by individual agencies would provoke efforts by elected officials to enhance their control over bureaucracy in ways that, over time, diminished their collective sources of power. Finally, much remains to be done before what Long called a “realistic science of administration” incorporating the “budgeting of power” exists in public administration.     

Help-seeking from public authorities: Who arrives at the agency door?

For ordinary citizens, political life is increasingly characterized by a request for a check, not a trip to the polls. Yet for all their frequency, very little is known about help-seeking encounters. This article asks the question “Who gets to the agency door?” or, more formally, “How do individuals decide to apply for public social benefits or services, and what does that decision signify?” Three topics are explored. The first defines help-seeking as a type of political participation. The second conceptualizes the process by which individuals decide to seek help from public social agencies. The third presents an agenda for research and action on the politics of help-seeking.     

ANTHROPOLOGY AND POLICY STUDIES: A NEW DELEGATION ENTERS THE U.N. OF ACADEME

Like all participating academic disciplines, anthropologists entering the policy studies field face a series of “unsolvable” problems that deal with intellectual values about how to ply one's trade. For example, what are one's obligations to agencies, and to the intended clienteles of public policies, especially when the citizens are “havenots” up against well-organized economic interests? Such questions raised by anthropologists in this volume allow one to assess the options available to applied social scientists studying public policy issues. They also lead us to recognize the existing biases of doing policy studies research. While weighing the propriety of doing applied research, anthropologists do possess critical concepts and research methods essential to the policy sciences. With a grounding in process or temporally-based concepts like “culture, context, and symbol,” applied anthropologists will strengthen the study of policy implementation. Further, with qualitative methods gaining a strong foothold in the policy sciences, anthropologists are contributing to the refinement of methods for studying the organizational behavior of actors charged with the implementation of public policy. Moreover, anthropologists in this volume demonstrate their discipline's potential to break new ground in the policy sciences. Specifically, the world view of anthropologists is likely to add a comparative, crosscultural perspective to existing areas of concentration like public health, and to increase the range of issues of interest to the policy sciences. Also, anthropologists are already developing new units of analysis different from the aggregation of individual scores, and adding new social indicators that are group or culturally grounded. In short, the policy sciences will be enhanced by anthropologists as they bring the strengths of their discipline to bear on the field.     

Government Reform,Political Ideology,and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agencies—liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacity—and partly by the ideological beliefs of employees—on average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.     

When complex facts threaten court reviews: Litigation over navigation projects

The capacity of the U.S. courts to provide effective review of cases involving complex scientific and economic analysis is declining. Rational action in such cases requires three things: a general rule by which to judge the appropriateness of actual or proposed actions; a set of facts sufficient for determining the consistency of the action with the general rule; and an independent review institution with power to enforce actions under the rule. Where the issues are complex, however, government agencies increasingly have tended to cloak their decisions in needlessly technical formulations and to buttress their presentations in masses of impenetrable data. Courts tend to avoid involvement in the complexities, resting instead on a presumption that government reports are accurate and government actions appropriate; this is a tendency we label “judicial math block.” Two cases taken from the complex area of public navigation investment illustrate the problem.     

Continuity,change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations

This paper compares the quality and use of regulatory analysis accompanying economically significant regulations proposed by US executive branch agencies in 2008, 2009, and 2010. We find that the quality of regulatory analysis is generally low, but varies widely. Budget regulations, which define how the federal government will spend money or collect revenues, have much lower‐quality analysis than other regulations. The Bush administration's “midnight” regulations finalized between Election Day and Inauguration Day, along with other regulations left for the Obama administration to finalize, tended to have lower‐quality analysis. Most differences between the Bush and Obama administrations depend on agencies' policy preferences. More conservative agencies tended to produce better analysis in the Obama administration, and more liberal agencies tended to do so in the Bush administration. This suggests that agencies more central to an administration's policy priorities do not have to produce as good an analysis to get their regulations promulgated.     

Sexual orientation and gender identity in Nepal: Rights promotion through UN development assistance

United Nations (UN) development agencies have been actively working to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) rights in Nepal, despite having no official mandate to work on these rights. This presents an important example of how such agencies are able to act independently to set their own agenda and illustrates the “open system” approach to international bureaucracies. It also suggests that these agencies have the potential to be important instruments of LGBTI rights promotion outside the traditional human rights machinery such as the Human Rights Council and various committees. Based on extensive interview research as well as documentary evidence, this article traces the origins of the UN's engagement with LGBTI rights. It then discusses the work of UN agencies in South Asia, and Nepal in particular, focusing on the UN Development Programme, the UN Children's Fund, UNAIDS, and UN Women. Political changes in Nepal since 2006 have opened it up for change in its approach to these rights, and UN agencies have worked actively to change both legal norms and social attitudes. The conclusion considers whether these lessons are applicable to other states and whether the UN development machinery must be considered an important ally in pursuing LGBTI rights worldwide.     

“Acceptable risk”: The case of nuclear power

The key policy question in managing hazardous technologies is often some variant of: “How safe is safe enough?” A typical response of regulatory agencies has been to lay down minimum requirements for how hazardous facilities should be built and operated, without specifying the level of safety that it is hoping to achieve. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, charged with regulating safety in nuclear power plants, has recently tackled the safety question directly, by adopting “safety goals” that facilities must meet. The NRC's approach proves to be sophisticated in some respects, incomplete in others. More generally, it points up the inherent difficulties that exist with the concept of “acceptable risk” and with any attempt to build policy instruments around it. Lessons from the NRC case apply to other hazardous technologies, as well as to public policies unrelated to safety.     

When risk‐based regulation aims low: A strategic framework

This article develops a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing intervention strategies for dealing with low risks and reviewing performance, building on the analysis by the same authors in the previous edition of this journal. The framework occupies the operational “middle ground” between risk analysis and formal enforcement action. At its core is a matrix, the Good Regulatory Intervention Design (GRID), which provides a framework to categorize sites or activities on the basis of two factors: the nature of the risk and the nature of the regulatee. Using GRID, regulators can select which intervention tools to use, and determine the overall level of regulatory intensity that should apply. GRID is accompanied by the Good Regulatory Assessment Framework (GRAF) for agencies to use in reviewing their performance and provides a step‐by‐step process for enabling “double loop learning.” The article also argues that the process of developing such a framework highlighted the extent to which “low risk” and “high risk” regulation are distinct. “Low risk” means “low priority.” Justifying why certain risks should not receive much regulatory attention requires a particular type of engagement, and has a bearing on the regulatory strategies that are adopted.     

Social movements and regulatory agencies: Toward a more adequate—and less pessimistic—Theory of “clientele capture”

Many regulatory agencies were established during the Progressive Era and the New Deal, in part out of faith in their capacity to regulate industry in an apolitical and “scientific” fashion. A number of observers—most notably Marver Bernstein—have noted that many regulatory agencies eventually become “captured” by the very interests they are supposedly regulating. This paper first examines the notion of “clientele capture,” focusing in particular on the development of an operational classification of regulatory policies. It then builds upon Bernstein's suggestion that the cycle of decay commences with the demise of the constituency supporting regulation. Through case studies an effort is made to explore (1) the conditions under which a regulatory agency is likely to actively attempt to develop a supportive constituency and (2) the conditions under which a constituency supportive of aggressive regulation is able to effectively monitor regulatory policy (and to be instrumental in preventing slippage) after the decline in public concern with the issue.     

Offsetting Uncertainty: Reassurance with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Conventional models of bargaining and reassurance under incomplete information assume that actors' behavioral signals are objectively cooperative or noncooperative. Even if actors are uncertain of each other's preferences, they know what types of actions the other will view as cooperative. Yet on many real-world issues, cooperation is subjective, and what constitutes a cooperative action is conditional on the receiver's preferences. We present a formal model showing that in these cases, two-sided incomplete information actually incentivizes honest behavior and facilitates credible signaling. Because uncertain senders do not know whether a particular action will be interpreted as cooperative, they have little incentive to misrepresent, and instead honestly pursue their true goals. Thus, where cooperation is subjective, mutual uncertainty is “offsetting,” such that credible signals allow actors to quickly and accurately update their beliefs. We illustrate this logic through a case study of the Sino–Soviet split, and highlight the model's implications for contemporary U.S.–China relations.     

Theorising Power and Resistance among “Travellers”

This paper (re-)examines the literature on Traveller communities in the United Kingdom by combining parts of Michel Foucault's and Michel de Certeau's theoretical legacies. Following an ethnographic summary, I demonstrate the relevance of Foucault and Certeau for a critical understanding of the Travellers’ structural predicaments and ideological resistance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I argue that Foucault's outline of modern power, surveillance and classification sheds new light on the impact of social control agencies and the implementation of legislative changes, such as the 1968 Caravan Sites Act, on (semi-)nomadic and/or self-employed groups. The implications of more recent legal developments are discussed as symptoms of postmodernity and the further ideological marginalisation of “non-consuming nomads”. I then argue that some of Certeau's key concepts, including the “strategies/tactics” distinction, illuminate the Travellers’ modalities of resistance and symbolisms of difference. Completing a two-way dynamic between theory and data, the article also shows that existing empirical material on Travellers highlights some of the weaknesses in Foucault's and Certeau's respective thought. Finally, I turn to Foucault's “analytics” to account for intra-group power and resistance, and hence to challenge the common portrayal of Foucault as a “theorist of domination” in juxtaposition to Certeau as a “theorist of subversion”.     

The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,the Separation of Powers,and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation

Numerous studies have found that elite and popular preferences influence decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court; yet, uncertainty remains about when, how, and why the Court is constrained by external pressure. I argue the justices are constrained, at least in part, because they fear nonimplementation of their decisions. I test this theory by utilizing a recent study of judicial power, which finds the Court enjoys greater implementation power in “vertical” cases (those involving criminal and civil liability) than in “lateral” cases (all others; e.g., those involving schools or government agencies). I find that Court constraint is strongest in important lateral cases—those cases in which implementation depends on support from nonjudicial actors. My findings suggest that Supreme Court constraint is driven by the justices' fear of nonimplementation and is, therefore, dependent on institutional context.     

Surviving local government policy intervention: the case of embedded markets within a historical cultural cluster

China's name derives from “china” (porcelain), and “China” (pronounced as “Changnan”) is the former name of Jingdezhen, the capital city of porcelain—through whose exports of “blue‐and‐white” china the country gained international renown. The 2200‐year‐old porcelain cluster in Jingdezhen has survived through multiple empires with distinct policies towards the development of the city's dominant industry. This in‐depth case study examines interactions between local government and the business community to discover the effectiveness of policies and the perception of those policies by entrepreneurs through qualitative research employing Grounded Theory methodology. The centralized institutional structure in China contributes significantly to the findings of a total split of “government action” from “public perception” and leads to new considerations for policy‐makers to redesign their economic development strategies and plans to engender real effects in the desired direction. This paper also provides an exemplary lesson for historical cultural clusters seeking to escape from unfavorable policy interference. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

State Capacity,Bureaucratic Politicization,and Corruption in the Brazilian State

Responding to recent articles in Governance highlighting the need for improved measurement of bureaucratic characteristics, this article describes efforts to map Brazil's federal agencies on three dimensions—capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance—derived from data on more than 326,000 civil servants. The article provides a “proof of concept” about the utility of agency‐level measures of these variables, demonstrating how they relate to an output common to all agencies: corruption. The article provides a first step in the direction of building a comparative research program that offers objective evaluation of bureaucracies within nation‐states, with the intent of better disentangling their impact on governance outcomes.     

Recipes for Pork and Other Delicious Offerings for the New Administration

Is pork produced by feeble budgetary processes? By fixing weak budgetary procedures, can wasteful spending and opportunities for corruption be reduced? This essay looks at three varieties of pork: earmarked, ad hoc, and presidential. What can be done to curb the excesses of each one? By examining the problem of congressional earmarking, this timely article proposes a new process for controlling “earmarked” pork by supporting a new (constitutional) presidential line‐item veto/reprogramming. “Ad hoc pork,” generated by emergency or stimulus bills, is also analyzed. Its downsides can be fixed, according to the essay, by creating a preapproved roadmap for the appropriations process, thereby enhancing the quality of spending oversight. Finally, “presidential pork” derives from chief executives rewarding congressional allies and from government agencies allocating program resources so as to engender support from congressional members. This third variety of pork can be controlled if agencies improve their operational transparency plus strengthen their procedures for selecting projects. What happens when you put good people in a bad place, good apples in a bad barrel? Do the apples change the barrel, or does the barrel change the apples? —Philip Zimbardo, 2008     

Political values in independent agencies

Despite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The “avoidance model” asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the “specification model” recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The “public reason model” requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.     

Managerial Perspectives on Implicit Bias,Affirmative Action,and Merit

Public sector organizations concerned about gender inequality have increasingly sought to address the effect of implicit biases on merit‐based employment practices through bias training and affirmative action programs. Applying qualitative content analysis to interviews with 104 managers in three government agencies in which bias training and affirmative action were being implemented, the authors find that many managers acknowledge the existence of implicit biases and their potential to create unequal employment outcomes. However, this recognition of bias does not translate into support for affirmative action, which is seen by many managers to be an unacceptable violation of merit. The authors argue that implicit bias training and affirmative action are unlikely to create a cultural “tipping point” to progress gender equality without a critical reassessment of merit.     

Fukuyama Is Right about Measuring State Quality: Now What?

Much has recently been written about how to best measure governance or “state quality.” Should we evaluate government performance by looking at what government achieves (outputs) as Robert Rotberg and Craig Boardman recently suggested? Or should we focus on measuring state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy, as Francis Fukuyama concludes? This commentary argues in support of Fukuyama's approach by using a public administration lens to disaggregate the public sector into two domains: upstream bodies at the center of government and downstream delivery bodies that deliver, commission, or fund services under the policy direction of government. It goes further by recommending a measurement framework that focuses on identifying indicators that are behavioral and action worthy in relation to five public management systems ultimately owned and operated by the central, upstream agencies.