Donor-conceived individuals and access to information about their genetic origins: the relevance and role of rights

The discourse of rights has increasingly been used to frame debates about access to information for donor-conceived individuals. This article seeks to clarify the moral and legal basis upon which human rights are relevant to this issue. It outlines the elements of a substantive rights-based approach which is then used to resolve the competing rights of a donor and a donor-conceived individual. Three arguments are offered. First, donor anonymity must be prohibited prospectively and donor-conceived individuals must be entitled to information about their genetic parents. Secondly, a context-sensitive application of a human rights-based approach allows retrospective access to non-identifying information but precludes retrospective access to identifying information where a donor wishes to remain anonymous in circumstances where anonymity was guaranteed at the time of donation. Finally, despite this finding, a rights-based approach requires states to actively encourage such donors to consent to the release of identifying information and to take reasonable steps to support donor-conceived individuals in circumstances where donors refuse to provide their consent.     

Psycho-social, ethical and legal arguments for and against the retrospective release of information about donors to donor-conceived individuals in Australia

In the February 2011 report on its inquiry into the past and present practices of donor conception in Australia, the Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee called for the introduction of legislation to regulate donor conception in all jurisdictions that do not have it in place "as a matter of priority". It further called for the establishment, "as a matter of priority", of a national register of donors to enable donor-conceived individuals to access identifying information about their donor. The Senate Committee left open the question as to whether the legislation and central register should have retrospective effect. This article focuses upon that question. It shows that arguments concerning the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of some donors who may wish to remain anonymous are outweighed by the manifest injustice faced by donor-conceived individuals who are denied access to such information, as well as their families and donors who wish to exchange this information,     

Supreme Court Preview:Reed v. Town of Gilbert to Address Content Neutrality in Sign Regulation

Abstract

For the first time in two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled in the 2014–2015 term to review the thorny planning and legal subject of local government regulation of outdoor signs and billboards and the core First Amendment requirement that regulations of speech be ”content neutral“. In basic terms, the content‐neutrality doctrine prohibits the government from regulating a speaker's content or message–including messages on outdoor signs. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Court will be asked to decide whether Gilbert, Arizona's sign code, which distinguishes among several categories of signs, including religious, political, and ideological signs, meets the content neutrality requirement. In so doing, the Court may provide direction on how far local governments can go in regulating speech based on message, and the Court can resolve a longstanding division among the federal appellate courts over the meaning of content neutrality     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.