Justice and Well‐Orderedness: Saving Rawls from Luck Egalitarianism

This paper develops a full account of Rawls's notion of a well‐ordered society and uses it to address two luck egalitarian objections to his principles of justice. The first is an internal criticism which claims that Rawls's account of justice is better captured by a responsibility‐sensitive egalitarian account. The second is an external objection according to which, regardless of the alleged inconsistency between Rawls's principles and his account of justice, we should reject those principles in favour of a responsibility‐sensitive criterion because it better captures our moral intuitions about distributive justice. The argument presented answers both objections by defending the value of well‐orderedness and showing the difficulties of responsibility‐sensitive egalitarian conceptions in realizing this ideal.     

Justice and Public Opinion from a Comparative Perspective

Toril Aalberg’s book links a wide array of issues and perspectives that conventionally are kept apart. She combines normative theory with empirical justice research, takes a longitudinal as well as a cross-national perspective, and she discusses her results against the background of the socio-structural and institutional context. The book provides a detailed picture of the attitudinal landscape and is a rich source of comparative data on social justice attitudes. The exceptionally wide variety of approaches that are used represents an asset of this analysis and addresses the need for an encompassing view on the issue of justice. At the same time, when recapitulating the results, it becomes evident that this strategy also entails dangers: Aalberg’s approach requires a more comprehensive conceptual framework that allows a coherent interpretation of her findings. It is argued that normative institutionalism would offer a suitable frame of interpretation for the subject and design employed.     

Democracy and Disagreement

Abstract. According to Popper's critical rationalism, the possibility of disagreement is at the heart of open societies. If this is assumed to be true, is it not illiberal to try to justify principles of justice, which can be regarded as the subject of an unending collective deliberation? I suggest that it is not, using an analogy with scientific progress. Moreover, I try to show that Rawls's achievement is misunderstood if one forgets that it is supposed to overcome the antinomy between “la liberté des Modemes” and “la liberté des Anciens.” In this respect, I insist on some unnoticed similarities between Rawls's and Popper's points of views. I conclude on the idea of the “neutrality” of the theory of justice, suggesting a link between Rawls's approach and the French republican tradition.     

相对积极主义刑事司法观的提倡

新的十六字方针是法律体系建成之后的必然选项,其实质是追求法律的正当性与司法的公正性,提倡一种相对积极主义的司法理念,强调社会安全与司法人权保障的平衡。司法积极主义是对简单遵循文义的专属主义反思化的结果,并非意味着基于秩序安宁而造法。司法克制主义和积极主义,都有相同的出发点。二者的根本分歧在于如何理解解释法律、寻找法律和创造法律的关系。绝对的积极主义因存在明显的违背教义学和罪刑关系的痕迹而应当引以为戒,相对积极主义因包含着法律的道德价值从而更能促进公正性的实现。当前我国的司法犯罪化理论如果被不加甄别地践行,或者不进行细致化的推演,可能具有绝对积极主义色彩而走向公正的反面。因为刑法包含着规范属性和道德属性,这意味着人道精神与法定理念互为补充,意味着公正和人道成为刑事司法的目标。相对积极主义的特征是注重方法论的合刑性以及合宪性要求。     

司法中的伦理解释及其限度——以美国宪法为分析样本

司法中的伦理解释本质上是一种立基于正当性的价值论解释方法，它要求解释者在法律文本语义的最大化范围内，选择和适用最合乎法的制度伦理的含义。伦理解释具有基础性、历史性、体系性和开放性等基本特征，这些特征都是由它所要表达的法的制度伦理赋予并在具体解释方法中展开与呈现的。伦理解释具有局限性：一方面，对法的制度伦理的辨识往往非常复杂，具有不确定性，这就会导致依托制度伦理来解释法律的客观性、正当性发生危机；另一方面，即或已经明确了法的制度伦理，但对它的维系与坚持也具有相当的难度，特别是当法官的个人正义观与法的制度伦理发生冲突时，难度更大，在极端情况下，甚至会使法律的伦理解释成为不可能完成的任务。     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. In the first part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third and final part, I shall argue that Rawls's reflective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach.     

原初状态的由来及其内在困境——浅论《正义论》的逻辑基点

罗尔斯以其《正义论》而奠定了他在当代政治哲学界的地位。据说,他扭转了政治哲学的方向,从新回到了近代的契约论传统,并使之上升到更高的抽象水平而提出了他的“作为公平的正义”的理论。他整个理论的逻辑起点是“原初状态”,那么通过分析“原初状态”构建及其内在的困境我们可以透视其整个理论的说服力。     

Care and Justice in the Global Context

Abstract. Morality is often dismissed as irrelevant in what is seen as the global anarchy of rival states each pursuing its national interest. When morality is invoked, it is usually the morality of justice with its associated moral conceptions of individual rights, equality, and universal law. In the area of moral theory, an alternative moral approach, the ethics of care, has been developed in recent years. It is beginning to influence how some see their global responsibilities.     

当代正义要求的法则化——兼论社会保障法的正义基础

19世纪以来,西方的正义观发生了重大变化,即从功利主义的正义观向社会正义理论转变,从谋求最大多数人的最大利益向关爱社会境况最差者转变。本文考察了罗尔斯的社会正义理论,并从法律视角分析了以罗尔斯为代表的社会正义理论所导致的法律变革,揭示了社会保障法的正义基础。     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls.     

The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl‐Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.     

"法学"是什么?——比较法视域中的"法学"含义诠释

法学是什么?法学不只是一种知识谱系,它本质上是基于对法的具体场景运用的实践活动的回应。法学是一种知识、一种逻辑、一种学问,却更是一种实践、一种经验、一种解释。从比较法之视域对“法学”之原初含义进行解读,可把它概括为三个判断:法学是公平之学、法学是智识之学、法学是判断与解释之学。     

Toward an Interpretive Criminal Justice

This paper presents the academic field of criminal justice as an interpretive social science. The opening section discusses academic criminal justice from scientific and interpretive perspectives, arguing that the terminology of “justice” is essentially contested. The second section presents the key implication of a contested core terminology: that an interpretive approach is the best way to develop the academic field of criminal justice. Section three reviews central elements of the Gadamerian tradition, with an eye towards its application to the field of criminal justice. The fourth section considers two issues pertinent to an interpretive criminal justice—the problem of interpretation in a field where professional practice is destructive to other normative systems, and the contribution of an interpretive criminal justice to public policy.     

Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up

This paper argues that transitional justice needs to adopt a participatory approach to achieve longer-term sustainability, shifting away from the top-down 'one-size-fits-all' approach to allow 'voices from below' to be heard and heeded. It critiques dominant interpretations of key transitional justice concepts, and links them to the difficulties of post-conflict transitional justice in a range of violently divided societies. Popular participation and local agency, it is argued, is necessary to achieve ends identified in much transitional justice discourse, and to embed mechanisms for the creation of sustainable peace. A Northern Ireland initiative (the Ardoyne Commemoration Project) will be explored in-depth, illustrating how a bottom-up 'truth-telling' process can make a significant contribution to transitional justice and casting doubt on the validity of the deference to legal dominance in current policy and practice. The paper recommends that knowledge available in development studies and participatory theory be applied more clearly in debates and approaches in transitional justice.     

The Idea of “Free Public Reason”

Abstract. In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so-called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see a contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability.     

Justice in old age: An analysis of corporatist social theory

It is sometimes argued that a tacit contract exists between the generations in industrial society that requires that the present structure of Social Security benefits not be altered in any way that would serve to diminish the present benefit levels. The demands of social justice, it is thought, require that Western societies maintain their commitments to Social Security programs, especially to those programs of the type administered in the United States. This paper examines questions of justice pertaining to the aged in contemporary society. It is argued here that the demands of justice pertain not only to the satisfaction of basic needs for subsistence but also to the satisfaction of the need for self-realization. The commitment of capitalist nations like the U.S. to social justice for the aged is analyzed using a theory of justice that is based on Durkheim's political writings on corporatism and the solidarist theory of the Catholic social movement. The corporatist theory of justice would require that public pension systems like Social Security be revised to provide more adequately for the social needs of the working-class aged.     

Punishment and Justice in Adam Smith*

Abstract. The modern interpretation of Smith as a retributive theorist of punishment is challenged in favour of a view of his work as containing a curious amalgam of retributive and utilitarian elements. This unsynthesised theoretical compound accounts for many of the contradictory positions assumed by him, examples of which are given in the article. At the level of “punishment” (i.e., punishment considered without a political dimension), the retributivehtilitarian dichotomy is observed in his discussions of merit and demerit (which are utilitarian in their logic) and propriety and impropriety (which are retributive). At the level of state punishment, the same dichotomy is seen in his juxtaposition of considerations of individual justice and the political ends of punishment. A final section locates Smith's “double cleft stick” theoretically in his position on the one hand in the Hobbesian materialist tradition and on the other in his historical stance half-way between the individualism of the contractarians and the full blown utilitarianism of Bentham.     

Multicultural Justice: Will Kymlicka and Cultural Recognition

Abstract. The article concentrates on Kymlicka's major area of research, i.e., the issue of justice for minority cultures. It deals with his perspective on cultural recognition in a multicultural society, which is grounded on his argument for culture and autonomy. Specifically, it covers issues such as cultural and moral pluralism, the justification for policies of cultural recognition, and the relation between cultural identity and membership. The aim of the article is to emphasise what the dangerous implications could be, in a multicultural society, were policies of cultural recognition to be predominantly or solely founded on liberal values.