Flawed attacks on contemporary human rights: Laudan,Sunstein, and the cost-benefit state

After giving a brief account of human rights, the paper investigates five contemporary attacks on them. All of the attacks come from two contemporary proponents of the cost-benefit state, attorney Cass Sunstein and philosopher Larry Laudan. These attacks may be called, respectively, the rationality, objectivity, permission, voluntariness, and comparativism claims. Laudan's and Sunstein's rationality claim (RC) ist that only policy decisions passing cost-benefit tests are rational. Their objectivity presupposition (OP) is that only acute, deterministic threats to life are objective. Sunstein’s permission claim (PC) is that regulators are merely permitted, 3 not required, to take distributive and human rights concerns into account. Sunstein’s 3 voluntariness claim (VC) is that the consent of potential victims is not relevant to government regulations about risks and benefits. Laudan’s comparativism claim 3 (CC) is that there are no rules of thumb, no precomparative norms like human rights, for assessing theory choice in policy science. The paper analyzes each of these claims, shows how they undercut human rights, and argues that each of them errs.     

The application of venture analysis to public policy decisions: A case study of photovoltaics

Venture analysis is a group of analytical techniques normally used by the private sector to assist in major capital decisions. The approach can be applied to public policy decisions in those cases where changing private sector investment decisions are the central focus. A case study concerning a temporary subsidy to an emerging energy technology is reviewed. Major strengths of the approach are its use of numerous data- and opinion-gathering techniques and its explicit treatment of market and supply uncertainties. The major weakness is its lack of ability to handle those social costs and benefits for which no market exists. Implications for other policy studies are also presented.     

Policy science: A conceptual and methodological analysis

In the first section policy science is differentiated from policy analysis, the notion of policy is defined, and an analysis of the concept of policy science is offered which gives emphasis to what is unique in this intellectual endeavor when it is conceived as a general method of problem solving. Section II provides a discussion of the criteria of rationality for the conduct of policy science. Attention is focused upon the methodological differences between science and policy science and upon certain methodological difficulties which are peculiar to policy science. The third section gives consideration to one important relationship between facts and values in the policy science process. While it is generally well recognized that values enter into policy science in a way they do not enter into science, it is also widely held that they do not operate in such a way as to frustrate the central objective of the policy scientist (i.e., the solution or alleviation of a policy problem). It is argued that the relation between values and facts in policy science is frequently such as to have this undesired frustrative effect.     

A Political-Institutional Framework for the Analysis of Competition Policy Institutions

The article presents an eight-point analytical framework for the examination of key political-institutional aspects of the functioning of national competition policy institutions. These are assessed against the competition policy regimes of the EC, UK, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, the US. Each element represents an aspect or institutional arena in which there is potential andlor actual room for the exercise of political influence and power in an increasingly important realm of micro-economic governance. Such political arenas and channels are woven in and around a set of competition authorities in each county or jurisdiction otherwise primarily attempting to apply economic analysis to numerous specific case decisions. The eight elements of the framework are: 1) the use of explicit non-competition criteria that can be taken into account by competition authorities; 2) ranges of, and opportunities for, ministerial discretion; 3) intra-cabinet and intra-govern-mental pressures from other ministers and departments and their political clientele interests; 4) direct hearings or avenues for direct representation and pressure by interests; 5) opportunities for private legal action; 6) processes for giving comfort or guidance letters to private parties; 7) vehicles for pressure and political learning through studies, media exposure, and public persuasion; and 8) the extent to which “one-stop” versus multi-sector competition institutions exist and can be played off one another.     

Analysing decentralised natural resource governance: proposition for a “politicised” institutional analysis and development framework

There has often been a gap between policy intentions and outcomes in the field of natural resource governance. Analysing the factors for these discrepancies requires multi-level approaches that relate policy decisions formulated at the national and international level with the decisions of local resource users. A key asset of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework is precisely its ability to link multiple governance levels. Yet most commons literature has been limited to the study of collective action among local communities without considering higher institutional and government levels. To overcome this limitation, I posit for a methodological development of the framework, which bridges the gap between institutional analysis, power-centred and historical approaches, and discourse analysis. The application of the extended framework to the study of state afforestation policies in Vietnam highlights the need to simultaneously consider institutions, the politico-economic context and discourses across governance and government levels. As illustrated in this paper, such a framework does not only facilitate the analysis of policy shortcomings but also supports the design and dissemination of policy recommendations.     

The policy movement as a policy problem

The policy movement is unified by a common interest in the improvement of policy decisions through scientific inquiry. The movement is differentiated, however, because this common interest is highly ambiguous and subject to interpretation from different perspectives. This paper applies a policy sciences perspective to the movement's disappointments over the last few decades, and in particular, the failure to realize earlier aspirations for rational, objective analysis on the more important and controversial policy issues. The paper offers a definition and diagnosis of the underlying problem, and suggests what can be done about it as a matter of individual and collective choice.     

Three Lenses of Evidence‐Based Policy

This article discusses recent trends to incorporate the results of systematic research (or ‘evidence’) into policy development, program evaluation and program improvement. This process is consistent with the New Public Management (NPM) emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness. Analysis of evidence helps to answer the questions ‘what works? and ‘what happens if we change these settings?’ Secondly, some of the well known challenges and limitations for ‘evidence‐based’ policy are outlined. Policy decisions emerge from politics, judgement and debate, rather than being deduced from empirical analysis. Policy debate and analysis involves an interplay between facts, norms and desired actions, in which ‘evidence’ is diverse and contestable. Thirdly, the article outlines a distinction between technical and negotiated approaches to problem‐solving. The latter is a prominent feature of policy domains rich in ‘network’ approaches, partnering and community engagement. Networks and partnerships bring to the negotiation table a diversity of stakeholder ‘evidence’, ie, relevant information, interpretations and priorities. Finally, it is suggested that three types of evidence/perspective are especially relevant in the modern era – systematic (‘scientific’) research, program management experience (‘practice’), and political judgement. What works for program clients is intrinsically connected to what works for managers and for political leaders. Thus, the practical craft of policy development and adjustment involves ‘weaving’ strands of information and values as seen through the lens of these three key stakeholder groups. There is not one evidence‐base but several bases. These disparate bodies of knowledge become multiple sets of evidence that inform and influence policy rather than determine it.     

Who has standing in cost-benefit analysis?

The issues involved in deciding whose preferences are to be counted in cost-benefit analysis are often misunderstood or controversial. This paper attempts to resolve the issues in a number of particular cases by looking to the fundamental value assumptions underlying cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is useful only to the extent that there exists a general consensus that the value assumptions are legitimate. Certain implications of the value assumptions prove useful in deciding what preferences have standing.     

Evaluating the effects of changes in AFDC: Methodological issues and challenges

Analysts are commonly called upon to perform the difficult task of evaluating the effects of specific changes in public policy upon the behavior of individuals, such as a change in the provisions of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program relating to the benefits of those in the program who find work. When charged with such a task, analysts commonly try to answer the question by tracing the behavior of a fixed panel of individuals, comparing the experience of the group before and after the change in policy. That approach, however, risks major errors; in the case of the AFDC program, for instance, changes in the work benefit provisions affected the decisions of some who might have come into the program, a consequence that would not be picked up by a fixed panel of initial recipients. Cross-sectional data drawn independently from a general population at points in time before and after a policy change can often provide a more valid measure of the effects of the policy change than can panel data; moreover, cross-sectional data are usually less expensive and more readily available.     

Still Moving Toward a European FBI? Re-Examining the Politics of EU Police Cooperation

This article builds a model for explaining the development of supranationalism in EU police cooperation, especially concerning Europol. This framework is also helpful for understanding the role of police cooperation in EU counter-terrorism policy. The article begins with a critical analysis of the analytical framework first development in my 2003 book and refines this based key events since 2002, as well a few important scholarly perspectives. According to the new model, supranationalism is explained by ‘interest shapers,’ which include the ‘spillover-enlargement effect,’ crises and shocks, and concerns for national sovereignty, democracy, and pragmatism. The development of these interests and the resulting supranationalism are also affected by ‘institutional dynamics,’ including entrepreneurship, path dependency, and bureaucratic resistance. These factors help to explain recent events and predict future developments concerning EU police cooperation.     

There is no “point” in decision-making: a model of transactive rationality for public policy and administration

The hope that policy-making is a rational process lies at the heart of policy science and democratic practice. However, what constitutes rationality is not clear. In policy deliberations, scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological concerns are often at odds. Harold Lasswell, in instituting the contemporary policy sciences, found that John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy provided an integrative foundation that took into account all these considerations. As the policy sciences developed with a predominantly empirical focus on discrete aspects of policy-making, this holistic perspective was lost for a while. Contemporary theorists are reclaiming pragmatist philosophy as a framework for public policy and administration. In this article, key postulates of pragmatist philosophy are transposed to policy science by developing a new theoretical model of transactive rationality. This model is developed in light of current policy analyses, and against the backdrop of three classical policy science theories of rationality: linear and bounded rationalism; incrementalism; and mixed-scanning. Transactive rationality is a “fourth approach” that, by integrating scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological considerations, serves as a more holistic, explanatory, and normative guide for public policy and democratic practice.     

The Multiple Domains of Harmonisation: Politics,Policy, Process and Program

This article builds a taxonomy of the different functions performed by the term ‘harmonisation’ in contemporary policy debates. Four broad functions or domains of use are identified – political, policy, process and program – within each of which there are multiple different uses. Based on this classification, the article then develops a multi‐dimensional conceptual framework through which the term can be better understood and examined, its political uses identified and isolated, and harmonisation initiatives constructed, framed and analysed. The framework should prove useful for Ministers and government departments called upon to determine if, how and to what extent to harmonise regulations in a particular area; regulators called upon to administer and enforce harmonised regulatory regimes; and regulatees, practitioners and academics concerned to understand the impact of a harmonisation task.     

Explaining the content of impact assessment in the United Kingdom: Learning across time,sectors, and departments

While several studies have documented how evidence‐based policy instruments affect public policy, less research has focused on what causes changes over time in the analyses mandated by the instruments, especially in Britain. Thus, we take the analytical content of a pivotal regulatory reform instrument (impact assessment) as a dependent variable, draw on learning as a conceptual framework, and explain the dynamics of learning processes across departments, policy sectors, and time. Empirically, our study draws on a sample of 517 impact assessments produced in Britain (2005–2011). Experience and capacity in different departments matter in learning processes. Guidelines also matter, but moderately so. Departments specialize in their core policy sectors when performing regulatory analysis, but some have greater analytical capacity overall. Peripheral departments invest more in impact assessment than core executive departments. The presence of a regulatory oversight body enhances the learning process. Elections have different effects, depending on the context in which they are contested. These findings contribute to the literature on regulation, policy learning, and policy instruments.     

Community Development Block Grant: The Role of Federal Requirements

The CDBG program provides an excellent opportunity to studywhat local governments do to carry out national policy whenit is stated in general terms and they are left to their owndevices, and what they do differently when policy is interpretedin explicit regulations which are enforced. This article reviewswhat happened with two major legislative guidelines (low incometargeting and community participation) during the first sixyears of the CDBG program, including a period during which HUDinterpretations and enforcement varied greatly. It appears thatstrong federal enforcement caused a small increment in low incometargeting overall; but rigorous HUD direction and enforcement,combined with strong citizen participation, was necessary forsome jurisdictions to emphasize targeting. The research is pertinentin the present era of attempts toward major relaxation of federalgrant conditions and enforcement programs.     

The ethical poverty of cost-benefit methods: Autonomy,efficiency and public policy choice

The principle of efficiency holds as the basic standard of market decision-making. Routinely however, it has been applied as a standard of judgement to public choices as well. This essay proceeds on the basis of four assumptions. First, that efficiency, outside the market context, has two manifestations (Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Methods) which are made distinct by one's concentration on judging the most cost-effective means to policy ends otherwise arrived at, and the other's use of efficiency to judge both the means and end of policy choice. Second, that although efficiency is a fit primary decision standard within a competitive market a principle with more distinctly moral weight is needed to judge ends outside of markets. Third, that one possible source of this moral weight is individual autonomy or freedom that is a fit ethical principle upon which to set the ends of public policy. Fourth, that the use of cost-benefit methods rather than cost-effectiveness analysis implies that it can satisfy the requirements of both efficiency and autonomy. If the efficient policy choice also provided protection of individual autonomy then cost-benefit methods could be used for the analysis of public policy ends, but if it fails to have a deeper moral justification then the role of efficiency in the public sector must be limited only to its judgement of cost-effective means to policy ends arrived at by a non-efficiency standard. I will argue that the autonomy of individual choice in a market is a thin and morally impoverished ethical standard of judgement that adds no additional moral weight to market efficiency for the judgements of policy ends. This conclusion limits efficiency to the consideration of public means alone, eliminating cost-benefit methods as a fit approach to policy analysis while simultaneously promoting cost-effectiveness analysis and the search for an independent moral standard for the assessment of public ends.This essay was originally prepared for the 1989 meeting of the APSA in Atlanta and I wish to thank all those who read and commented on my work at that time. In addition, I would like to thank those who participated in its evolution to this form: Douglas MacLean, Mark Sagoff, Brian Barry, Alan Donagan, Russell Hardin, Maurice Wade, Andy Gold, Thomas Reilly, Diana Evans, an anonymous reviewer at Policy Sciences and its two editors, William Ascher and G. Brewer.     

What do Parties Want? Policy versus Office

What parties want – policy, office or votes – affects how they represent their voters, make strategic decisions and respond to external changes in society. What parties strive to accomplish is crucially important for what they do. Moreover, our knowledge of what parties want affects what we expect them to do. For instance, coalition theory assumes that parties have homogeneous goals, and hence are equally likely to join coalitions given the same circumstances. However, this article investigates this basic assumption of party goal homogeneity and finds that party goals do indeed diverge. The article demonstrates that party goals are influenced by party-specific factors such as party size, policy position and intra-party politics. It therefore suggests, further, that intra-party politics should be included more systematically in future studies of party behaviour.     

An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections

Lau and Redlawsk (1997) proposed that the quality of voter decision making can be evaluated by measuring what they called correct voting —the extent to which people vote in accordance with their own values and priorities—but in so doing provided little guidance about what actually determines whether voters can make such high-quality decisions. This article develops a framework for analyzing the vote decision that views the quality of decision making as a joint function of individual characteristics and various higher-level campaign factors. We hypothesize that differences in cognitive capacity, political motivation, the availability of political heuristics, and macrolevel factors that affect the difficulty of the choice confronting citizens, including the nature of the political information environment, should all affect the probability of a correct vote. We find significant support for seven proposed hypotheses across three levels of analysis, which places responsibility for incorrect votes on both the individual and our electoral system.     

Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance

The multifaceted challenges of contemporary governance demand a complex account of the ways in which those who are subject to laws and policies should participate in making them. This article develops a framework for understanding the range of institutional possibilities for public participation. Mechanisms of participation vary along three important dimensions: who participates, how participants communicate with one another and make decisions together, and how discussions are linked with policy or public action. These three dimensions constitute a space in which any particular mechanism of participation can be located. Different regions of this institutional design space are more and less suited to addressing important problems of democratic governance such as legitimacy, justice, and effective administration.     

Evidence‐Based Policy‐Making: The Elusive Search for Rational Public Administration

Evidence‐based policy making has been criticised as a revival of the ‘rationality project’ in which democratic politics is regarded as rent‐seeking and a deadweight loss to society. In response, the evidence‐based policy movement has failed to articulate a defence in which the rationality animating the policy process is situational and contextual rather than unique and authoritative. This article traces the movement's motto –‘what works?’– to the American pragmatist movement, whose influence on Harold Lasswell and New Labour in the UK was substantial. This article argues that the ambition for evidence‐based policy‐making should be seen in terms of the transition from a single, unique and universal rationality toward multiple rationalities that vary according to different policy making contexts. Interpreted in such terms, evidence‐based policy making can avoid several of the main criticisms, and offer strong potential to contribute to solving policy problems.