财政分权、政治晋升、环境规制失灵: 一个政治经济学的分析框架

环境资源的公共产权属性决定了其容量的使用需要环境规制.对地方主要政府官员的政治激励约束机制是影响地方政府环境规制绩效的主要因素.优化政府环境规制绩效的路径选择关键在于激励与约束相容的制度安排,在于建立政府、生产企业、社会大众利益相协调的激励约束机制.     

Modernity Gone Awry: Lefort on Totalitarian and Democratic Self-representation

Abstract

This essay starts by reviewing Claude Lefort's writings on totalitarianism, a theme that runs like a red thread through his oeuvre and plays a key role in the different stages of his intellectual development. The analysis of the USSR is a central interest of Lefort and his colleagues at Socialisme ou Barbarie (and inspires them to adopt an explicitly "political" approach against the "economism" of their fellow Marxists); the problem of totalitarianism features prominently in Lefort's theory of democracy and human rights (where it functions as the "flipside" of democracy); and the theme holds Lefort's attention well after the events of 1989. The emphasis of this essay, however, is not on the chronology of Lefort's trajectory, but on the methodological role of totalitarianism in his theoretical framework. Lefort's account of totalitarianism serves him as a tool to dissect the symbolic fabric of modern society. In Arendt's view, totalitarian rule reveals something of the essence of modernity, as a movement towards ever increasing technical mastery. For Lefort, by contrast, totalitarian tendencies arise as an attempt to close off the experience of indeterminacy that has been opened up by political modernity. He shows that the totalitarian "imaginary" (which he dissects in psychoanalytic terms) presupposes yet deliberately inverts the very ideas that sparked the democratic revolution and that are central to the self-representation of democratic societies. In consequence, democracy is continuously at risk of degenerating into totalitarianism. Importantly, the totalitarian threat, which Lefort believes to be the main threat to modern society, only becomes visible by adopting a specifically "political" perspective. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we continue to under stand and to interpret our society in "political" terms, that is, in reference to the symbolic constellation of collective power.     

Political Information, Political Involvement, and Reliance on Ideology in Political Evaluation

Many studies have focused on the relationship between political information and the use of ideology. Here, we argue that two “evaluative motivations”—general investment of the self in politics and extremity of partisanship—serve as moderators of this relationship. Specifically, we use data from two recent national surveys to test whether the possession of information is more strongly associated with a tendency to approach politics in an ideological fashion among individuals high in both types of evaluative motivation. Results supported this hypothesis, revealing that information was more strongly associated with ideological constraint and with a tendency to give polarized evaluations of conservatives and liberals among those who highly invest the self in politics and those with more extreme partisanship. As such, this study suggests that information and involvement interact to shape the use of ideology.     

Self-Interest,Symbolic Politics,and Public Attitudes Toward Gun Control

Numerous studies have found that immediate and tangible self-interest has a minimal influence on public attitudes toward many policy issues. We examine public attitudes toward gun control in order to determine whether gun owners exhibit distinctive policy preferences. Our results indicate that self-interest strongly influences public preferences on gun control and that banning handguns evokes stronger self-interest effects than banning assault weapons or imposing a waiting period on purchases of firearms. We conclude by discussing why gun control evokes self-interested calculations among gun owners, the implications of our findings for self-interest theory, and suggestions for further lines of research.     

Symbolic Politics and Pornography

For feminism, liberalism and conservatism, pornography has operated as symbol of fundeamental political values and visions. However, unlike liberalism, both feminism andconservatism have special affinities with the politics of the symbolic. For both, pornography is taken as symbol of the social order at large and its images are given an emblematic status. Liberalism does its best to render these frameworks unintelligible. One important strategy of obfuscation is to portray radical feminists (Dworkinite) as ‘Conservative’ although here there is the greatest overlap with liberalism. The use of law being a key issue, it is argued here that the more ‘archaic’ libels capture the symbolic harms of pornography far better than modern obscenity law.     

Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries

We investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance. While some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies, in contrast we show, conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency, that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies. Using a sample of 19 OECD countries in the 1990s, we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low(er) transparency countries, while no such cycles can be observed in high(er) transparency countries. Furthermore, we find, in accordance with recent theory, that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries.     

Constitutionalism,Division of Power and Transaction Costs

According to many democracytheorists, there is an unavoidabletrade-off between constitutionalism and theneed for political action. This papercriticizes that belief. Rather, it arguesthat a division of power, while sometimesentailing high political transaction costs,can nevertheless be beneficial andthat it is not necessarily the case that adivision of power does entail hightransaction costs. The analysis expands theframework of Buchanan and Tullock (1962).Constitutionalism is thus defended againstone of its main perceived deficiencies: itsbringing about gridlock. This does notalways happen, and when it does, it isoften a good thing.     

Money, Time, and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Quick Recall and Political Learning Skills

Surveys provide widely cited measures of political knowledge. Do seemingly arbitrary features of survey interviews affect their validity? Our answer comes from experiments embedded in a representative survey of over 1200 Americans. A control group was asked political knowledge questions in a typical survey context. Treatment groups received the questions in altered contexts. One group received a monetary incentive for answering the questions correctly. Another was given extra time. The treatments increase the number of correct answers by 11–24%. Our findings imply that conventional knowledge measures confound respondents' recall of political facts with variation in their motivation to exert effort during survey interviews. Our work also suggests that existing measures fail to capture relevant political search skills and, hence, provide unreliable assessments of what many citizens know when they make political decisions. As a result, existing knowledge measures likely underestimate people's capacities for informed decision making.     

Political Culture, Political System Characteristics, and Public Policies Among the American States

Daniel Elazar's typology of political culture is updated forall states for 1980 using religious affiliation data. On average,the political culture indices do not vary much from simitarmeasures constructed for 1906–1936. The effects of politicalculture on state politics and policy are tested in two ways:(1) by calculating partial correlation coefficients for tendependent variables holding four environmental variables constant(affluence, industrialization, fertility, and liberal politicalideology), and (2) by estimating regression equations withintwo categories of political culture (individualistic and traditionalistic)to gauge the indirect or contextual effects of culture. Thepartial correlation analysis yields the expected outcome—moralisticstates have more interparty competition, higher voter turnout,more policy-relevant parties, and more liberal and innovativepolicies; traditionalistic states show the opposite result.The attempt to assess the contextual effects of political cultureproves less satisfactory. No such effects appear for about halfthe dependent variables, and the contextual effects that arefound correspond only in part to expectations.