Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature

What is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates? What is preferable: a bureaucrat or a partisan politician? Does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies? This article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice: (1) the median voter model, (2) the Leviathan model, (3) the slack-maximizing model, (4) a general model of bureaucracy, (5) the partisan politicians model and (6) a general model of lobbying. Among several results, it is shown that the median voter’s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good/tax package, even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter’s utility. The article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect.     

The consequences of the US DOJ’s antitrust activities: A macroeconomic perspective

Do the antitrust law enforcement activities of the US Department of Justice act as exogenous “technology shocks” or as “markup shocks” limiting market power and promoting economic growth? We analyze annual time series data from 1947 to 2003 on three measures of federal antitrust intervention: the ratio of the Antitrust Division’s budgetary expenditures to GDP as well as the numbers of civil and criminal antitrust cases instituted. We find that changes in the levels of these policy variables act like negative technology shocks and that the negative effects are transitory; antitrust policy generates no subsequent offsetting increases in productivity.     

Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment

We explore a setting where the central bank is offered an incentive scheme by an interest group, in addition to the contract designed by the government. We prove that the inflation bias can be eliminated when principals do not cooperate and have different output or inflation objectives. These conclusions contrast with those of Chortareas and Miller (Public Choice 121:131–155, 2004). The reason is that our analysis takes into account the participation constraints of the central bank. We also show that, if principals cooperate, the inflation bias is eliminated when their output target is different but not when they disagree over the inflation objective.     

The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach

The riskiness of state employee pension plan portfolios varies across states. We investigate whether this variation is related to how public employees and taxpayers share actuarial surpluses of pension accounts. We focus on two determinants of a plan’s asset mix: the relative influence of public employees to taxpayers; and whether a surplus-sharing contract is specified. Our theoretical model demonstrates that the effect of public employee influence on the asset mix is ambiguous. Our empirical results corroborate this complex theoretical result. In our theoretical and empirical analyses, if a surplus sharing rule is specified, plans adopt a more aggressive investment allocation.     

Cost of ruling as a game of tones: The accumulation of bad news and incumbents’ vote loss

An extensive body of research documents how governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. Varying explanations have been offered, most of which touch upon the liabilities of policy responsibility. Although media coverage is generally acknowledged as one of these liabilities, few empirical studies have examined how news content affect government support. Based on the fact that voters get their information about politics, policies and societal issues from the media, this article studies how the constant stream of negative news influences incumbent support over a 20-year period in Denmark. Modeling a previously untested argument on the cost of ruling, it shows that the accumulation of bad news throughout tenure exerts a substantial effect on government support.     

The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror

This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country’s level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.     

The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif

Rowley’s (Public Choice 140:275–285, 2009) claim that I have “expropriated” (p. 276) intellectual property rights from Professor Landa by insufficiently citing her works is vacuous. It failed, among other faults, to recognize the substantive distinction between the lines of research pursued by Professor Landa and myself. Her analysis of trust is preferences-based while my analysis is beliefs-based. We talk about similar issues but what we say is very different.     

The Greek General Election of 2009: PASOK – The Third Generation

The policy networks model recently has become a more frequent analytical tool of EU policy analysts. In a recent article, Hussein Kassim offers a sceptical view about its applicability to the EU. Kassim fails to make explicit the key variables — or internal characteristics of policy networks ‐ which help to explain policy outcomes. However, his own analysis echoes many of the assumptions of the model: that policy networks are rife in the EU because they facilitate informal bargaining amid fluid policy processes, that networks provide order amid extreme institutional complexity and frequent change, and that the hard work involved in identifying EU policy networks is worth the effort. The policy networks model requires further testing and refinement at the EU level, but it remains the most analytically powerful approach on offer.     

Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey

Public choice economists began studying anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following early public choice economists, many economists are researching how individuals interact without government. From non-public-interested explanations of the creation of government to historical studies of internalizing externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective of human interaction with and without government. Although the economics of politics receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.     

Bringing home the bacon: an empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics

Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001–2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding—particularly on road-building—was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election.     

The Perils of Terrorism: Chinese Whispers,Kevin Bacon and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia – A review essay

This review examines the scholarship on Islamic terrorism and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, arguing that three factors undermine the academic credibility of much of this scholarship. Two points relate to the extensive reliance on interviews with various anonymous ‘security personnel’, or media reports of such statements. Firstly, these sources are in themselves problematic in that they cannot be independently checked or verified. In such circumstances, factual errors undermine the credibility of the argument. Secondly, many researchers using these sources appear to take them at face value, without interrogating their reliability and political motives. The third point relates to the way in which different types of source are utilized and, in particular, how tentative allegations are transmuted into established facts. The review concludes that such studies would benefit from greater contextualization within the domestic politics of the countries in question, rather than their current focus on specific individuals, organizations and networks.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation

Drawing on new data that combine recorded votes from the Swiss National Assembly with canton-level referendum results on identical legislative proposals, Portmann et al. (Public Choice 151:585–610, 2012) develop an innovative strategy to identify the effect of district magnitude on the relationship between representatives and their constituents. We replicate PSE’s central result and also estimate a related model that allows for the possibility of non-monotonicity in the relationship between district magnitude and representatives’ deviance from referendum median voters. Our results indicate that representatives elected in low-magnitude multi-member districts deviate from canton-level majorities less than either MPs from single-member districts or those from high-magnitude multi-member districts.     

Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy

We investigate whether the effect of government corruption is conditional on a country’s institutional structure. Federal systems have an additional layer of government, making lobbying relatively more costly. We investigate whether the effect of government corruption on environmental policy (in the form of restrictions on energy use) is conditional on a federal system being in place. Using 1982–96 data from 11 industry sectors in 12 OECD economies we find that while greater government corruption reduces the stringency of environmental policy, the effect declines in federal systems.     

Dilatory or anticipatory? Voting on the Journal in the House of Representatives

In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd–107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal’s approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days.     

Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program

Are bureaucracies in fact controlled by the president, Congress, or legislation? We analyze a 1998 policy change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) $6.5 billion annual military housing allowance program. Results show that both the president and Congress were able to influence the bureaucracy, even in the presence of an exceedingly specific law that outlined the manner in which the DoD was to allocate the funds. After policy implementation, allowances were disproportionately higher in locations that (a) supported the president in the 1996 election and (b) were represented by members of the House or Senate Armed Services Committees.