Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions

Together with the WTO, the Bretton Woods Institutions are thepreeminent international institutions devoted to managing internationaleconomic relations. This mandate puts them squarely in the centerof the debate concerning development, inequality and globaljustice. This essay explores how justice criteria might applyto the ideology and operations of the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund. Using the Rawlsian model of egalitarian justiceadapted to international institutions by the author in connectionwith the WTO, this essay asks what difference it would makefor the Bank and Fund if an explicit justice framework informedtheir international lending activities.     

论罗尔斯的正义观及其借鉴意义

罗尔斯的正义观是一种普世化的正义观,主要是为了解决社会不公平问题,在保证大多数人利益的前提下,力求保证最少受惠者的最大利益。对罗尔斯的正义原则进行重新探讨和分析,从中汲取合理的因素,有助于重建社会公平。辩证地解读罗尔斯的正义观有助于我们正确把握正义的内涵从而为构建社会主义和谐社会提供有益的启迪,而且对完善社会主义市场经济和解决弱势群体问题也有一定的借鉴意义。     

Liberalism and capabilities: Theories of justice and the neutral state

Modern liberal theories share the idea that the state and its laws should remain neutral with respect to the varying conceptions of the good life held by individuals. This article discusses the way in which this notion of neutrality is defined and justified. Rawls's theory of justice is shown to be a prime example of such a theory. Questions are raised, however, if Rawls's theory has adequately formulated the conditions that would make it possible for each citizen to fulfill his own conception of the good. After arguing that Dworkin's solution to this problem is also problematic, it is argued that Sen's solution to the question of what conditions create neutrality shows the way ahead.     

程序正义理论的再梳理:从《正义论》到《政治自由主义》——遵循罗尔斯思想发展的轨迹

在1971年出版的<正义论>里,罗尔斯将程序正义分为:完善的程序正义、不完善的程序正义、纯粹的程序正义;并认为:纯粹的程序正义决定了结果的实体正义.在学术界,罗尔斯的程序正义理论产生了涟漪:赞同观点和反对主张同时存在.作为自身学术思想的发展,在1993年出版的<政治自由主义>里,罗尔斯修订了其在<正义论>里的观点,认为:程序正义的正义性,部分依赖结果的实体正义性.学术思想的修正,并不代表罗尔斯对程序正义理论的放弃,而是加强了程序正义理论的现实实践基石.     

A Metastructural Reinterpretation of the Rawlsian Theory: From Rawls to Machiavelli*

Abstract. In the framework of a reinterpretation of Marxism and Rawlsianism which aims at a non-eclectic integration of both these theories, the author presents a transformation of the Rawlsian principles of justice into principles of political struggle with a view to establishing a just society. He deduces this normative development from a general theory of the modern world, proposed in his recent book (Bidet 1990).     

Contract Law as Fairness

This article examines the implications for contract law of Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. It argues that contract law as an institution is part of the basic structure of society and as such subject to the principles of justice. Discussing the basic structure in relation to contract law is particularly interesting because it is instructive for both contract law and Rawlsian theory. On the one hand, justice as fairness has clear normative implications for the institution of contract law. On the other hand, this discussion forces us to critically assess the meaning and appeal of the concept of a basic structure in justice as fairness.     

法律正义的客观叙事

西方法律正义观念有着一以贯之的发展脉络。法律正义被理解为一种客观实在,体现为现实关系的"恰当状态",即人与法、人与人、人与群体关系的均衡。古典正义理论为此"恰当状态"建立了理性且客观的价值分析框架,即守法与均等的平衡、分配与矫正的平衡、交往理性与友爱的平衡。现代的法律正义理论学说在回应现代社会政治经济文化的新问题,回应同时代法律的实证分析和功利分析,以及在思考和论述实质正义、个案正义、权利与权力以及权利之间的关系等法律问题时,遵循了与古典正义理论同一的逻辑结构和价值理念。法律正义客观的内在结构为正义的实践和法的价值分析提供了明确且有力的思维方案。     

作为“中介”的“复合平等”——沃尔泽对罗尔斯分配正义理论的批判及其限度

沃尔泽认为,罗尔斯通过＂原初状态设置＂所演绎出的＂正义二原则＂只是一种实现通常之＂简单平等＂的分配正义原则,无法解决由诸多领域所构成之社会的分配正义问题。因而基于对西方世界分配现状的观察及其人性观,沃尔泽提出了＂复合平等＂的分配正义理论。事实上,只有罗尔斯的＂正义二原则＂才能有效实现社会的分配正义。因此,沃尔泽的分配正义理论实际上只是深刻理解罗尔斯＂正义二原则＂的＂过渡理论＂或＂中介＂,而不是对后者的根本性超越。     

Applying Rawls to medical cases: an investigation into the usages of analytical philosophy

John Rawls's Theory of Justice has been widely and correctly recognized as a tremendous intellectual accomplishment. It has been applauded as a comprehensive and satisfying approach to the problem of defining justice. Health policy analysts and medical ethicists have thus been inspired to apply Rawls's principles to various health care issues. The result has not been greater coherence in approaches to issues of policy and ethics, leading the author to question the validity of Rawls's analytical approach.     

Social Justice and Individual Ethics*

Abstract. If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics of Rawls, the idea of a well-ordered society does not require maximin-guided choices at the individual level, and hence leaves room for legitimate incentive payments. (2) Despite Rawls's own neglect of this fact, a limited form of patriotism does constitute an individual “natural duty” following from a commitment to maximin social justice.     

立功制度若干问题研究

我国立功制度的价值观念是功利主义,虽然有其积极意义,但因其排斥刑法正义观而导致在司法实践中存在许多弊端。本文认为,在设置该制度时应以正义观为主兼顾功利主义;立功制度的本质决定了立功行为的本质是对国家和社会有益的行为。     

Equality as a Basis for Religious Toleration: A Response to Leiter

In this short essay, I respond to Brian Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion. I focus on two criticisms. First, I argue that Leiter’s own theory depends on an unacknowledged ideal of equality, and that equality is central to the utilitarian and Rawlsian bases for religious toleration that he draws upon in his book. Second, I argue against Leiter’s allowing, in certain circumstances, the state to establish religion and to promote religious conceptions of the good.     

无知之幕与正义的蒙眼布——对程序正义的反思

无知之幕是罗尔斯法哲学中的重要概念,也是其正义论的逻辑起点。无知之幕的具有程序意义,无知之幕正是程序正义的体现。在此基础上,以罗尔斯对程序正义前提的论述,结合刘涌案讨论中国当下的程序正义问题。     

Comparative vs. Transcendental Approaches to Justice: A Misleading Dichotomy in Sen's The Idea of Justice

This paper examines the distinction drawn by Amartya Sen between transcendental and comparative theories of justice, and its application to Rawls' doctrine. It then puts forward three arguments. First, it is argued that Sen offers a limited portrayal of Rawls' doctrine. This is the result of a rhetorical strategy that depicts Rawlsian doctrine as more “transcendental” than it really is. Although Sen deploys numerous quotations in support of his interpretation, it is possible to offer a less transcendental interpretation of Rawls. Second, the dichotomy between transcendental and comparative approaches to questions of justice is partly misleading, insofar as any plausible moral doctrine has both transcendental and comparative elements. Transcendental elements are necessary to avoid the confusion between the general acceptance of a norm, value or principle and its justification. A comparative view highlights the conditions of application of the doctrine to the real world, taking into account the possibility of moral dilemmas, evaluative disagreements and limited resources, while proposing possible provisos and caveats to the risk of the doctrine being self‐defeating. Third, although the transcendental approach is useful, it is argued that in elaborating this dichotomy Sen overlooks the merits of the third way between comparative and transcendental doctrines, what he calls “conglomerate theory,” and also the possibility that his doctrine (the capability approach) might be considered as an example of such a theory. The paper concludes with the argument that conglomerate theory does not aim to produce complete moral orderings, but rather a comparative approach with transcendental elements, as a form of weak transcendentalism.     

法官的中立问题探讨

法官中立是司法公正的内在要求和体现,法官中立原则作为保证司法的权威性和公正性的必要措施,为当今世界各国的宪法和法律所普遍确认,已成为现代法治国家所普遍遵循的一项基本法治原则.然而,由于我国的诉讼制度受职权主义影响太深,法官的中立地位并未得到真正的确立,其直接后果就是严重阻碍了实体公正与程序公正的实现,因此,确保法官的中立地位,是诉讼改革的当务之急.     

Individual rights vs. social utility: The search for the golden zigzag between conflicting fundamental values

Since Bentham and Kant, there has been an ongoing conflict between utilitarian and rights-based philosophies of government. However, most discussions of either perspective have been in the form of an advocacy that aggrandizes the positive values of one side and denigrates the negative values of the opposing side. There has been very little systematic analysis of the values protected by utility or the values protected by rights. Nor has there been a systematic analysis of the relationship between these values. This article maps the values underlying the two perspectives, analyzes their relationships, and argues that the utility/rights conflict is an essential and potentially productive conflict because both utility and rights protect fundamental, but limited, values that are necessary for the achievement of justice. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the values underlying both utility and rights.     

“Let us content ourselves with praising the work while drawing a veil over its principles”: Eighteenth-century reactions to Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments

Cesare Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments, first published in 1764, has often been read as a purely utilitarian work. Beccaria, while certainly not ignoring considerations of utility, was far more interested in considerations of justice than many critics have believed, and he was at least as much a retributivist as a utilitarian.

The misperception of Beccaria grew out of the political controversies surrounding the book during the years following its publication. Beccaria's critics often grasped the rights-oriented and justice-centered aspects of his thought, but they attacked them in the name of tradition or religion. Those who defended Beccaria's retributivist side were few and generally not influential. By far the greatest number of his supporters—Milanese reformers, French philosophes, and Austrian civil servants—stressed the utilitarian side of his book to suit their own purposes. The upshot was that, by the end of the eighteenth century, Beccaria was wrongly perceived as a sort of Benthamite avant la lettre, both by Bentham himself and by the retributivists Kant and Hegel. This misunderstanding of Beccaria has persisted in many quarters, creating a false impression of the criminal justice system advocated by the Lombard reformer.     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part II

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis - in the sense of rational reconstruction based on alleged moral principles - for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous ones by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victim's claim to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part I

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis — for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous arguments by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the use of principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victims claims to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

Severely handicapped infants with life-threatening conditions: federal intrusions into the decision not to treat

In recent years the federal government has attempted to intervene in certain family-medical decisions to withhold treatment from seriously handicapped newborns with life-threatening conditions. Invoking section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified handicapped" individuals, the Reagan Administration promulgated regulations allowing federal government investigations of such decisions. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld lower court decisions invalidating these "Baby Doe" regulations. The federal government's fall-back position is reflected in the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Amendments of 1984, requiring states accepting funds under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to establish and maintain procedures to assure that cases of medical neglect of handicapped infants are investigated by the states. Although the primary oversight of parental decision-making has been returned to the states where it has traditionally belonged, the federal government's definition of medical neglect of handicapped infants with life-threatening conditions is an ethically inadequate response to the complex needs of the handicapped child, the family, the medical profession, and society as a whole. After examining the relevance of Kantian, utilitarian, and Rawlsian ethical positions, the author contends that an effective governmental policy, capable of enforcement and acceptance by the public, must utilize the strengths of each philosophy and reflect the pragmatism of American society.