论反垄断法上协同行为的认定

协同行为是与经营者协议、行业决议平行的一种垄断协议。协同行为的特殊性集中体现在协同合意上。寡头相互依赖理论认为协调一致行为是经营者依据纯粹的相互依赖关系实施的理性行为，但经济分析证明稳定持续的协调一致行为背后很可能存在一个对双方具有约束力的协同合意，从而构成协同行为。认定协同行为的关键就在于证明经营者之间存在协同合意。协同合意的证明应采用“平行行为＋附加因素”方法，注重行为因素、环境因素以及抗辩因素等附加因素的整体考查和效果分析，以达到“倾向排除”的证明标准。     

依间接证据认定协同行为的证明结构

作为垄断协议的一种＂高级＂形式——协同行为,其在实施中往往不会遗留直接证据。如何利用间接证据来证明公司间的价格行为属于协同行为成为现代各国反垄断机构的挑战性的课题。利用欧美等国家（地区）的相关判例,并借助于间接证据的特殊分类及在分类证据组合上的特殊性来推定某些行为属于卡特尔,是解决这一难题的有效方法。     

依间接证据认定协同行为的证明结构

作为垄断协议的一种高级形式——协同行为,其在实施中往往不会遗留直接证据。如何利用间接证据来证明公司间的价格行为属于协同行为成为现代各国反垄断机构的挑战性的课题。利用欧美等国家(地区)的相关判例,并借助于间接证据的特殊分类及在分类证据组合上的特殊性来推定某些行为属于卡特尔,是解决这一难题的有效方法。     

垄断协议中协同行为的证明问题研究

垄断协议中的明示协议行为很容易被发现、被证明,而默示的协同行为的证明问题却是反垄断法执法的难题。综合各国反垄断法执法经验,反垄断行政执法和司法过程中证明协同行为的证据分为直接证据、间接证据和环境证据。环境证据是反垄断法特有的一种证明方法,由于很难用传统的方法直接证明协同行为,需要采取法律推定制度和举证责任倒置制度对其进行证明。     

反垄断法上协同行为的规范认定

在反垄断法上,协同行为的概念和内涵不尽明确,其认定通常需要根据若干间接证据或"附加因素"进行推论.但这些因素的结构、权重、层次不明,存在较大的不确定性.为此,首先应确立协同行为的裁判逻辑:在不存在"意思一致"的情况下,当事人行为的一致性不符合市场正常条件或正常情况下其自身的利益.其次,应根据证明力的大小,对"附加因素"进行分类排序,区分一般与超级附加因素,并将其纳入证明间接事实与主要事实的证据环或证据链.最后,在以信息交流为起点的证明中,以交流证据推定证明"意思一致"和行为协同;在以平行行为为起点的证明中,宜采纳"优势证据"的证明标准而非直接推定.在此基础上,应当根据信息传递路径区分双边与三边协同行为,分类厘清证明的关键点.     

论促进家庭暴力认定的证据机制——以诉讼行为的激励作用为视角

人类的行为可以分为基本行为和诉讼行为,两者相互影响、相互作用.诉讼行为对基本行为具有激励作用,能够促进和改善人们的基本行为.为了通过诉讼行为遏制和减少家庭暴力,考虑到家庭暴力案件“证据少”“证明难”的特点,应当通过一系列证据机制来强化司法裁判中对家庭暴力行为的认定,包括强化证据固定、证据范围拓宽、证明责任减轻、证明标准降低等.在重视家庭暴力案件证据规则特殊性的背景下,我国反家庭暴力立法中的证据规范应作相应调整.     

论刑事证据契约的理论模型与实践样态

随着认罪认罚从宽制度的建立,刑事诉讼模式从"压制型司法"向协同型(合作型)司法转变,这为刑事诉讼程序合意及证据契约的萌生奠定了制度基础.在合作式刑事司法模式中,控辩双方在证据场域内的合作与协商符合理论与实践的发展趋势.刑事诉讼模式的转型势必带来其证明模式的相应转变.与协商式刑事诉讼模式相适应的是合意证明模式.合意证明模...     

合意确定添附物归属的规范内涵

民法典第322条第1句令添附物归属得为当事人合意确定，就该合意的制度功能与形态构造，学理与实务均有争议和模糊，有必要重新整理其规范内涵。规范效果上，确定添附物归属合意分为同一型与变动型，前者欠缺特定标的不生物权变动效力，后者遵循“原始取得—继受取得”规范逻辑变动所有权。延伸效力上，添附当事人既可通过确定添附物归属之合意间接形塑抵押权，亦可直接合意确定添附物抵押权效力，此时不适用民法典第403条规定。确定添附物归属合意系要因处分行为，基本形态包括横向维度上负担与处分合意的区分，以及纵向维度上合意变动所有权与抵押权之不同构成要求。合意涉他时，利他合同以不存在禁转特约为前提，第三人承担抵押责任的负担合意仅在其明示时构成债务承担，否则按无因管理处理各方关系。就合意之有效要件，应先检视是否存在权利滥用，再依民法典第153条各款检验合意的内容与效果。     

北京锐邦涌和科贸有限公司诉强生（上海）医疗器材有限公司、强生（中国）医疗器材有限公司纵向垄断协议纠纷案

【裁判摘要】 限制最低转售价格的协议、决定或其他协同行为,具有排除、限制竞争的效果．才能构成垄断协议。分析评价限制最低转售价格行为的经济效果．可以从相关市场竞争是否充分、实施企业在相关市场是否具有很强的市场地位、实施企业是否具有限制竞争的行为动机、限制最低转售价格行为的竞争效果四个方面进行综合判断。     

实质主义认定标准下转售价格维持的类型化认定

受《中华人民共和国反垄断法》第18条影响,人民法院或执法机构对转售价格维持的认定遵循了形式主义的认定标准,若涉案行为具备转售价格维持协议的形式则只能构成纵向垄断协议。形式主义的认定标准难以揭示涉案行为的本质,造成行为定性与处罚决定相互矛盾等弊端,不利于反垄断法的体系化适用。实质主义的认定标准依据涉案行为的实质机制认定行为;实质主义的认定标准可准确认定违法行为,避免上述弊端,克服形式主义的认定标准的不足,因此转售价格维持的认定应依据实质主义的认定标准。在实质主义的认定标准下,转售价格维持应进行类型化认定,“滥用市场支配地位行为与垄断协议的两分法”是类型化认定的基本思路。在前一类型下,经营者滥用市场支配地位强迫交易相对人签订转售价格维持协议的行为构成滥用市场支配地位行为,寡头经营者共同从事的转售价格维持可能构成共同市场支配地位的滥用。在后一类型下,当协议的一方经营者构成横向垄断协议的组织者或实质帮助者时,转售价格维持构成横向垄断协议;实施协同行为的经营者的共同交易相对人可作为协同行为的组织者,此时转售价格维持构成协同行为;在一定条件下,上下游经营者基于通谋达成的转售价格维持构成纵向垄断协议...     

Concerted Practices and the Presence of Obligations: Joint Action in Competition Law and Social Philosophy

This paper considers whether, and if so how, the modelling of joint action in social philosophy – principally in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman – might assist in understanding and applying the concept of concerted practices in European competition law. More specifically, the paper focuses on a well-known difficulty in the application of that concept, namely, distinguishing between concerted practice and rational or intelligent adaptation in oligopolistic markets. The paper argues that although Bratman’s model of joint action is more psychologically plausible and phenomenologically resonant, its less demanding character also makes it less useful than Gilbert’s in our understanding of the legal concept of concerted practice and in dealing with the above difficulty. The paper proceeds in two parts: first, a discussion of the concept of concerted practices in European competition law; and second, a discussion of Gilbert and Bratman’s models of joint action, including a comparative assessment of their ability to provide an evidentiary target and an evidentiary platform for concerted practices.     

共同市场支配地位的理论基础与规则构造

为解决寡头市场中的垄断问题,我国《反垄断法》提供了"滥用共同市场支配地位"的路径,但法律规定有缺陷并导致实践中难以适用或错误适用。以美国、欧盟为代表的理论和法律实践均表明这种认定思路是行之有效的,但其难点在于如何通过间接证据证明市场寡头不具合理性的一致性行为不是由于客观市场结构造成的,而是基于主观意图,因此具有可责性。分析美国、欧盟的执法、司法案例,通过各自演进过程论证其内在逻辑,发现两种路径殊途同归。我国反垄断执法认定共同市场支配地位时应该将结构、行为因素并举。     

Tacit collusion and liability rules

This paper demonstrates that the likelihood of tacit collusion in a given oligopolistic industry may depend on the kind of liability rule applied to the industry. We study typical settings for the analysis of product liability and environmental liability. For the latter, it is established that tacit collusion is more likely under strict liability than under negligence. However, the two liability rules are equivalent with regard to their effects on tacit collusion in the model pertaining to product liability. This context-dependent impact on tacit collusion can be traced back to a difference in the shape of firms’ cost functions.     

A note on collusion and resale price maintenance

This paper advances a new, anti-collusive, explanation of resale price maintenance. By imposing a price floor, an upstream firm increases the non-cooperative profits of downstream firms and makes collusion relatively less profitable. As a result, collusion may be destabilized and the price floor enables a manufacturer to prevent collusive behavior among downstream firms. This finding contrasts with the popular view that resale price maintenance fosters collusion.     

Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies

This article analyzes experimentally whether the degree of collusion for one dimension of duopolists?? interactions influences the degree of collusion for another dimension. More precisely, I will explore whether a high degree of collusion for advertisement expenditures facilitates tacit price collusion. Two environments are tested, in which the size of the spillover between advertising expenditures is varied. The results indicate that both degrees of collusion are correlated: a high degree of collusion on advertising functions as a signalling device triggering a significantly higher degree of price collusion by the opponent. Thus advertising expenditures seem to be a useful indicator for market regulators to detect non-competitive pricing.     

Collusion and Facilitating Practices: A New Perspective in Antitrust Analysis

A systematic revision of the notion of facilitating practices is put forward in this paper, with the purpose of relaxing the long-debated tension between economic and legal perspectives on oligopoly. Whereas the law knows of just one collusive illegal conduct, namely agreements, in economic theory the focus on internal enforcement makes the distinction between agreements and other behaviour resulting in the collusive outcome irrelevant. However, the tension may be relaxed, at least in a number of relevant circumstances, provided the focus of competition law shifts from straightforward co-ordination on market strategies to the firms' concerted efforts in the design and implementation of given organisational arrangements of the oligopolistic industry, to which an anticompetitive object can be attached. The theoretical analysis is extensively supported by examples drawn from some recent decisions of the European Commission and the Italian Competition Authority.     

Market Transparency and Collusion: On the UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange

We review the decision by the European Commission in the case of the UK Agricultural Registration Exchange. We propose a theoretical model, offering a basis for some of the intuitive arguments used by the Commission on the anti-competitive role of information exchange in the case of price and non price collusion. Market transparency on non price data is shown to be a collusion facilitating device which may achieve stability in otherwise unstable cartels.     

中国企业海外购置不动产的法律风险防范———尼日利亚土地交易理论与实践

随着中国企业对非洲的投资日益增长,在非洲购买不动产发展实业的案例也越来越多。由于殖民地历史和当地习惯法的双重影响,非洲国家规制不动产交易的法律呈现出多种样态并存的现象。巨额的交易价格和资产的不可移动性致使在非洲投资不动产存在各种风险。如何从法律层面控制和防范风险成为中国企业海外投资不动产的重要课题。,以中国企业在尼日利亚购买土地为实例④,探讨尼日利亚的土地市场、契据交付、产权登记、土地法律渊源、产权移转流程、合同规则等理论及操作实践,旨在为在尼日利亚投资的中国企业和个人提供法律指引,降低在当地投资的法律风险。