Legal Elites and the Shaping of Corporate Law Practice in Brazil: A Historical Study

Brazil today has a legal market that allows for foreign lawyers and foreign firms, but existing regulations are restrictive. Foreign lawyers cannot practice domestic law or litigation, nor can Brazilian‐licensed lawyers working for foreign firms or partnering with foreign lawyers. This was not always the case, however. Until 1963, there was little regulation of the legal profession. Beginning in 1913, elite US lawyers traveled to Brazil, with some even becoming prominent domestic practitioners. They partnered with local elite lawyers (who maintained their domestic privileges) and served as key brokers for US businesses seeking market entry. Drawing on the elite theory literature, and on ethnographies, interview data, and over 1,000 pages of rare Portuguese and English archival sources, this study's thesis is that sophisticated US and Brazilian legal elites capitalized on the lack of regulation to advance their financial interests, and in the process transformed Brazil's corporate legal sector.     

Secret Law and the Value of Publicity*

Abstract. Revelations in the United States of secret legal opinions by the Department of Justice, dramatically altering the conventional interpretations of laws governing torture, interrogation, and surveillance, have made the issue of “secret law” newly prominent. The dangers of secret law from the perspective of democratic accountability are clear, and need no elaboration. But distaste for secret law goes beyond questions of democracy. Since Plato, and continuing through such non‐democratic thinkers as Bodin and Hobbes, secret law has been seen as a mark of tyranny, inconsistent with the notion of law itself. This raises both theoretical and practical questions. The theoretical questions involve the consistency of secret law with positivist legal theory. In principle, while a legal system as a whole could not be secret, publicity need not be part of the validity criteria for particular laws. The practical questions arise from the fact that secret laws, and secret governmental operations, are a common and often well‐accepted aspect of governmental power. This paper argues that the flaw of secret law goes beyond accountability and beyond efficiency to the role that law plays, and can only play, in situating subjects’ understanding of themselves in relation to the state. Secret law, as such, is inconsistent with this fundamental claim of the law to orient us in moral and political space, and undermines the claim to legitimacy of the state's rulers.     

On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality*

Abstract. The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality.     

Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. A Defence of the Original View

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance of the one‐right‐answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation*

According to contemporary legal positivism, law claims to create obligations. In order for law to be able to create obligations, it must be capable of having authority. Legal positivism claims that for law to be capable of having authority, it only has to meet non‐moral or non‐normative conditions of authority. In this paper it is argued that law can only be capable of having authority if it also meets certain normative conditions. But if something must meet certain normative conditions in order to be capable of having authority and if it must be capable of having authority in order to be law, then it is only law if it is conceivable that it meets these normative conditions and this can only be ascertained by means of an evaluation. Therefore, legal positivism's claim that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations (the separation thesis) is incompatible with its claim that law must be able to create obligations. Further, an analysis of Hart's concept of law shows that it is not only possible that the identification of the law depends on moral evaluation, as Hart claims, but that it is conceptually necessary that it does.     

LAWYERS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS WORKING TOGETHER: RECONCILING THE DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND MANDATORY CHILD ABUSE REPORTING

Lawyers are increasingly finding themselves working in conjunction with a social worker and/or a psychologist. This dynamic can be found in organizations that take a multi‐disciplinary approach to the law, such as New York City's Legal Aid Society and Lawyers for Children. Collaborative law is another such example. Collaborative law is an increasing trend in family law; it provides a divorcing couple the opportunity to work with professionals from different disciplines, without being subject to the court system. While a multi‐disciplinary approach to the law has the ability to maximize the value of representation, it also can create tension when inconsistent duties are imposed by conflicting professional obligations. A major area of conflict is between the lawyer's duty to maintain client confidences and the mental health professional's duty to report child abuse. This Note discusses the important policies behind these opposing duties. The Note recommends amending state child abuse and neglect laws in order to eliminate the conflict between the professions' duties and allow lawyers and mental health professionals to work together more harmoniously. Amending state child abuse and neglect laws will allow for mental health professionals working with a lawyer who represents a client the same reporting duties as lawyers in the process.     

The Weak Natural Law Thesis and the Common Good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.     

社会实在的规范性与公私法的界限——与徐国栋教授商榷民法的“公私法混合说”

民法的＂公私法混合说＂建立在＂强行法说＂基础之上,该理论通过区分任意性规范和强制性规范把私法的范围限于任意性规范。强行法说预设了一种缺少规范性的＂社会实在＂：一方面忽略了法律对社会实在的构造功能,没能看到强制性规范与私人领域的构成性关系;另一方面忽略了通过强制性规范所表达的私人自治的规范性要素,没能看到强制性规范与私人领域之间在合法性意义上的共生性。尽管公私法的划分问题具有可争议性,但强行法说因其对社会实在的理解存在偏差而无法成为一种妥当的公私法界限理论,民法的＂公私法混合说＂自然无法成立。     

Social networking sites and the legal profession: Balancing benefits with navigating minefields

The purpose of this article is to review the impact of social networking sites on law, the legal profession and dispute resolution. Within a very short period of time, social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace, combined with social networking hardware platforms, such as iPad, iPhone, Blackberry, and Android, have infiltrated the profession of law and dispute resolution. Many legal professionals now have a social networking profile, use information on social networking sites as evidence, and interact with other lawyers and judges through such forums. This increased interaction in a publically accessible and viewable medium presents a challenge to the legal profession's traditional ideas of independence, confidentiality, and rules of evidence. Social networking mediums are here to stay. Therefore, this article looks at how this trend affects law and the legal profession, what issues it presents to lawyers and judges, whether new laws are necessary to take into account the impact of social networking sites and the benefits of such technology in fostering access to justice and helping parties achieve justice.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique

In this article the author adduces a non‐positivist argument for a necessary connection between law and morality; the argument is based on the claim to correctness, and it is directed to an attack stemming from Eugenio Bulygin. The heart of the controversy is the claim to correctness. The author first attempts to show that there are good reasons for maintaining that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness. He argues, second, for the thesis that this claim has moral implications. Finally, he attempts to refute Bulygin's objection that the claim‐based argument for non‐positivism boils down to contradiction and triviality.     

行政法律责任的规范分析——兼论行政法学研究方法

本文从行政法律责任概念的语义分析入手,在法规范的语境中从逻辑形式、社会事实和价值评价机制三个方面阐释了行政法律责任概念完整的构造,进而展开对行政法研究方法的思考。文章认为,作为法律学分支的行政法学之研究方法,应当在综合考量法的各组成要素的前提下,以法规范为其核心研究对象,着重于法规范本身的逻辑及形式层面的阐释,同时又不排斥法律中的价值考量,在实证规范的约束下寻求价值的客观化,从而避免沦为极端的法律实证主义。另外,行政法学还应该是一门具有教义性质的学科,它要求研究者的认知过程必须受到预置规则的限制,而不能流于形而上或本体论或社会学意义上的探究。文章指出,中国大陆行政法学上行政法律责任的误区在于:忽视了这一法律基本概念的教义性和规范性,从而将法律责任的研究导入非法律学的歧途。     

再论法在事中

法在事中,法就是事之理。这一命题的确立对正确地认识和使用法意义重大。它为法律工作者树立了两个航标:事和理,从而使我们在法律工作中有一个明确的目标和正确的工作方法,这就是研究事和求其理。只有这样,我们才能找到和认清真正的法,我们制定出来的法才不会不通情理,甚至有悖于理。而这种无理之法必然是无用之法,是得不到广大群众的认可和遵守的,也是没有生命力的。     

One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the “Thin” View of Legal Positivism

Much controversy has emerged on the demarcation between legal positivism and non‐legal positivism with some authors calling for a ban on the ‐as they see it‐ nonsensical labelling of legal philosophical debates. We agree with these critics; simplistic labelling cannot replace the work of sophisticated and sound argumentation. In this paper we do not use the term ‘legal positivism’ as a simplistic label but identify a specific position which we consider to be the most appealing and plausible view on legal positivism. This is the view advocated by Gardner in his paper 'Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (Gardner 2001 , 199), where he carefully scrutinises the most convincing and unifying postulates of legal positivism, which he calls “the thin view”. The study shows that this thin view presupposes an empirical conception of action that is untenable and implausible since it makes acts of engagement with the law unintelligible to an observer of such acts.     

Rules of Power and the Power of Rules

Abstract
The paper describes at length and then discusses critically Frederick Schauer's analysis of rules in his recent book Playing By the RuZes . For most of the book Schauer discusses rules in general, and only at the end talks about legal rules in particular. The chief message of Schauer's analysis is that rules permit, and even constitute, a particular kind of decision-making, one that quite deliberately insulates the decision-taker from considerations of what would be in the circumstances the best justified decision to take. Rules are thus for Schauer devices for the allocation of decision-making power: The effect of A delegating to B the power to decide by a set of rules devised by A is that A retains much control over B 's decision-making. Schauer canvasses the claims of what he calls "presumptive positivism" to be a theory of law which embodies such a view of legal rules. In his criticism, the author compares Schauer's view with Joseph Raz's notion of legal rules as exclusionary reasons. The author then compares "presumptive positivism" with some other recent versions of positivism and the idea of rules as devices for the allocation of power with theories of law in the Critical Legal Studies movement.     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

Lawyers' Professional Ethics—Do They Exist?

The author's aim is to prove that certain moral principles will always be etched into laws when the interest of society demands it and when morality as a set of norms guiding behavior no longer functions in an expected manner outside the system of law. In this paper, it is argued that morality is constituted within the law in a more profound way as well as in a way which is also much more difficult to identify than, for example, conventional instructions concerning professional ethics may indicate. The main thesis is that de facto there are no particular professional ethics of lawyers beyond or above the ethical principles binding all people.