Democracy and Political Scepticism: Comment on Bufacchi

The claim that democracy requires a particular type of political scepticism for its justification has an initial plausibility. The present article argues, however, that Bufacchi does not succeed in adequately identifying the relevant type of uncertainty. Secondly, it is claimed here that Bufacchi's analysis neglects a crucial element in the justification of democracy, namely, the positive evaluation of moral autonomy. When the role of autonomy is given its proper place epistemology becomes secondary, providing a basis not for scepticism but for a theory such as Rawls's theory of reasonable disagreement.     

A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism

Vittorio Bufacchi argued in this journal that democracy was under threat from two extreme philosophical positions: totalitarianism and nihilism. Sandwiched between these polarities is liberal democracy. Bufacchi believes that one of liberal democracy's distinctive properties is an endorsement of scepticism, which he then attempts to illuminate. In contrast, this article will argue that an authoritarian government bound by a constitution permitting civil liberties might also adopt political scepticism. This removes the aforementioned distinctiveness of liberal democracy in this regard and, in addition, leads us toward a rethinking of the possibility of a more plausible consideration of democracy.     

Über die Notwendigkeit und Bestimmung liberaler Bürgertugenden

Numerous sociological studies describe the status of contemporary liberal democracy as frightening. Taking up these investigations, this article asks for the pre-conditions of liberal democracy, particularly for their moral foundations. In contrast to the classic political theory of liberalism, these moral foundations are not assumed to be locked in the institutional order of the state, but in a certain morality of the citizens. The first target of the investigation is to proof that a moral quality of the citizens is a necessary prerequisite for the persistence of a liberal democracy. The second aim of the work is to show how these moral orientations (liberal virtues) should be shaped within each citizen. This is clarified by discussing three liberal thinkers (Charles Larmore, John Rawls, and Ralf Dahrendorf). The so distilled central liberal virtue is formulated as follows: The political convictions of the citizens must be justifiable for everybody, i.e. also to citizens with a different world view. Political convictions and values, which are expressed during the political process and which influence the voting-behaviour, should therefore not rely exclusively on one’s own set of moral values. The work closes with a discussion of the implications of this normative claim.     

Liberal Democracy and Neoliberalism: A Critical Juxtaposition

In this essay I argue that neoliberalism is both an economic and a political doctrine and that its historical trajectory, both conceptual and political, especially in the United States, is better understood in relation to its complex relationship of affinity with liberal democracy. The intersection between liberal democracy and neoliberalism is thus better apprehended from the perspective of the separation of the economic and the political in capitalism and the relative autonomy that it structurally grants to each field of power. Liberal democracy has provided a depoliticized framework that nurtures neoliberalism, while providing it with a cloak of legitimacy. Stated somewhat differently, the historical trajectory of liberal democracy, as a theory and as a practice of power, betrays an anti-democratic tendency that leads to depoliticization and has quelled the democratic politics that once gave credence to it, thus paving the way for the rise of neoliberalism.     

The logic of multiculturalism and Korean democracy

In this article, I attempt to construct a normative framework of Korean multiculturalism in the Confucian public-societal context of Korean democracy by focusing on the political implications of the claim to cultural rights (so-called ‘logic’ of multiculturalism) and cultural pluralism that it is likely to entail for Korean democracy. After examining the logic of multiculturalism that often puts multiculturalism in tension with liberal democracy, I turn to Will Kymlicka's account of immigrant multiculturalism that resolves the potential tension between multiculturalism and liberal democracy in a liberal way. Then, I construct a normative framework of Korean multiculturalism in a way that a decent multicultural society can be established on the same public-cultural ground on which Korean democracy has matured in the past two decades.     

Universals and Particulars: the Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism

Recent work in liberal political theory has rejected cosmopolitanism to incorporate the empirical agenda of nationalism and multiculturalism. In this article three issues facing cultural national liberalism are first extracted from Rawls's Political Liberalism : the range of reasonable cultural identities under liberalism; the substantive ethical bases of the state; and the possibility of principles of cultural self-respect. I then examine three works which address these problems, Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship , David Miller's On Nationality , and Charles Taylor's 'The Politics of Recognition'. Kymlicka provides principles of cultural self-respect but is caught between conceptualising culture in universalist and particularist terms. Miller's liberal national state rests on shared meanings, but this serves to complicate the introduction of universal moral ideas. Taylor presents authenticity as an alternative self-understanding to liberal autonomy, but I argue against the notion of cultural authenticity.     

Review Article: Modus vivendi versus public reason and liberal equality: three approaches to liberal democracy

Liberal democracy constitutes a particularly attractive political model with its emphasis on both popular sovereignty and individual liberty. Recently several new and innovative articulations of the liberal democratic ideal have been presented. This article reviews three of these recent theories and particularly their democratic credentials. The selection includes theories emphasizing modus vivendi, Rawlsian political liberalism and liberal equality. Taken together these theories show different ways to conceptualize democracy within liberal thought. I argue that ultimately all three approaches struggle with articulating a persuasive conception of democracy, but nevertheless these theories show that liberals do think seriously about the role of democracy in their theories.     

Conflicts of Values and Political Forgiveness

Citizens have a right to be governed by officials with an acute awareness of the conflicts between the constitutional values of liberal democracy. Such an awareness is an integral part of a public official's integrity. That is why citizens should have a say in deciding whether to remove from office an official with such integrity. In this article, this type of conflict between constitutional values is translated into the terms of an individual official's decision making with the help of moral theory. This yields two paradoxes: one focusing on the decision maker and the other on the object of his or her decisions: the citizen. These paradoxes lead to the following questions: If running a liberal democratic constitution essentially involves moral complexity, should we not try to have it run by officials with a sensitivity to that complexity? And if officials with that sensitivity are bound to commit moral wrongs because of complexity, do not we owe them something like political forgiveness? The paradoxes are used to formulate conditions for political forgiveness.     

On monarchy

Monarchy is liberalism’s little secret. Given the number of articles and books appearing every year dealing with liberal democracy as the hallmark of contemporary Western societies, it is astonishing that monarchy is rarely ever mentioned despite the fact that monarchy, and not a republic, is the constitutional form of quite a number of Western liberal states. I argue that considering the political reality of the established monarchies in Europe leads into a dilemma: either contemporary liberalism is not the kind of theory it claims to be or it has to reconsider its central tenets. In conclusion, I show that the dilemma cannot be solved or avoided but needs to be embraced by conceiving liberalism not as a applied moral theory but as a political theory that leaves room for various symbolic self-understandings and acknowledges the crooked timber of historical realities.     

Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation

Going beyond conventional conceptions of political representation, Ernesto Laclau takes representation to be a general category and not just limited to formal political institutions, and he takes representation to be performative in that it also brings about what is represented. This article examines the implications of this conceptualization of representation for Laclau’s theory of populism. Laclau takes populism to be exemplary of his conception of representation because populism is a discourse that brings into being what it claims to represent: the people. This is important for current debates about populism and the crisis of democratic institutions, whether domestic or international. I show how our conceptions of representation inform how we think about populism and liberal democracy, and specifically about populism as a threat to liberal democracy at the domestic or global level. I show this in the context of a reading of Jan-Werner Müller’s influential critique of populism.     

Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan

The literature on populism used to depict the phenomenon as an alternative to the standard path from traditional to modern society; as a way to enfranchise the underclass; or as an anomaly vis-à-vis class politics and liberal institutions. More recently, the debate has shifted into something of a terra incognita as a result of the growing interest in the connection between populism and democratic politics. One of the more intriguing contributions to this debate is an article by Margaret Canovan, if only because it makes this unknown territory less confusing. Her argument draws from Michael Oakeshott's claim that political modernity is characterised by the interplay of two distinct styles – the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism . She renames them the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy and suggests that populism arises in the gap between them. This establishes a relation of interiority between populism and democracy. The former will follow democracy like a shadow. At times, however, the theoretical status of the gap is somewhat uncertain, as it seems more appropriate for thinking politics (particularly radical politics) in general. The political valence of the shadow could also be specified further to show the undecidability between the democratic aspect of the phenomenon and its possible ominous tones. This paper looks into this in some detail to engage in a friendly interrogation of Canovan's claims.     

New challenges in immigration theory: an overview

Normative political theory over recent decades has focused mainly on what ought to be done as far as migration policies are concerned. It faces a basic challenge, which stems from two competing, yet equally fundamental, ideals underpinning liberal democratic societies: a commitment to moral universalism and the exclusionary requirement of democracy. The objective of this special issue, ‘New Challenges in Immigration Theory’, is to provide a conceptual overview of (some) immigration theories and to highlight the challenges new streams of immigration pose for normative (political) theory and liberal democratic practice. The issue will consider how to reconcile state-based exclusion with a commitment to equal moral concern for all persons, by focusing on the non-standard immigration questions that have so far been ‘neglected’ by normative political theory. In line with this objective, the issue will discuss some of the inadequacies of the dominant political theories of immigration and show how such theories can be expanded to take account of new migration challenges such as brain drain, climate migration, detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, rights of labour migrants, transnational networks of movement, and so on.     

Letter from Ankara

This article focuses on the relationship between discourses of economic development and prospects for democracy in Turkey. It does so by tracing the political discourse of high‐ranking government officials and journalists close to them to show how they use arguments for economic development as a tool to politically legitimise interventions into liberal democracy. I first illustrate the dangers caused by the discourse surrounding economic development to democracy by looking at the Gezi protests. I show how demands for pluralism and respect for different lifestyles—which are crucial aspects of liberal democracy—were instead framed by the government as chaos created by agents of the so‐called ‘interest rate lobby’ and provocations caused by those who want to stop Turkey's economic development. I analyse Gezi in comparative perspective with presidentialism debates and the corruption scandal of December 2013. In these cases too, demands for democracy, transparency, checks and balances are pitted against economic development. Citizens are made to choose between a vaguely defined notion of economic development and democratisation.     

Liberal Nationalism and Cultural Rights

Liberal nationalists such as Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka have argued for an extravagant range of cultural rights based on respect for individual autonomy. I present an alternative account of the moral import of liberal autonomy for the status of cultural minorities. The article examines three pivotal aspects of Tamir's argument for cultural rights and argues that, in each case, Tamir's position fails to honour the value of individual autonomy, and in ways parallel to Kymlicka's argument. These shared difficulties point to some basic ontological and moral properties of a genuine autonomy-based defence of cultural rights.     

Hobbes on Democracy

Hobbes is often cited as a precursor of modern liberalism, both on the grounds of his individualism and of his endorsement of intellectual and moral autonomy. Yet Hobbes supports absolutist government rather than democracy. This is partly explained by his rejection of autonomy understood as self-government. But Hobbes's case against democracy is more comprehensive than this. This article considers Hobbes's case against democracy.     

The Theory of Universal Human Rights: A Comment on Talbott

In this analysis of William Talbott’s important book, I note with appreciation his defense of universal moral principles and of moral justification as a “social project,” his focus on the critique of oppression, and his emphasis on empathic understanding in the account of human rights. I go on to develop some criticisms regarding: 1) Talbott’s traditional understanding of human rights as holding against governments and not also applying to nonstate actors; 2) his account of the interrelations among well-being, autonomy, claims for first person authority in moral judgment, and human rights; 3) his strongly rationalist and liberal individualist interpretation of moral judgment and autonomy; and 4) the lack of a role for intercultural dialogue about human rights, which nonetheless are held to apply to all human beings across cultures. In each case, I briefly consider what an alternative approach would look like.     

A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so-called "duty of civility" ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the "duty of civility," which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.     

The Speed of Global Flows and the Pace of Democratic Politics

The claim I want to make in this article is, in short, first, that democratic theory for the most part has seriously neglected the temporal preconditions of liberal democracy and, second, that it therefore fails to adequately grasp some fundamental aspects of the crisis of democratic self-determination in the contemporary global age. In its first part, the article seeks to demonstrate that the history of modernity is an ongoing process of social acceleration and that most of the phenomena we currently grasp under the concept of “globalization” can in fact best be understood as instances or consequences of the latest wave of social acceleration. In the second and main part of this article, the consequences of this acceleratory character of modernity for the plausibility, legitimacy and possibility of political democracy are systematically explored. The main argument is that the speed-up of society at first enabled and supported democratization, but beyond a certain critical threshold, the reverse effect occurs: the speed of social change and the dynamics of socioeconomic development threaten to undermine the proper functioning of democracy. Thus, it is my claim that democracy only works properly within a certain time- or “speed-frame” of social change. From this, I conclude that what is called for in the Age of Globalization is a new critical theory of acceleration, the contours of which I briefly sketch out in the third and last part of this essay.     

Is politics under increasing corporate sway? A longitudinal study on the drivers of corporate access

This article argues that the European Parliament (EP) provides a poor model of representative democracy, as the nature of its representativeness is rooted in a pre‐democratic form. If this is correct, the EP's experience might indicate that liberal representative democracy in western political systems has become an inadequate vehicle for governmental legitimacy. However, the EP could promote devolution of power, which is a prerequisite for a more participatory form of democracy better suited to a politically mature populace.     

Sanctioning Liberal Democracies

This article examines when economic sanctions should be imposed on liberal democracies that violate democratic norms. The argument is made from the social-liberal standpoint, which recognises the moral status of political communities. While social liberals rarely refer to the use of economic sanctions as a pressure tool, by examining why they restrict military intervention and economic aid to cases of massive human rights violations or acute humanitarian need, the article is able to show why they are likely to impose strong restrictions on the use of economic sanctions as well. After reconstructing the social-liberal case against economic sanctions, the article develops the argument that liberal democracies have reasons to support sanctions on other liberal democracies, even when they perpetrate injustices on a smaller scale. Liberal democracies share especially strong ideological, cultural and institutional bonds, and these peer group relations open them to mutual influence. When one liberal democracy commits serious injustices while still proclaiming allegiance to the democratic ethos, it can adversely affect the vitality of the democratic culture in those other liberal democracies with which it maintains close relations. Other liberal democracies therefore have the right and the obligation to condemn this behaviour, in order to preserve their allegiance to their values. The article defends the use of economic sanctions in light of some recent critiques, and concludes by providing an overall assessment of the factors which liberal democracies ought to take into account when they consider imposing economic sanctions on other liberal democracies.