Opportunity Costs and Outside Careers in U.S. State Legislatures

Cost‐benefit models of career choice predict that potential legislators choose legislative careers when they expect greater utility from legislative service than from other options. In state legislatures, the utility of legislative service includes the monetary value of outside careers. I hypothesize that legislators are more likely to pursue outside careers when financial opportunity costs are higher or when they derive less non‐monetary value from legislative service. In particular, I posit that individual characteristics that predict labor market value (such as age, education, race, and sex) and legislative salary predict outside careers. I test this model employing a new dataset of individual outside‐career activity derived from financial disclosure reports. The findings strongly support the hypothesis that outside‐career behavior is a function of the financial opportunity costs of legislative service. In addition, I find that Republicans are more likely to hold outside careers than are Democrats. This research has important implications for the study of state legislative participation, legislative organization, and the Democratic bias hypothesis.     

Strain and Opportunity Structures

Traditional strain theory received substantial empirical attention for a prolonged period of time, but it currently occupies a marginal position in criminology. Efforts to revitalize and elaborate it have occurred under the rubric of Agnew's general strain theory. These theories share a focus on how contextual factors, in particular what are commonly referred to as opportunity structures, affect the relationship between stresses and strains and delinquency. Using national-level data, this study considers empirically the impact of several illegitimate opportunity structures conceptualized at the school-level on the association between strain, stressful life events, delinquency, and self-concept. The results indicate that both stress and strain affect changes in delinquency and self-concept over time. Yet there is little evidence that these relationships are conditioned by access to illegitimate opportunity. These results suggest that strain and stress affect delinquency uniformly across a variety of illegitimate opportunity structures.     

The Wasted Costs Jurisdiction

The wasted costs jurisdiction is flawed for six reasons, based on an analysis of all reported cases in the last nine years and five years of statistics provided by the Bar Mutual Insurance Fund Limited, and despite the guidance laid down by the Court of Appeal in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205. First, it is very costly proportionate to the amount recovered. Secondly, judges can initiate a wasted costs enquiry, which is unfair and even more disproportionately costly. Thirdly, it is procedurally complex. Fourthly, it is unpredictable whether the client will waive privilege, and what the consequences will be whether or not privilege is waived. Fifthly, it is not possible for solicitors and barristers to make contribution claims against each other. Sixthly, it is mostly used against lawyers representing legally aided litigants from whom costs cannot be recovered.     

探寻“牟取公司机会禁止原则”的决定因素

通过对英国公司法及美国特拉华州公司法的比较研究,我们可以明确三个决定牟取公司机会禁止原则判断标准的主要因素,即法律理念、利益集团的游说及法庭的专业审判能力。但是我国并不适合采用特拉华州公司法的判断标准,英国公司法相对严格、保守的司法进路更具借鉴意义。     

公司机会准则研究

公司机会准则是英美国家公司法的一个重要理论 ,它确立了董事不得篡夺公司机会义务。判断一个交易机会是否是公司机会 ,须根据交易机会之不同而采不同方法。董事不得篡夺公司机会义务与董事的竞业禁止义务间不是种属关系 ,而是交叉关系 ,这就决定了我国公司法应在规定竞业禁止制度之外 ,另行导入公司机会准则     

交易成本与区域经济合作

交易成本对国家间的经济合作具有重要影响。区域经济合作的实质是区域内不同主体之间的权利交换,即交易。合作制度是对交易条件的相关规定。合作制度的选择,也就是现有条件下的交易成本最小化选择。区域的具体特点不同,相互之间所需的交易条件不一样,合作制度也不一样。     

我国政府行政成本控制策略研究

改革开放以来,随着我国经济的持续快速发展,政府行政成本也一直居高不下,远远超出世界平均水平.其结果是加大财政负担,挤占公共服务资金,损害人民群众的切身利益,严重影响政府执政效率、能力及公信力,成为政治体制改革的障碍,成为构建和谐社会的不和谐音符,成为改革发展中的不利因素.因此,对行政成本控制的研究是新时期社会转型不可回避和急需解决的问题,是建设诚信政府、有限政府、责任政府、效率政府的核心所在.     

Costs of Alternative Sanctions in Hungary

ABSTRACT. The author calculated the specific costs of executing probation and community service orders. In addition, she attempted to design indicators that help determine the amount of effort probation officers make to perform their duties. In Hungary, the probation service is under the supervision of the judicial system; therefore, it does not have a separate budget. The author calculated the costs of alternative sanctions in multiple steps. The study found that in 1997 the costs of performing probation orders amounted to HUF 10,645 (± 47 Euro) per case per year whereas those of performing community service totalled HUF 13,395 (± 60 Euro). The analysis established that fines imposed are collected and utilised by the courts themselves. This implies a risk, namely, that judicial sanctioning practice may be determined not only by penal law but also by financial considerations. The author claims that this casts a different light on the recent punishment practice under which imprisonment (and its non-suspended form, in particular) has been increasingly replaced by fines rather than community sanctions.     

Opportunity fairness and equal income Lindahl equilibrium

In this paper we propose a concept or opportunity fairness for economies in which there are public goods and establish its equivalence with the concept of an equal income Lindahl equilibrium.     

The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Impossibility Arguments

This article considers whether English law should allow a director to argue that if the company is unable to exploit a corporate opportunity, the director should be free to exploit it personally. The article supports the view of the Company Law Review Steering Group that the answer should remain no. In so doing it analyses US practice to show that, even where such arguments are recognised, they are difficult to prove and their potential application is curtailed through the development of satellite rules. Indeed, in practical terms there may be no significant difference between the Steering Group's recommendations and the position towards which US law appears to be moving.