Rent-seeking with multiple winners

This paper examines the impact of the number of winners allowed by regulators on rentseeking expenditures. It is demonstrated in a widely used model that an increase in the number of winners will decrease total rent-seeking expenditures. This result is generally obtained regardless of whether the firms are risk-averse or risk-lovers. When regulators award coveted market franchises, there will be smaller welfare losses if more winners are allowed.I am grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments were very helpful. The usual caveats apply.     

Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem

We investigate policy reform in a modelwith both lobbying, which involves afree-rider problem, and ordinary rentseeking, which does not. These activitiesinvolve similar skills, so a reform whichreduces rents shifts labor into lobbying.Also, because of the free-rider problem,the marginal return to the industry fromlobbying may greatly exceed an individualfirm's return to lobbying. Thus, the shiftinto lobbying caused by rent reduction maylead to large increases in transfers to thelobbying industry. Under somecircumstances, a reform which reducesavailable rents increases total rents plustransfers to the industry.     

An Experimental Analysis of Rent Seeking Under Varying Competitive Conditions

We test several predictions of Gradstein's(1995) rent seeking model using anexperimental design that includes avariable number of participants, costheterogeneity, and an entry fee. Consistentwith theoretical predictions, costheterogeneity and the entry fee decreasethe number of participants. Overall,participation is much lower than predicted. Also consistent with Gradstein's model, wefind that rent seeking expendituresincrease with the number of competitors anddecrease with the addition of an entry fee. Experimental results do not support theprediction that cost heterogeneitygenerally decreases expenditures in rentseeking contests.     

Cultural Policy and Governance: Reviewing Policies Related to Cultural and Creative Industries Implemented by the Central Government of Taiwan Between 2002 and 2012

Cultural and creative industries have exhibited rapid changes in recent years, and public sectors worldwide have expanded interest in policies related to these industries as a means of promoting culture, innovation, and economic vitality. This article argues that the cultural values promoted by and economic significance of cultural and creative sectors are essential to the formation of policy and to the development of new industries. This article offers insight into cultural policy that has governed regional and local development, and addresses academic debates about policy related to cultural and creative industries based on several cultural, economic, and geographical factors. In addition, this article presents the results of analyzing various theories and case studies, based on how the Central Government of Taiwan (CGT) has adopted policies to promote cultural and creative industries. The research results link areas of cultural and economic development with policies enacted by the CGT. Ideas concerning the cultural ministry, industrial development, civic boosterism, subsidies, regional development, creative clusters, tourists and tourism businesses, and export markets are areas of emphasis in this study.     

A rent-seeking model of TELs

Tax and expenditure limits or TELs are constitutional or statutory constraints on the fiscal powers of government. Since the taxpayer revolt beginning in the late 1970s, TELs have been introduced in twenty-three states. In recent years a number of studies attempting to test the impact of TELs have found little evidence that TELs significantly reduced the growth of state government. In this study we challenge the implicit Leviathan model that underlies most of these studies, and offer an alternative rent-seeking model. Econometric tests provide support for this rentseeking model, and indicate that TELs have been significant in reducing the growth of state government, at least in the short run. “... the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed, that political power will be abused to promote the particular purpose of the holder; not because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions”     

Institutions and Market Reform in Emerging Economies: A Rent Seeking Perspective

The role of institutions as determinants ofrent seeking success is well established. In this paper, we focus on institutionsthat have received little attention in theliterature, namely electoral institutions. We examine three measures of electoralinstitutional structure that arehypothesized to be instrumental indetermining the level of rent seekingsuccess. These are the type of electoralsystem, pluralistic or proportional; methodof selection of the chief executive,presidential or parliamentary; and thenumber of electoral districts. An index ofeconomic freedom is used as the metric forrent seeking opportunities created bygovernments. Theoretical implications ofvariation in these electoral institutionsare developed. These implications areempirically tested employing data from 29countries classified as having emergingmarket economies. Countries with emergingeconomies are expected to exhibit moreinstitutional flexibility that moredeveloped countries whose property rightsare well established and defended. Theempirical results are controlled fordifferences in a number of demographic andhistorical factors. Plurality electoralsystems are more resistant to the politicaldemands of rent seeking than proportionalsystems. Fewer election districts seem toreduce rent seeking opportunities. However, conditional on the type ofelectoral system, presidential systems arefound to be no more resistant to rentseeking than parliamentary systems. Finally, we find strong control effects. Literacy increases a country's resistanceto rent seeking while military spending andyears of institutional entrenchment reduceit.     

哈尔滨市发展文化创意产业策略研究

文化产业肩负着调整产业结构、转变经济增长方式的重任。在哈市全面实施新战略,建设现代大都市的关键时期,把文化产业发展成为支柱产业,拓展新的经济增长点显得极为迫切。要更加注重文化产业链中高端部分——文化创意产业的发展。分析了文化创意产业的特征,提出发展文化创意产业的重要性;全面分析哈尔滨市文化创意产业发展现状,剖析哈市发展文化创意产业的现实基础、优势和条件,提出发展文化创意产业重点领域,提出发展文化创意产业的政策支持和环境建设。     

环境规制降低了重污染行业的投资效率吗?

在低碳经济背景下,实现经济与环境双重目标的和谐发展至关重要。本文首次基于投资效率视角,利用投资支出与投资机会敏感性模型,分析环境规制对重污染行业的影响。研究发现,环境规制从整体上降低了重污染行业的投资效率,对非国有企业投资效率的负面影响非常显著;地方国企存在着投资规模过大的现象;是否为重污染行业、行业环境规制强度与污染排放强度三者之间整体上呈高度正相关,但仍存在着细微的差异,这种差异使中央国企在投资支出上的表现不尽相同;所在地为地方政府环境治理水平较低地区的企业,投资效率下降显著。上述结果表明,我国的经济发展与环境保护之关系并未达到波特假设的双赢局面;地方政府对地方国企的支持,使重污染行业非国有企业在环境规制中处于相对不平等地位;设计至少与污染排放强度相匹配的环境规制强度,有利于刺激高环境治理水平企业的投资;提升地方政府和企业的环境治理水平,是实现经济发展与环境治理双赢的重要途径。     

Industry, occupation, and disability insurance beneficiary work return.

This article uses the New Beneficiary Data System to describe the first job held after award of Disability Insurance benefits, in terms of occupation and industry. It examines work activity within sectors of employment, and looks at the issues of whether work return in certain industries and occupations varies according to the demographic characteristics of the beneficiaries. The article also presents data on sector-specific employer accommodations that can aid in sustained work return. Postentitlement work was fairly evenly distributed across occupational and industrial sectors. Persons with higher levels of educational attainment were found to be in white-collar employment sectors. There were noticeable differences in the availability of employer accommodations across postentitlement occupations and industries.     

Innovation at the edges of the metropolis: An analysis of innovation drivers in Sydney's peripheral suburbs

Abstract

This article discusses using the concept of innovation ecosystems to assess innovation intensity in peripheral areas of metropolitan regions. Innovation is a significant driver of prosperity, industrial growth, and job creation. Emergent areas of new technology applications have their roots in entrepreneurial and innovative practices. However, studies have focused on the strengths that cities—and central business districts and inner suburbs in particular— have relative to the industries of the emerging knowledge economy, notably information technology and financial, property, and business services. Most of the time, the peripheral suburbs have been neglected.

The results from a study of innovation drivers in Sydney, Australia, show that peripheral suburbs in metropolitan areas have local innovation processes that require specific planning measures to promote innovation intensity. Some of these processes are linked to local suburban characteristics that might not apply to the entire city or metropolitan region.     

State Government Targeting in Economic Development: The New York Experience

New York State has made extensive use of social, geographic,and sectoral targeting in economic development. It has targetedboth distressed industries, particularly manufacturing, andgrowth industries. When the initial assistance provided to manufacturingin the 1960s did not stem the decline of this sector, the stateresponded by providing larger subsidies. Even though manufacturingcontinued to decline, both absolutely and relatively, supportfor its preferred status has, nevertheless, remained strong,and few of the programs initially aimed at this sector haveseen any sign cant changes in their manufacturing focus. Effortsto target distressed areas and individuals, however, were notsustained over time. The state's two most significant effortsat geographic targeting were expanded statewide over relativelyshort periods of time.     

Tilting Towards the Cosmopolitan Axis? Political Change in England and the 2017 General Election

The general election of June 2017 revealed a continued tilting of the political axis in England that has been long in the making. This was not a Brexit ‘realignment’—in that the vote is better seen as a symptom of a longer‐term divide that is emerging between citizens residing in locations strongly connected to global growth and those who are not. In this analysis, we explore constituency‐level patterns of voting in England between 2005 and 2017. Over this period, Labour's vote share has tended to rise in urban areas (that is, major cities), with younger and more diverse and more educated populations often working in ‘cosmopolitan’ industries, whereas the Conservative vote has tended to increase in less densely populated towns and rural areas, with older and less diverse populations. Significantly, Labour has also increased its vote in constituencies with a higher share of ‘precariat’ and emerging service workers—somewhat at odds with characterisation of a party that has lost the ‘left behind’. To the extent that changes in electoral support for the Conservatives and Labour are linked to the Brexit vote, the relationship far predates the referendum vote and should be expected to continue to reshape British politics in future.     

Federal Preemption Under Reagan's New Federalism

Ronald Reagan defined his federalism program in terms of returningpolitical power to state and local governments. In practice,he was Janus-faced with respect to his views on domestic policyissues. His "public" face emphasized initiatives promoting areturn of political power to the states and local governments.His "silent" face encouraged additional centralization of politicalpower in several functional areas, and he signed bills prohibitingstate economic regulation of certain industries. Most of Reagan'sinitiatives were administrative, and increased to a limitedextent the discretionary authority of states. In general, thepresident favored a smaller federal regulatory role but notnecessarily a larger state and local government role. He signedtotal preemption bills granting greater freedom of action tothe banking, communications, and transportation industries,and tax sanction and crossover sanction bills. At the closeof his administration, intergovernmental relations were morecoercive than they had been in 1980.     

Averting Environmental Justice Claims? The Role of Environmental Management Systems

Today, more regulatory provisions are in place for protecting low‐income minority populations who shoulder a disproportionate amount of environmental risk. Recognized as communities of “environmental justice,” industrial facilities located within these areas bear greater legal liabilities for and societal scrutiny of their environmental impacts. The authors offer compelling evidence that, in an effort to avoid regulatory and societal claims that they are disproportionately harming minority and ethnic populations, businesses operating inside environmental justice communities tend to adopt an environmental management system (EMS). The article probes whether industries actually improve the environment as a consequence of EMS adoption or whether such systems are simply used to avoid greater governmental scrutiny without necessarily reducing overall environmental risks.     

Unity of effort requires unity of object: why industry should not be involved in formulating public health policy

This paper provides a framework for examining the general issue of public health authorities' collaboration with industry. The framework distinguishes between industry involvement in the development of public health policy and the implementation of policy‐driven interventions. A distinction is also made between industries marketing products conducive to good health versus products that impact negatively on public health (e.g. alcohol and energy‐dense, nutrition‐poor food and beverage industries). Drawing on concepts with respect to the effectiveness of military coalitions, it is argued that a common goal (i.e. ‘unity of object’) is a prerequisite for optimal co‐operation (i.e. ‘unity of effort’) between collaborators in any sphere of activity. However, this vital precondition does not exist in the public health arena because the end goals of industry and those of public health are fundamentally different, if not opposed (i.e. profits to owners/shareholders versus the social good). It is argued that because of this fundamental disjunct between industry profit goals and the public good, unity of effort will always be compromised in any form of collaboration with industry, and particularly where public health policies and interventions are designed to negatively impact on product consumption. Hence, while industry can be asked to co‐operate in implementing public health policy initiatives, industry should never be involved in developing policy initiatives. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐level political capabilities and subsequent financial performance

While there is a robust literature on corporate political activity, scholars have not adequately framed these activities as being part of a strategy to garner political capabilities. In this paper, we incorporate political capabilities and argue that those firms that more intensely commit resources to political activities have associated subsequent performance benefits. In a sample of 87 Fortune 500 firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that both political action committee and lobbying intensity were associated with higher return on invested capital and return on assets after controlling for other factors. Additionally, we find support that the cumulative effect of political action committee and lobbying intensity on performance is also significant. Finally, we moderate the main effects with industry concentration and find that returns are greater in more consolidated industries. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL POLICIES AND THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

Structural policy has two elements: rules of competition and concentration in the marketplace, and deliberate attempts to structure industrial sectors. Historically, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. have pursued quite dissimilar structural policies, reflecting their differing perceptions of the national interest, different international imperatives, and different conceptions of the role of the state. The automobile industry offers sharp cross-country comparisons of structural policy at i t s most vigorous. In this paper, the successes and failures of U.S. antitrust activity toward the automobile industry are considered in comparison to the relative absence of such policies abroad. Similarly, governments' attempts to develop internationally competitive automobile industries in Europe and Japan contrast with the domestic regulatory orientation in the U.S. This historical analysis suggests the current need for reorientations in national structural policies in order to deal effectively with internationalized markets, firms, and competition in the automobile and other industries today.     

Federal Preemption and State Regulation of Transportation and Telecommunications

Transportation and telecommunications are two of the most importantinfrastructural industries in the American economy. As theseindustries are so vital and because they exhibit characteristicsthat have frequently rendered them quasi-monopolistic, theirgrowth has been accompanied by state and federal regulation.We document how the imposition of regulation has led to continualconflicts over the extent to which federal regulation shouldtake precedence over state regulation. We illustrate how thejustifications for federal preemption have been applied notonly to the regulation, but also to the recent deregulation,of railroads, trucking, and telecommunications. We contend thatpolitical factors, such as congressional support, precedent-settingcourt rulings, and, most important, political pressure fromaffected interest groups that is related to the revenues stillgenerated within states by these industries, ultimately determinethe form of preemption that emerges from the Congress.     

Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition

Which firms oppose action to fight climate change? Networks of input sourcing and sales to downstream customers ought to propagate and reinforce opposition to decarbonization beyond direct emitters of CO₂. To test this claim, we build the largest data set of public political activity for and against climate action in the United States, revealing that the majority of corporate opposition to climate action comes from outside the highest‐emitting industries. We construct new measures of the carbon intensity of firms and show that policy exposure via carbon‐intensive inputs and sales to downstream emitters explains this large volume of opposition from non‐emitting industries. Sixty‐six percent of U.S. lobbying on climate policy has been conducted by an extended coalition of firms, associations, and other groups that have publicly opposed reducing carbon emissions. Public opposition to climate action by carbon‐connected industries is therefore broad‐based, highly organized, and matched with extensive lobbying.