Ownership,empowerment, and productivity: Some empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion

Abstract This paper uses a sample of professional engineers employed in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (customers or clients, peers, mid‐ and top‐level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show that disagreement among important and attentive proximate principals (mid‐level managers) expands discretion, but disagreement among important and attentive distant principals (top executives and politicians) reduces discretion. Sector has no direct or indirect effect on discretion. When customers or clients and peers are important and attentive principals, discretion increases, and so does productivity. Monitoring by mid‐level management has no effect on productivity. Because disagreement among distant principals is greater in the public sector, devolution of authority alone is unlikely to increase public sector productivity. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Theories of legislation: some Austrian evidence and general conclusions

Abstract. After defining legislation as an extended process which includes initiation, preparation, legislation proper as well as implementation, an empirically derived threefold typology of laws differentiating them according to the groups most active in the initiation phase is proposed. Taking into consideration the official and unofficial policy theories of these groups, predictions can be made about the degree of effectiveness of laws. Some empirical evidence supports these assumptions. In this way a better understanding of the extended lawmaking process and the conditions for the successful implementation of laws may be achieved.     

The rise and demise of theocracy: theory and some evidence

This paper models theocracy as a regime where the clergy in power retains knowledge of the cost of political production but which is potentially incompetent, quarrelsome, or corrupt. This is contrasted with a secular regime where government is contracted out to a secular ruler, and hence the church loses the possibility of observing costs and creates for itself a hidden-information agency problem. The church is free to choose between regimes—a make-or-buy choice—and we look for the range of environmental parameters that are most conducive to the superiority of theocracy and therefore to its occurrence and persistence, despite its disabilities. Numerical solution of the model indicates that the optimal environment for a theocracy is one in which the “bad” (high-cost) state is disastrously bad but the probability of its occurrence is not very high. Quantitative evidence on the rise of ancient Israelite theocracy and the current surge of Islamic theocratic fundamentalism provides surprisingly strong support for this prediction. Lastly, supportive evidence is suggested by two rare instances of a theocracy’s peaceful demise.     

Legislative policy-making authority,party system size,and party system nationalization

How does the internal organization of legislatures shape the legislative party system? We argue that the size and nationalization of the national legislative party system is related to the size of the legislative prize—namely, to how the legislature's internal rules and structures concentrate policy-making authority in the hands of the largest party. To test this argument, we draw on studies of legislative organization to develop a measure of the concentration of legislative policy-making authority. Using two time series cross sectional data sets of post-war elections, one of advanced industrial democracies with pure parliamentary systems and one of all advanced industrial democracies, we find support for our argument and note that the effect of internal legislative structures is larger than that of the electoral system. We also show that the incentives to aggregate and consolidate the legislative party system are generally stronger where there are few external constraints on the legislature.     

Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings

Empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences; regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention. We empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the United States on state bond ratings, which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt. After controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings, we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings, which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt.     

Risk aversion and rent-seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence

Theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent-seeking activities. Following this line of investigation we extend Hillman and Katz's work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals.Our earlier laboratory results were evaluated with respect to the risk neutral Cournot-Nash predictions. However, given the uncertainty present in the rent-seeking experiment, our ability to reject these risk neutral predictions may not be, in fact, a failure for the model but a result of risk aversion. In laboratory experiments in which we control for the relative risk attitudes of individual agents, we show that risk aversion matters. The relative risk aversion of individuals affects the level of rent-seeking activity and the extent to which rents are dissipated. In our experiments, the relatively less risk averse individuals dissipated relatively more rent.     

More than wishful thinking: Causes and consequences of voters’ electoral expectations about parties and coalitions

Accurate expectations about the outcome of elections play a central role in psychological and economic theories of voting. In the paper, three questions about voters’ expectations are investigated. First, we identify and test several factors that influence the overall accuracy or quality of voters’ expectations. Second, the phenomenon of “wishful thinking” is tested and confirmed for expectations about the electoral performance of individual parties and coalitions. Finally, two mechanisms how expectations might influence voting behavior are identified and tested. Based on surveys from Austria and Germany, the results suggest that voters not only rely on expectations to avoid casting “wasted” votes for parties without electoral chances, but that they are able to engage in fairly sophisticated strategic coalition voting.     

Affinity,arming, consequences,and perceptions: an introduction

Public Choice - This article provides an introduction to the special issue on Political violence: affinity, arming, consequences, and perceptions. The issue contains panel analyses, theoretical...     

Risk assessment in the policy-making process: environmental health and safety protection

This article examines the extent to which differences exist in the relative degree of discretion permitted by the statutory mandates under which health risk assessments are conducted as a basis for regulatory action. Attention is focused on the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, because they are the lead federal regulatory agencies on most environmental health matters. The statutes are found to define risk, consider effects, identify target populations, and use benefit-cost analysis in a flexible way. But the burden of proof of risk typically is assigned in a more direct and stringent fashion. Overall, however, agencies are found to have substantial discretion in the manner in which risk assessments are incorporated into the policy process. A number of examples of efforts to reduce this flexibility are outlined and their implications for the future of the analysis of risks are delineated.     

Neglected challenges to evidence-based policy-making: the problem of policy accumulation

Claims for evidence-based policy-making are motivated by the assumption that if practitioners and scholars want to learn about effective policy design, they also can. This paper argues that this is becoming more and more challenging with the conventional approaches due to the accumulation of national policy portfolios, characterized by (a) a growing number of different policy targets and instruments, that (b) are often interdependent and (c) reformed in an uncontrolled way. These factors undermine our ability to accurately relate outcome changes to individual components within the respective policy mix. Therefore, policy accumulation becomes an additional source of the well-known ‘attribution problem’ in evaluation research. We argue that policy accumulation poses fundamental challenges to existing approaches of evidence-based policy-making. Moreover, these challenges are very likely to create a trade-off between the need for increasing methodological sophistication on one side, and the decreasing political impact of more fine-grained and conditional findings of evaluation results on the other.     

Defining the policy-making function in government: An organizational and management approach

Applying what is in effect a roles and missions approach to the management of the office of the chief planner in large scale public operations is at variance with modern public administration theories. However, a definitional approach is advanced here as a needed step in organizing and managing the policy-making process, which in most agencies is in constant flux. Five key functions are defined: Planning, Analysis, Research, Demonstration and Evaluation. A simplified scenario is used to show how these functions and their management interact over several years of policy-making. Activities identified with each function are spaced chronologically and are shown to be mutually reinforcing. The scenario also makes extensive use of the initial earmarking of portions of the Research and Evaluation budgets for coordinated use in response to requirements growing out of the overall policy determination process.