Organizing consent: The role of procedural fairness in political trust and compliance

Abstract.  Political theory often attributes democratic legitimacy to the fairness of the processes by which collective decisions are taken; empirical research by contrast has primarily investigated whether citizens' approval of democratic institutions derives from satisfaction with the substantive output of those institutions. This article examines whether assessments of decision-making processes shape public willingness to consent to authority. The role of procedural fairness in institutional legitimacy has previously only been investigated in the context of the United States, and has fallen short of demonstrating that procedural assessments actually have a causal effect on institutional legitimacy. Panel survey data of attitudes in a large-scale land use issue provide the empirical base of the analysis. The results indicate that assessments of procedural fairness have a bearing on two conceptualizations of subjective legitimacy: respondents' trust for the authority and their willingness to accept a decision outcome.     

Sexual orientation,political trust,and same-sex relationship recognition policies: evidence from Europe

Public Choice - This study uses data from the European Social Survey to analyze the impact of same-sex relationship recognition policies on the political trust of sexual minorities. We exploit...     

Birds of a feather flock together: trust in government,political selection and electoral punishment

Public Choice - Although often at the heart of the public debate, the underlying determinants of political selection and voters’ punishment of corrupt politicians remain poorly investigated....     

Procedural legitimacy and political trust: The case of citizen juries in Spain

Abstract.  During the past few years, new mechanisms of citizen participation in decision making have been introduced into local governance frameworks in many countries around the world. One of the basic objectives of these mechanisms is to bridge the gap between citizens and politicians or, in other words, to build political trust. In Spain, citizen juries are one of the main manifestations of this trend towards local democratic innovation. Their contribution to the building of political trust depends above all on their ability to secure their own procedural legitimacy. Case studies of Spanish citizen juries demonstrate that this mechanism can guarantee sufficient pluralism, and that appropriate amounts of information and deliberation, as well as devices to guarantee neutrality, can be incorporated. However, the limited role that citizen juries assign to associations and the strategic considerations that all political actors have with respect to them are crucial limits to their broader political acceptance. Moreover, their educative effects are limited by two factors: they are isolated experiences in a context of very limited opportunities for participation; and their impact on decision making tends to be irregular and diffuse. Nevertheless, Spanish citizen juries also have the potential to increase citizens' interest in local events and the topics under discussion, and to stimulate reflection on social problems. Their contribution to achieving better informed and more responsive bureaucrats and politicians could also be a crucial step towards establishing a greater degree of political trust.     

Co-operation in institutional economics and the political economy of trust

The aim of this paper is to analyze the institutional economics of co-operation and the political economy of trust. It is reviewed the transactions costs, the principal-agent theory, market power, increasing-returns theory and value creation, strategic management, competitive forces, resource-based theory, organizational knowledge and learning, strategic choice theory and the collective efficiency theory. Finally, it is sustained the political economy of trust.     

Macroeconomic performance,political trust and the Great Recession: A multilevel analysis of the effects of within‐country fluctuations in macroeconomic performance on political trust in 15 EU countries, 1999–2011

Recent cross‐national comparative studies have found no effect of countries’ macroeconomic performances on trust in national political institutions, once political explanations (most notably corruption) are taken into account. Although political trust is not determined by the comparison of national economic performance to other countries, it is argued in this article that it is affected by comparisons to their own past performance. In a multilevel, fixed effects analysis of Eurobarometer data (21 waves in 15 European Union Member States between 1999 and 2011) the extent to which within‐country variations in economic performance affect political trust longitudinally is tested. Three major conclusions are reached. First, within‐country, longitudinal changes in performance (growth, deficits, unemployment and inflation) affect political trust. Second, the impact of macroeconomic performance is stronger among the lower educated. Third, even in times of economic duress, budgetary deficits tend to undermine political trust.     

Justice: Plain Old and Distributive: Rejoinder to Charles Taylor

This paper argues that the views of Charles Taylor on justice in income and wealth distribution are fallacious, especially in regard to issues such as private property rights, justice, human rights, and theft. As to this last point, Taylor maintains it is possible, under certain circumstances, to “legitimately steal.” We regard this as a philosophical howler of the first order. We also demur from his contention that equity and equality can be used as synonyms.

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Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: Rejoinder to Fried

Fried (in Public Choise, this issue, 2013) claims that Quesada (in Public Choise 130:395–400, 2007) is wrong in showing that the dictator in a dictatorial social welfare function does not necessarily enjoy absolute decision power. This reply revisits, and illustrates by means of an example, the framework where Quesada’s result is obtained. It is argued that Fried’s counterfactual analysis conducted to invalidate Quesada’s conclusion relies on untenable presumptions: (i) that the rules to identify the values of a social welfare function say something about how these values must have been obtained; and (ii) that counterfactual analysis can be conducted in an environment where causes and effects cannot be unequivocally established.     

Implementation, accountability and trust

Abstract. According tot standard dictionaries 'implementation' is ambiguous, as it means either the act of implementing or the state of having been implemented. This duality has characterized implementation theory, which models the process of implementation in different ways, each presumably conducive to successful implementation as an outcome. It is argued that one model of implementation as a process is most suitable for successful implementation meaning the fulfillment of policy objectives by programme technologies. However, there is no necessary relation between some model of implementation processes and implementation as an outcome. Public policies may be implemented in various ways and some policies do fail implementation or result only in political symbolism, but that does not warrant generalizations about the impossibility of successful implementation or create a case for some special model of implementation as hierarchical authority, or as evolution, learning or coalition. Basic to implementation is accountability, which restricts the amount of trust that gives autonomy to those responsible for the implementation of policies. The conceptualization of implementation as a combination of accountability and trust points in a new direction for the analysis of policy cycles.