Adolescent Refusal of MMR Inoculation: F (Mother) v F (Father)

F (Mother) v F (Father) concerned a dispute between parents as to whether or not their 15 and 11 year old children should receive the MMR inoculation. Mrs Justice Theis took into consideration the wishes of both parents and the two ‘intelligent, articulate and thoughtful’ minors and held that inoculation was in their best interests. The troubled history of the MMR vaccine and its importance to public health provided the backdrop. Whilst the court's efforts to establish the views of the minors are to be commended, the decision is problematic in its assessment of the minors' individual medical interests and capacities, and in the significance placed on their views when determining whether inoculation would be in their best interests.     

Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council: A Material Contribution to Uncertainty?

In the conjoined cases of Sienkiewicz and Willmore, the Supreme Court decided that the exceptional Fairchild approach to the proof of causation in negligence applied where a mesothelioma victim had been negligently exposed to asbestos by one defendant at a level well below unavoidable environmental asbestos exposure. The negligent exposures in both cases materially increased the risk of mesothelioma thereby satisfying the Fairchild test. Whilst reasserting the primacy of the common law as governing the rules of causation in mesothelioma cases, the Supreme Court failed to clarify the scope of the Fairchild exception. Moreover, in an extensive obiter discussion of epidemiological evidence, the Supreme Court has raised more questions than it has answered relating to the role, if any, of scientific evidence in the law of toxic torts.     

Investors’ Rights in (Crypto) Custodial Holdings: Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation)

Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation) is a landmark decision of the New Zealand High Court that considers for the first time in a comprehensive way whether cryptocurrencies are property at common law and to what extent account holders’ (interests in) cryptocurrencies are protected from the claims of the insolvent crypto‐exchange's creditors. The ruling relies on a body of case law from various common law jurisdictions and, to a significant extent, on the findings of the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts. In tackling complex areas of legal uncertainty, it provides an authoritative conceptual benchmark for future court decisions and normative initiatives.     

The Rule in Cradock v. Piper (1850): Exception or Principle

In Cradock v. Piper (1850) the court allowed a solicitor-trustee to charge for his professional services in relation to certain litigation This was in the absence of a charging clause, and in apparent violation of a strict and general principle of the law of trusts that trustees had to act without remuneration. The rule still exists today, though it is invariably described as anomalous and lacking any rational basis.This paper examines whether the court did indeed establish an exception to the general no-remuneration rule, or whether it applied legal principle correctly The analysis of the court's judgment, of case law, and of contemporary attitudes to professional trustees, shows that the court was correct in refusing to prohibit remuneration where the connection was too tenuous to give rise to a conflict of interest.     

R. (Martin) v Mahony: the History of a Classical Certiorari Authority

R. (Martin) v Mahony, a decision of the Irish High Court of 1910, continues to be acknowledged by modern textbook writers as a leading authority for the classical rule that certiorari could not correct error of law. This rule, which considerably reduced judicial superintendence of magistrates' courts, had been established by the English court of Queen's Bench in the 1840s. However, the rule was repudiated by the Exchequer Division in Ireland in the late 1880s, which developed a novel, liberal theory of certiorari. This doctrinal innovation, which was used in overturning convictions under the anti-boycotting statute, the Criminal Law and Procedure Act 1887, appalled sections of Lord Salisbury's government, was disapproved of by the English courts, and split the Irish judiciary. The division caused by the doctrine persisted until 1910 when the Irish High Court, having assembled in banc in Martin's Case in order to resolve the impasse, re-established orthodox English doctrine.     

The invisible/visible claims to justice: sexual violence and the university camp(us)

If the relationship between international tribunals and reconciliation remains empirically under‐researched within the transitional justice literature, this is even truer in respect of hybrid and local courts. Seeking to address this gap, the purpose of this article is to explore whether the State Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) – and more particularly its War Crimes Chamber (WCC) – can contribute to reconciliation in BiH. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the State Court is located in the country itself. Hence, in theory at least, it has greater potential to involve local people and thus to facilitate the reconciliation process. In practice, however, the Court faces many of the same problems as the ICTY, including perceptions of bias and the difficulty of satisfying victims. What this ultimately demonstrates is that criminal trials are not a panacea or “magic bullet” and that reconciliation – both in BiH and in post‐conflict societies more generally – requires a comprehensive and holistic approach to transitional justice that does not over‐rely upon the administration of retributive justice. The State Court, therefore, is merely one potential path to reconciliation.     

Economic impact of Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2010) 84 ALJR 497

In Wicks v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2010) 84 ALJR 497 the High Court of Australia held that, among other things, plaintiffs (who establish that they suffer a recognised psychiatric illness as a result of the breach of duty of care owed to them by the defendant under s 32 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)) are entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm under s 30 if their psychiatric injury arose "wholly or partly from" a "series of shocking experiences" in the form of "a sudden and disturbing impression on the mind and feelings" in connection with witnessing at the scene "another person ('the victim') being killed, injured or put in peril by the act or omission of the defendant". The High Court construed the phrase "being ... injured or put in peril" to include plaintiffs who suffer pure mental harm by witnessing at the scene another person being injured through the process of suffering pure mental harm in the form of psychiatric injury occasioned by the defendant's negligent act or omission. The Wicks decision raises the question whether the expanded liability of defendants for pure mental harm is economically sustainable.     

Lambe v Finch (1626): An Early Seventeenth-Century Expectant Heir Chancery Suit in Context

ABSTRACT

The suit of Lambe v Finch (1626), at first glance, appears to offer evidence that the court of chancery’s jurisdiction to relieve expectant heirs from the consequences of their improvident bargains had at this time not yet developed to the point it was to reach in the latter part of the seventeenth century. However, if a contextual case study approach is taken, the significance of this particular suit to the development of the jurisdiction changes. By going beyond the information contained in the enrolled decree, a clearer – and qualitatively different – picture emerges; one which offers a more nuanced understanding of the jurisdiction to relieve expectant heirs, and sheds light on the involvement of one individual with the court of chancery in the early seventeenth century.