Critique of the International Law on Protection of the Outer Space Environment

Environmental concerns are an issue for the outer space legal regime. Human activities result in insurmountable amounts of debris, chemical effluents, and radioactive waste carried into the domain of space, which poses a serious threat to future generations and uses of space. Sophisticated technology and the amount of funds required to access space complicate the task of addressing orbital debris. To correct this anomaly, regulation of space activities with a view to making them environmentally sustainable is called for in this article. With this aim in mind, I critically analyze the existing international legal framework, examining its relevance in conserving the space environment. Discovering a slew of irregularities, I endeavor to review each legal instrument in the context of environmental conservation and evaluate their effectiveness. I conclude that the outer space legal regime is acutely ineffectual and reforms are an imperative. The research reveals a plethora of suggestions, which include, inter alia, amendment to Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, harmonization of international environmental law and space law, and the establishment of an international regime for the removal, maintenance, and servicing of satellites. With such proposals in mind, the need to frame a new space policy or modify the existing framework is emphasized herein.     

Perceptions,fear, and economic loss: an application of prospect theory to environmental decision making

Most of the analysis of costs associated with the introduction of risky prospects has concerned contingent costs amenable to insurance programs. An important missing element is the current cost associated with changes in uncertainty. These costs are not amenable to insurance plans and require compensation in order to prevent transfers. In a novel approach, this paper develops an application of prospect theory to such questions, in an intergenerational context. The importance of such an application is demonstrated in a case study of the high-level nuclear waste repository (HNWR) siting decision. As a case study, the costliness of obtaining some elements of the analysis leads to a simulation approach, comparing prospect costs at the three sites that were under consideration by the U.S. Department of Energy. Finding that such costs can be large, we argue for a reassessment of current risk analysis approaches. On a policy note, on the basis of the prospect cost analysis here, the choice of the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, HNWR site seems ill-advised.     

Exploring Aggregate vs. Relative Public Trust in Administrative Agencies that Manage Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States

Trust is a key component of democratic decision‐making and becomes even more salient in highly technical policy areas, where the public relies heavily on experts for decision making and on the information provided by federal agencies. Research to date has not examined whether the members of the public place different levels of trust in the various agencies that operate within the same policy subsystem, especially in a highly technical subsystem such as that of nuclear energy and waste management. This paper explores public trust in multiple agencies operating within the same subsystem, trust in each agency relative to aggregate trust across agencies that operate within the nuclear waste subsystem, and trust in alternative agencies that have been suggested as possible players in the decision‐making process. We find that trust accorded to different federal agencies within the nuclear waste subsystem varies. The variation in trust is systematically associated with multiple factors, including basic trust in government, perceptions about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy/waste management, party identification, and education. These findings have significant implications for research on public trust in specific government agencies, alternative policy entities, and for policy makers who want to design robust and successful policies and programs in highly technical policy domains.     

General interest and redistribution with self-interested voters: Social contract revisited

I provide a rational solution to the lasting paradox that citizens be more concerned with “general interest” than most economic agents. I show who that, in the face of fundamental political uncertainty, the social contract, as conceptualized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau two centuries ago, provides to self-interested voters an effective mechanism of self-insurance that limits amount of involuntary transfers. My positive theory of voter behavior and general interest has but a formal resemblance with the normative theory of welfare judgments and social justice. Even when the efficiency aspects of redistribution are not considered, there is no way in which the final distribution of incomes could be equal if the initial distribution of incomes were unequal! The role of political parties in this model is to manipulate the distribution of political chances in order to maximize their probability of winning elections. I show for instance that “social instability” and progressive redistribution characterize the equilibrium outcome of a two-class democracy in which the lower class forms a majority.     

Enfranchising the Youth

ABSTRACT

Democratic theorists tend to assume, without a great deal of argument, that age-based discrimination in access to the franchise is justified. In this paper, I challenge the orthodoxy. I argue that all major, plausible accounts of the justification of democracy converge upon a requirement to enfranchise a substantial proportion of the child population. Along the way, I consider and respond to several challenges that have been raised to child enfranchisement.     

Models of liberty: Berlins's ‘Two Concepts’

According To Sir Isaiah Berlin; (a) freedom is an essentially ‘negative’ concept; (b) one's freedom can only be limited deliberately, by another person or persons; (c) the impersonal operation of a natural force, such as gravity, cannot be said to limit freedom; (d) the impersonal operation of a market force cannot be said to limit freedom. I argue that all four claims are false and that (b), (c), and (d) are logically incornsistent with (a). There would be less point to inevitably somewhat ‘picky’ exercise were it not for the fact that Berlin's account of freedom exemplifies a well-entrenched and influential orthodoxy. The fact is made particularly apparent by the prominent role played by assumption (d) in defences of the ‘free market’. I go on to discus this.     

Resource allocation under uncertainty

Rarely is the informational data required for the analysis of resource allocation decisions known with precision; uncertainty in such data is the rule, and not the exception. The conventional approach relying on data averaging, even when coupled with sensitivity analysis, limits the insights obtainable. Concepts of decision analysis under uncertainty are applied here to a controllable, Markov resource-allocative model. Proper application of these concepts provide the preferred framework for resolving informational data uncertainties.     

行政法上的平等原则探析

平等原则,经常作为受不利处分的当事人所引据为请求作成撤销或变更特定处分的理由,简单地说,也就是"别人可,为何我不可?"这就是"不法的平等"问题。相对人能否依据信赖原则在应然与实然之间主张不法的平等,国外和我国台湾地区一般禁止该主张,我国正处于市场化和法制化逐步完善之时,也宜加以禁止。     

Threats, institutions and regulation in common pool resources

Can bureaucracies respond to threats marked by both potentially high costs and fundamental uncertainty? Standard guidelines such as maximizing expected value to the society over a period of time may be ineffective; yet, state action is often most demanded for such situations. I argue that the precautionary principle of reserved rationality helps explain the ability of bureaucracies to choose appropriate actions under uncertainty. Such bureaucracies are empowered when there is sufficient informal institutional support for their expertise and the bureaucracy has the discretion to take necessary precautions. I draw historical information from the case of Singapore's regulation of the formerly common pool resource of water catchment areas. This case reveals decision making when it is not clear that the expected-value criterion would support action, as well as the importance of political and institutional support for such action.     

A New Look at New Labour

This article challenges the current orthodoxy, for instance put forward by Driver and Martell (1998), that New Labour represents a clearly defined break from the Labour Party's past. Drawing upon accounts of Labour's historical development, I argue that Labour in government has always been concerned with forging cross-class alliances, more often than not in the face of bitter internal opposition from the party's grass-roots membership. I conclude that the objectives of the Blair government are not dissimilar from those of the Attlee and Wilson administrations, and that where the means to achieve these ends differ – for example with regard to social policy – this is a rational response to the profound economic and social changes that have taken place since the 1970s.     

“It's the Central Government's Fault”: Elected Regional Officials' Use of Blame‐Shifting Rhetoric

This article investigates regional officials' use of blame‐shifting rhetoric in times of heated public criticism of unpopular regional policy decisions. Based on a content coding of nearly 500 political accounts from elected regional officials it is shown that “it's the central government's fault” is the most frequently used excuse when regional officials publicly defend unpopular decisions to cut public health care. The article finds that this excuse is used more by regional leaders (mayors and chairmen of regional boards) than by other elected officials and that partisan competition affects how often this excuse is used.     

On the limits to rent-seeking waste

The general equilibrium framework developed in this paper for analyzing the limits to rent-seeking waste goes beyond the existing literature by incorporating tax-financed, public subsidies and rent-protecting activities into a rent-seeking environment. We show that the limits to rent-seeking waste depend on the extent to which government subsidizes rent seekers and rent defenders through tax-financed grants, contracts and favors. As observed by Tullock (1967), the diversion of resources toward efforts to acquire a monopoly rent causes a social waste in addition to the excess burden of monopoly pricing measured by the Harberger triangle. In the absence of government subsidies to rent-seeking and under competitive conditions, this additional waste cannot exceed the maximum monopoly rent attainable. However, if government subsidizes expenditures on rent-seeking, then the additional waste can exceed the Tullock rectangle of monopoly rent and, in the limit, equal the economy's maximum potential social surplus.Rent avoidance expenditures reduce the rent to be captured and thus discourage rent-seeking. If rent avoidance is a relatively efficient mechanism for transferring consumer surplus to rent granters, then rent-seeking expenditures are displaced by less wasteful expenditures on rent defending. As a result, under competitive conditions, unsubsidized demand for private rent protection may be socially efficient. Nonetheless, the upper limit to rent-seeking waste depends on constitutionally determined maximum rates of public subsidies to rent-seeking and rent-avoidance activities.     

Achieving a negotiated compensation agreement in siting: The MRS case

Theoreticians claim that negotiated compensation plans could overcome local resistance to nuclear waste (or other less than desirable) facilities, and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 gives the Department of Energy considerable flexibility to negotiate with and compensate states in which it locates waste storage. DOE's monitored retrievable storage (MRS) proposal is the first attempt under the NWPA to site nuclear waste operations, and both DOE and one local community tried the negotiated compensation approach with some success. State and regional leaders chose to oppose the project rather than to negotiate, however. The limited experience to date suggests that local reluctance to negotiate is a generic weakness of the compensation approach to siting and must be given greater attention.     

The Politics of Bureaucracy and the failure of post-war reconstruction

Gordon Tullock’s The Politics of Bureaucracy must be considered one of the most important works on bureaucracy ever written. In this paper, I argue that Tullock’s analysis of bureaucracy is as relevant as ever. To support this claim, I focus on U.S.-led reconstruction efforts which attempt to export liberal democracy via military occupation. Bureaucratic organizations play a key role in these reconstruction efforts and as such, Tullock’s analysis is directly relevant. It is argued that Tullock’s study clarifies not just the limits of bureaucratic activity, but also the importance of spontaneous orders for coordinating activities outside those limits and generating the very institutional context in which liberal democracy can evolve and sustain. The main conclusion is that the nature of public bureaucracy constrains the ability of the United States to exogenously impose liberal democratic institutions in foreign countries for the very reasons Tullock emphasized long ago.     

Waste management and its contestation in the Republic of Ireland*

I'll tell you what I see here, Sims. The scenery of the future. Eventually the only scenery left. The more toxic the waste, the greater the effort and expense a tourist will be willing to tolerate in order to visit the site. Only I don't think you ought to be isolating these sites. Isolate the toxic sites, okay. This makes it grander, more ominous and magical. But basic household waste ought to be placed in the cities that produce it. Bring garbage out into the open. Let people see it and respect it. Don't hide your waste facilities. Make an architecture of waste. Design gorgeous buildings to recycle waste and invite people to collect their own garbage and bring it with them to the press rams and conveyors. Get to know your garbage. And the hot stuff, the chemical waste, the nuclear waste, this becomes a remote landscape of nostalgia. Bus tours and postcards, I guarantee it.1 ¹Don DeLillo, Underworld (New York: Scribner, 2000), p. 286.      

The role of compensation in siting hazardous facilities

Empirical evidence indicates that compensation can prove effective in gaining public acceptance for siting facilities on the benign end of the spectrum (e.g., landfills, prisons), but is subject to serious limitations when it comes to facilities that the public regards as particularly risky or of questionable legitimacy such as nuclear waste repositories. These facilities require creative mitigation measures such as independent inspections of the facility and local shutdown power. Even then they may be viewed as too risky to be acceptable with or without compensation. This article proposes a two-stage siting process which recognizes the importance of regulations and safety standards (Stage 1) while employing a voluntary process with compensation to address concerns with equity and efficiency (Stage 2).     

Crisis of political parties and representative democracies: rethinking parties in associational,experimentalist governance

The contrast between the normative functions of political parties in representative democracies and their empirical working is stark and rapidly increasing. This article starts from a sober, realist account of the empirical state of affairs and from structural problems of democracy and participations – in terms of limits of time, information, qualification and relevant expertise – that have to be acknowledged by any realist–utopian proposal of alternatives beyond the exclusive alternative of ‘thin, realist democracy’ or emphatic ‘strong, participatory, direct, or mass democracy’. We can do better. My search for institutional alternatives looks not for the replacement of political parties but for their relief. Many, not all, of their normative tasks can be shared with other functional networks, associations and organizations. In exploring such a new division of political labour I draw on older debates and designs of associative democracy and on recent discussions to democratize expertise and to expertise democracy in order to address urgent societal problems of high-risk decisions under conditions of extreme complexity, contingency, unpredictability and uncertainty and deep contestedness of our knowledge, problems that turn out to be unmanagable by party politics and representative democracy.     

Economic Perceptions and Executive Approval in Comparative Perspective

Controversy exists over whether people use retrospective or prospective economic perceptions when evaluating their political leadership. In this article, I argue that the structure of the political-economic system affects which type of economic perception people employ. Specifically, in established democracies with developed economies, people will employ prospective assessments. In contrast, in nations with less well-established democratic systems and less developed economies, people will employ retrospective reasoning. They do so because under such conditions uncertainty about the future is too high for them to make reliable prospective assessments. I test this hypothesis on aggregate survey data taken from 41 nations in 2002. Support for the hypothesis is found. The conclusion puts the findings into perspective and discusses directions for future research.     

The discourse of democracy in Canadian nuclear waste management policy

Canadian nuclear waste management policy has taken a deliberative democratic turn. What explains this turn? What is its significance? What lessons does it teach us? I trace a narrative of a powerful discursive coalition that was able to take advantage of institutional and financial opportunities to advance deliberative democratic decision making. I identify limitations in this turn by evaluating the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s subsequent consultation process against the criteria of inclusion, equality, reciprocity, agreement, and integration. Despite impressive deliberative democratic designs, the process falls short of each criterion. This analysis clarifies the relative importance of actors to coalitions and institutions. Even with a strong coalition and favorable institutional context, realizing deliberative democracy is contingent on the will of involved actors. This conclusion has implications for the theory and practice of deliberative democracy.