Does ethnic voting harm democracy?

A large literature argues that ethnic voting is detrimental to democracy. Ethnic voting may have at least three effects: (1) it can reduce uncertainty over electoral results; (2) it may increase the winner-take-all character of elections; and (3) it can lead to a process of ethnic outbidding. However, few studies have tested the effect of ethnic voting on democracy using large-N quantitative analysis. Previous tests instead look at whether ethnic fractionalization hinders democracy. Yet, ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to the politicization of ethnicity, and it is only when ethnicity is activated as a vehicle of political mobilization that it can destabilize democracy. This article tests the effect of ethnic voting in 58 democracies worldwide between 1992 and 2015. On balance, the evidence suggests that democracies with high ethnic voting levels tend to see the quality of their democracy reduce over time relative to those with less ethnic voting. Ethnic and religious fractionalization, however, have little effect.     

How does democracy influence citizens’ perceptions of government corruption? A cross-national study

We examine the effect of democracy as an institutional context on individuals’ perceptions of government corruption. To do so, we compile an integrated dataset from the Asian, Afro, and Latino Barometer Surveys and use a hierarchical linear regression model. Our primary finding is that the effect of democracy has different effects on ordinary citizens’ perceptions of corruption in different contexts. In general, people in countries with higher levels of democracy tend to perceive their governments to be more corrupt. However, more importantly, conditional models show that in countries with more developed democratic institutions, individuals with stronger democratic values are less likely to perceive the government to be corrupt. Moreover, people in such countries are less likely to assess their government based on their perceptions of economic situation.     

Does faith limit immorality? The politics of religion and corruption

Critically considering scholarship relating religiosity to ethical behaviour, we contend that religion is systematically related to levels of corruption, and that the nature of this relationship is contingent on the presence of democratic institutions. In democracies, where political institutions are designed to inhibit corrupt conduct, the morality provided by religion is related to attenuated corruption. Conversely, in systems lacking democratic institutions, moral behaviour is not tantamount to staying away from corrupt ways. Accordingly, in non-democratic contexts, religion would not be associated with decreased corruption. Time-series cross-sectional analyses of aggregate data for 129 countries for 12 years, as well as individual level analyses of data from the World Values Surveys, strongly corroborate the predictions of our theory. The correlation of religion with reduced corruption is conditional on the extent to which political institutions are democratic.     

Does China’s middle class prefer (liberal) democracy?

Many surveys show that China’s political regime, under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rules, enjoys a high level of public support. However, it is still uncertain whether China’s emerging middle class will become the “agent of democratization” as suggested by modernization theory. Using the data of Asian Barometer Survey conducted in China in 2011, this article demonstrates that the relationship between class identity and preference for liberal democracy in China may be inverted U-shaped. The Chinese middle class shows a higher preference to features of liberal democratic regimes than its counterparts of the lower- and upper-class. Members of the Chinese middle class also tend to regard democracy as the best form of government. Thus, the middle class has the potential to initiate democratization in China if the Chinese government fails to keep satisfying the middle class’ quest for economic well-being and protection of property rights.     

Is democracy about redistribution?

Some scholars champion broad conceptualizations of democracy where distribution of economic resources is an integral part, whereas several prominent arguments drawing on narrower conceptualizations of democracy still assume that progressive redistribution is central to democratic politics. We empirically analyse individual opinions on whether progressive taxation and redistribution are among democracy's central characteristics. While many citizens around the world associate democracy with redistribution, we find that surprisingly few consider redistribution among the most central characteristics of democracy. We further analyse what factors affect individuals’ propensity to consider redistribution among democracy's most important features. Running multi-level models, we find that having lived under a communist regime and ? although less robust – currently living under democracy make individuals less likely to hold this notion. However, individuals with more to gain from progressive redistribution (that is, little education and belonging to lower classes) are more likely to hold it. We discuss how our findings help shed light on two puzzles in comparative politics; (I) why do democracies not promote more redistributive policies than autocracies, and (II) why is there no net relationship between income inequality and democratization?     

What is democracy? A reconceptualization of the quality of democracy

Works on the quality of democracy propose standards for evaluating politics beyond those encompassed by a minimal definition of democracy. Yet, what is the quality of democracy? This article first reconstructs and assesses current conceptualizations of the quality of democracy. Thereafter, it reconceptualizes the quality of democracy by equating it with democracy pure and simple, positing that democracy is a synthesis of political freedom and political equality, and spelling out the implications of this substantive assumption. The proposal is to broaden the concept of democracy to address two additional spheres: government decision-making – political institutions are democratic inasmuch as a majority of citizens can change the status quo – and the social environment of politics – the social context cannot turn the principles of political freedom and equality into mere formalities. Alternative specifications of democratic standards are considered and reasons for discarding them are provided.     

India as a democracy promoter? New Delhi's involvement in Nepal's return to democracy

According to the theory of ‘democratic peace’, India, as the largest democracy in the world and as South Asia's predominant regional power, should be expected to promote democracy in neighbouring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any kind of official democracy-promotion policy, and its past record on democracy promotion efforts in the region is mixed at best. Against this background, the article analyses the substantial role India has come to play in the peace and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005–2008, asking whether this constitutes a departure from New Delhi's traditional policy of non-interference in its neighbours' internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion. However, the analysis shows that India's involvement in Nepal was the product of short-term stability concerns rather than being an indicator of a long-term change in strategy with the intention of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.     

Does women’s empowerment through policy intervention reduce food insecurity in South Africa?

This article determines the extent to which the food insecurity status of women in South Africa can be reduced by participating in gardening around the homestead, using survey data from 207 women farmers. A household food insecurity average score index and an empirical model that accounts for observed and unobserved factors contributing to food insecurity were employed. The findings reveal that participating in the programme worked to reduce the food insecurity of women significantly, and also show other policy factors that need to be taken into consideration to reduce food insecurity. We recommend that policy interventions towards promoting high participation by women are a sustainable strategy to address food insecurity and to achieve the 2030 agenda targeting an end to poverty and hunger.     

Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's counteracting democracy strategy

Saudi Arabian foreign policy is often declared to be countering the possible democratic transitions of the Arab Spring. As such, Saudi Arabia has been cast as a “counter-revolutionary” force in the Middle East and North Africa. This article explores the extent to which this has been the case in Egypt and Bahrain, and the extent to which Saudi foreign policy has challenged United States and European Union democracy promotion efforts in those countries. The article highlights how the transatlantic democracy promotion strategy is complicated by a conflict of interests problem, which leads them to promote democracy on an ad hoc and incremental basis. As a result, their efforts and larger strategic thinking are undermined by Saudi Arabia in Egypt. However, in Bahrain, transatlantic democracy promotion is itself muted by the strategic interest in containing Iran. As a result, Saudi Arabia can be seen as a regional countervailing power but this is implicitly in line with transatlantic policy. Tensions with Saudi foreign policy in Bahrain are over how best to manage the uprisings and maintain the status quo, rather than a conflict over political transition.     

Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?

While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the ‘democratic peace’ and the ‘failed democratization’ approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states.     

Is successful democracy promotion possible? The conceptual problem

There is a standard academic consensus that semi-presidentialism is perilous for new democracies. In particular, this is because semi-presidential countries run the risk of experiencing difficult periods of ‘cohabitation’ between a president and a prime minister who are opposed to each other, and because they may also experience periods of divided minority government that encourage the president to rule by decree and subvert the rule of law. This article examines the evidence to support these two arguments. It finds very few cases of cohabitation in young democracies and only one case where cohabitation has led directly to democratic collapse. By contrast, it finds more cases of divided minority government and more cases where divided minority government has been associated with democratic failure. However, the article also finds that young democracies have survived divided minority government. The conclusion is that, to date, there is insufficient evidence to support the long-standing and highly intuitive argument that cohabitation is dangerous for new democracies. There is more evidence to support the much newer argument about the dangers of divided minority government. Even so, more work is needed in this area before we can conclude that semi-presidentialism is inherently perilous.     

What should journalism do in a new democracy?

The particular circumstances of new democracies invite reconsideration of normative ideas of the role of journalism. The model of communication developed by Habermas posits that various rules are built into the nature of communication, including norms of inclusivity, openness and non-coercion. Based on this approach, the role of journalism can be defined in relation to notions of civic discourse in the public sphere. This article describes the role in the following three dimensions: (1) as curator of information and views; (2) as direct participant, in its own voice; and, underpinning these, (3) as custodian of public discussion, whose quality is measured against the norms of fair discourse. This Habermasian approach lays the basis for critique, and the three dimensions identified are here applied to the particular circumstances of South Africa’s new democracy. It considers characteristics of South Africa as a new democracy and highly unequal society which impinge on the quality of civic discussion. Normatively, journalism’s role is to respond to those particular characteristics in building and protecting a vibrant public sphere where inclusive, fair civic discourse can take place. This includes a focus on areas where media practices and institutions themselves stand in the way of the ideal.     

Is there difference in democracy promotion? A comparison of German and US democracy assistance in transitional Tunisia

Since the 1990s, comparative scholars and constructivists have recognized the universally liberal character of democracy promotion and yet continued the analysis of difference in this area. Mainly in studies of German and US democracy promotion, constructivists have demonstrated the recurring and difference-generating impact of ideational factors. In this article, I hence assume the likeliness of difference and address the question of how we can analyse and explain those differences through a comparison of German and US democracy assistance in transitional Tunisia. I conceive of Germany and the US as a dissimilar pair and adopt a broad perspective to uncover differences at the diplomatic level and between and within the respective approaches to democracy assistance in Tunisia. Theoretically, I argue that national role conceptions hardly impact democracy assistance in a clear manner, and that roles are renegotiated in the process. I rather focus on liberal and reform liberal conceptions of democracy, which shape perceptions of the local context, and democracy assistance agencies different organizational cultures, which impact civil society support. Finally, I account for transnational dialogue and coordination as a factor mitigating differences in democracy promotion.     

Promoting democracy or the external context? Comparing the substance of EU and US democracy assistance in Ethiopia

This article analyses the substance of the European Union's and United States' democracy assistance in Ethiopia in 2005–2010. Does this case reveal a transatlantic split, whereby the EU focuses on the external context and the US on the partial regimes of embedded, liberal democracy? Emphasizing the importance of institutions in analysing how interests and ideas affect democracy assistance, the article investigates how the substance may differ between the European Development Fund (EDF), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The analysis finds a transatlantic split whereby the EU focused more on the external context and the US more on the partial regimes. This transatlantic split can be explained by the combination of ideas and institutions. More specifically, it reflects a difference between the EDF and USAID in their focus on ownership, alignment and harmonization in democracy assistance. The combination of interests and institutions played a less significant role in explaining the substance of democracy assistance, as USAID emphasized the partial regimes, despite political control from the State Department.     

Are IMF lending programs good or bad for democracy?

Have IMF lending programs undermined political democracy in borrowing countries? Building on the extensive literature on conditional lending, we outline several pathways through which IMF program participation might affect the levels of democracy in borrowing countries - including a new variant that suggests the possibility of a positive association between lending program participation and democracy scores. In order to test the argument we assemble annual data from 120 low- and middle-income countries observed (at maximum) in each year between 1971 and 2007. We use three strategies - genetic matching, instrumental variables, and difference-in-differences estimation - to better estimate the direction and size of the statistical association between participation in IMF lending programs and the level of democracy. We find evidence for modest but definitively positive conditional differences in the democracy scores of participating and non-participating countries.     

The paradox of integration? European democracy and the debt crisis

Europe is facing both a political crisis of democracy and legitimacy and an economic crisis of debt and competitiveness. These crises seem to point in two distinct directions, growing social unrest over the Europeanized mechanisms of economic adjustment, and increasing efforts at strengthening those same institutions that regulate the adjustment process. Recent analyses have suggested that this failure of democracy will prove decisive; legitimacy for crisis management efforts requires a redemocratization of the European polity. Instead, drawing on an analysis of ordo- and neo-liberal traditions, the article explains how European integration was itself a response to the perceived threat of democratic demands at the domestic level. The body of the article then traces the crisis through three phases, arguing that efforts by state managers reflect a deliberate attempt to depoliticize policy-making processes. Yet the selective intervention—to restore accumulation whilst withdrawing social spending—has only fuelled the politicization of segments of European society. This threatens to test the limits of depoliticization as a governing strategy.