Wrongful death claims. Harriton v Stephens. [2002] NSWSC 461. Edwards v Blomeley. [2002] NSWSC 460. Waller v James [2002] NSWSC 462

Studdert J in all three cases went to great length to summarise the global judicial position of "wrongful life" claims. He did not, however, examine in great length how or whether "wrongful life" claims or "wrongful birth" claims are reconcilable with tort and common law principles. Although the cases identify the difficulty in assessing and quantifying damages, they do not directly address the strict legal principles which apply in the assessment of damages. The main conclusion of the three judgments was that no duty of care is owed to the plaintiff in these circumstances and, even if a duty could be established, the impossibility of quantifying damages and public policy considerations warrant the rejection of such a claim: "thus conscience does make cowards of us all." The significance of the decisions cannot be understand. The decisions deny recognition of "wrongful life" claims in circumstances where a disabled person has incurred injuries en ventre sa mere (in the mother's womb) as a result of infections contracted by a plaintiff's mother or genetic material passed on by a plaintiff's parents. Some countries have now legislated for the abolition of "wrongful life and birth" suits. In January 2002 the French legislature passed a Bill overturning the "wrongful life" decision of the Cour de Cassation in Perruche (17 November 2000). As the issue now falls for ultimate determination by the French Senate, the French pro-life movement continues to lobby for the prohibition of "wrongful birth" suits as well. Furthermore, eight States in the United States have prohibited either one or both actions and the State of Michigan prohibited both actions in 2001. It is likely that all three cases will be appealed. The appeal in Harriton will re-examine the viability of a "wrongful life" claim in Australia whereas the cases of Edwards and Waller still need to determine the "wrongful birth" claims brought by the plaintiffs' parents. It is likely that the latter two cases will not be determined until the High Court has considered the Queensland "wrongful birth" case of Melchior v Cattanach, expected to be late in 2002.     

Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam: Malory v Cheshire Homes and the LRA 2002

Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam, holds that Malory v Cheshire Homes is binding in relation to the Land Registration Act 2002. Newey J saw himself as bound by that decision because he could find no relevant distinction between the provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925, and the Land Registration Act 2002. There are however significant differences in the general system of registration that is established. In particular the different roles of section 20 LRA 1925, and section 29 LRA 2002 mean that Malory was not binding and indeed ought not to have been followed. In addition, the treatment of the priorities rules in Richall misinterprets section 29 LRA 2002. Finally, the decision by‐passes the rectification and indemnity provisions of schedules 4 and 8. The decision ought to be overruled.     

Towards a liberalisation of standing conditions for individuals seeking judicial review of Community acts: Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council

The concept of ‘individual concern’, the main admissibility requirement for actions brought by individual applicants for the annulment of Community acts not addressed to them under Article 130 EC, has traditionally been interpreted restrictively by the Community courts, thereby constituting a nearly insurmountable obstacle for individual seeking judicial review of Community acts of general application. In a recent decision, the CFI, referring to the newly adopted EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 47 on the right to an effective judicial remedy), proposed a new and more liberal interpretation of that requirement, thereby widening access to judicial review for individual, companies and representative groups. The Court of Justice has not followed up, but seems to leave the door open for further developments towards a liberalisation of standing conditions.