Who Will Fight For Us?

Our military is in reasonably good shape today, but it is working very hard and the level of individual sacrifice among soldiers and Marines, in particular, is very high. Were it not for the distinct likelihood of a major reduction in combined deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan by 2010, we would need urgent responses to the situation now. And if those missions go less well, or less quickly, than now hoped—or if, heaven forbid, another war breaks out in the meantime—additional measures will be required.     

Can We Win a War If We Have to Fight by Cosmopolitan Rules?

After months of bombing, NATO achieved only a stalemate in Libya. That disappointing result may reflect NATO's commitment to respect “international humanitarian law,” now understood to impose severe limits on military operations that might harm civilians. This body of rules is a departure from traditional understandings of the law of war. The embrace of these inhibiting rules raises serious questions about whether western nations are now prepared to fight and win actual wars.     

Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?

This paper will explore the ambivalence or conflict in the literature about the extent to which leaders matter in international politics, commonly linked to the level-of-analysis question. One the one hand, national leaders are often larger than life figures with strong preferences and distinctive personalities who seem to leave their stamp on events. On the other hand, most ir scholars place great stress on the incentives and constraints posed by the environment, be it domestic or international. I will proceed in four sections. The first discusses the essential claims at stake, the kinds of evidence that could be adduced to support one position or the other, and the pathways by which individual differences can make themselves felt. The second section examines the implications for morality, responsibility, and democratic theory. This discussion too will point to relevant methods, including ones that are contested. I will then turn to post-Cold War American foreign policy, skeptically examine the claim that individual presidents, even George W. Bush, mattered as much as is generally believed and close by discussing the implications for democratic accountability and control.     

Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO'S Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?

Abstract

This paper focuses on the NATO-in-crisis literature, particularly the variant claiming that the Atlantic Alliance is facing its worst crisis ever. The paper argues that this approach is an analytical dead-end, incapable of producing new, cumulative knowledge about NATO in particular and alliances in general. It also suggests ways of getting out of the blind alley that the NATO-in-crisis literature has become.     

We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.     

What Will Improve Governance?

Misgovernance in India ranks among its toughest problems to solve. Despite decades of seemingly progressive legislation, there is a simmering dissatisfaction even among those for whose benefits the legislation is designed. The electoral debacle of the UPA government in the parliamentary election of 2014 can be partly attributed to the disenchantment that a vast majority of people felt toward the governance issues. We argue that dynastic politics is the hallmark of many political parties in India and it prevents the emergence of meritorious leadership. Just as we need the process of creative destruction in the economic arena for sustained growth, we need a similar process in the political arena so that local leaders are chosen on the basis of their performance. The success of the new government at the center will depend on whether they succeed in jettisoning centralized decision making and moving the political process in this direction.     

“How to Fight Savage Tribes”: The Global War on Terror in Historical Perspective

The Bush administration's “Global War on Terror” has, by both defenders and critics, been characterized as unique. However, as this article shows, there is a long tradition, both in the United States and in Europe, of fighting wars against “savage tribes”—against enemies who fail to make a distinction between soldiers and civilians, and who use terror as a weapon. The problem of how to fight such groups was much discussed in the legal literature of the nineteenth century. This is a discussion from which it is possible to learn contemporary lessons.     

Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?

ABSTRACT

Although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s, the country catapulted to international media attention on July 1, 2016, after an attack on a café in the upscale neighborhood of the capital Dhaka. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack which killed 29 people, mostly foreigners. The attack came in the wake of a series of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers by both an AQIS affiliate and ISIS. The government denied the existence of militant groups tied to international terrorist organizations. Despite these developments and instances of Bangladeshis joining the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been very little in-depth discussion about who these militants are and what is driving Bangladeshis to militancy. This article addresses this lacuna. This paper examines the common traits of alleged Bangladeshi militants and explores the factors of radicalization. Drawing on media reports of the profiles of the alleged militants, between July 2014 and June 2015, and between July 2016 and August 2017, the article finds that most of the Bangladeshi militants are young, educated males increasingly coming from well-off families. We have also found evidence that four factors—social relationships, use of the Internet, personal crises, and external relations—appear most frequently in the narratives of Bangladeshi militants.     

Can We Negotiate and Still Be Friends?

In this essay, we address why it is that people may not feel comfortablenegotiating with friends. We hypothesize what the effects of friendshipcould be on the negotiation process and outcome, and propose also how anegotiation could impact a friendship. Finally, we suggest means for measuringthis impact. This essay, based on a discussion at the Hewlettconference, does not provide answers but instead proposes questions withthe hope that these questions will provoke future research into these areas.     

Why Fight?: Examining Self-Interested Versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion

Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror, or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social-network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity—they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation toward process rather than outcome. This article tests these two lines of argument against each other by directly linking values orientations in a refugee camp to professed willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion in two different contexts. Professed willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows—negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations—as anticipated sacrifice increases. Results are discussed.     

After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?

Since succeeding the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Ali Khamenei has striven to make himself indispensible to the fate of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. However, the measures Khamenei has taken to secure his power have left his succession in doubt, with no consensus heir. The lack of clear successors among the clergy, weakness of the government institutions, and concerns about regime strength could lead to instability and the potential for an Islamic Revolution Guard Corps coup.     

Will science and technology undermine the international political system?

The framework, actors and issues of international politics havechanged as a result of the massive effects of advances in scienceand technology, but the fundamental principles and organizationof the international system have not been substantially altered.Science and technology are no more or less subversive of theinternational political system than are other pressures forchange. Rather, the nation-state structure, with all its problems,will be essential to manage this increasingly complex and interdependentworld. The policy processes within nations, in fact, rarelyallow scientific and technological factors to dominate policy,even in international issues in which those aspects are clearlycentral, might be thought to be the overwhelming considerations,and might have been expected to overturn traditional patternsin the international system. With climate change as the primaryexample, it is seen how and why economic, political and socialconsiderations dominate, not the scientific and technological.     

Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?

The percentage of Israelis killed by terrorism is higher than in any other democracy. The article analyzes the threats Israel has faced, the impact terrorism has had on Israel, and the counter-terrorism policies Israel has adopted. Terrorism has had a decisive effect on Israeli elections and national security decisions, but not the economy. Israeli counter-terrorism has often been conducted without a coherent overall policy, has failed to reflect and conflicted with broader objectives, and has greatly undermined Israel's international standing. Conversely, it has enabled Israel to live in relative security and thrive, and provided its leaders with the latitude to pursue various policies, including peace, should they wish to do so.     

The Unasked Question: Will the Chinese Communist Party Endure?

This article contends that the United States is competing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), not “China,” and also that the competition with the CCP should be oriented around the “known unknown” question: How long will the CCP retain a monopoly on power over China? Such a framework provides significant benefits to policymakers and strategic planners. First, it focuses the aim point of the U.S. competition on the true center of power. Second, it provides a desired end state of U.S. policy around which to orient the competition and design strategy—the CCP no longer in a monopoly position.