‘Accountable Independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the Logics of Transparency

The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the financial crisis not only as the institutional ‘winner’ but also as the most central—and powerful—supranational institution of our times. This article challenges the so‐called ‘accountable independence’ of the ECB across the range of tasks it carries out. Citizens ‘see’ the ECB today especially for its role in promoting austerity and its involvement as part of the troika and otherwise in the economic decision making of troubled Member States. Far from ECB monetary policy heralding a ‘new democratic model’, the ECB today suffers from a clear deficit in democracy. In between the grandiose concept of ECB ‘independence’ and the more performative ECB ‘accountability’ lies ‘transparency’. Across the range of ECB practices there is a need to take the related concepts of ‘transparency’ and of (democratic) ‘accountability’ more seriously, both in conceptual terms and in their relationship to one another.     

Holding to Account a Possible European Public Prosecutor Supranational Governance and Accountability Across Diverse Legal Traditions

The Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for the Member States of the European Union (EU) to establish a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) with competence to prosecute, in the courts of the Member States, crimes against the financial interests of the Union. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provides that the Member States may unanimously, or through flexible cooperation where nine Member States agree, establish such a European-level prosecution body, with the possibility for its powers to be extended by unanimity to include serious crime having a cross border dimension or affecting more than one Member State. Within the legal traditions of the Member States, means of holding prosecution authorities to account vary considerably. Probably the strongest form of accountability exists in the civil law tradition of Member States that permit appeals to judicial bodies for decisions not to prosecute, which contrasts with the traditional common law reluctance to even give reasons for not prosecuting. Similarly, the ways in which prosecution authorities interact or overlap with police functions, and thus with general mechanisms of police and/or bureaucratic accountability, differ. Some of the particular features of EU cooperation suggest additional accountability issues, notably, questions concerning competence spill-over and problems of remoteness. This paper seeks to address how to conceptualise governance and accountability of a possible EPP outside of the context of a trial (the latter entailing a type of open legal accountability that can be studied in its own right) and including the question of the definition of competences.     

A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration

The development of European integration from an economic to a political community has become manifest not just in the continuous addition of non‐economic policy areas to the treaties. The introduction of Union citizenship (and its controversial subsequent development in the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence) has also triggered a paradigm shift in one of the community's core areas, the concept of negative integration hitherto intrinsically linked to the internal market. Thus, neither the individual's quality as a market actor nor his/her involvement in a transnational economic activity is a condition for enjoyment of the market freedoms' core guarantees, these being a right of residence and a far‐reaching claim to national treatment in other Member States, as well as a prohibition on restrictions to the free movement of persons. A new fundamental freedom beyond market integration (‘Grundfreiheit ohne Markt’) has emerged. This process, whose consequences for the welfare systems of the wealthier Member States have been fiercely discussed for some time, however, also threatens to curtail severely the regulatory autonomy at the national level.     

The Log in Your Eye: Is Europe's External Promotion of Religious Freedom Consistent With its Internal Practice?

The commitment of the EU to the external promotion of the respect for human rights allegedly distinguishes its foreign policy from that of traditional powers. Yet there is the perception that EU's statements are not always consistent with internal practices. This article analyses one set of EU's inconsistencies that has not been sufficiently studied: the discrepancy between internal and external human rights standards. The article focuses on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, which has become a priority of the EU's foreign policy. It is submitted that the EU's external position generally reflects values common to the Member States, but is sometimes contradicted by the practice of domestic authorities. The human rights standards identified in the EU's foreign policy may arguably serve as a reference for legal reform and the interpretation of fundamental rights in Europe.     

Can Tax Authorities Scrutinise the Ideas of Foreign Charities? The ECJ's Persche Judgment and Lessons from US Tax Law

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) recent Persche judgment poses important questions about the relationship between taxation of gifts and charitable purposes in the light of EC law requirements. This article argues that by applying its established case‐law to the matter of donors to foreign recipient bodies, the ECJ takes a position on the social role of both charities and tax deduction. Moreover, the position of the ECJ clearly paves the way for tax authorities to check the objectives and the values pursued by recipient bodies seeking tax‐preferred status, a situation that recalls a similar power recognised under specific circumstances of the US Internal Revenue Services. Arguably, the ECJ case‐law has more profound consequences on charitable action, since it seems that the power accorded to tax authorities of the Member States to check the purposes of charitable organisations leads to a cosmopolitan apprehension of charitable action while it pushes charities to enhance transparency in their activities.     

Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality

Abstract:  The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a complex new typology of acts, distinguishing between legislative, delegated and implementing acts. This reform, the first since the Treaty of Rome, will have an impact on some of the most contested topics of EU law, touching several central questions of a constitutional nature. This article critically analyses which potential effects and consequences the reform will have. It looks, inter alia, at the aspects of the shifting relation between EU institutions, the distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States, as well as the future of rule-making and implementation structures such as comitology and agencies.     

Delegated and Implementing Rule Making: Proceduralisation and Constitutional Design

The reform of non‐legislative acts introduced by Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was guided by concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy of (lato sensu) implementing acts of the Union. However, it has ignored the centrality of transparency in the Union's democracy and the role of participation as a complementary source of democracy. This article argues that the procedures leading to the adoption of delegated and implementing acts are subject to the treaties' provisions on transparency and participation, and should be shaped by them. It analyses the constitutional choices underlying Articles 290 and 291, with a view to assessing whether and to what extent the material, organic and functional profiles of delegated and implementing acts condition procedural rules on transparency and participation to be followed in their adoption.     

Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity

It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation‐of‐powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ‘mixed government’—a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ‘estates’ representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation‐of‐powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule‐making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ‘regulatory estate’. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need.     

Double Nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance

Currently the Member States' nationalities, short of being abolished in the legal sense, mostly serve as access points to the status of EU citizenship. Besides, they provide their owners with a limited number of specific rights in deviation from the general principle of non‐discrimination on the basis of nationality, and—what is probably more important for the majority of their owners—trigger legalised discrimination in the wholly internal situations. Viewed in this light, the requirement to have only one Member State's nationality enforced in national law by 10 Member States seems totally outdated and misplaced. This paper focuses on the legal analysis of this controversial requirement.     

Exceptions to Article 226: Alternative Administrative Procedures and the Pursuit of Member States

This article considers the procedures used in EC law to prosecute infringements committed by Member States, in addition to the well-known Article 226 (ex Article 169) EC. It has three purposes. The first is to systematise the main categories of these, to examine the reasons for the creation of these procedures and the interaction among them, using Article 226 as the main point of reference. The basic criterion is the distinction between procedures established by the EC Treaty and procedures established by secondary legislation but without a clear legal basis in the Treaty. The second purpose is to explain why Member States have accepted the development of new procedures, even though they serve to reinforce the Commission's powers. The article argues that this acceptance can be explained, first, by the active participation of Member States, through committees, in the establishment of these procedures; and, secondly, a deliberate strategy to convince Member States, on both a sectoral basis, and a case-by-case basis, by the Commission. The article concludes, however, that the current procedures should be improved and that it is time for them to be realigned and rationalised.     

Independent Discretion or Democratic Legitimisation? The Relations between National Regulatory Authorities and National Parliaments under EU Regulatory Framework for Network‐Bound Sectors

The European legislator, being supported in that regard by the Court of Justice, confers upon national regulatory authorities (NRAs) the exercise of the most important tasks concerned with the regulation of the network‐bound sectors, while at the same time guarantees NRAs a far‐reaching independence in exercising of their discretionary powers and shielding NRAs against other public authorities, including national parliaments. This, in turn, raises many doubts from the perspective of some essential constitutional principles of the Member States, such as, among others, ‘the domain of the law,’ which reserves the regulation of issues sensitive to the citizens as an exclusive parliament's prerogative. It is submitted in this article that national parliaments should play a much more active role in regulating the network‐bound sectors. The main point is to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights of regulated parties and create the real democratic legitimisation of NRAs, while not undermining those regulatory objectives that are already accorded at the EU level.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: An Institutional Analysis

The development of access to documents and open meetings provisions by the Council of Ministers of the European Union shows an interesting pattern: before 1992 no formal transparency provisions existed, between 1992 and 2006 formal transparency provisions dramatically increased, and since 2006 this increase has come to a halt. This paper aims to enhance our understanding of these shifts by conducting a historical institutional analysis of policy change. As explanatory factors, we consider the preferences and power resources of Member States, as well as external catalysts and social structures. We conclude that the current revision deadlock is more stable than the situation before 1992 because now the pro‐transparency coalition and transparency‐sceptic Council majority have entrenched their positions. Nevertheless, and in spite of Council entrenchment, we expect that Council transparency will continue to develop in the longer term, under the pressure of increasingly influential outside actors, particularly the European Parliament.     

EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation

After the European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights the EU will become subject to legally binding judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and participate in statutory bodies of the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly; Committee of Ministers) when they act under the Convention. Convention rights and their interpretation by the ECtHR will be directly enforceable against the EU institutions and against Member States when acting within the scope of EU law. This will vest the ECHR with additional force in a number of Member States, including Germany and the UK. All Member States will further be subject to additional constraints when acting under the Convention system. The article considers the reasons for, and consequences of the EU's primus inter pares position under the Convention and within the Council of Europe, and the likely practical effect of the EU's accession for its Member States.     

In courts we trust,or should we? Judicial independence as the precondition for the effectiveness of EU law

The present article argues that the EU possesses an arsenal of tools to address dissuasively rule of law problems in the Member States. This shows the double nature of the EU's separation of powers problem. Whereas some states suffer from rule of law decline and a lack of limitation of governmental powers, there is a risk of the crumbling of separation of powers at the EU level, too, where institutions fail to adequately address rule of law violations. Against the EU institutions' lack of forceful action towards rule of law backsliding, domestic courts try to protect judicial independence increasingly via preliminary references. Also, they attempt preventing the proliferation of the consequences of rule of law decline via judicial cooperation in the mutual trust/mutual recognition domain. This article explores to what extent preliminary rulings can make up for the failure to use adequate EU tools of rule of law enforcement.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by the EU Member States contain substantially similar clauses, including free movement of capital and investor‐to‐state dispute resolution. Article 307 EC provides for the primacy of pre‐accession treaties over the EC Treaty and simultaneously requires the Member States to eliminate their mutual incompatibilities. The European Court of Justice has declared that free movement of capital clauses of Austrian and Swedish pre‐accession extra‐EU BITs are incompatible with the EC Treaty as they will impede any restrictions on the movement of capital imposed as future Community legislation. A similar ‘free movement of capital’ clause is present in all extra‐EU BITs of the Member States, whether pre‐ or post‐accession. Article 307, however, does not apply to the post‐accession treaties which are equally capable of contriving the same consequences of impeding the application of the EC Treaty. In addition, the application of intra‐EU BITs provides investors from BIT party states access to the investor‐to‐state dispute resolution which is not available to investors from the Member States who do not have BITs with those Member States. This is discrimination and may distort the principle of equal treatment within the EU. Furthermore, the newly acceding EU States are facing extensive arbitral claims for carrying out the BIT‐EU conflicting obligations within their respective territories.     

The European Community and the Member States in the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: United or Divided?

Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice determined the competence of the European Community and the Member States to conclude and implement WTO Agreements. Whilst the European Community enjoys exclusive competence to implement the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, it shares joint competence with the Member States in respect of the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. However, the Court’s recognition of a division of competences between the Community and the Member States in WTO agreements has given rise to many fears that such a division would greatly complicate Community and Member State participation in WTO Agreements, would create many problems for them in doing so and, as a result, would greatly impede their successful participation in the WTO. Given the benefit of a number of years’ experience in the WTO, this paper focuses on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO and addresses the extent to which the division of competences between the Community and the Member States has affected their participation in the DSU. Primarily, it aims to examine the extent to which the provisions of the DSU affect Community and Member State participation in dispute settlement within the WTO. It then analyses the duty of co-operation imposed on the Community and on Member States by the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/94 in the implementation of the WTO Agreements and the degree to which this duty influences their pursuit of dispute settlement. Finally, the paper examines the manner in which Community and Member State dispute settlement proceedings have evolved in practice, the extent to which the division of powers has penetrated dispute settlement proceedings and the manner in which the Community, the Member States and other WTO members have addressed it. In essence, the paper attempts both to highlight some of the more obvious consequences and effects that the internal division of powers between the Community and the Member States has for their participation in the DSU and to suggest some ways in which these consequences may be manipulated for their mutual and successful settlement of disputes.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.