Political Cycles,Fiscal Deficits,and Output Spillovers in Europe

This paper investigates whether national elections in Europegenerate political cycles in other European countries, and, ifso, whether these spillover effects are likely to surviveinside EMU. The paper first tests whether elections in Germanyaffect macroeconomic outcomes in other European countries andthen investigates the impact of elections on budget deficits.The results indicate that German politics significantlyimpacts macroeconomic variables in other European countries,and also that politics significantly affects the behaviour ofEuropean budgetary policy. The prospect of elections tends toincrease public deficits in recessions, whereas left-winggovernments tend to be more deficit-prone than right-winggovernments regardless of the state of the economy. Moreover,the existence of political cycles spillovers among Europeancountries suggest that there may be a need for electoralcoordination.     

Examining Relationships Between Legislative and Presidential Influences and Organizational Probity: Evidence from South Korean Central Government Agencies

In public management, few empirical studies have been conducted on the effects of the most influential political authorities—the legislature and the president—on government organizations, despite the theoretical and practical significance of these effects. This study tests the relationships between legislative and presidential influences and organizational probity in South Korean central government agencies, on the basis of political transaction-cost and principal–agent theories. We use three measures of legislative influence—inspectional influence (total annual days of legislative inspection), statutory influence (rules-to-laws ratio), and budgetary influence (ratio of reprogramming budget to total budget), and one measure of presidential influence (annual number of substantive meetings with the president). Then, these independent variables are linked to the organizational probity measure from audited archival data. The two-time-point panel data analysis reveals a positive link between legislative inspectional influence and probity but a negative relationship between the presidential influence measure and probity; the results support theoretical arguments for control over administrative agencies. Thus, the evidence suggests that governments should be cautious of implementing reforms that increase organizational or managerial autonomy.     

The Political Consequences of Self-Insurance: Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe,the Caucasus and Central Asia

Political Behavior - Does self-insurance, such as access to savings or assets, affect support for government? While existing research recognizes that households’ ability to privately manage...     

Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries

We investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance. While some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies, in contrast we show, conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency, that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies. Using a sample of 19 OECD countries in the 1990s, we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low(er) transparency countries, while no such cycles can be observed in high(er) transparency countries. Furthermore, we find, in accordance with recent theory, that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries.     

Cycles in Politics: Wavelet Analysis of Political Time Series

Spectral analysis and ARMA models have been the most common weapons of choice for the detection of cycles in political time series. Controversies about cycles, however, tend to revolve around an issue that both techniques are badly equipped to address: the possibility of irregular cycles without fixed periodicity throughout the entire time series. This has led to two main consequences. On the one hand, proponents of cyclical theories have often dismissed established statistical techniques. On the other hand, proponents of established techniques have dismissed the possibility of cycles without fixed periodicity. Wavelets allow the detection of transient and coexisting cycles and structural breaks in periodicity. In this article, we present the tools of wavelet analysis and apply them to the study of two lingering puzzles in the political science literature: the existence of cycles in election returns in the United States and in the severity of major power wars.     

An Evaluation Crucible: Evaluating Policy Advice in Australian Central Agencies

Policy advice is a core function of government that until quite recently remained outside the formal processes of performance evaluation. Evaluation, by its very nature, is designed to question both the effectiveness and relevance of government activities; applying it to policy advice opens up a traditionally confidential and politically sensitive arena. This paper reports on an evaluation experiment in Australian government — policy management reviews (PMRs) — that sought to evaluate the quality of central agency policy advice. It traces the development of the PMR model around interdepartmental committee processes, the bureaucratic politics that diluted the focus on policy outcomes, and examines how central agencies steered evaluation away from questions of public accountability towards arrangements for achieving more effective control of the processes underpinning production of advice. By targeting the process rather than outcomes of policy advising, PMRs sought unsuccessfully to adhere to the divide between management and policy and, in doing so, marked out the limits to performance evaluation.     

Organizational Resistance to Participatory Approaches in Public Agencies: An Analysis of Forest Department's Resistance to Community-Based Forest Management

The organizational resistance of public agencies to participatory approaches is analyzed by means of a case study involving the implementation of community-based forest management (CBFM) in India. Both exogenous and endogenous causes of resistance are identified, and a theoretical model proposed. The model consists of two dimensions of resistance to change (structural resistance and cultural resistance) and three categories of causal factors (organizational, personal, and environmental factors). The model is empirically tested using the perceptions of senior and middle management level members of the state Forest Departments (FDs) of four states in India, collected through a questionnaire survey. The empirical findings are used to suggest strengthening of public management theories on four aspects: the distinction between structural and cultural resistance; inclusion of extra-organizational processes; the distinction between individual and organizational learning; and the need to differentiate between the impacts of the legislative and executive wings on public agencies' organizational resistance. The results are used to suggest some specific measures to deal with the organizational inertia in public agencies.     

Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Are citizens in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe able to hold politicians accountable at elections? The inheritance of communism—disengaged citizens, economic flux, and inchoate party systems—might be expected to weaken accountability. Looking at the results of 34 elections in 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper finds instead a phenomenon that it calls hyperaccountability. Incumbents are held accountable for economic performance—particularly for unemployment—but this accountability distinguishes not between vote losses and gains, but between large and small losses. This result is significant in several respects. The evidence for economic voting restores some faith in the ability of voters to control their representatives in new democracies. The consistency of punishment in the region, however, may mitigate some of the benefits of economic voting. If incumbents know they will lose, then they may decide to enrich themselves when in power rather than produce good policies.     

Political leadership in Southern Europe: Research problems

The role played by political leaders in the transition and consolidation of Southern European democracies has not been adequately explored. This article argues that the contributions of political leaders to both processes have been particularly important. They ought, therefore, to be specifically analysed and not submerged into structural and configurative studies. More precisely, it is suggested that the leaders’ contributions can be more accurately evaluated within their political contexts, in the light of the resources available to them, with reference to the problems to be faced. However, this is not meant to encourage a country‐by‐country nor a leader‐by‐leader approach. It requires instead a proper comparative analysis. Only by so doing will the processes of transition and democratic consolidation be fully illuminated and provide useful lessons.     

Behavioral and Institutional Determinants of Political Business Cycles

The link between business cycles and the democratic politicalsystem has long been recognized by economists. However, thedeterminants of political business cycles are not well understood.We discuss several institutional and behavioral determinants ofthose cycles, such as revolving-door appointments, term limits andpreferences of the incumbent politician, electorate and businesscommunity concerning the intertemporal pattern of publicexpenditure. We show how they affect the cycle's amplitude in thecontext of a rational-expectations model.     

The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe

Governments and legislatures in Europe have created or greatly strengthened independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Yet they also retain many formal controls over those agencies. The article analyzes whether elected politicians have used their powers to create IRAs in their own image and kept IRAs under tight control or whether they have allowed IRAs to become a distinct set of actors, hence a "third force" in regulation. Principal–agent (PA) theories, largely based on U.S. experience, emphasize the importance of certain formal controls for elected politicians to limit "agency losses." However, an analysis of four European nations between 1990 and 2001 shows that elected politicians did not use their powers to appoint party politicians, force the early departures of IRA members, reverse IRA decisions, or reduce IRA budgets and powers. Using PA theory, two interpretations of this apparent puzzle are offered, each with differing implications for agency autonomy. One is that elected politicians used alternative methods of control, hence they suffered low "agency losses" and IRAs in practice had little autonomy. The other is that elected politicians found that the benefits of IRA autonomy in practice and the costs of applying their formal control outweighed agency losses, and hence accepted agency autonomy.     

Religion and Political Action in Postcommunist Europe

Patterns of political identification in postcommunist Europe are still weakly formed. The churches, however, command high levels of confidence, in sharp contrast to political parties. Representative surveys in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine in late 1997 and early 1998 indicate high levels of confidence in the churches in three of these nations, but not in the Czech Republic for reasons that appear connected to its forced conversion to Catholicism. The religious, as in other countries, are disproportionately female, but attenders in postcommunist Europe are not more likely to be elderly or resident in the countryside. There was little difference between church attenders and national populations in attitudes to the market, NATO membership, or the current government; there were rather larger differences between the countries, with Bulgarians the most favourable to the market, NATO and pro-market parties, and Ukrainians the least favourable. A multiple regression analysis found that church attendance of itself had little effect on attitudes or party preferences in either the Czech Republic or Slovakia; it did, however, increase support for the market, for joining NATO and for pro-market parties in Bulgaria and Ukraine. The relatively modest effects of overt religiosity are likely to be helpful to the formation of a democratic political culture, although account must also be taken of a strong association between the Muslim minorities in these countries and the political parties that seek to represent their interests.     

The New Right in Central Europe I: Czechoslovakia

'The New Right', as it has come to be known, derives from at least two major intellectual sources, free market theory and social conservatism. The question how far these are compatible is frequently raised. The aim of this two-part article is to explore the impact of 'New Right' thinking in East Central Europe (specifically in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) in order to show that, in the conditions of 'real socialism', free market and social conservative ideas seem to arise naturally from the same root conceptions. The first part deals with Czechoslovakia—specifically with the thought of Patocka, Havel and Bratinka, and with the conservative wing of the Charter movement. It argues that, while many writers would specifically reject labels like 'conservative' or 'right-wing', the actual content of their thought is very close to that of the New Right in the western hemisphere. In particular, the call for a 'de-politiciza-tion' of society, for responsible accounting, and for a lived historical identity which will be both national and European, are indistinguishable from long-standing themes of social conservatism.     

The New Right in Central Europe II: Poland and Hungary

'The New Right' as it has come to be known, derives from at least two major intellectual sources, free market theory and social conservatism. The question how far these are compatible is frequently raised. The aim of this two-part article is to explore the impact of 'New Right' thinking in East Central Europe (specifically in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) in order to show that in the conditions of 'real Socialism', free market and social conservative ideas seem to arise naturally from the same root conceptions.
This second section deals with Poland, and examines the new 'market sociology' propagated within universities, together with the metaphysical and political ideas surrounding the Polish Nationalist movement.     

Making Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe,and the Impact of Europe

The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe offered the region a unique opportunity for institutional redesign. Thanks to the variety of historical experiences, inherited structures, transition paths and deal sweeteners during the round-table talks, post-communist Europe initially witnessed much institutional diversity. Throughout the course of the past decade, however, there has been a notable convergence of institutional designs across the region. The process of convergence has been, in part, a response to domestic political concerns, but the demands of the European Union have also played a role. This article plots the course of institutional development in the region, outlining some of the major cases of institutional redesign and highlighting both the positive and negative impact of 'Europe' on the process.     

National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of Federalism

Scholars have challenged the notion of "political safeguardsof federalism" in a large and well-developed body of work onthe use of coercive policy tools by the federal government.This study suggests, however, that there may be some utilityin re-examining the political factors that help to constrainthe growth of national power. Specifically, it argues that theneed to win votes from subnational constituencies makes nationallawmakers less supportive of mandates, preemptions, and taxsanctions during election cycles and, thus, provides an intermittentsafeguard of state authority. It tests and finds evidence forhypotheses related to that general argument in analyses of thepassage of coercive federalist policies over the last thirtyyears.     

Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.     

The Solitary Center: the Core Executive in Central and Eastern Europe

This article discusses the coordinative capacity of Centers of Government (COGs) in several Central and Eastern Europe countries. In formal terms, COGs are at the heart of the executive process; but their contribution to coherence in executive policymaking has remained limited. This observation applies both to coordination within the executive, and between the executive and other key participants in the political process. In important respects, the "solitary centers" operate in isolation from their political and institutional environment. In part, this weakness of linkage reflects the particular features of the post-Communist political systems; in part, it can be explained by a lack of nodality, authority and policy expertise at the COG. There are good reasons to assume that, as policy systems mature, problems of linkage will decline in significance. But this outcome cannot be taken for granted. Instead, we might be witnessing the emergence of a "new administrative type" in some Central and Eastern European countries.