Inequality and voting among deprived ethnic groups: evidence from India

ABSTRACT

What are the conditions that determine the electoral success of parties that champion deprived ethnic groups? What is the impact of within-group inequality on this outcome? Existing arguments focus on the role of institutions or the relationship between ethnicity and other social cleavages. This paper contributes to the second approach by studying the impact of within-group as well as between-group inequality on ethnic voting. We use elections to state legislatures within India to control for institutional and historical factors that may influence ethnic voting. Using data from the National Sample Survey, we calculate inequality in consumption expenditure. We show that high within-group economic inequality among deprived ethnic groups hinders the electoral success of parties that champion these groups, whereas high between-group economic inequality has the opposite effect. Our findings also identify a potential causal mechanism (preference heterogeneity) that might link within-group inequality to ethnic voting.     

Neither the T Index nor the D2 Score Measure “Two-Partyness”: A Comment on Gaines and Taagepera

This comment critiques the paper by Gaines and Taagepera (2013 Gaines, Brian J. &; Taagepera, Rein (2013) How to operationalize “two partyness”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. Digital online version, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2013.770398> (accessed 23 March 2013). [Google Scholar]) outlining two new measures that compare how far election outcomes diverge from a particular ideal of “perfect two-partyness” (one in which all votes are divided equally between the top two parties). Their first proposed T index is an unstable amalgam of two different measures, one linear and the other not. Applied to analysing sets of election outcomes, it systematically mis-signals “two-partyness” in its accepted meaning, producing perverse results. Their second index, D₂, has a varying minimum size level depending on the size of the largest party (P₁) and the number of observable parties competing. In many circumstances D₂ scores bifurcate – the same scores are produced by both very low and very high P₁ levels. Applied to distributions, the D₂ score artefactually homogenizes very dissimilar distributions, again misreads even two-party configurations, and always overstates “two-partyness” in multi-party systems. I conclude that neither the T nor D₂ indices are fit for purpose. They should not be further used in electoral analysis.     

Pension Programs Around the World: New Comparative Global Policy Data

Abstract

Income protection during old age is a universally recognized human right. Are nations fulfilling their responsibility for income support for older adults? Using a new global dataset on social protection conceptualized and built by two of the authors, this paper examines whether countries have legislated for national pension systems, and the characteristics and adequacy of those systems.     

Labor market institutions and income inequality: an empirical exploration

This paper presents evidence on the impact of labor regulations on income inequality using a recently published database on labor institutions and outcomes as well as different panel data analysis techniques for a large sample of countries for 1970–2000. When applying our preferred technique we find that both de jure and de facto regulations improve the distribution of income although the former appear to be non-robustly associated with improving income inequality. This result partly reflects the fact that regulations are endogenous and, more interestingly, that different regulation yield distinct effects.     

The political trend in local government tax setting

Previous fiscal studies have paid little attention to the effects of social interaction on local tax setting. This paper seeks to fill this gap by developing a theoretical model in which politicians belonging to the same party interact with each other in order to draw inferences about ideology. This phenomenon produces a mimic effect which is called the political trend. The results of the analysis show that the political trend gives rise to higher income tax rates and to tax mimicking at the local government level. The framework developed also makes it possible to discriminate between Leviathan-type and welfarist-type politicians. The results show that the former are more sensitive than the latter to changes in the average income tax rate of their peers. Moreover, Leviathan-type politicians are less sensitive than benevolent ones to changes in the central government’s income tax rate.     

Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional axioms

There are two categories of income distribution evaluations: first, the more-or-less “value-free” perception of income inequality as a statistical dispersion; and second, the valuation of income distributions according to an explicit social welfare function which is meant to capture all of society's value judgements. These societal value judgements can be expressed in the form of preferences. Whereas the inequality perception of income distributions appeals to an observer's sober judgement, the revelation of preferences with respect to specific income distributions appeals to his or her sentiments. This paper is an empirical analysis which investigates the juxtaposition of preferences with respect to income distributions and corresponding perceptions of distributional inequality. We do this through a questionnaire in which attitudes towards various distributional axioms are tested. The source of our data is 1773 completed questionnaires collected from five German universities. Based on our data, we observe that individuals' preference orderings over the set of income distributionssubstantially deviate from their perceptions of distributional inequality. In fact, our test responses showed that even when some income distribution is judged to be more unequal than another, that distribution might be preferred, as it accords higher incomes to each individual. We hold that the preference for these greater incomes expresses a compensation for the increased degree of inequality. This explanation applies both to equiproportional and to equal fixed-sum increases in incomes, which implies a support of Paretian ethics.     

The private safety net: The role of charitable organizations in the lives of the poor

Abstract

As welfare reform unfolds, nonprofit social service agencies will increasingly be called upon to help fill the gap between what unskilled and semiskilled mothers can earn in the low‐wage labor market and what they need to meet their monthly expenses. This article draws on in‐depth interviews with low‐income single mothers and multiyear observational studies of two nonprofit social service agencies.

Using these data, the authors show what kinds of resources these agencies provide low‐income single mothers, how mothers mobilize the resources available, to what degree agencies actually contribute to mothers’ cash and in‐kind resources, how agencies distribute their resources, and what effect agencies’ distribution practices have on these women. The analysis shows that although nonprofit social service agencies are a crucial part of many low‐income mothers’ economic survival strategies, they cannot come close to substituting for the eroding public safety net.     

Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models

A production and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model. The total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within-group and between-group decisiveness. Productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role. The collective action problem is more severe for the RS model. As group size increases, the ratio of within-group to between-group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the P&C model, while it increases convexly for the RS model. Adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in RS groups than in P&C groups, while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result. The severe between-group fighting in the P&C model for many groups causes the P&C model to be preferable for few groups, while the RS model is preferable for many groups. Applications are considered to intergroup migration, inside versus outside ownership, divestitures, mergers and acquisitions, multidivisional versus single-tier firms and U form versus M form of economic organization.     

Economic justice and economic power: An inquiry into distributive justice and political stability

We characterize and study the relationship between income redistributions that are just and stable. We assume that for a given economy there exists a set of possible income redistributions, the constitution of the economy. The choice of redistribution is in the hands of the agents, who decide by majority vote. A stable redistribution is one that majority vote cannot alter when each agent tries to maximize his income. A just redistribution is defined thus: in the set of all possible redistributions it is the one that leads to an income distribution which, when viewed as a lottery, optimizes the expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the agents of the economy. We assume that all agents have the same utility function, that is, the same attitude toward risk. We postulate a trade-off between efficiency and egalitarianism and derive and analyze conditions for just and stable redistributions. We look for the characteristics of initial income distributions that make just and stable redistributions identical. In an example we show how a certain tax schedule on productive work implies certain income redistributions. This work was completed when I, as a research fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, was a guest of the Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Universität Mannheim. I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Fakultät, and the Sonderforschungsbereich 5, Universität Mannheim, for their support.     

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we study the political economy of the inter-regional allocation of investment in infrastructure, in an effort to disentangle tactical and programmatic motives, where tactical politics refers to the discretionary allocation of investment to districts with more ‘political clout’ and programmatic politics refers to the allocation of investment according to certain ‘objective’ criteria (e.g., income level). We use a panel of data from the Spanish electoral districts for the period 1964–2004 to estimate an equation in which investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since the districts receiving the most funds are those in which: (i) the incumbent’s vote margin is low, (ii) few votes are needed to win an additional seat in the legislature, (iii) the central and regional governments are controlled by the same party, and (iv) regional parties play a pivotal role in the legislature. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution is shown to increase: (i) with the arrival of democracy and European Union funds, (ii) under leftist governments, and (iii) the weaker the correlation is between ‘political clout’ and regional income.     

‘Activating’ those that ‘lag behind’: space-time politics in Dutch parenting training for migrants

Space and time (or rather space-time) are crucial concepts in the legitimation of policy interventions into citizens' private lives. Across Europe, social policy measures to promote ‘activation’ among migrant communities—employment guidance, parenting training, youth work and so on—have proliferated, aiming to ‘move’ the Other into the here-and-now of European modernity. Van den Berg brings together theories of space-time, alterity and ‘cultural lag logics’ in an analysis of a contemporary case of such a policy: parenting training in the Netherlands. Based on ethnographic research, her study shows how certain societal problems are translated into problems of difference, and how that difference is in turn conceptualized as distance in space and time to be overcome through professional intervention.     

Brown kids in white suburbs: Housing mobility and the many faces of social capital

Abstract

Social capital has many faces in the geography of urban opportunity, and as such, particular housing policies might have positive effects on some forms of social capital and negative effects on others. The author defines social support and social leverage as two key dimensions of social capital that can be accessed by individuals. A sample of 132 low‐income African‐American and Latino adolescents is used to examine the early impacts of a Yonkers, NY, housing mobility program on social capital.¹

Overall, program participants (^‘’movers^‘’) appear to be no more cut off from social support than a control group of “stayer” youth. On the other hand, movers are also no more likely to report access to good sources of job information or school advice— to leverage that might enhance opportunity. Adding just one steadily employed adult to an adolescent's circle of significant ties has dramatic effects on perceived access to such leverage.     

Ticking all the boxes? A comparative study of social sorting and affective polarization

This study explores whether, in societies around the world, affective polarization – or animosity between citizens based on their political allegiance – is stronger if political divisions align with non-political ones. Such ‘social sorting’ has earlier been established to foster affective polarization in the United States. In this study, I argue that the underlying mechanism travels across the globe. I then present two complementary studies which confirm this hypothesis. First, I employ CSES data to predict the level of affective polarization by social sorting at 119 elections in 40 countries, showing that greater alignment of partisan divisions with non-political divisions in a society (along the lines of income, education, religion and region) is associated with stronger dislike towards political outgroups. Second, using Dutch panel data, I show that individuals who fit the socio-demographic ‘profile’ of their party better tend to be more affectively polarized. This has important implications for our understanding of affective polarization.     

How Tame Will Leviathan Become in Institutional Competition – Competition Among Governments in the Provision of Public Goods

This article critically examines thehypothesis of Brennan and Buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments.Since Leviathan-type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors, one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors. Indeed, such arule leads to a Nash-equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor. However, net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule, depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article. Acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may,depending on the same variables, evendecrease net income. Moreover, somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone, since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium. Finally,applying the rule in a real-worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies. Forthese reasons, such a rule will hardly everbe introduced. Hence, competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints.Whoever is afraid of Leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments (alone).     

The Likelihood of Higher-Education Reform

Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987) and Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa’s Academically Adrift (2011) stand as bookends. Between them rests a generation of college graduates. Together, they chronicle the crisis in higher education. This paper argues: (1) Adrift’s employment of the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) may serve in part to corroborate Bloom’s contention that popularized moral and cultural relativism have devitalized the love of learning. Students stripped in such fashion might be expected to show little increase in the general collegiate skills that the CLA measures and on which basis Adrift critiques higher education. (2) Adrift may be taken to support Bloom’s case that the higher-education reform that matters most is restoring a required core curriculum consisting of common courses in the sciences and liberal arts. The paper concludes with some reflections on the limits and possibilities of the reforms pointed to by the two books.     

A political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution

We present a two-country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor. Migration can be exogenous and/or endogenous (i.e., determined by labor income differentials). Political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups, where the latter can be affected by immigration. We show that immigration can increase the transfers to, and the income of, the mobile group. We also investigate the possibility of migration regulation, tax-transfer policy competition and coordination and, finally, coordination of regulation policies. It is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries.

     

How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy

Beliefs about normative economics appear to be primarily determined by sociotropic rather than egocentric variables. (Sears & Funk, 1990; Citrin & Green, 1990) Using the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, the current paper finds that the same holds for positiveeconomic beliefs in most – but not all – cases. This hinges on whether a question is “causal” or “non-causal”: Causal beliefs depend on sociotropic variables, especially education and ideology; non-causal beliefs, in contrast, depend on egocentric variables, with income growth playing the leading role. This is consistent with a cognitive model where actors answer easier questions using personal experience, and harder ones with ``off-the-shelf" theories.     

Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion

This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.     

Nationally poor,locally rich: Income and local context in the 2016 presidential election

When social scientists examine relationships between income and voting decisions, their measures implicitly compare people to others in the national economic distribution. Yet an absolute income level (e.g., $57,617 per year, the 2016 national median) does not have the same meaning in Clay County, Georgia, where the 2016 median income was $22,100, as it does in Old Greenwich, Connecticut, where the median income was $224,000. We address this limitation by incorporating a measure of one's place in her ZIP code's income distribution. We apply this approach to the question of the relationship between income and whites' voting decisions in the 2016 presidential election, and test for generalizability in elections since 2000. The results show that Trump's support was concentrated among nationally poor whites but also among locally affluent whites, complicating claims about the role of income in that election. This pattern suggests that social scientists would do well to conceive of income in relative terms: relative to one's neighbors.     

The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation

This paper develops two models of the lobbying of interest groups to examine the effect of the number and size of interest groups on rent dissipation. In cases where individuals ignore the effect of the lobbying activities on the rent size, the number of groups is negatively related to rent dissipation and there exists an inverse relation between the extent of egalitarianism of within-group rent sharing rules and the total rent dissipation in the symmetric setting. Model two examines the case where each individual in each group takes into account the effect of lobbying activities on the total “pie”, of which she/he competes for a share through within-group and between-group interaction. The relation between the number of symmetric groups and the total rent dissipation is shown to be an inverted “U”-shape, contrary to the conventional wisdom that holds a monotonous relation between the two variables.