CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN THE USA: PROMISE VERSUS REALITY*

Abstract: The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) mobilized changes to the basis and structure of the federal service which are the most far-reaching since those installed by the Pendleton Act in 1883. Several of the 1978 provisions were directed toward encouraging a more incentive-oriented approach to personnel matters. Other measures involved the dismantling of the Civil Service Commission, the installation of new mechanisms to handle labour-management relations, the codification of merit principles, and the delegation to individual agency managements of wider personnel responsibilities. This paper raises the question of whether, four years after the passage of CSRA, there are indications that the legislation is living up to its earlier promise. Attention focuses upon the character of the 1978 measures and how well the federal service is coping, or is being allowed to cope, with the private sector-style, rewards-sanctions approach to personnel matters which was embraced by the Carter proposals. To a very significant degree the 1978 Act's provisions in that respect concentrated upon the more senior managerial and supervisory levels. It is less surprising, therefore, that many of the difficulties now associated with CSRA's implementation also are concentrated among those same groups (Senior Executive Service and merit pay). The salary and other incentives available to career executives for outstanding job performance have been eroded by Congress; the sanctions for poor performance remain, however, while worries persist about the possibilities of manipulating the new performance appraisal procedures in order to harass or remove career government officials. Meanwhile, the bulk of the federal service is, in practice, largely unaffected by the new performance appraisal arrangements. Many of the concerns about CSRA have been reinforced by the actions of the Reagan Administration and the 97th Congress. The bonus system for career executives remains under siege, the pay cap remains intact, while there are more general doubts about the Reagan Administration's commitment to civil service reform. The locus of responsibility for overseeing CSRA's implementation remains unclear, while there is evidence in some agencies that Reagan political appointees have attempted deliberately to exclude career executives from the policy process. Thus, despite the probably well-intentioned initiatives enshrined by CSRA, the US federal service still finds itself beset by problems of identity and support. It still feels vulnerable, too, to the types of political abuse from which the 1978 measures were supposed to afford protection.     

THE USE OF MANDATORY SENTENCING LEGISLATION AS SYMBOLIC STATEMENTS

Mandatory sentencing legislation often results in laws which use provisions and set penalties in order to make strong symbolic and political statements. Thus, in addition to protecting society, they are powerful vehicles for expressing moral outrage. This is especially evident in mandatory sentencing for drug and alcohol offenses. The present research examines the consequences of that practice on one state's criminal justice system. Interviews with key actors along with examinations of official documents, newspaper publicity and media campaigns illustrate the political decisions and symbolic statements which pervade driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) legislation. The process is studied from before the lawls enactment through its subsequent outcome.     

THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC RATIONALISM: THE TREASURY AND THE MARKET ECONOMY

The 1980s have seen the triumph of economic rationalism. Greater efficiency has become a sacred goal. Increased competition and the unlocking of market forces, we are told, are the key means to obtain it. Proponents of economic rationalism insist that the public sector is riddled with inefficiencies. The private sector, by contrast, is self-evidently superior. To the extent that the private sector often operates less than optimally, a major reason is the plethora of perverse governmental regulations which hamper its efficiency. Despite the problems, the public sector needs to model itself wherever possible on the private. And where public sector activities can be or are being done in the private sector, then the public sector should surrender such activities. The inevitable result will be an increase in net economic welfare: the economy will become more dynamic and scarce resources will be allocated more efficiently. Such is the rhetoric of the economic rationalists.     

PLEA BARGAINING AS A GAME: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATED SENTENCING DECISIONS

Current studies of courtroom decisionmaking emphasize contextual variation and the interaction of large numbers of variables In explaining decision outcomes. However, theory suggests that courtroom decisions may be dominated by simple "rules of thumb" that allow decisionmakers to cope with scarcity of time and resources. Following this approach, a parslmonious model of plea bargaining as a two-person game is developed and hypotheses are derived. Data on negotiated sentences for burglary and robbery in three California counties serve to test the hypotheses. The findings confirm that prior criminal history is the dominant factor in determining the severity of negotiated sentences and that defendents with more extensive prior records have less incentive to plea bargalh. Identlfication of this decision rule for negotiated sentences contradlcts arguments for limiting plea bargaining that assume negotiations result in sentencing leniency across the board.     

REGULATORY POLICY DESIGN: COOPERATIVE VERSUS DETERRENT MANDATES

Abstract: Two forms of regulatory policy design—"cooperative" and "deterrent" designs—are considered in the context of intergovernmental regulation of floodplains. Both types of design entail efforts by higher-level governments to induce local-level regulatory efforts. However, the approaches differ in terms of their underlying philosophies and in the extent to which they address local regulatory commitment and capacity. The contrast between the United States and New South Wales policies, and changes over time in the New South Wales policy, illustrate key points about the two types of policy design. The broader significance of this discussion concerns lessons for intergovernmental regulatory policy design.