The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence

Drawing on literature from Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange with in a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations. The theory accommodates old facts and yields a large number of new and testable ones, including the fact that the peace among democracies is limited to market-oriented states, and that market democracies—but not the other democracies—perceive common interests. Previous research confirms the first hypothesis; examination herein of UN roll call votes confirms the latter: the market democracies agree on global issues. The theory and evidence demonstrate that (a) the peace among democratic states may be a function of common interests derived from common economic structure; (b) all of the empirical research into the democratic peace is underspecified, as no study has considered an interaction of democracy with economic structure; (c) interests can be treated endogenously in social research; and (d) several of the premier puzzles in global politics are causally related—including the peace among democracies and the association of democratic stability and liberal political culture with market-oriented economic development.     

Preferences and the Democratic Peace

A debate exists over whether (and to what degree) the democratic peace is explained by joint democracy or by a lack of motives for conflict between states that happen to be democratic. Gartzke (1998) applies expected utility theory to the democratic peace and shows that an index of states' preference similarity based on United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes ( affinity ) accounts for much of the lack of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies. Oneal and Russett (1997b, 1998, 1999) respond by arguing that UN voting is itself a function of regime type—that democracy 'causes' affinity . Oneal and Russett seek to demonstrate their thesis by regressing affinity on democracy and other variables from a standard model of the democratic peace. I replicate results reported by Oneal and Russett and then extend the analysis in several ways. I find that the residuals from Oneal and Russett's regression of affinity remain highly significant as a predictor of the absence of MIDs. Further, significance for democracy is shown to be fragile and subject to variable construction, model specification, and the choice of estimation procedure.     

Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace

The invasion of Iraq has been justified, ex post , as for the purpose of promoting the democratic peace. It does not, however, appear to have been a principal goal ex ante . Most democratic peace theorists, moreover, do not endorse democratic regime change by great-power external military intervention. Success is difficult to achieve (usually at high cost), and the conditions in Iraq were not promising even had the occupation been carried out more competently. Greater success in democratization has been achieved by UN peacekeeping operations, and by various regional international organizations using a variety of peaceful measures to ensure free elections, constrain authoritarian leaders, and empower democratic forces. International organizations, notably those whose membership is largely composed of democracies, are especially likely to succeed in promoting democracy.     

民主阿拉伯民族主义探析

民主阿拉伯民族主义是多元化阿拉伯民族主义阶段的一个重要流派。它的出现归因于市民社会的势力逐渐扩大、导引民族主义的理念由主权变为民主等因素。其主要主张包括:坚持恢复市民社会自治、强调民主的价值和重要性、主张作为文化实体而非政治实体的阿拉伯统一。民主阿拉伯民族主义的产生和发展,既有重要的现实意义,也有一定的理论价值。它促进了阿拉伯世界的民主化进程,发展了现代阿拉伯民族主义,对维护阿拉伯民族团结有积极作用。     

On Democratic Peace and Democracy Exporting

Democratic Peace and Democracy Exporting are two relatively young theories in the Western IR theory family.The authors believe both are questionable assertions.Democracy,whether as personal consciousness or a political mechanism,can only arise when the productivity of a nation reaches a certain level. Fundamentally,even if we agree with the assertion that democracy leads to peace,the real reason is level of productivity;democracy is only a result.Secondly,the close relationship between democracy and capitalism means that democracy can not be exported randomly.To treat democracy as a universally adaptable commodity exportable to any nation without considering the level of productivity can hardly be successful;in fact,it may be harmful to some nations.     

Normative Power and the Liberal Peace: A Rejoinder to John O'Brennan

This rejoinder to John O'Brennan reasserts the case that the EU enlargement process has a depoliticising effect, which weakens the connections between Western Balkan states and their societies. It suggests that O'Brennan's response is more apologia than analysis; evading issues raised by asymmetrical relations of power between the EU and Western Balkans states. Here the EU is idealised, with the ascribed status of a “normative actor” projecting power merely through “soft power” mechanisms. The points raised in rejoinder seek to clarify that the more “muscular” use of conditionality and direct management of policy reforms inevitably limit the possibilities for public and political debate and consensus-making. Moreover, they distance political elites from their societies. In particular, the use of political conditionality is highlighted, to demonstrate that whether “hard” powers of imposition or “soft” powers of conditionality are used matters less to those on the receiving end of external imposition than to the EU itself, which has attempted to distance itself from its use of executive powers in the region.     

Between Liberal Autocracy and Democracy: Democratic Legitimacy in Hong Kong

The partial democracy in Hong Kong is an experiment with limited suffrage in a liberal, self-governing society. This article examines the impact of system dissatisfaction and fundamental cultural values on democratic legitimacy, using logistic regression analyses of data drawn from an electoral survey in 2000. It is found that widespread public dissatisfaction with the economic downturn has not been generalized to the abstract, structural level of regime legitimacy. Equally widespread discontent with the political situation matters; but it has strengthened public support for democracy, rather than weakened it. Finally, democratic legitimacy is grounded in liberal, post-material and individualist-competitive values. In recognition of the plausible durability of these fundamental cultural norms and in view of the relative lack of support for non-democratic alternatives and strong support for partial electoral reform, we conclude that Hong Kong is very likely to remain on track toward a fuller democracy by incremental steps.     

Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace

The extent to which democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive is tested empirically with implications for civilizational conflict and the democratic peace. Three measures of democracy are used: a political rights index, an index of liberal democracy, and a measure based on institutionalization. Environmental variables such as sea borders and rainfall that minimize external threat to democratic systems are found to predict better to the more rudimentary political rights index, while cultural variables, including Islam in a negative direction, are more clearly associated with liberal democracy. The measure of democratic institutionalization behaves in a manner intermediate between the two. Divergence of the structures of explanation for these measures suggests that conclusions concerning the likelihood of war between democracies can depend on the specific index of democracy employed. The absence of a significant negative association between Islam and the political rights index under controlled conditions suggests that the probability of civilizational conflict is low.     

United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic,Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East–West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dub?ek. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world—part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war “compelled” the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.     

Give Me Shelter: Reexamining Military Intervention and the Monadic Democratic Peace

Increasing empirical evidence points to the existence of a monadic democratic peace. However, the quantitative literature on international conflict has yet to produce any compelling evidence that such a peace holds for one of the most prominent types of interstate force in use today, foreign military intervention. This study tests the hypotheses that democracies are less prone to intervene militarily and less likely to be the targets of such incursions. In doing so, it compares six overlapping theoretical perspectives on the monadic democratic peace. No empirical support is lent to the hypothesis that democracies intervene less often than nondemocracies, but considerable evidence indicates that democracies are rarely the targets of foreign military intervention. The latter result remains consistent across six different intervention populations from 1975 to 1996. Of the six theoretical perspectives analyzed, the institutional approach recently advanced by Bueno de Mesquita and his associates fares best. Its predictions match the empirical outcomes exactly. None of the other theoretical frameworks is even half right. In sum, it seems that democratic governance provides a barrier against foreign military intervention, but it does not limit intervention abroad.     

论日本自民党派阀政治回归的必然性

日本自民党前任总裁小泉纯一郎在其当政期间采用了一系列标新立异的政治手法,使该党传统派阀政治一时间似乎面临消亡的境地。但是,小泉刚离任不久,曾经红极一时的"小泉政治"即迅速走向终结,派阀政治随之卷土重来。究其原因,小泉政治其实只是特定时期的特殊产物,而自民党的派阀则由于建立在日本社会、历史和文化基础之上,不可能轻易消亡。不过,对于自民党来说,不管是小泉政治还是派阀政治,从根本上说一切都是为了权力。     

关于苏联民族和民族主义问题的思考

俄罗斯的民族主义有着悠久的历史传统，它直接产生于俄罗斯民族的特殊发展历程，形成了与西方的民族主义不同的道路和特点，长期以来扮演着与西方文化影响相抗衡的民族精神核心内涵的角色。俄罗斯民族主义的两大支柱——弥赛亚意识和俄罗斯的特殊道路，为俄罗斯民族主义的发展奠定了不可动摇的基石。正是在弥赛亚意识和俄罗斯的特殊发展道路的相互印证、相互作用下，俄罗斯民族主义才得以产生、发展和强化，并且深刻影响着俄罗斯的发展。其中，苏联领导人对待民族问题的态度是一个不容忽视的方面。     

The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's assessment of Hitler as a potential threat to American security in the aftermath of the Munich crisis highlights the role of liberal-democratic norms in shaping the threat perceptions of democratic leaders. A critical factor in Roosevelt's post-Munich expectation of future trouble for the United States was his judgment that Hitler's contempt for democratic processes of accommodation forecasted unlimited aims. Since Roosevelt did not link his perception of threat to regime type, however, this episode also calls into question a central tenet of the theory of democratic peace: the notion that democracies invariably harbor a "presumption of enmity" toward nondemocracies. Nevertheless, the Munich case allows us to see which democratic norms do matter in threat perception and establishes that they are not simply the epiphenomena of state interests. Moreover, Roosevelt's response to the Munich crisis shows that threat can be assessed primarily on the basis of intentions and suggests how democratic predispositions can provide indicators of intent. Finally, in analyzing why some democratic leaders derive diagnostic information about aggressive intentions from such indicators, while others do not, this article explores the connection between different leaders' perceptions and the foreign policy processes of democratic states.     

Toward a Multiprocess Model of Rivalry and the Democratic Peace

In this paper we examine recent efforts to combine quantitative research on the democratic peace with research on interstate rivalry. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we highlight problems with separately analyzing the processes associated with rivalry and the democratic peace. Specifically, we specify a multiprocess model and demonstrate that previous research on this topic may overestimate the pacifying effect of democracy on enduring rivalries. Since pairs of democracies are unlikely to experience interstate rivalry in the first place, the true effect of joint democracy is difficult to ascertain in a censored sample of interstate rivals. Our simulation results are consistent with historical data analysis that suggests that the pacifying effect of democracy is most pronounced in the enhanced probability of jointly democratic dyads averting the onset of rivalry. More generally, this article fits into a larger body of research that examines the confounding effect of selection bias on world politics research.     

Probing the Democratic Peace Argument Using Linguistic Fuzzy Logic

Did disputes between non-great powers in the New World, 1816–1989, escalate to war if the disputes involved roughly equal sides or not? Metaphorically and practically, “balances of power” are about measurement, but many of the usual measures prove to be incorrect. Proper assessments of the balances of fighting power qualify counts of the material resources by considering the political-organizational capacity of the state to employ what is counted, the geopolitical location and logistics, and what bystander states might do if the dispute were to escalate. A modest correlation exists between rough equality in power capabilities and war, not peace, in the Americas, 1816–1989. A bare majority of the wars in the Americas from 1816 until 1989 were fought between equal sides, and equal disputants were thirteen times more likely to escalate to war than non-equals were. This relationship found among non-great powers is much less strong than the relationship found among the great powers.     

An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation

Scholars such as Walker Conner have argued that ethnically based nationalism is likely to reinforce trends toward political fragmentation, particularly in the Third World, even as the momentum of integration and interdependence continue apace. There has been little or no discussion of the implications this sort of fragmentation poses for multi‐national states threatened with such disintegration. This article examines the problem from the vantage point of multi‐ethnic societies and from the perspective of the government's extractive capability vis‐a‐vis society. The exploratory data analysis suggests that ethnic cleavages alone may not constitute serious separatist potential without the presence of substantial systematic political discrimination.     

Critical Periods and Regime Type: Integrating Power Cycle Theory with the Democratic Peace Hypothesis

The critical question whether or not detente is a prologue to peace between the superpowers is seldom confronted with scientific rigour. The authors explore the hidden developmental set of assumptions which are built into the mainstream western view of the relations between deterence and detente and proceed to extrapolate these assumptions mathematically further. The results of the exercise suggest that detente will eventually lead to a stable peace but not before an indeterminate (probably long drawn out) process of rhythmical oscillation between several periods of detente and several periods of cold war.     

Questions of Research Design in Developing New Tests of the Democratic Peace

We argue that the prevailing dyad-year research design employed in quantitative tests of the theoretical literature on the democratic peace suffers from several limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on three different stages or "games" that typically emerge in the evolution of international disputes over time. In this type of research design the units of observation are the policy choices of "challenger" and "target" states in each of these three games. We argue that this alternative research design has several advantages, such as requiring researchers to test a more complete and extensive set of hypotheses as well as helping them to address statistical issues related to strategic behavior and selection effects.     

State and Majority Nationalism in Plurinational States: Responding to Challenges from Below

Abstract

While calls for self-determination and independence make headlines worldwide, an often more subtle state nationalism remains an endemic condition of the modern world. In the introductory article for this Special Issue, we define state and majority nationalism we identify three challenges in the study of these phenomena, we suggest that a focus on plurinational states helps to overcome them, and we set out the conceptual, ideational and strategic dimensions of the Special Issue. We hope that this edited collection as a whole contributes to refine our understanding of state and majority nationalism and encourages scholars to engage more actively in their study.