Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra: A Critical Survey

In spite of the fact that the mūla-text of the Cārvākasūtra is lost, we have some 30 fragments of the commentaries written by no fewer than four commentators, namely, Kambalāśvatara, Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa, and Udbhaṭa. The existence of other commentators too has been suggested, of whom only one name is mentioned: Bhāvivikta. Unfortunately no extract from his work is quoted anywhere. The position of the Cārvākas was nearer the Buddhists (who admitted both perception and inference) than any other philosophical system. But in order to brand the Cārvākas as pramāṇaikavādins they were made to appear as one with Bhartṛhari. Even though the commentators of the Cārvākasūtra had some differences among themselves concerning the interpretation of some aphorisms, they seem to have been unanimous in regard to the number of pramāṇas to be admitted. It was perception and inference based on perception. Only in this sense they were pramāṇaikavādins. Unlike other systems of philosophy, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata did not accord equal value to perception and inference. Inference, they said, must be grounded on perception first, so it was of secondary kind (gauṇa). From the available evidence it is clear that the commentators were unanimous in one point, namely, primacy of perception which includes admittance of such laukika inference as is preceded and hence can be tested by repeated observations. In this respect both Aviddkarṇa and Udbhaṭa were in agreement with Purandara. Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa or Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was known as a commentator who differed from the traditional Cārvākas and broke new grounds in explaining some of the aphorisms. His commentary is creative in its own way but at the same time unreliable in reconstructing the original Cārvāka position. Udbhaṭa seems to have digressed from the original, monist materialist position by taking a dualist position concerning the body-consciousness relation. Moreover, he seems to verge on the idealist side in his explication of an aphorism. In this sense he was a reformist or revisionist. Aviddhakarṇa, like Udbhaṭa, attempted to interpret the Cārvāka aphorisms from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, perhaps without being converted to the Cārvāka. Since it is not possible at the present state of our knowledge to determine whether they were Cārvākas converted to Nyāya or Naiyāyikas converted to Lokāyata, the suggestion that they simply adopted the Cārvāka position while writing their commentaries without being converted to the Cārvāka, may be taken as a third alternative. In spite of the meagre material available, it is evident that (1) not unlike the other systems, there is a lack of uniformity in the commentary tradition of the Cārvākasūtra, (2) not all commentators were committed monistic materialists; at least one, namely, Udbhaṭa, was a dualist, and (3) in course of time Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, such as gamya, gamaka, etc., quite foreign to the traditional Cārvāka, has been introduced into the Cārvāka system.     

The Interpretation of Matching Trace Evidence: A Legal Perspective

本文描述了用于规范法庭科学证言的英美证据法,这些法庭科学证言主要是解释微量物证之匹配的重要性。本文根据即将出版的维基百科全书法庭科学卷部分改编。     

The Impact of Subsequent Customary International Law on Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Interpretation?

Conflicts between treaty and customary norms are endemic to international law and are increasingly frequent. Yet there is nothing automatic or mechanical about interpreting and resolving such conflicts, which require a high degree of contextual sensitivity. Their identification and interpretation test the limits of the rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, particularly where treaty modifications by subsequent customary law are concerned. This article endeavours to sketch how the latter phenomenon occurs, and the interpretative and evidentiary challenges involved—many of which remain underexplored. The analysis begins with the identification and interpretation of newly emerged customary norms, before delving into the process of determining their treaty-modifying potential. This involves the side-by-side interpretation of the pre-existing treaty and the customary norm to assess whether there is a genuine incompatibility that cannot be resolved through harmonious interpretation. The final inductive step is to ascertain the parties’ consent to displace the treaty norm in favour of the customary norm, subject to certain crucial requirements. Against the backdrop of the organic and continuous interplay between treaties and customary international law, these interpretative and evidentiary steps serve to ensure that the parties’ intention remains paramount.

     

A “meeting of the minds” — The greater illusion

Conclusion Despite a superficial similarity in circumstance, the dynamics of the judicial process of contract interpretation are not equivalent to the circumstances giving rise to the Primacy Dilemma. The Primacy Dilemma involves two parties; the judicial process involves a third: the court. This distinction is critical for while Wittgenstein's exposé of the Primacy Dilemma as illusion does not require that centuries of refinements to theories of contract interpretation be scrapped, it does require an abandonment of the ideal that courts do not and cannot make contracts; courts merely enforce agreements that the parties themselves have reached.Copyright ©1995 by Samuel C. Damren. All rights reserved.     

Architecture and Terrorism: A Case Study of the Impact of “The Troubles” on the Architecture of Northern Ireland

Twenty years ago last month “the troubles” began in Northern Ireland. The political, social and economic implications of the problems that now beset the province are well known. What is less familiar is the effect the troubles are having on architecture and environmental design in Northern Ireland. This paper seeks to examine the way the special demands of security and solidity of construction are reconciled with the political policy of playing down the visual impact of the troubles.     

The Concept of “Political Prisoner”: A Critique

The term “political prisoner” plays an important role in contemporary affairs. But how coherent is the concept behind the term, and is use of this term essentially unobjectionable? As it turns out, the most influential contemporary definitions of the concept of “political prisoner” are fundamentally flawed, and the use of the term itself may do more harm than good. One basic problem with the concept of “political prisoner” concerns the most current definitional criteria, which all prove either arbitrarily narrow or excessively broad. Even more worrisome than these definitional issues, the use of the concept contributes nothing to the moral assessment of detentions and punishment, and deflects attention from other considerations that are more relevant in evaluating their legitimacy. There is, finally, a third fundamental problem with the concept: it serves to arbitrarily privilege one class of prisoners vis-à-vis all the others.     

Yogic Mindfulness: Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s Quasi-Buddhistic Interpretation of Smṛti in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda āra?ya’s unique interpretation of sm?ti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdar?an (1911), I argue that his interpretation of sm?ti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of sm?ti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on sm?ti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipa??hānasutta and Buddagho?a’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into his complex account of the practice of sm?ti certain fundamental doctrines of Sā?khyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“ī?vara”) and mental identification with the Puru?a, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of sm?ti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of sm?ti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Mi?ra and Vijñānabhik?u straightforwardly identify sm?ti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the a??ā?gayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that sm?ti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the a??ā?gayoga.     

The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”     

“Schrems II”: The return of the Privacy Shield

On 16 July 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice rendered its landmark judgment in Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (“Schrems II”). The Grand Chamber invalidated the Commission decision on the adequacy of the data protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield. It however considered that the decision of the Commission on standard contractual clauses (“SCCs”) issued by the Commission for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third states was legally valid.The legal effects of the judgment should first be clarified. In addition, it has far-reaching implications for companies which transfer personal data from the EU to the US. The judgment of the Grand Chamber has also far-reaching implications for transfers of personal data from the EU to other third states. Last, it has far-reaching implications for the UK in the context of Brexit.© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.     

Shakya Chokden’s Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga: “Contemplative” or “Dialectical”?

Journal of Indian Philosophy - This reconciliation of the dialectical and contemplative approaches to the buddha-essence is related to and closely resembles Shakchok’s reconciliation of the...     

The Case of the “Offering of Life” in the Causes for Canonization of Catholic Saints: The Threshold of Self-Sacrifice

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - Catholic legal and doctrinal tradition defined two main cases for the canonization of saints:...