Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What thePhilosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’,I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived hisinterpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theoryof meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’.In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that hecommitted the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact thathe considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’,‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—inLaw's Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each,he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning,which he describes as the view that ‘the doctrinal conceptof law is an interpretive concept’. In this Reply, I arguethat Dworkin's argument that he does not commit Dworkin's fallacyis itself an example of the fallacy and that Dworkin's fallacypervades Justice in Robes just as much as it did Law's Empire.     

Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique

‘Before the game begins players should agree on a dictionaryto use in case of a challenge.’ (from the Official Rulesof SCRABBLE®)

Treaty interpretation in WTO law continues to represent a topicof highly theoretical and practical importance. The Panel’sand the Appellate Body’s reports in the recent US –Gambling dispute have critically turned on ascertaining themeaning of the United States’ GATS Schedule and ArticleXVI GATS on the basis of the public international law rulesof treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. The paper’s principal aim is toreview the interpretative approach followed in particular bythe Appellate Body in reaching its decision in US – Gambling.Its main argument is that, although the Appellate Body appearsto be trying to emancipate itself from a rigorous textual approach,it has not yet embraced a holistic approach to treaty interpretation,one in which the treaty interpreter looks thoroughly at allthe relevant elements of the general rule on treaty interpretationpursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

Gaining confidence in the law of confidence

Legal context. The recent case of EPI v Symphony has left theUK law of confidentiality in an uncertain state: the extentto which recipients of confidential information may be permittedto ‘use’ mixtures of such information with publiclyavailable material remains unclear. The Court of Appeal in EPIfelt that it was hard to reconcile the principle that any claimin confidence must fail if the material in question is in thepublic domain with the ‘springboard’ doctrine; butis the distinction illusory? Key points. Issues raised in this case include considerationof what precisely is ‘use’ of confidential information,when mixed with public information, and whether a confider shoulddo more than rely on confidentiality obligations to protectthe fruits of his/her disclosures. This article asks how confidentialityobligations may be aligned with the control of statutory intellectualproperty rights. It considers whether the Court of Appeal inMarkem v Zipher has confused the issue and speculates as tohow far the general law of contract can assist the confider. Practical significance. Finally, this article discusses whichlegal tools will best assist the confider seeking to protectits intellectual property.     

Shadows in Paradise - Exploring Non-Refoulement as an Open Concept

The principle of non-refoulement contains a paradox. While stateshave committed to respecting the principle by joining the 1951Refugee Convention and key human rights conventions, its contentis not established in international law. In other words, stateshave committed to a principle the content of which is indeterminate.Since no common definition exists, in practice, national andinternational bodies have extensive powers of discretion togive content to the terms ‘persecution’, ‘torture’,‘degrading’ or ‘cruel’ treatment. Thepurpose of this article is to explore non-refoulement as anopen and ambiguous concept. Acknowledgement of the indeterminacyis important, as open concepts never remain such in practicebut are always issued with content or interpreted. This approachcalls for a further question: how do interpretations come aboutand what kind of factors influence them? The conclusion of thearticle is that different national and international actorspromote their own ‘correct’ interpretations of thiskeystone of refugee protection.     

The WTO's First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition

A World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel has decided theWTO’s first antitrust case. It resolved the matter infavour of the United States’ claim that Mexico had anticompetitivelyfacilitated exploitative prices and a cartel that raised theprice of terminating cross-border telephone calls in Mexicoand thereby harmed trade and competition. The case is Mexico– Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (April2004) (‘the Mexican telecom case’). This essay arguesthat if the WTO’s antitrust clause was in fact triggered(which is a point of contention), Mexico’s conduct violatedits obligations. Furthermore, it argues that the GATS antitrustobligation in the telecommunications sector should be acknowledgedas occupying an important place at the intersection of trade,competition and industrial policies. Antitrust law is the otherside of the coin of liberal trade law. Antitrust law opens marketsby prohibiting private and other commercial restraints, whiletrade law opens markets by prohibiting public restraints. BeforeMexican telecom, no legal discipline was regarded as copiousor flexible enough to address combined public and private restraints.In particular, nations were allowed free rein to privilege nationalchampions that harmed competition in and out of their country,imposing costs on outsiders as well as on their own people.A positive reading of the antitrust clause helps to fill thegap.     

Similar Facts in Civil Cases

This essay evaluates the recent restatement in O’Brienv Chief Constable of South Wales Police of the law on similarfacts in civil proceedings. The two-stage approach propoundedin O’Brien contains a number of conceptual problems. Apparentsimplicity was achieved by avoiding fundamental issues underlyingthis area. Prior to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, judges recognizedthat the common law similar facts rule had a role to play inboth civil and criminal trials; but they gave the rule a widerexclusionary scope in criminal than in civil cases. Adoptionof a moral perspective helps to explain this state of affairs.The rule, so it will be argued, protects the legitimacy of trialdeliberation by forbidding reliance on an assumption that disrespectsthe moral autonomy of the person whose conduct is being judged.This moral objection can arise in civil cases; but it arisesmore frequently and usually with greater force in criminal proceedings.Hence, while there is a need to reserve some judicial powerto disallow proof of similar incidents in the civil context,there is usually less reason for the exercise of that powerin civil cases than at criminal trials.     

Violence and Massacres -- Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?

The law's responses to massacres seem to vacillate between twomodels: (i) the model of the ‘criminal law of the enemy’inspired by the national criminal law and rendered topical againby the attacks of September 11; (ii) the model of the ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ symbolized by the paradigm of crimesagainst humanity. The latter model is better suited to takeaccount of the qualitative dimension of massacres, i.e. thefact that they, besides being mass offences (quantitative criterion),also offend against humanity. To establish a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ as a model with a universal, or universalizable,dimension, three conditions are necessary, which concern (i)the definition of the crimes, (ii) the assignment of responsibilityand (iii) the nature of the punishment. As for the definitionof the crime, one could implicitly deduce from the list of actsconstituting crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute) that humanity so protected has two inseparablecomponents: the individuality of each human being, not reducibleto membership in a group, and the equal membership of each inthe human community as a whole. With regard to the second condition,it is not sufficient to hold responsible the de jure or de factoleaders; intermediaries and perpetrators, at all levels of hierarchy,must also be held accountable. As for the third condition, itis not sufficient to content oneself with the watchword of thefight against impunity without bringing up the nature and functionsof the punishment; hence the necessity not only to rethink therole ‘criminal’ law can play in a policy of punishment,but also to focus on prevention, reparation and reconciliation.Finally, the author suggests that the proposed model of a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ must be built through the interplaybetween municipal law and international law. On the one hand,the wealth of national legal systems — also with regardto penalties and responsibility — should be better integratedinto international criminal justice; on the other, nationalcriminal systems should be better adapted to conditions of internationallaw, through the introduction into domestic law of the definitionsof the crimes and also the rules for assigning criminal responsibility.     

The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law

The question of how the ‘border’ is conceived ininternational law, and how it shapes identity and peoples’lives, remains largely unexplored in the international legalliterature. This article seeks to contribute to our understandingof the meaning of the border in international law, and in thecontemporary context, by drawing on the work of the philosopherand political theorist, Étienne Balibar, and by reflecting,in the light of his work, on the recent decision of the Houseof Lords in R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport. It isshown that international law's focus on the territorial bordermay render invisible other borders which are significant forsubaltern groups, and thereby fail to address the manner inwhich borders affect lives and determine outcomes. Borders arenot stable and ‘univocal’, but instead, ‘multiple’,shifting in meaning and function from group to group. They arealso being ‘exported’ such that a person may experiencea foreign border while still within the territory of their owncountry. In highlighting the multiplicity of borders, the articleseeks to prompt further reflection on the articulation and applicationof norms of international law in a way that addresses the realitiesof the contemporary context.     

The Problem with Entrapment

In R v Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of2000) the House of Lords articulated a legal framework to govern‘entrapment’ in criminal cases. Their Lordshipsregarded the need for judicial intervention to assist entrappeddefendants as uncontroversial. This article argues that thedoctrine they set out, in fact, necessitates substantial, andlargely unarticulated, departures from principles the courtsordinarily stress as fundamental to the criminal law. In particular,entrapment doctrine determines liability for criminal acts byreference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators,a perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. This articlesuggests that the anomalous treatment of entrapment can be understoodas a device to prevent the police from relocating the temptationto commit crime to environments in which they are not ordinarilyconfronted and to ensure that those from backgrounds in whichserious criminality is not usually a plausible option will escapepunishment if tempted to commit crime by the police.     

A Critical Appraisal of 'Triple Divorce' in Islamic Law

The issue of the ‘triple divorce’ is regarded ashighly sensitive among the Muslims, not only in India but elsewhere.The Holy Qur’an is very cautious in matters of divorce.Three talaqs have to be spaced over a period of 3 months togive husband and wife time for reconciliation through the interventionof relatives and friends. Moreover, talaq can be pronouncedonly when the wife is in a state of tuhur, ie purity after menstruation.Yet, despite clear Qur’anic injunctions to the contrary,immediate triple divorce is permitted, destroying marital lifein one breath. The practice of immediate triple divorce is widespreadamong Sunni Muslims and has legal validity. Even then the juristscall it a talaq-e-Bidat (innovative form of divorce). The disputehas been highlighted by reports of some Muslims instantly divorcingtheir wives by mail, over the telephone, and even through mobilephone text messages. This article explains the different theoriesof divorce prevailing in the contemporary Muslim world and whatchecks and restraints have been imposed by Islam over the exerciseof husband's power of talaq. The article critically appraisesthe ‘innovative triple divorce’ by examining whetherit is sanctioned by the Holy Quran or the sunnah and if thereis a consensus of opinion (ijma) on the effectiveness of tripledivorce.     

Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defence in the Wall Case

In its recent Wall Opinion, the International Court of Justicegave rather short shrift to Israel’s claims that the constructionof the wall could be justified as an act of self-defence inthe sense of Article 51 United Nations Charter. This articleassesses the Court’s approach and places it in the broadercontext of ICJ pronouncements on the use of force. It suggeststhat the Court failed to appreciate the complex legal problemsto which Israel’s claim gave rise, in particular the problemof self-defence against attacks by non-state actors. It showsthat the Court’s restrictive understanding of self-defence,while following the 1986 merits judgment in the Nicaragua case,is difficult to bring in line with modern state practice, andincreases the pressure to admit other, non-written, exceptionsto Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.     

Underwriters' counsel as gatekeeper or turnstile: an empirical analysis of law firm prestige and performance in IPOs

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• The article investigates the relationship betweenpricing in an initial public offering (IPO) and the prestigeof the participating underwriters’ law firm.
• The hypothesisof the article is that law firm quality affects how law firmsperform their obligations in IPOs—more prestigious lawfirms acting more independently. Consistent with this hypothesis,the authors find a negative relationship between pre-IPO priceadjustment and the participation of prestigious underwriters’counsel, and a negative relationship between the participationof prestigious underwriters’ counsel and initial return,which is consistent with market trading reflecting the decreasedrisk associated with offerings involving prestigious underwriters’counsel.
• Finally, it is found that certain observable characteristicsindicating diminished likelihood of undisclosed negative information(venture backing and quality of the issuer's counsel) are associatedwith an increased likelihood that prestigious underwriters’counsel is used.