Innocent denials of known genocides: A further contribution to a psychology of denial of genocide

Conclusion The problem of revisionism, or efforts to deny and censor the incontrovertible history of known genocides, is a growing one. It is now clear that denial is inevitably a phase of the genocidal process, extending far beyond the immediate politically expedient denials of governments who are currently engaging in genocidal massacre or have just recently done so—i.e., the Chinese government's abject denials of the killings of some 5,000 in Tiananmen Square, or the Sri Lanka government's denials of the state-organized massacre of 5,000 Tamil. Denials of genocide continue long after the event by a variety of groups and people, including successor governments or successor enemies of the victim people, such as anti-Semites against Jews, Turks against Armenians, and bigots and celebrants of violence and murder of all sorts. But such denials also occur—and this is the most perplexing fact—among a variety of not obviously malevolent people, including intellectuals who, in the process of calling for a better world, effectively exonerate, support, encourage, and participate in denials of a known genocide, implicitly condoning and even celebrating its occurrence, meanings, and portents for the future. This article is an effort to study and analyze this latter phenomenon, which has been little recognized. Together with previous essays on the psychology of more explicit malevolent denials of genocide, the intention is to generate a broader psychological theory of denials of genocide and revisionism by proposing that there are also a variety of “innocent denials” of the factual reality or significance of known cases of genocide, and a variety of “innocent disavowals of violence” which in truth celebrate the violence. These “innocent denials” join with the well-known explicit bigots in creating a vast panorama of dangerous denials of genocides and implicit calls to new genocides in our world. The basic thesis of this article has been under development since its first presentation in a plenary address at the Soviet Academy of sciences in Yerevan, Armenia in 1990 on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide.     

The United Nations and genocide: Prevention,intervention, and prosecution

Conclusion The UN has to date not been effective in preventing genocide, and has had only a slightly better record in stopping it. There have been occasions when its interventions has occurred only after a genocide has taken place, and even then its major focus has been on facilitating the provision of aid by non-governmental agencies rather than on the task of tracking down the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. The exceptions of the ICTY and the ICTR are so stark, in this regard, that they only serve to throw light on the many other genocidal events where the UN has not initiated measures against those responsible for carrying them out. In short, as a body the UN has no—until very recently—even approached the fulfillment of its mandate as articulated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and only rarely invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to intervene physically for the purpose of countering threats to peace or stopping conflict. Its strengths, so far as there have been any, have focused on balancing great power interests with demands to intervene more forcefully. While in the years up to 1989 this could be seen as a way of maintaining the peace (albeit over the broken bodies of victims of genocide in places such as Biafra, Cambodia, and East Timor), since then the UN has been required to act with greater resolve and purpose. The failures of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo must thus be seen as having been brought on by a transition from one international regime to another; from a Cold War regime in which the UN—s main role was one of preventing a third (and possibly nuclear) World War from breaking out, to a post-Cold War regime which appears increasingly to be characterized by the UN searching for a new role in which humanitarian issues are to assume a higher priority than they once did. Whether or not this will continue, of course, will depend on an extremely wide variety of circumstances—and at this time it is likely that only a few of these can accurately be anticipated.     

The chameleon of mens rea and the shifting guises of culture-specific genocidal intent in international criminal proceedings

This article examines the significance of the mens rea-related evidence present in the specific language and discourse identified in the records of the International Military Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The author argues that international proceedings have seen the emergence of a new type of evidence: a cognitive, linguistic, culturally determined plural of genocidal mens rea. As a result, the mental element of genocidal intent can neither be interpreted nor understood without an advanced forensic approach to the language used by the network of génocidaires. Based on a combination of cognitive and social science research with the humanities, the article applies a hybrid method of analysis to some of the genocide cases in international criminal justice and demonstrates how and why this approach ought to be introduced into the process of identification of the guilty minds of the architects of genocide.     

Conceptual blockages and definitional dilemmas in the 'racial century': genocides of indigenous peoples and the Holocaust

Moses argues that the study of indigenous genocides and the Holocaust is marred by dogmatically held positions of rival scholarly communities, reflecting the genocidal traumas of the ethnic groups with which they are closely associated. In particular, those who study genocides of indigenous peoples in colonial contexts (and many others) object to the thesis of the Holocaust's 'uniqueness' or 'singularity' on the grounds that it overshadows 'lesser' or 'incomplete' indigenous genocides-if indeed they are considered genocides at all-that are considered marginal or even 'primitive', thereby reinforcing hegemonic Eurocentrism. They claim that the moral caché of indigenous survivors of colonialism is consequently diminished in comparison to that of Jews. Such scholars counter that genocide lies at the core of western civilization, and some extend its meaning to cover a wide variety of phenomena, thereby raising the issue of definition. These positions are reflected in the two schools of thought regarding genocide: liberals who emphasize intentionality and agency, and post-liberals who highlight impersonal structures and processes. The question almost raises itself: should the victim's point of view be authoritative in this regard, when different victim groups make incommensurable, indeed competing, claims? If we are to move beyond this unproductive intellectual and moral stalemate, rehearsing the now familiar arguments is insufficient. A critical perspective that transcends that of victims and perpetrators and their descendants is clearly necessary. Moses argues that laying bare the group traumas that block conceptual development and mutual recognition can aid in their being worked through, as well as in stimulating the critical reflection needed to rethink the relationship between the Holocaust and the indigenous genocides that preceded it. Such a perspective can transcend liberal and post-liberal positions if it links the colonial genocides of the 'racial century' (1850-1950) and the Holocaust to a single modernization process of accelerating violence related to nation-building that commenced in the European colonial periphery and culminated in the Holocaust.     

Organic purity and the role of anthropology in Cambodia and Rwanda

Straus investigates the ideology of two genocidal regimes in the developing world: the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Hutu Power in Rwanda. Although the regimes were quite different - one Communist, the other nationalist - he argues that their ideals converged around a notion of organic purity. Both regimes pursued extraordinary violence to meet the ideal: mass destruction was a method to achieve organic purity. Straus further contends that anthropological writings provided the necessary ideational building blocks for this ideal. In promoting a violent return to a mythic past, both murderous regimes embraced the images and concepts of European archaeology and ethnography.     

The ethos of sovereignty: A critical appraisal

Taking as its starting point the commonly held claim about the obscurity of the concept of sovereignty, the article first identifies a fundamental paradox between the classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and human rights. In the rhetoric of international politics, attempts to establish the responsibility of states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms within their jurisdictions are often countered with claims referring to the “sovereign equality” of all states and the subsequent principle of non-intervention. The article suggests that in a more contemporary understanding of sovereignty the responsibility of a state to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen as a constituent ingredient of the state itself. The chapter continues to elaborate how this change has come about. The classical notion of sovereignty is illustrated through a reading of Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576). In Bodin’s world, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the state, and the possibility of a multitude of sovereign entities in a global world logically denying the possibility of any “supra-national” normative framework is still a minor consideration. This possibility is only worked out with the emergence of international law. In both classics such as Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758) and more contemporary treatises such as Lassa Oppenheim’s International Law (1905), state sovereignty has become conditional to recognition by other sovereign states and a subsequent membership in the “family of nations.” The conditional membership in the “family of nations” involves a contradiction: a sovereign state must act in a “dignified” manner, it must use its sovereignty with “restraint” by respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, i.e., it must employ its sovereignty in a non-sovereign way. This restriction of sovereignty, addressed as “ethical sovereignty,” becomes a constitutive element in a post-Westphalian state and a central ingredient in the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The article further criticizes the various uses (and abuses) of “ethical sovereignty” in the regulation of “failing” and “rogue” states and concludes by identifying its general political dangers. Finally, with reference to Jacques Derrida’s Rogues (2003), the article suggests a more radical reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty. It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs.¹ —Lassa Oppenheim But to invoke the concept of national sovereignty as in itself a decisional factor is to fall back on a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content. It is to substitute pride for reason.² —Eli Lauterpacht     

Violence against women and economic, social and cultural rights in Africa

International human rights treaties and declarations lay out the interconnection of civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it was not until 1993 at the 2^nd UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna that governments agreed that all of women’s rights are an integral part of human rights. Promoting women’s economic, social, and cultural rights is a critical human rights advocacy issue. Poverty leaves women more exposed to violence and less able to escape it, and severely restricts women’s ability to organize and fight for change. The article describes work by AI and other NGOs on violence against women and its connection with women's poverty and lack of education, healthcare, housing, and access to land in Africa. Besides the burgeoning of African women’s organizations calling for protection of all women’s human rights, a second hopeful development has been approval in July 2003 of an historic Protocol on the Rights of women in Africa.     

Toleration and permissiveness

Professor Horowitz argues that it is important for political sociology to try to understand and analyse genocide as a distinct social phenomenon. For this purpose it must be clearly distinguished from other forms of human destruction, such as natural disasters, random killing, warfare and symbolic or cultural assaults. The collective nature of genocide sets it apart from other social evils, as it contradicts traditional Western approaches to law and morals which emphasize individual responsibility for actions.     

Decentralization as a conflict transformation tool: The challenge in Kosovo

Perspectives are divided on whether decentralization can ease ethnic conflict. This article considers whether asymmetric decentralization reforms in Kosovo have reduced tensions between Kosovo Albanians (K‐Albanians) and Serbs (K‐Serbs). We argue that because decentralization has been linked to Kosovo's sovereignty in the years after the NATO bombings, during the final status talks, and after independence, it has not achieved intended outcomes throughout the territory of Kosovo. Instead of assuaging tensions and generating allegiance to the central government, decentralization has re‐inforced ethnic divisions and strengthened K‐Serb ties to Serbia, particularly in northern Kosovo. Concessions to majority Serb municipalities in Kosovo have been seen by K‐Serbs as a bribe to buy acceptance of independence, while K‐Albanians question their leaders' continued policy of asymmetric decentralization. Since independence, there have been some encouraging developments in southern municipalities, where K‐Serbs have participated in municipal elections organized by Pristina. Based on Kosovo's experience, we argue that policy‐makers must consider the impact of decentralization reforms at multiple levels of conflict. Further, although we find that decentralization may engage minorities in political processes if reforms are attempted after the establishment of a central government, we caution that it must be combined with policies to encourage interaction and dialogue between ethnic groups if it is to assuage conflict. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Responsibilities for Human Capabilities: Avoiding a Comprehensive Global Program

Violence, poverty, and illness are all too prevalent in our world. In order to alleviate their hold systematically, we need normative schemes with a global reach and with definite responsibilities. Martha Nussbaum’s human capabilities theory (Martha Nussbaum 2006) provides us with an insightful example. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations 1948), however, already includes most of the human capabilities central to Nussbaum’s theory, and violence, poverty, and illness usually appear as objectionable enough without any additional reference to capabilities. In the current article, the author argues that the primary global responsibilities can mainly be established without Nussbaum’s account of capabilities. The human rights-based approach is more promising for this purpose (Jack Donnelly 2007; Abigail Gosselin, Human Rights Review 8:35–52, 2006; Ivar Kolstad, Human Rights Review, doi:, 2008). However, the author also contends that Nussbaum’s theory may be very instructive as a relatively comprehensive moral approach that supplements the human rights view and inspires its adherents to assume secondary responsibilities in addition to the primary ones. Once we learn to see Nussbaum’s agenda in this way, not as the global program, but as one of the many reasonable and relatively comprehensive views in the global background culture, we can also learn to cultivate the responsibilities it implies in a duly dialogical way.     

From Promoting to De-emphasizing ‘Ethnicity’: Rethinking the Endless Supervision of Kosovo

International statebuilders’ strategy to achieve a peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo has shifted from the top-down institutionalization of a multi-ethnic society in the UNMIK period (1999-2008), to the neutral and technical administration of society, with a focus on the reduction of the ethnic divide (EULEX and ICO after 2008). However, despite this evolution in the understanding of statebuilding, this article identifies a dominant sentiment among practitioners of both periods, shared also by academic scholars: further international assistance is key to building a truly inclusive peace. It is argued that this shared assumption rests on the belief that the problems in Kosovo are caused by ethnic thinking—a psychosocial dysfunction. This psychosocial framing of the problem—no matter whether the solution is a process of promoting or de-emphasizing ‘ethnic’ differences—involves a constant and endless international management of Kosovo.     

Beyond borders: The human rights imperative for intervention in Kosovo

Conclusion A close reading of the United Nations Charter supports humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. While the explicit Charter provisions permitting force do not appear to be applicable, the Charter implicitly permitted and even mandated the action. The strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are linked to affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and procedural limitations. While the intervention in Kosovo was fully legal at the outset, any claims that the bombing campaign violated the laws of war should be investigated. Meaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten world order. Rather, it vindicates the fundamental principles for which the United Nations was created. The author acknowledges the tremendous assistance of Katherine Guernsey and Barbara Wilson in the preparation of this article.     

Human Rights in Kosovo

The emotions surrounding the question of Kosovo’s future owe their intensity to the long history of human rights abuses in the province. The years 1945–1966 and 1987–1999, in particular, saw harsh repression of local Albanians and a systematic favoring of local Serbs. Since June 1999, the province has been under international supervision, and, in this period, Serbs complain that they have been the victims of repeated acts of violence at the hands of Albanians. This article provides an overview of human rights abuses since 1945 and closes with a brief assessment of the international plan presented by UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari in February 2007.

The Irish Parliamentary Elections of 2007: New Gloss on an Old Engine

The issues of Kosovo independence and European Union membership have dominated Serbian domestic politics and foreign policy since the fall of Slobodan Milo?evi? in 2000. Despite the lack of formal EU conditionality on the Kosovo issue, Serbia’s insistence on its uncompromising ‘no recognition’ of Kosovo policy has been detrimental to its EU candidacy aspirations. This article examines Serbia’s Kosovo policies in the context of EU integration, in particular the divergence between Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo and its aspirations towards EU candidacy. Considering the negative effects that the Serbia–Kosovo relationship has had on regional cooperation and Serbia’s EU integration, this article considers why Serbia appears to have failed to ‘Europeanise’ its Kosovo policies, i.e. to normalise relations in a way that would be more favourable to accession. In doing so, it examines Serbia’s Kosovo policies since 2000, and the ways in which domestic actors have deliberately manipulated and complicated the question of Kosovo and Serbia’s EU membership.     

The politics of genocide scholarship: the case of Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

The massive communal violence that occurred in East Pakistan in 1971 received worldwide attention at the time, but has been largely ignored since. Some scholars and other writers have denied that what took place in Bangladesh was a genocide. Journalists’ reports, expatriate testimony, refugee reports and an investigation by the International Commission of Jurists in 1972 all indicate, however, that the Pakistani army did commit genocide in Bangladesh in 1971. The political and ideological circumstances that led to the secession of East Pakistan were conducive to religious and ethnic genocide. Beachler examines the treatment by memoirists and scholars of the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan and seeks to explain the reasons why the genocide in Bangladesh has been largely ignored since the early 1970s. No ideological or partisan faction in the United States has stood to gain much from the study of the Bangladesh genocide. And the governments of Bangladesh and Pakistan have not been interested in promoting study of the mass murder and rapes that took place in 1971.     

Conceiving human rights without ontology

Conclusion In his book, World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge sets out to articulate an approach to basic justice that is inversal and cosmopolitan. This notion of justice is to be articulated through the language of human rights. Pogge’s arguments about justice, moral universalism and cosmopolitanism are impressive and reward serious study. It is to be hoped. indeed, that many aspects of his argument might be adopted by the elite ruling classes of world politics; they have much to offer in the project of creating a world that is humane for all. The issues that I have raised in the foregoing argument however are central to the integrity of Pogge’s project. I have argued, in sum that it is not possible to advance a program for the expansion of justice and the implementation of human rights in world politics without making an appeal to a specific account of the nature of justice and of human rights. The account that informs Pogge’s argument is that of political liberalism, and this is an account that has much in its favor as a preferred vehicle for justice in world politics. However, this account makes itself vulnerable when it argues for universal principles without acknowledging their partisan and normative base. My argument has been that this issue is at the center of Pogge’s attempt to isolate the conception of human rights he explicates, which he wants to serve as the language for his global ethical universalism, from the ontological affirmations which make that conception of human rights possible, and which of necessity tie human rights to a specific conception of the nature of the good for human persons and groups. The attempt to establish a single, universal criterion of justice, and to express it in the language of human rights, is undermined from within for as long as it fails to engage with ontological concerns.     

Sovereignty,Human Rights,and Responsibility: Changes in China’s Response to International Humanitarian Crises

The question of whether human rights are above sovereignty has dominated China’s human rights discourse. Relying on a sovereignty-human rights spectrum, this article reviews China’s behaviors, particularly its participation in the UN Security Council, in managing the three major international humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era—Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur, and finds that there have been impressive changes in China’s response to the crises. Yet, a content analysis of China’s official discourse on human rights finds that China’s attitudes towards sovereignty and human rights have not changed much. Drawing on constructivist international relations theory, this article attempts to explain the paradox. It is argued that the international discourse on the “responsibility to protect” has brought about changes in international norms regarding violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and that, having undergone in recent years an identity change from a defensive power of bitterness and insecurity to a rising power aspiring to take more responsibility, China is more concerned about its national image and more receptive to international norms, which has led to the changes in its response to international humanitarian crises.     

Afraid of a ‘Kosovo Scenario’: A Disquieting Precedent for International Conflict Management

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) represented an interim settlement that permitted conflict de-escalation while postponing the search for a lasting political solution. The final settlement should have been reached through negotiations between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians, and then endorsed by the UN Security Council, in accordance with the UN Resolution 1244 (1999). However, citing the ambiguity of the interim agreement and a deadlock in the negotiations, the United States and its allies recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, thereby allowing the Kosovo Albanians to defect from the peace process. Therefore, instead of an internationally endorsed negotiated outcome, there has been an attempt at a unilaterally enforced political settlement, in disregard for the authority of the UN Security Council, which had placed Kosovo under international administration. The subsequent involvement of the International Court of Justice has failed to resolve the contentious issues between Belgrade and Prishtina or bridge the international divide over Kosovo. Besides creating a troublesome legal precedent, the recognition of Kosovo represents a bad model for international conflict management. The issues of concern are the viability of future interim settlements, good faith negotiations and the legitimacy and guarantees provided by the international involvement, including the authority of the UN Security Council. Some parallels are drawn between Kosovo and other territorial disputes, particularly in the Caucasus, indicating how the Kosovo case could influence other conflicts.     

Britain’s holocaust memorial day: A case of post-cold war wish-fulfillment, or brazen hypocristy?

This article considers why institutionalized commemoration of the Holocaust in the United Kingdom developed in the 1990s. It finds that the answer may have less to do with Jewish lobbies, or the influence of a “Holocaust Industry” and much, more to do with state political objectives in the ebb of the Cold War. It argues that by repackaging and ritualizing the Holocaust into a “sacred” event in which Western states themselves were absolved of responsibility but also sought to come to Jewish rescue, it became an invaluable prop with which to promulgate Western values while at the same time acting as a moral alibi for interventions against anti-Western regimes. By focusing on the example of specifically British relations with Iraq, it is demonstrated that the moral high ground which Western states have attempted to milk from a Holocaust association is meretricious cant. Appalling and inhuman acts of genocide changed the course of history in the twentieth century. Millions of people perished or had their lives hideously damaged. This is an opportunity for us to recognize and act upon the lessons of the past. Our aim in the twenty-first century must be to work towards a tolerant and diverse, society which is based upon the notions of universal dignity and equal rights and responsibilities for all citizens. The Holocaust Memorial Day is a symbol of this. I would like to thank Prof. Dave Cesarani and two other unknown readers for extremely assiduous and helpful comments on the original draft of this article.