Moderat bevorzugt, extrem gewählt. Zum Zusammenhang von Präferenz und Wahlentscheidung in räumlichen Modellen sachfragenorientierten Wählens

This article demonstrates, on the basis of survey data from the 2005 German national election, that voters often systematically choose more extreme parties than warranted by their own preferences. Estimation of Grofman’s (1985) spatial discounting model reveals that party preference and vote decision follow different utility functions. Preferences turn out to be purely proximity driven, i. e. voters prefer parties with positions close to their own. Moving from preference to the vote of the top-ranked alternative, a devaluation of party positions and a significant shift in voter utility towards more extreme parties is observed. These results show that voter behaviour may change, even though voter preferences remain unchanged. Results also suggest that the remarkable success of FDP and Linke in the 2005 election is more likely due to shifting behaviour by moderate voters rather than to sweeping changes in the German electorate’s preferences toward welfare policy.     

Europäisierungsdruck und Parteiendifferenz in den deutschen Bundesländern

Based on the 2008 Rüffert judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which dealt with wage-related compliance requirements laid out in several German federal state procurement laws (Tariftreueerfordernis) the convergence induced by Europeanization through law is being investigated. Contrary to the initial presumption of unilinear adjustment, three different responses are identifiable. Conservative-liberal governments abolish the respective regulations. Conservative governments which are subject to influence from associations representing small- and medium-sized business enterprises absorb the adjudication by a rapid adjustment consistent with the European requirements. Coalitions led by the Social Democratic Party tend to a policy expansion influenced by smaller coalition partners. They codify more rather than less social and environmental standards in policy amendments. The case study points out the persistence of political party differences in the face of Europeanization which is dependent on a sufficient degree of programmatic incongruence as well as on the plurality of European law.     

Staatskapazität und Verwaltungsreformen in hybriden und autoritären Regimen – am Beispiel der Steuerverwaltung in postsowjetischen Ländern

In order to enlarge state capacity, authoritarian regimes have undertaken considerable efforts to (re-)construct and modernize their administrations. Combining various research strands, this literature review links basic findings of research on authoritarian and hybrid regimes to those on administrative reforms in post-soviet countries. As tax administrations are essential for increasing state capacity, a particular focus is laid on these reforms. Drawing on the cases of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazachstan, the article reveals that stable, hegemonic authoritarian regimes seem to succeed better in increasing administrative efficiency and capability. While professionalizing their civil services, however, tax administrations can still be used to repress opponents. Hybrid regimes which are shaped by frequent government turnovers, by contrast, seem to avoid longsome efficiency-oriented reforms of their administrations.     

Rationalitätsdefizite in der Biopolitik

Zusammenfassung  Der Fortschritt der molekularen Medizin und der Biotechnologie ist zu einem fundamentalen Faktor der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Orientierung geworden. Ethische und politische Beurteilungen der biomedizinischen Entwicklung bleiben schwierig. Einerseits macht diese politische und rechtliche Ma?nahmen erforderlich, andererseits wird von „politischem Missbrauch“, einer besorgniserregenden „Ethisierung der Forschungspolitik“ bzw. einer „erschreckenden Politisierung“ der bioethischen Debatte gesprochen. Die Schwierigkeiten, die sich bei der übertragung von wissenschaftlicher Expertise und moralischen überzeugungen in biopolitische Normierungen zeigen, erweisen sich als Symptome weitreichender Rationalit?tsdefizite in der Biopolitik, die sich an der politischen Semantik in den Grenzbereichen von biomedizinischer Forschung, ethischer Beurteilung, politischer Steuerung und politikwissenschaftlicher Analyse ablesen lassen. Besonders kritisch zu betrachten sind in diesem Kontext Adaptionen bestimmter „Public-Reason“- und Diskurs-Modelle, die ihrerseits Rationalit?tsdefizite aufweisen. Als problematisch erweist sich in diesem Zusammenhang ein verbreiteter Vorbehalt, der im Namen der Demokratie gegenüber Ans?tzen der politischen Philosophie vorgebracht wird. Die politische Philosophie kann indessen als „Rationalit?tsreserve“ dienen, auf die angesichts von Defiziten im Bereich der Explikation biopolitischer Leitideen und demokratietheoretischer Begründungszusammenh?nge nicht verzichtet werden kann.      

Netzwerkstruktur, Handlungslogik und politische Räume: Institutionenwandel in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Grenzregionen

This paper is a contribution to the debate on political order and governance in a “debordered world” beyond the “Westphalian system”. It is based on empirical information about the development and change of political institutions in cross-border regions in Europe and North America in the 20th century. First, it is shown that the nation state is loosing its gate keeper role at the end of the century and that various sub-national actors institutionalise independent cross-border links or participate on an equal footing. Therefore, the pattern of interaction is changing from formal hierarchies to networks. Nevertheless, if we define hierarchies and networks as modes of governance, we cannot conform such a change since the mode of interaction has not changed over the years. There does not exist and never has existed any other mode of interaction as “negotiated agreement”. What has changed is the institutional logic for finding such a cross-border agreement. Whereas older institutions were designed to find a common solution by using a technocratic-deductive logic, younger institutions use a symbolic-inductive logic (mainly in Europe). In North America they are based either on a rationalistic-evolutionary logic (at the US-Mexican border) or on a discursive-constructivist logic (in the Pacific Northwest). Also in respect to the much proposed tendency towards “deterritorialization” of political orders we find strong differences between the continents: Whereas in Europe even the younger institutions are based on “spaces of place”, in North America the more recent institutions are much more oriented towards “spaces of flows”.     

Globale Besteuerung und Demokratische Legitimität

The democratic state has been offering the conditions for legitimately levying taxes. Tax revenues have been securing the sovereign’s ability to act, policy aims pursued through taxation have been the outcome of a democratic process and the coercion backed institutions levying taxes have enjoyed the status of democratic legitimacy. But a twofold dynamic challenges this status quo. States are under pressure to address problems to which global taxation offers the most promising response. And phenomena like capital mobility impose constraints on the state’s ability to effectively use the policy instrument of taxation. Under what institutional arrangements could taxation be maintained as a justifiable instrument? And what should future institutional arrangements of public finance look like?     

Begrenzte Rationalität und regulatives Lernen in der EG: die Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsversorgung

The article analyses the liberalization of the EC electricity supply industry. Confronting the intergovernmental approach, the case study is based on the premise that the member state executives act within the limits of a bounded rationality and do therefore not always represent clear and fixed interests in EU negotiations. Taking the examples of France and Germany, it shows that the national positions and preferences may change greatly during the course of the decision making process. While the French positional changes may be reasonably well explained by the intergovernmental approach, the German preference changes are attributed to effects of the EC institutions and negotiations. Institutional principles, policy-concepts and fairness criteria guide member state orientations and behavior and hinder the pursuit of unilateral advantages. Incremental negotiation techniques within the Council induce learning processes and cause reassessments of the domestic situations. Furthermore, the EC decisions may cause behavioral changes which clearly surpass their regulatory content even if they contain extensive flexibilisation mechanisms.     

Bündnisse für Arbeit: Nationale Handlungsfähigkeit im europäischen Regimewettbewerb

In recent years, new forms of tripartite concertation between governments, employers’ confederations and trade unions have re-emerged in the form of social pacts. The paper aims at explaining the emergence of social pacts under the impact of European regime competition. It argues that governments increasingly seek structural reforms of the labour market in order to solve the employment crisis. These structural reforms are however hardly attainable without the co-operation of the social partners. Using tripartite agreements, governments try to get the acceptance of trade unions to a reform policy which is conducive for employment growth. While social pacts are struck under the impact of regime competition, the political exchange between trade unions and governments does not have to foster this competition, but social pacts can facilitate European co-ordination of employment policies, since they strengthen the role of social partners.     

Reformfähigkeit messen? Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zu einem Reformfähigkeitsindex für OECD-Staaten

In the present article, I propose to determine reform capacity based upon policy outcomes and the governing performance of executives. Both components shall be measured through expert assessments and quantitative data for the 30 OECD member states in order to construct an index of reform capacity. The concepts underpinning the index are explained and compared with existing approaches of performance and governance measurement. Criteria are developed to assess the strategic capacity of governments and the accountability-generating functions of political actors surrounding the government. The envisaged measurement and aggregation methods are described and the potential of the proposed approach is discussed.     

Gebhard Kirchgässner, 60 years on

This introductory essay summarizes the contents of the papers presented at a conference in honor of Gebhard Kirchgässner entitled “(Macro-)Economic Policy and Public Choice” which are published in this special issue. In addition to this brief overview on the contributions, this essay relates them to the scientific works of Gebhard Kirchgässner after locating the latter within the realm of Public Choice analysis.     

Politikdiffusion im Schatten des Parteistaats: Die Integration Chinas in das internationale Regime zur Geldwäschebekämpfung

This study scrutinizes the functions and effects of various mechanisms of policy diffusion by taking the hyper-sovereigntist state of the People’s Republic of China as a hard test case. It demonstrates that a one-sided focus on the contribution of international or transnational interactions to policy diffusion may lead to severe misinterpretations. Thus, careful control studies of the domestic determinants of policy diffusion are indispensable for clearing up the focus. As the Chinese case reveals, politically orchestrated, tactical adaptation to international regulatory standards can be employed to promote a nation’s rise in the global political economy. Policy diffusion does not therefore automatically promote the establishment of credible, shared norms of global governance.     

Parteien, Vetospieler und der Wettbewerb um Wählerstimmen: Die Arbeitsmarkt-und Beschäftigungspolitik der Ära Kohl

The paper develops a model to explain the labour market and employment policies of the Christian-liberal coalition in Germany between 1982 and 1998. It takes partisan theory as its starting point, but expands it by taking into account the effects of party competition and veto players as well. For the first period of observation, the years 1982 to 1989/90, only moderate reforms can be observed. This can be explained by the fear of the coalition that more far-reaching reforms could exert negative effects on its electoral performance on the one hand, and by the strong influence of the labour union wing of the Christian democratic party on the respective policies on the other hand. During the first years after German unification the government could not implement far reaching partisan reforms either. This was due to the necessity of reacting to the external shock of the unification and the problems associated with it. Only during the last three years in office the coalition was able to push through more coherent reforms due to the huge problems on the labour marker which put the government’s re-election at risk. These reforms could be carried through because the CDU’s labour wing had lost its veto power and because the Bundesrat’s approval was not necessary.     

Mehr Normativität wagen: Ein Plädoyer für eine reflexive Grundhaltung in der politikwissenschaftlichen Lehre

This article argues for a more conscious reference to normativity in political science education. A greater reference to normativity should find its expression in a self-reflexive attitude which includes a disclosure of own normative assumptions, an examination of given postulates and knowledge and a recognition of the complexity of social relations. By looking at students, teachers and learning relations, we show how such a reflexive attitude can be implemented and facilitated in order to educate students who think and act critically.     

Die Politik wirtschaftlichen Wachstums in autoritären Staaten

The article analyses the widely debated impact of democracy on economic growth. It is argued that an increase of political participation causes a shift in the support-seeking strategies of opportunistic governments. Pure autocrats rationally ensure political support by providing rents to a small group of supporters. With growing political participation, however, public goods become a more efficient political instrument. While rents are assumed to be economically neutral, public goods have an positive impact on economic performance. Hence, growing participation in autocracies is related to higher growth rates of per capita income. This hypotheses is supported by the data.     

Deliberative Politik in transnationalen Räumen — Legitimation und Effektivität in der grenzüberschreitenden Umweltpolitik zwischen Kanada und USA

The article addresses new, horizontal and dialogue-oriented forms of political governance in transnational spaces. A normative-analytical model of deliberative governance will be developed to appraise the democratic potential of transnational structures and actions. The research is guided by the observation that the North American Great Lakes Regime reveals a high democratic-deliberative quality whereas international governance rather tends to de-democratization. This raises a challenging research question: To what extent does the deliberative governance of the Great Lakes Regime provide a model case, which allows drawing conclusions on institutional prerequisites and means how to “democratize” governance in similar issue areas.     

Prinzipal Parlament. Die Bedeutung europäischer Parlamente als Wahlorgane

In parliamentary systems of government, parliaments can be conceptualized as central power-distributing institutions and as principals of the cabinet and other external officeholders. Relying on the principal-agent framework, this paper shows that electoral powers of parliaments can reduce agency loss and indicate a deviation from the ideal typical chain of delegation in parliamentary systems. Electoral powers of parliaments can be used to assess the degree to which cabinets are indeed constrained by external officeholders, whose constraining effect is often simply assumed. Empirically, the paper offers the first systematic comparative study of electoral powers of 25 European parliaments with regard to seven state offices. The analysis reveals major differences between parliaments and identifies electoral powers as an empirically distinct dimension of parliamentary power resources.