Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?

The reinforcement of the protection of fundamental rights at the European level and the emergence of the status of Union citizenship are two closely connected phenomena. European citizenship has been and continues to be one of the central arguments in favour of the extension of the scope of EU fundamental rights. This argument arises out of a sentiment that vindicates equality at the core of the citizenship of the Union as a fundamental status. Against this background, this paper examines the different possibilities of interconnection between the traditional doctrine of EU fundamental rights and the jurisprudential construction of the citizenship of the Union. Particularly, it will be discussed whether fundamental rights should be placed at the core of the formula that protects the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of the rights conferred by EU citizenship, inaugurated by Ruiz Zambrano, already latent in Rottmann and substantially refined in an ever‐growing case‐law (McCarthy, Dereci, O. and S., Ymaraga and Alokpa). It will be argued that this formula carries the very valuable potential to reinforce citizenship of the Union as an independent source of rights able to overcome problems such as reverse discrimination. For these purposes, this formula could be considered to encompass not only the absolute deprivation of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights’, but also the existence of serious obstacles thereto.     

Precedent in the Sui Generis Legal Order: A Mine Run Approach

In this article, we use case‐to‐case citation networks to explore the force of precedent in EU law. We introduce a novel methodology to analyse the extent to which references to past decisions act as reasons for decisions in subsequent cases and illustrate the approach on the European citizenship case‐law citation network. We conclude that the cohesive pull of precedent in EU citizenship case‐law is too weak to generate a coherent judicial doctrine, thereby confirming qualitative research on the subject. However, the incursions into competences of the Member States in areas, found only tangential to EU citizenship, form a more consistent underlying story.     

The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case‐law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court's reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.     

CASES: European Arrest Warrant Cases and the Principles of Non‐discrimination and EU Citizenship

This case comment provides an analysis of the recent judgment in Wolzenburg (C‐123/08), delivered on 6 October 2009 not yet reported (Grand chamber) concerning the application of the EU principles of nondiscrimination and citizenship to the European Arrest Warrant cases. It also considers the impact of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the implications of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC for this area of law.     

The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union

Abstract The concept of citizenship is analysed on three seemingly contradictory levels: its integration by the recent case law of the European Court of Justice into the existing free movement acquis, its restriction in the accession treaties with new Member States concerning free movement of workers, and its redefinition by new Member States themselves. The result is a somewhat blurred picture: While the European Court of Justices uses citizenship to fill gaps left by primary and secondary law mostly with regard to non‐discrimination, the accession treaties have allowed a ‘re‐nationalisation’ of free movement, against the promises of equality inherent in the citizenship concept, which also includes nationals from new Member countries. The concept of citizenship itself in new Member countries, as the examples of Latvia and Estonia on the one hand, and Hungary on the other demonstrate, is very much related to the (somewhat sad) lessons of the past and therefore highly politicised; it has not been shaped with regard to free movement in the EU. The author suggests a gradual ‘communitarisation’ of citizenship itself even though the EU seems to miss competence in this area, for example, by paying greater attention to residence as basis for Community rights.     

EU Citizenship without Duties

Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five interrelated claims. (1) There are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship; (2) such duties would lack any legal‐theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; (3) legal‐theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; (4) EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce them; (5) this development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de‐dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are correct, it is time to stop categorising EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law.     

Migrant Workers as Citizens within the ASEAN Landscape: International Law and the Singapore Experiment

Using both legal and sociological definitions of citizenship,this paper examines how the international community, ASEAN countriesand Singapore have responded to the migrant worker question. The first part of this paper uses ASEAN examples and interrogatesthe question of migrant worker citizenship from an internationallegal or policy perspective, particularly recent efforts toconstruct a differentiated citizenship for migrant workers withindestination States based on an inclusionary principle. The second part of this paper then undertakes a close case studyof foreign domestic workers or "maids" in Singapore. I examinehow maids are depicted as non-citizens under Singapore's lawand policy, how Singaporean non-governmental organizations havesought to counter this and how the latter may be guided by internationallydeveloped concepts of differentiated citizenship and the inclusionaryprinciple.     

A General Theory of Law or the Foundation of the Ideal Republic? Five Doubts about Luigi Ferrajoli's Theory of Fundamental Rights

This contribution starts by comparing two of Ferrajoli's essays:Cittadinanza e diritti fondamentali (1993) and the articleof the review's present issue, Fundamental Rights. Theauthor shows that the methodological perspective of the twoworks is different: in the first one, while remaining in theframework of present constitutionalism, Ferrajoli argues chieflyfor an overcoming of citizenship; in the second one, the attemptis to give birth to a new law paradigm. The doubts and questionsVitale mentions concern exactly this possibility.     

Irony of Citizenship: Descent,National Belonging,and Constitutions in the Postcolonial African State

In 2010, like many African countries since the 1990s, Kenya passed a new constitution. This constitution aimed to get rid of many past issues including the definition of citizenship. Globally, two general principles govern the acquisition of citizenship, descent from a citizen (jus sanguinis), and the fact of birth within a state territory (jus soli). In contrast to the prior Constitution that required both descent from Kenyan parents and birth in Kenya, the 2010 Constitution adopted a rule of citizenship by descent alone (jus sanguinis) from either parent. However, today Kenya is faced with a conundrum first articulated by Aristotle: how do you understand and operationalize citizenship by descent in a new state, or in the case of Kenya, one that has only just turned fifty? The crux of this conundrum is determining the basis of the citizenship of parents who precede the polity and therefore what they can transfer to their children. Understanding that articulations of citizenship are also systems of exclusion, this paper asks who can and cannot be a Kenyan citizen and why? What are the unintended consequences of efforts to escape Aristotle's conundrum?     

The Strasbourg Court and Indirect Race Discrimination: Going Beyond the Education Domain

Prohibiting indirect discrimination has been hailed as guaranteeing substantive equality by addressing issues of structural discrimination and inequalities in a way that direct discrimination cannot and will not. However, Article 14, the ECHR's non‐discrimination provision, does not distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. Only in 2007 the European Court of Human Rights explicitly included the notion of indirect (race) discrimination under Article 14 in DH and Others v Czech Republic, its famous judgment on Roma education segregation. Since then it has applied the prohibition of indirect race discrimination in a limited manner to similar education cases. However, in its recent Grand Chamber decision, Biao v Denmark, the Strasbourg Court started clarifying some unsolved issues in the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in its case law and finally applied the concept to the much broader area of immigration and citizenship.     

Civic Integration,Migrant Women and the Veil: at the Limits of Rights?

Controversies surrounding the wearing of the veil by Muslim women in Europe have coincided with a resurgence of interest in ‘pathways to citizenship’ and integration testing. This article argues that the historical vestiges of discrimination in immigration and citizenship laws persist today in the scrutiny of the cultural affiliations and practices of aspiring immigrants and citizens. Muslim women have been placed at the center of such scrutiny, increasingly defined by the arbiters of belonging as les anormeaux. This article explores recent legislative developments on the wearing of the veil in France and examines these developments in the light of the expansion of integration testing and human rights law's normative commitments to more just multicultural arrangements.     

Rules for Rights: European Law,Health Care and Social Citizenship

Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.     

Social Citizenship,Housing Wealth and the Cost of Social Care: Is the Care Act 2014 ‘Fair'?

This article assesses the extent to which it is ‘fair’ for the government to require owner‐occupiers to draw on the equity accumulated in their home to fund their social care costs. The question is stimulated by the report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support, Fairer Care Funding (the Dilnot Commission) and the subsequent Care Act 2014. The enquiry is located within the framework of social citizenship and the new social contract. It argues that the individualistic, contractarian approach, exemplified by the Dilnot Commission and reflected in the Act, raises questions when considered from the perspective of intergenerational fairness. We argue that our concerns with the Act could be addressed by inculcating an expectation of drawing on housing wealth to fund older age: a policy of asset‐based welfare.     

European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future

Abstract:  EU citizenship has matured as an institution, owing to a number of important interventions by the European Court of Justice and legislative initiatives, such as the Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC, which has recently entered into force. In this article, I critically examine minimalist and cosmopolitan conceptions of European citizenship and argue that once we dispense with the preoccupation of assigning primacy to a specific level of citizenship and establishing some kind of hierarchy among them, we can begin to address the questions and issues that really matter. Among these are the future governance of citizenship and the design of a more inclusive, multilayered and multicultural conception of citizenship. European citizenship entails a number of fruitful ideas for a more ambitious transition to a post-national tableau and can be the prototype for institutional experimentation on citizenship on a global scale.     

“Impossible Families”: Mixed‐Citizenship Status Couples and the Law

This article explores the complex and contradictory relationship between citizenship in the law and the immigrant reality of mixed‐citizenship family life through in‐depth interviews with individuals in mixed‐citizenship marriages. An examination of mixed‐citizenship marriage exposes the inadequacies of approaching citizenship as an individual‐centered concept. The data indicate that, though both immigration and citizenship laws focus on the individual, the repercussions of those laws have family‐level effects. Because of their spouses' immigrant status, many citizens are obliged by the law to live the immigrant experience in their own country or to become immigrants themselves.     

Governing Health and Social Security in the Twenty-First Century: Active Citizenship Through the Right to Participate

This article discusses the role of individual rights in the production of active citizenship. In recent years, the notion of ‘active citizenship’ has become an object of research in both political and social science. Studies that draw on the Foucaultian governmentality tradition have been particularly interested in various societal discourses and practices through which active citizenship is being produced. However, the role of law and rights has been neglected or even rejected in these studies. The aim of this article is thus to show that certain procedural rights, the right to participate in particular, constitute an important legal technology in the production of active citizenship. The analysis is based on the recent developments in Finnish social and health care law. It will also be argued that despite the apparently convergent subject-matter, Jürgen Habermas’s normative theory of the ‘procedural paradigm of law’ does not offer a meaningful framework in which to address the relationship between active citizenship and procedural rights since it is based on an overly narrow conception of subjectivity.     

Who has the right to govern online activity? A criminal and civil point of view

This paper compares how the Australian defamation case of Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 and the English obscenity case of R. v. Perrin [2002] EWCA 747 dealt with the legal concept of publication in the transnational online context or, more specifically, with the issue as to how to treat a foreign online publication. Despite the different nature of the causes of action, with the former being a civil case and the latter being a criminal case, the article shows that, not only were the underlying jurisdictional issues the same, but that there were also significant similarities in the approaches taken to them. Both courts firmly rejected arguments in favour of an exclusive country‐of‐origin approach and stuck with the traditional country‐of‐destination orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it is argued that, given the different nature of and rationales behind civil and criminal law, as well as the less cooperative transnational criminal law regime, the same jurisdictional approach taken to both civil and criminal transnational activity may in fact yield substantially very different outcomes. Thus, the approach appropriate in the criminal law context may lead to undesirable over‐regulation in the civil law context.     

Rights, Relationality, and Membership: Rethinking the Making and Meaning of Citizenship

The republication after 40 years of T. H. Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class signifies a revived interest in sociolegal historical approaches to citizenship rights. For decades students have been guided by Marshall's classic treatise. But can Marshall's argument for the causal power of the “transition from feudalism to capitalism” continue to provide an adequate grounding for sociolegal approaches to citizenship and rights formation? Building on Marshall's path-breaking expansion of the concept of citizenship, I use institutional analysis and causal narrativity to present an alternative explanation. I argue that modem citizenship rights me a contingent outcome of the convergence of England's medieval legal revolutions with its regionally varied local legal and political cultures, not of the emergence of capitalist markets.     

Citizenship and the Corporation

This article investigates the contribution made by the concept of citizenship to contemporary understandings of the widely held business corporation. Because the conventional economic understanding of corporations and corporate law cannot fully explain the nature of the business corporation and the purposes of corporate law, the framework within which teachers and students of corporate law approach the corporation must be enlarged. By looking at the corporation exclusively through the lens of economics we are unable to account for all features of the corporation and corporate law, and we risk mistaking the purpose of these features, or wrongly supposing that they serve no purpose. The article proposes that through resort to a distinct set of conceptual tools—the concept of citizenship, borrowed from political theory—we can attain a fuller comprehension of the meaning of the corporation.