Where the Action Is: Macro and Micro Justice in Contract Law

In contemporary private law theory the relationship between ‘macro’ theories of distributive justice and the ‘micro’ site of interpersonal transactions remains under-explored. In this paper, I draw on the ‘macro’ theory of justice articulated by John Rawls and offer an account of ‘micro contractual justice’ that helps us understand how the micro domains of contracting introduce particular relational constraints on the infusion of distributive considerations into contract law, resulting in constrained conception of ‘relational Rawlsianism’ operating in contractual domains. My framework provides a bridge between the macro and micro, helping us understand how they are in various senses separate yet interlocking, and also provides a ‘third way’ between all or nothing positions on the place of distributive justice in contract.     

Revisiting the role of distributive justice in Tyler’s legitimacy theory

Objectives

Tyler’s theory of legitimacy identified procedural justice and distributive justice as antecedents of legitimacy, but placed distributive justice in a relatively minor position compared with procedural justice. This has led to researchers paying less attention to distributive justice in the development of theory, despite consistent findings that distributive justice is important to a number of outcomes for criminal justice authorities. This report uses uncertainty management theory to revisit Tyler’s legitimacy model and gain a more nuanced understanding of distributive justice.

Methods

The proposed model is tested using a series of latent variable analyses conducted on a sample of 2169 adults and a factorial vignette design. The vignette design randomly manipulates outcome favorability and officer behavior during a hypothetical traffic stop. Multiple indicator multiple cause (MIMIC) models are then utilized to test the impact of these manipulations on perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice. This is followed by a structural equation model that tests the relationships between procedural justice, distributive justice, and legitimacy.

Results

Officer behavior is a primary predictor of both procedural justice and distributive justice. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that distributive justice judgments are shaped by perceptions of procedural justice. Accordingly, distributive justice mediates the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy.

Conclusions

Distributive justice should not be treated as a competing explanation for legitimacy evaluations, but as a concept that contextualizes why procedural justice is important.

     

Internal Market Rationality,Private Law and the Direction of the Union: Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the Political

This paper proposes a concept of ‘internal market rationality’ for the analysis of the political, legal and economic consequences of European integration. Internal market rationality refers to a specific pattern of political action in the field of internal market, which has emerged gradually due to the confluence of three main factors: first, the EU's functional institutional design; second, the processes of post‐national juridification; and third, a more contingent influence of ideas. In the interplay of those three factors, the interpretation of internal market has become overdetermined, restricting thereby the space of (democratic) politics in its regulation. This reification of internal market rationality has had a direct influence on the content of European law, as I demonstrate through the example of European private law. Internal market rationality has transformed the very concept of justice underpinning private law, the concept of the person or subject of law, the (re)distributive pattern of private law as well as the normative basis on which private law stands. I argue, finally, that a close examination of the legal, institutional and ideological arrangement behind internal market rationality provides clues for the democratisation of the EU.     

How Is Criminal Justice Related to the Rest of Justice?

Are principles of criminal justice derived from a broader conception of justice, or does criminal justice involve some of its own distinctive principles such that it is not—for example—an aspect of distributive justice? Examining considerations regarding luck and desert provides an illuminating approach to this issue. The notion of desert has largely been excised from a great deal of recent political theorizing, and in particular, it has been eliminated from many influential conceptions of distributive justice. It is widely held that the pervasiveness of luck renders desert inappropriate to contexts of distributive justice, and incompatible with the freedom and equality of persons in a just political community. Should considerations of desert also have a minimal role in criminal justice—where they seem to still be important? Are considerations of desert in the context of criminal justice consistent with persons being free and equal participants in a just political community? How are principles of criminal justice related to principles of distributive justice and political justice in an overall just society? Many scholars agree that criminal justice presupposes an adequately just society. Still, that leaves open just how criminal justice relates to justice overall. That is the present topic.     

Effects of Defects—Action or Argument? Thoughts about Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment*

Abstract. Two claims lay the foundation for Beyleveld and Brownsword’s legal theory. The first says that immoral laws cannot be law, the second that rights to freedom and welfare can be proven to be logically necessary given merely the phenomenon of agency. The author argues that both claims are too strong. The first is an overidealization of law, which fails to do justice to its double nature as a real as well as an ideal phenomenon. The second must fail, for a moral “ought” cannot be deduced from a merely instrumental “ought.”     

Aristotle's Forms of Justice

Abstract. In Aristotle's account, corrective and distributive justice are not (as they are today) particular substantive ideals, but are rather the formal patterns that inhere in interactions and in the legal arrangements that regulate them. Corrective and distributive justice are the structures of ordering internal to transactions and distributions, respectively. The Aristotelian. forms of justice thus constitute the rationality immanent to the relation ships of mutually external beings. This article stresses Aristotle's formalism, contrasting it to modem instrumental conceptions of legal rationality, and defending it against Kelsen's allegations of emptiness. The article concludes with the suggestion that corrective justice, as the conceptual pattern that makes private law what it is, can be considered the formal and final cause of private law.     

言论自由、出版自由、新闻自由的主体及其法律保护

言论自由的主体是自然人 ,出版自由的主体是自然人和法人 ,新闻自由的主体是法人。法律应当对言论区别不同类型给以相应的保护 ;对出版自由 ,法律既要保护 ,又要限制 ,但二者的界限尚有待明确 ;法律对新闻自由在保护的同时 ,要注意它与公民个人权利、与国家权力、与公众人物的利益发生冲突时应采取不同的调整手段。     

Prolegomenon to a Southern Jurisprudence

It is good to take stock from time to time and to see how things stand in jurisprudence. So, what is the relationship of doctrine and theory with jurisprudence? Is private law theory apolitical while public law contains politics for the very many constitutional ends in the Global South? In India, legal theorist Chhatrapati Singh very originally asked if legal systems and normative systems were the same? Chhatrapati’s enquiry was however a species of the classical approach to the law that promotes the law’s purity. On the contrary, the postcolonial approaches account for the historical life as well as the political proclivities of the law. The private law theory often seen as impersonal and non-imperial comes under scrutiny in the postcolonial approaches. Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger notably problematized contract theory, while Upendra Baxi argued for mass tort as public law—contract and tort are both private law—to offer, if you will, a jurisprudence of the South. A southern jurisprudence essentially rejects an impersonal reading of the private law.

     

社会分配法的价值范畴分析

分配正义作为社会分配法的基本价值范畴,是一个由平等、自由、公平、效率等要素性价值目标构成价值体系。但是,在不同国家的特定社会经济条件下,分配法律制度的主导价值追求和目标排序是有明显差异的。在分配法律制度中,分配正义将通过基本原则这一价值载体来确认和指导法律调整分配关系的目标定位和路径选择。     

Transnational Solidarity and the Mediation of Conflicts of Justice in Europe

This contribution analyses the conflicts of justice that are becoming increasingly visible in Europe. It argues that while European Union (EU) law can be understood as an instrument for the incorporation of the demands of justice and the articulation of ‘the good’ beyond the nation state, it also potentially skews the distributive criteria and assumptions of justice that underlie the national welfare state. In light of the absence of a transnational political system that can bound such conflicts of justice, this article suggests that the capacity of the EU to contribute to, rather than detract from, the attainment of justice depends on the careful articulation and institutionalisation of the different types of transnational solidarity that exist in Europe.     

Means and Capabilities in the Discussion of Distributive Justice*

Abstract. Dworkin's equality of resources can be interpreted as a proposal that integrates distributive criteria taken from both equality of means and equality of capabilities, and overcomes the risks of subjectivism, overrigidity and perfectionism inherent in theories of welfare, means and capabilities respectively. This can be achieved by concentrating on arrangements of justice working within the parameter of equality of resources that equalize capabilities at a level of minima, thus avoiding the perfectionist risk and, once the threshold that ensures autonomous subjects is passed, ruled by criteria taken from theories of means. In such a task, the concept of moral person will be used as the criterion for determining the threshold of autonomy, and not only will it allow for the discrimination between the different circumstances that make the application of distributive criteria possible, but it will also specify the circumstances in which it is possible to attribute responsibility to an agent.     

Private Law Exceptionalism? Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the Structural Arguments from Bipolarity and Civil Recourse

Contemporary discussions of private law theory have sought to divine the deep structure and content of private law by reference to two key distinctions. First, the distinction between private and criminal law has been utilized to flesh out the distinctively bipolar structure of private law (and its various departments, namely, property, contract, torts, and unjust enrichment). Second, the distinction between formal and distributive equality has served to highlight the special terms of interaction established in private law. In these pages, I take up the former distinction, arguing that its theoretical significance is overdrawn. I argue that it does not succeed in identifying private law’s precise nature.     

我国商法的核心价值:逻辑展开与实践应用

总纲性规范的缺失以及以之为载体的商法核心价值的模糊是我国商事司法实践中法律适用困境的重要原因。为使我国商法理论研究与商事立法、司法等实务活动获得确定的价值指引，有必要对我国商法核心价值的逻辑展开及实践应用进行系统研究。商法的核心价值曾被普遍界定为效率或效益，但基于正本清源，应将其界定为自由，其内容主要表现为强化私法自治与经营自由。商法中自由价值的边界应立足于秩序价值进行界定。在商事立法、监管及审判活动中，应立足于自由与秩序的平衡，使商法核心价值的得到合理应用。     

The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian Life Under Rebel Control

This article draws upon social science literature to offer a new assessment of the normative value of human rights law vis-à-vis international humanitarian law in territory under armed groups’ control. In particular, the article considers how the two bodies of law can be applied in a complementary manner to regulate the everyday life of civilians who are not involved in hostilities. The article demonstrates that while it might be tempting to imagine that concerns relating to rights such as the freedom of movement, the right to work or protection from common crime are completely displaced by considerations of physical security and survival in times of armed conflict, in reality this is often not the case.

     

Public Health as Social Justice? A Qualitative Study of Public Health Policy-Makers’ Perspectives

Social justice is often described as the ‘foundation of public health.’ Yet, outside of the theoretical literature the polysemous nature of the concept is rarely acknowledged. To complement recent contributions to normative theory specifically motivated by questions of social justice in public health, this study explores public health policy-makers’ perspectives on the meaning and role of social justice in their practice. This study involved twenty qualitative, semi-structured interviews with public health policy-makers recruited from two programmatic areas of public health [chronic disease prevention (CDP) and public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR)] within public health organizations in Canada. Participants’ perspectives appeared to be influenced by the perceived goals belonging to the programmatic area of public health in which they practiced. Those involved in PHEPR indicated that justice-based considerations are viewed as a ‘constraint’ on the aims of this area of practice, which are to minimize overall morbidity and mortality, whereas those involved in CDP indicated that justice-based considerations are ‘part and parcel’ of their work, which seeks primarily to address the unique health needs of (and thus, disparities between) population groups. The aims and activities of different programmatic areas of public health may influence the way in which social justice is perceived in practice. More ought to be done (in theory and in practice) to interrogate how the unique contributions that individual programmatic areas of public health can and should cohere in order to realize the broader aim that public health has as an institution to promote social justice.

     

Is Coercion a Ground of Distributive Justice?

In his rich and stimulating book, Blake argues (among other things) that comprehensive coercion triggers egalitarian obligations of distributive justice. I argue that (1) coercion is not a necessary condition for egalitarian justice to apply; (2) Blake’s use of a moralised conception of coercion is a mistake; (3) coercion is a redundant member of any set of sufficient conditions that might explain why distributive justice applies; (4) Blake’s emphasis on providing conditions for the exercise of autonomy might support a much more cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice.     

Social justice in the large and small

Social justice is an issue at both the large or even whole-society level and the very small group or dyadic level. If it is an issue in distribution of resources or welfare, rather than an issue of procedure, it requires very strong interpersonally comparable value judgments. This generally distinguishes it from other small and large group moral and political problems, which can often be resolved satisfactorily without such a strong value theory, in particular without interpersonal comparisons of welfare, because their resolution can yield mutual advantage to all concerned. At the dyadic and small-group level social justice is the philosopher's problem of beneficence; at the large level it is the problem of distributive justice. Much of the social-psychological literature on social justice deals with the small-scale problem; political theory is generally concerned with the large-scale problem. Yet, strategically and in their value theory requirements, the two problems are in many ways analogous. In both variants of social justice the core problem is a pure conflict interaction in which one party or group must bear a cost in order that another party or group may benefit.     

The “Economic Battle” Now and Then: (E)valuation Patterns of Distributive Justice in Cuban State-Socialism

This article disentangles and explores some commonly made assumptions about egalitarian state-socialist ideologies. Based on the conceptual framework of the multiprinciple approach of justice, it presents the results of an in-depth analysis of (e)valuation patterns of distributive justice in Cuban state-socialism. The analysis mainly focuses on ideational conceptions of distributive justice (just rewards), but it also accounts for distribution outcomes and resulting (in)equalities (actual rewards). The results of the comparative case study of the Cuban framework of institutions and political leaders’ views in two periods of time, the early 1960s and the 2010s, point to (e)valuation patterns that are generally labelled as egalitarian, such as the allocation rules of outcome equality and (non-functional) needs. However, contrary to common assumptions about egalitarian state-socialist ideologies, the results also point to several other patterns, including equity rules as well as functional and productivist allocation rules. I argue that many of these (e)valuation patterns, in their connection to the discursive storyline of the Cuban economic battle, are indeed compatible with egalitarian state-socialist ideology.

     

Procedural goods in a democracy: How one is treated versus what one gets

There are four classes of procedural goods, each of which is an appropriate ground for answering the question: “Is this a fair procedure?” (i) It is unfair not to treat a person with dignity; the dignity goods are self-respect, personal control, and an understanding of the procedures that determine relevant outcomes. (ii) It is unfair to impose upon a person heavy (net) costs, such as overburdened cognitive capacities and high information costs, excessively painful interpersonal conflict, threats beyond those inherent in the situation, and humiliation. (iii) It is unfair to disregard (but not necessarily to violate) the person's own sense of justice, the codes of honor and practice of his own group and culture. And, of course, (iv) it is unfair to use a procedure that does not have the highest probability of achieving distributive or retributive justice. Few of the standard articles of democratic theory (e.g., liberty, equal treatment before the law, rights, and sharing of power) offer sufficient protections for the first three of these procedural goods.     

Reflective Judgement and Prudential Rationality: A Contribution to an Inclusive Practical Application of Law

Hannah Arendt has developed a theory of the importance of judgment of taste for political manners, founded on the Kantian aesthetic theory. Nowadays this theory is considered a current theoretical reference for establishing a political way to reconcile the demands of the radicalization of deliberative democracy with the need for political inclusion (Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib). Albena Azmanova in her The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgment proposes an inclusive political rhetoric. The political theory founded on judgment is based on Kant’s philosophy; it was developed by Arendt and has greatly influenced the current debate, as an alternative theory in which the moral basis of law can be more sensitive to human contexts; a universalist theory more adequate for dealing with the tragic dimension of human life. The theory of political judgment uses the concepts of reflective judgment and ‘enlarged thought’ as its main concepts. As a starting point, a theory like this considers the singular judgments of justice that each person makes. The background, therefore, is not a rational foundation of principles, but the capacity of rational beings to make judgments. This post-metaphysical theory of law, based on a theory of judgment, is a critique of legal positivism, but presents itself as an alternative to the idealistic theory of law. But this theoretical project has received some criticism related to the adequacy of Arendt’s rereading of Kantian philosophy and her attempt to approximate Kant’s reflective judgment to the Aristotelian concept of phronêsis. Some critics, such as Bryan Garsten, believe that Kant’s rhetoric of public reason diminished and displaced the prudential faculty of judgment that Arendt is to be interested in reviving. Arendt’s attempt to find a theory of judgment in Kant’s aesthetic theory is not successful, in Garsten’s view. Our purpose is to show that a critical theory of judicial judgment is not only possible, but necessary; Arendt’s theory of judgment offers an important contribution to a critical theory of judicial judgment, particularly one devoted to the construction of a legal theory that prioritizes a politics of social inclusion. This theory proposes a critical approach to the project of the procedural conception of democracy, since it can mask social exclusion. An adequate understanding of judicial argumentation cannot forget that it happens in a rhetorical context: it is not only important what a discourse says, but how it says it. The radicalization of deliberative democracy supposes a revision of the ways judicial deliberation is thought: not by reference to universal or at least general principles, but taking into consideration what is ‘critically relevant’, with a view to remedying social injustice (following Azmanova).