Party size and policy outcomes: An empirical analysis of taxation in democracies

Taxation varies widely among democracies. Yet scholars disagree whether differences in political institutions help produce the variation. This article identifies topdown and bottom-up mechanisms by which political institutions are thought to influence taxation. It then combines political and economic data on more than 50 democracies to evaluate the impact of political institutions on government revenues. Cross-sectional and pooled time series analyses that include controls for economic conditions and partisan ideologies of governments confirm an indirect impact of these institutions: there is a curvilinear relationship between the size of political parties in a democracy and the tax revenues collected. Yet the effect of party size on policy outcomes is limited to a subset of democracies. The article opens new paths for research on the roles of electoral, constitutional, legislative, and party institutions in democratic policy making around the world. Andrew C. Gould is associate professor of government at the University of Notre Dame, where he is a Fellow of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies. He recently publishedOrigins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth Century Europe and the article “Conflicting Imperatives and Concept Formation,” which appeared inThe Review of Politics. For their suggestions and/or data, I thank José Antonio Cheibub, Sven Steinmo, Duane Swank, Daniel Verdier, and Michael Wallerstein. For their comments, I am grateful to Carles Boix, Delia Boylan, Lloyd Gruber, Fran Hagopian, Peter Hall, Mark Hallerberg, Gretchen Helmke, Scott Mainwaring, Paul Mueller, Dennis Quinn, Ashutosh Varshney, and two anonymous reviewers. Peter Baker and Tom Lundberg provided insights and skilled research assistance. This work was supported in part by a grant from the Faculty Research Program, University of Notre Dame. A prior version of this article was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. The errors that remain are my own.     

Measuring Democratic Consolidation

The concept of democratic consolidation has become a pivotal concept in comparative politics. In its most widespread acceptation, a “consolidated” democracy is one that is unlikely to break down. For all its apparent thinness and simplicity, this conceptualization poses considerable problems of operationalization and measurement. As the article argues, cholars have been relying on three basic strategies to assess the survival prospects of democratic regimes. They have been studying either behavioral, attitudinal, or structural foudnations of democratic consolidation. This article briefly examines those approaches that rely on different kinds of empirical evidence as well as on different causal assumptions. On the basis of a quick revision of recent Latin American experiences, it concludes that in common judgments about democratic consolidation, behavioral evidence seems to trump both attitudinal and structural data. Andreas Schedler is professor of political science at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Mexico City. He also chairs the Research Committee on Concepts and Methods (C&M) of the International Political Science Association. His current research focuses on democratization and electoral governance in Mexico in comparative perspective. I am indebted to the Austrian Academy of Sciences for supporting work on this article through the Austrian Program for Advanced Research and Technology (APART). Also, I am most grateful to Ruth Berins Collier, Peter Burnell, David, Collier, Michael Coppedge, Larry Diamond, Graciela Ducatenzeiler, Francis Hagopian, Robert R. Kaufman, James Mahoney, Scott Mainwaring, Sebastián Mazzuca, Gerardo L. Munck, Martin Schürz, Richard Snyder, Kurt Weyland, and the anonymous reviewers ofSCID for their valuable comments. Many thanks, too, to Harold Waldrauch for sharing the New Democracies Barometer data. Naturally, though, all responsibility is mine.     

Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics

This article analyzes the analytical limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics. Adherents of this approach have made important contributions by analyzing topics that Latin Americanists traditionally neglected, such as the political impact of electoral rules and the processes of legislative decision-making. But rational-choice institutionalism has difficulty explaining the complicated, variegated, and fluid patterns of Latin American politics. It overemphasizes the electoral and legislative arenas and—in general—the input side of politics; it overestimates the importance and causal impact of formal rules and institutions; it does not explain the origins of political change and often suggests a static image of political development; it offers an incomplete analysis of institutional creation by neglecting the importance of political beliefs; it cannot fully account for crisis politics; and it puts excessive, analytically arbitrary emphasis on “microfoundations.” The article questions whether these limitations can successfully be overcome, arguing that rational-choice institutionalism—while an important addition to the debate—is not inherently superior to other approaches applied in Latin American Studies. Kurt Weyland is associate professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of two books—Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, 1996) andThe Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela (Princeton, 2002)—and of numerous journal articles on democratization, market reform, social policy, and populism in Latin America. His current research focuses on the diffusion of policy innovations across countries. I would like to thank Barry Ames, James Booth, Ruth Collier, Marcelo Costa Ferriera, Wendy Hunter, Mark Jones, Fabrice Lehoucq, Scott Mainwaring, Gerardo Munck, Anthony Pereira, Tim Power, Ken Roberts, Charles Shipan, Richard Snyder, Donna van Cott, and two anonymous reviewers for excellent comments.     

Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method

Subnational units of analysis play an increasingly important role in comparative politics. Although many recent studies of topics such as ethnic conflict, economic policy reform, and democratization rely on comparisons across subnational political units, insufficient attention has been devoted to the methodological issues that arise in the comparative analysis of these units. To help fill this gap, this article explores how subnational comparisons can expand and strengthen the methodological repertoire available to social science researchers. First, because a focus on subnational units is an important tool for increasing the number of observations and for making controlled comparisons, it helps mitigate some of the characteristic limitations of a small-N research design. Second, a focus on subnational units strengthens the capacity of comparativists to accurately code cases and thus make valid causal inferences. Finally, subnational comparisons better equip researchers to handle the spatially uneven nature of major processes of political and economic transformation. Richard Snyder is assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author ofPolitics after Neoliberalism (2001). His articles on regime change and the political economy of development have appeared inWorld Politics, Comparative Politics, Journal of Democracy, andBritish Journal of Political Science. I appreciate helpful comments on this material from Nancy Bermeo, Dexter Boniface, David Collier, John Gerring, Edward Gibson, Robert Kaufman, Juan Linz, James Mahoney, Kelly McMann, Gerardo Munck, Peter Nardulli, David Samuels, Judith Tendler, and two anonymous reviewers. I also benefited greatly from the insightful comments on an earlier draft provided by the participants in the conference on “Regimes and Political Change in Latin America,” held at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in August 1999.     

Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, discontent, and disaffection

This article examines changes in perceptions of democracy in Spain over the last two decades. A variety of empirical indicators gleaned from numerous surveys are used to distinguish between democratic legitimacy and political discontent, as well as between this (which includes the well-known indicator of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works) and political disaffection. The article traces the different ways in which these attitudes have evolved in Spain over the last twenty years, and demonstrates that they belong to different dimensions. It also includes the results of two tests showing that these two sets of attitudes are conceptually and empirically distinct: a factor analysis confirms the distinct clustering of the indicators at the, individual level, whilst cohort analysis identifies different patterns of continuity and change across generations. José Ramón Montero is Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. He obtained his doctorate in Law at the Universidad de Santiago and has taught, at the Universities of Granada, Santiago, Zaragoza, Cádiz and the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. He has been Visiting Professor at the Universities of Harvard, California at Berkeley, and Ohio State University, as well as Secretary and Dean of the School of Law, Universidad de Cádiz, and Deputy Director of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Richard Gunther is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and is co-Chair of the Subcommittee on Southern Europe of the Social Science Research Council. Mariano Torcal is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. He holds a doctorate from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and a Ph.D candidacy in Political Science from the Ohio State University. He has been a Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Univeristy of Michigan, and Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University.     

Rethinking agency and structure in the study of regime change

The oscillation of the study of political regime change between voluntarist and structural approaches has increasingly led scholars to seek research strategies for synthesizing the two approaches. This article addresses the conceptual and practical difficulties of achieving such a synthesis by evaluating several strategies for integrating voluntarist and structural factors in the analysis of regime change. It examines competing ways of conceptualizing agency and structure and assesses the varied consequences that different conceptualizations have for explaining regime transformation. The article also analyzes three distinct strategies for integrating agency and structure: the funnel, path-dependent, and eclectic strategies. Each integrative strategy isanchored by a different conceptual base and has characteristic strengths and limitations. The conclusion explores future directions for developing integrative strategies. The authors are listed in alphabetical order and share equal responsibility for the content of this analysis. We appreciate helpful comments and suggestions from Christopher Ansell, Ruth Berins Collier, Michael Bratton, David Collier, Larry Diamond, Giuseppe di Palma, Peter Evans, John Foran, Jeff Goodwin, Tomasz Grabowski, Ernst Haas, Stephan Haggard, Jonathan Hartlyn, Terry Karl, Steven Levitsky Juan Linz, Gerardo Munck, Pierre Ostiguy, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Eric Selbin, Michael Sinatra, Jutta Weldes, Alexander Wendt, and Brendan Works. James Mahoney is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Brown University. He is currently finishing a book that analyzes liberalism and regime change in five Central American countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. Richard Snyder is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published numerous articles on both regime change and the politics of economic reform. He is currently completing a forthcoming book entitledPolitics after Neoliberalism.     

Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing recent evidence

The purpose of this article is to reassess two influential theories of democratic development: the theory of democratic culture and the theory of economic development. The leading predecessors in each domain—Ronald Inglehart and Adam Przeworski—are the prime targets of analysis. We take issue with recent evidence presented by these authors on three grounds: the evidence (1) confuses “basic” criteria of democracy with possible “quality” criteria (Inglehart); (2) conceptualizes democracy in dichotomous rather than continuous terms (Przeworski); and (3) fails to account for endogeneity and contingent effects (Inglehart). In correcting for these shortcomings, we present striking results. In the case of democratic culture, the theory lacks support; neither overt support for democracy nor “self-expression values” affect democratic development. In the case of economic development, earlier findings must be refined. Although the largest impact of modernization is found among more democratized countries, we also find an effect among “semi-democracies.” Axel Hadenius is professor of political science at Uppsala University in Sweden. He is the author ofDemocracy and Development (Cambridge University Press, 1992) andInstitutions and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2001). Jan Teorell is associated professor of political science at Uppsala University. His articles on intra-party democracy, social capital, and political participation appear in international journals.     

Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective

This article explores the application of ideas about path dependence to the study of national political regime change. It first reviews the central components of pathdependent explanation, including the concepts of critical juncture and legacy. This mode of explanation is then employed in the analysis of diverging regime trajectories in Central America during the 19th and 20th centuries. The article argues that the 19th-century liberal reform period was a critical juncture that locked the Central American countries onto divergent paths of long-term development, culminanting in sharply contrasting regime outcomes. A final section puts the argument about Central America in a broader comparative perspective by considering other pathdependent explanations of regime change. James Mahoney is assistant professor of sociology at Brown University. He is the author ofThe Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America (2001). His current research focuses on long-run development and the legacy of Spanish colonialism in Latin America. For helpful comments and criticisms on an earlier draft, I would like to thank David Collier, Gerardo L. Munck, and the anonymous referees.     

Democracy and Gender Equality

This article examines the relationship between democracy and gender equality. In particular, it contrasts the impact of long-term stocks of democracy with the contemporary level of democracy and the participation of women in democracy. It contends that democracy should be thought of as a historical phenomenon with consequences that develop over many years and decades and that women’s participation should be included as an important component of democracy. The main argument is that long-term democracy together with women’s suffrage should provide new opportunities for women to promote their interests through mobilization and elections. A cross-national time-series statistical analysis finds that countries with greater stocks of democracy and longer experience of women’s suffrage have a higher proportion of the population that is female, a greater ratio of female life expectancy to male life expectancy, lower fertility rates, and higher rates of female labor force participation.

Multi-party elections in the Arab world: Institutional engineering and oppositional strategies

Recent moves toward multi-party competition for elected legislatures in numerous Arab countries constitute a significant departure from earlier practices there, and create the basis for democratic activists to gradually chip away at persistent authoritarian rule. This article explores the institutional mechanisms by which incumbent authoritarian executives seek to engineer these elections. It documents examples of rulers changing electoral systems to ensure compliant legislatures, and demonstrates the prevalent use of winner-takes-all electoral systems, which generally work to the regimes’ advantage. I then review various strategies of opposition forces—boycotts, non-competition agreements, election monitoring, and struggles over election rules—and the dilemmas that these entail. Surmounting differences in terms of ideologies, as well as short-term political goals and prospects, is a central challenge. The future should see greater electoral participation among opposition activists, along with cleaner elections. As vote coercion and ballot box stuffing is restricted by opposition pressures, electoral institutions will take on greater importance, and struggles for proportional representation are likely to increase. Marsha Pripstein Posusney is associate professor of Political Science at Bryant College and an adjunct associate professor of International Relations (Research) at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Her first book,Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring (Co-lumbia University Press, 1997) was co-winner of the 1998 Albert Hourani prize, awarded annually by the Middle East Studies Association for outstanding original scholarly work on the Middle East. She is currently completing work on a co-edited volume,Privatization and Labor: Responses and Consequences in Global Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming). Earlier versions of this article were presented at Middle East Studies seminars at Harvard and columbia Universities in April, 1998, and at a Brown University Political Science Dept. seminar in April, 1999. In addition to the feedback at these events, I would like to acknowledge helpful comments on earlier versions from Miguel Glatzer, Iliya Harik, John Kerr, Ann Lesch, Vickie Langohr, Rob Richie, Wendy Schiller, Jillian Schwedler, Joe Stork, Greg White, and especially Ellen Lust-Okar and four anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful for the research assistance of Myrna Atalla, Daria Viviano, Laurent Fauque, and Colleen Anderson. The article draws on presentations and discussion at the conference on “Controlled Contestation and Opposition Strategies: Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World”, Brown University, October 2–3, 1998. Sponsored by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown in cooperation with the Center for Middle Eastern Studies as Harvard, it brought together ten democratic activists from seven different Arab countries. It is referenced here (to save space) as the “Brown elections conference.”     

A deficit of democratic authenticity: Political linkage and the public in Andean polities

The article argues that Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are political systems suffering from an acute deficit of democratic authenticity, that is, a loss of substance in democratic processes. The deficit in democratic authenticity is a product of malfunctions in the mechanisms of political linkage and multiple barriers that inhibit effective citizen participation in public life. Rather than acceding to minimalist interpretations of democracy that deemphasize the importance, of active citizen participation, the author stresses the importance of maintaining a rigorous normative definition of democracy as the standard by which to assess the state of democractic political development. Catherine M. Conaghan is a Queen’s National Scholar and professor of political studies at Queen’s University. She is the author ofRestructuring Domination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988) and co-author ofUnsettling Scatecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).     

The wrong kind of crisis: Why oil booms and busts rarely lead to authoritarian breakdown

Economic crisis has been a central catalyst to Third Wave democratic transitions by contributing to authoritarian breakdown, yet crises in oil-exporting states have generally failed to catalyze such breakdowns, which are a crucial precondition to democratization. This article argues that oil wealth produces two distinct political trajectories, depending on its timing relative to the onset of late development. The dominant trajectory in the oil-exporting world is durable authoritarianism which has forestalled all but a few regime collapses. And, when the alternate trajectory produces vulnerable authoritarianism, oil-catalyzed authoritarian breakdown tends to generate new authoritarian regimes. I use case materials from Iran and Indonesia during the 1960s and 1970s to illustrate the two oil-based trajectories, and I conduct a broader test of the theory against data for 21 oil-exporting, developing countries, which provides suggestive support for a two-path theory of oil-based aturhoritarian persistence. Benjamin Smith is an assistant professor of political science and Asian studies at the University of Florida. His first book,Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil, Opposition, and Late Development, is under contract with Cornell University Press. Other work has appeared in theAmerican Journal of Political Science, World Politics, and theJournal of International Affairs. He is currently at work on a book-length study of durable authoritarianism with Jason Brownlee (University of Texas-Austin) and on a study of the conditions under which democracy can consolidate in oil-rich countries with Joseph Kraus (University of Florida). Thanks to Jason Brownlee, Sam Huntington, Joel Migdal, Pete Moore, Jon Pevehouse, Susan Pharr, Dan Slater, David Waldner, Patricia Woods, participants in the Sawyer Seminar in comparative politics at Harvard University; participants in the “Transforming Authoritarian Rentier Economies and Protectorates” seminar at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn; and three anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article.     

Macroeconomic conditions and political instability: An empirical analysis

This article uses statistical methods to examine the relationship between two key macroeconomic indicators—inflation and economic growth—and four measures of political instability—peaceful unrest, violent unrest, coups d’etat, and changes of government. Using a panel research design and fixed effects regression analysis, I examine first whether contemporaneous relationships exist between these two groups of variables and then the direction of causality between them. Peaceful unrest clearly produces higher inflation and slower growth. Oddly, coups d’etat seem to producelower inflation, and there is some evidence that reverse causation may operate here as well—that high inflation mayreduce the likelihood of coups. Slow economic growth is associated with higher levels of violent unrest and a higher likelihood of coups and changes of government, but the direction of causality in these relationships is not clear. These findings, taken together, suggest that the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and political instability runs primarily from the latter to the former, raising doubts about the widely held view that poor economic conditions generally produce unrest and instability. Mark J. Gasiorowski is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University. He is currently working on a project focusing on the relationship between democracy and macroeconomic conditions.     

Communist Legacies, Postcommunist Transformations, and the Fate of Organized Labor in Russia and China

This study aims to generate fresh hypotheses concerning emergent variations in labor politics across postcomunist settings. Although labor may be weak throughout the postcommunist world, a historical comparison of labor politics in Russia and China reveals consequential differences in the extent and sources of union weakness. Taking these differences seriously, the study asks why organized labor in Russia—in spite of a steeper decline in union membership, greater fragmentation, and a conspicuously low level of militancy—wasrelatively more effective in advancing working-class interests during economic liberalization than the growing, organizationally unified trade union apparatus in China. The comparisons suggest that some constraints on organized labor are more malleable than others, allowing for openins where labor can affect outcomes in ways that surprise, if not scare, state and business. Specifically, key differences in historical legacies and in the pace and ynamics of institutional transformation have conferred upon Russian unions key organizational, material, and symbolic resources that Chinese unions do not possess to the same degree. These differences reflect mechanisms capable of generating increasingly divergent prospects for organized labor mobilization over long-time horizons. Calvin Chen is Luce Assistant Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College. His research interests include the industrialization of the Chinese countryside, the political economy of East Asia, and labor politics in postsocialist countries. He is presently working on a book on the role of social ties and networks of trust in China’s township and village enterprises. Rudra Sil is associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. His research interests include the political economy of development, comparative labor relations, postcommunist transitions, Russian and Asian studies, and the history and philosophy of social science. He is author ofManaging “Modernity”: Work, Community, and Authority in Late-Industrializing Japan and Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002) and coeditor ofThe Politics of Labor in a Global Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). He is presently working on a book comparing the evolution of labor politics across postcommunist countries. We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions offered by Hilary Appel, Harley Balzer, Ruth Collier, Eileen Doherty, Todor Enev, Tulia Falleti, David Ost, Lü Xiaobo, and three anonymous reviewers on drafts of this article.     

Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them

This article opens with a discussion of the types of institutions that allow markets to perform adequately. While we can identify in broad terms what these are, there is no unique mapping between markets and the non-market institutions that underpin them. The paper emphasizes the importance of “local knowledge”, and argues that a strategy of institution building must not over-emphasize best-practice “blueprints” at the expense of experimentation. Participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and aggregating local knowledge. Democracy is a meta-institution for building good institutions. A range of evidence indicates that participatory democracies enable higher-quality growth. Sakenn pe prie dan sa fason (Everyone can pray as he likes.) —Mauritian folk wisdom This paper was originally prepared for the International Monetary Fund’s Conference on Second-Generation Reforms, Washington, DC, November 8–9, 1999. I thank Ruth Collier, Steve Fish, Mohsin Khan, Saleh Nsouli, conference participants, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Dani Rodrik is professor of international political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is also the research coordinator for the Group of 24 (G-24), a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (London). He serves as an advisory committee member of the Institute for International Economics, senior advisor of the Overseas Development Council, and advisory committee member of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey. Professor Rodrik’s recent research is concerned with the consequences of international economic integration, the role of conflict-management institutions in determining economic performance, and the political economy of policy reform.     

Democratization through European integration: The case of minority rights in the Czech Republic and Romania

While scholars have tended to focus on domestic factors as most critical to the consolidation of democracy, the post-communist European Union (EU) candidate states have exhibited a unique confluence of domestic and foreign policies, due to their objective of EU membership. This article assesses and compares the impact of the EU on policy making in two diverse candidate states in their first decade of transition, focusing on minority rights protection as a fundamental requirement of both EU membership and a stable democracy. I find that the EU has played a principal role in the reform process and democratic consolidation of candidate states, even in the controversial field of minority rights. The degree and nature of the EU’s impact, however, has depended in part on the activism of the particular minority, EU interest and pressure, EU Member States’ own domestic policies, and the persistence of racism in society. Dr. Melanie H. Ram is a research associate at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University and Senior Program Officer for the Japan International Cooperation Agency USA Office. She has written extensively on European Union enlargement and democratic consolidation and reform in Central and Southeastern Europe, and is the author most recently of “Harmonizing Laws with the European Union: The Case of Intellectual Property Rights in the Czech Republic” inNorms and Nannies: The Impact of European Organizations on Central and East European States (2002). Earlier versions of this article were presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 30 August–2 September 2001, San Francisco, CA and at “Voice or Exit: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnic Minorities in Twentieth Century Europe,” Humboldt University, Berlin, 14–16 June 2001.     

Democratization without Development: Benin 1989–2009

In contrast to a widely held view that sees Benin’s democratic transition in 1989 primarily as the fall-out of global tendencies, this paper focuses specifically on the internal causes of this historical event, which it locates in the context of the history of Dahomey/Benin since 1960 and the country’s political economy. It argues that, while the Renouveau Démocratique doubtlessly represented a significant step towards democracy, it did little to change the country’s deep-rooted political-economic structures. Since Dahomey gained independence in 1960, it has been a structurally deficient rent-based economy. None of the regime changes of the past 50 years—independence in 1960, the adoption of Marxist-Leninism in 1974 or the Renouveau Démocratique of 1989/90—have succeeded in changing anything in relation to this fundamental fact. Thus, the crisis of 1989 was primarily a crisis of a particular pattern of political-economic regulation. None of the regime changes of the last 50 years, however, succeeded in resolving the country’s basic development problem, i.e. how to transform a structurally deficient rent-based economy into a productive one. Likewise, throughout the entire period from 1960 to 2009, basic elements of the political culture of the country remained unchanged. Neopatrimonialism, personalization, authoritarianism, regionalism and generationalism became, at best, more subtly differentiated as a result of the democratic renewal. To this extent, the Beninese democratic renewal of 1989/90 highlights the problematic connection between democracy and economic development.     

Institutional duration and growth in Africa

We argue that there are strong reasons to believe that continuous competitive, multiparty elections produce different growth dynamics than first competitive elections. We test this conjecture by looking at the effects of competitive elections and their endurance on growth rates in African countries from 1970 to 2001. We find that initial competitive elections do not offer a growth dividend over having no elections at all, although noncompetitive elections may result in a growth penalty. However, over time, countries that hold competitive elections slowly begin outperforming those without them—especially those that hold noncompetitive elections. Africa’s poor growth experience may therefore be related less to an unwillingness to experiment with democracy, than to an inability to consolidate democratic reforms once in place. Karen E. Ferree is assistant professor of political science at University of California, San Diego. She specializes in the study of elections in new democracies, especially those in Africa. Her work has examined the political economy of elections as well as the role of ethnicity in elections. Smita Singh is Special advisor to Global Affairs at the William and Flora Hewlett Foudation. Her research interests include the political economy of development and violence in Africa and Southeast Asia. We wish to thank Robert Bates for support and advice at all stages of this project. Thanks also to Macartan Humphries, Naunihal Singh, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors atStudies in Comparative and International Development for helpful comments.     

Understanding contentious collective action by Chinese laid-off workers: The importance of regional political economy

Episodes of contentious collective action involving laid-off workers have erupted throughout China in recent years. With few exceptions, studies of Chinese laid-off workers’ contention have attempted to generalize from field research in very few⦓r even single⤜ocalities. This limitation has led to several debates that can frequently be addressed by examining differences in political economy among China’s industrial regions. Based on 19 months of fieldwork and over 100 in-depth interviews with workers, managers, and officials in nine Chinese cities, this article offers a systematic, sub-national comparative analysis of laid-off workers’ contention. The article also addresses broader issues in the analysis of social movements and contentious politics, a field that has too often failed to take such regional differences into account. William Hurst is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is completing a dissertation on the politics of China’s state-sector lay-offs. His previous publications include “Analysis in Limbo: Contemporary Chinese Politics Amid the Maturation of Reform” (with Lowell Dittmer;Issues & Studies, December 2002/March 2003), and China’s Contentious Pensioners” (with Kevin O’Brien;The China Quarterly, June 2002). This article benefited from the assistance of many Chinese friends and colleagues in Beijing, Benxi, Chongqing, Datong, Harbin, Luoyang, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Zhengzhou. Kiren Chaudhry, Calvin Chen, Ruth B. Collier, Kenneth Foster, Mark W. Frazier, Douglas Fuller, Mary E. Gallagher, thomas B. Gold, Kun-chin Lin, Chung-in Moon, Kevin O’Brien, Dorothy Solinger, Jaeyoun Won, as well as Judy Gruber and all the participants in her Spring 2003 seminar, and two anonymous reviewers offered extremely helpful comments. For their generous financial support during various stages of my research and writing, I wish to thank: the Fulbright Institute of International Education Program, the National Security Education Program, the Yanjing Institute at Harvard University, the University of Hawaii, Beijing University, the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research at SUNY-Albany, the University, of California Institute for Labor and Employment, as well as the Graduate Division, the Institute for International Studies, the Institute for East Asian Studies, and the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California-Berkeley.