Colonial legacies and economic growth

Much of the work on colonialism has been theoretical or anecdotal. In this paper, I close the gap between the literature on development and new growth theory by testing the effect of colonization on subsequent growth and development. In a sample of 63 ex-colonial states from 1961-1990, I find that colonies that were held for longer periods of time than other countries tend to perform better, on average, after independence. Finally, I show that the level of education at the time of independence can help to explain much of the development gap between the former British and French colonies in Africa.     

Institutional technology and economic growth

An endogenous model of constitutional changes and economic growth links the temporal decline in private market returns when technology is constant with the returns to rule changes realized in a political market. There is a steady state constitutional setting in which all rule changes have been incorporated that is analytically equivalent to the neoclassical steady state. As in the neoclassical model, private-sector technological progress postpones the steady state. To the extent the original constitutional setting promotes innovation, the evolutionary process toward the steady state is delayed. The model yields a theory of revolution based on forces leading to the adoption of inefficient changes in the constitutional setting.     

Social choice and economic growth

Optimal economic growth deals with the problem of how societies make tradeoffs between current and future consumption, or equivalently, how societies make decisions about investment rates. Until now, theorists have simply assumed that there is some societal utility function which planners can maximize. Social choice theorists have thrown doubt upon the concept of a societal utility function. We treat optimal economic growth as a problem in social choice theory. Assume that citizens have preferences over the various growth plans. Under what conditions will a majority rule equilibrium exist? We show that such an equilibrium can exist for a Ramsey type problem. We then briefly consider social choice in the so-called “labor surplus” economy.     

Distributional coalitions,state strength,and economic growth: Toward a comprehensive theory of economic development

High-performing economies in the Asia-Pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in Latin America prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries. Combining a statist perspective with Olson's theory of interest group formation, this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective. Using a longitudinal research design, this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight Asian-Pacific and twelve Latin American countries. By considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society, the results indicate that approximately two-thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained.     

Puerto Rico: National security,economic growth and colonialism

Abstract

Puerto Rico's significance for the US state and imperialism has gradually deteriorated. In the context of recent global changes and new developments in the US political economy the logic that justified colonial control cannot be sustained. However, an array of counteracting political and economic forces are conspiring to overcome the altered material and geopolitical conditions that make evident the need for Puerto Rico's decolonization.

Colonialism has given rise to an array of forces that impedes any changes in Puerto Rico's formal political status. Where once the US state, corporate capital and the dominant political forces in Puerto Rico were in relative agreement on sustaining the colonial enterprise, a new constellation of competing forces has emerged. Within Puerto Rico proponents for the status, quo and those who agitate for statehood have reached virtual electoral parity. Monopoly “capital, primarily in Pharmaceuticals, dominates the local economy. However, it is challenged by North American unions and their congressional allies who seek to rescind the lucrative fiscal policies that account for these firms exorbitant profits. Agencies of the US state and congressional committees are at odds on what needs to be done to sustain an unmanageable, increasingly expensive and anachronistic colony.

This essay presents a framework for examining the array of forces and conditions that continue to erode the colonial relation and that explains colonialism's fragility in the current period of global readjustment.     

Implementation, accountability and trust

Abstract. According tot standard dictionaries 'implementation' is ambiguous, as it means either the act of implementing or the state of having been implemented. This duality has characterized implementation theory, which models the process of implementation in different ways, each presumably conducive to successful implementation as an outcome. It is argued that one model of implementation as a process is most suitable for successful implementation meaning the fulfillment of policy objectives by programme technologies. However, there is no necessary relation between some model of implementation processes and implementation as an outcome. Public policies may be implemented in various ways and some policies do fail implementation or result only in political symbolism, but that does not warrant generalizations about the impossibility of successful implementation or create a case for some special model of implementation as hierarchical authority, or as evolution, learning or coalition. Basic to implementation is accountability, which restricts the amount of trust that gives autonomy to those responsible for the implementation of policies. The conceptualization of implementation as a combination of accountability and trust points in a new direction for the analysis of policy cycles.     

Whom do you trust? An analysis of executive and congressional economic forecasts

Economic forecasts play an increasing role in U.S. budgetary and fiscal policies. This paper analyzes the accuracy and bias of economic forecasts prepared by the Executive Branch and Congress. Short-run forecasts by the Executive Branch for the forthcoming year do not appear biased. They are as accurate as private forecasts and the forecasts of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO); they are not sensitive to political factors such as the size of the deficit. At the same time, the accuracy of Executive branch's short-run economic forecasts has not improved over the period from 1962 to 1984, and the forecasts themselves can be well approximated by simple, single-equation models that use a small number of variables. In contrast to short-run forecasts, long-run economic forecasts of both the Executive branch and CBO are consistently optimistic. The degree of optimism increases with the length of the forecasting horizon and the degree of fiscal pressure the year in which they are issued. The Reagan Administration's long-run forecasts, while typically optimistic, have not been rosier than those issued under previous administrations.     

Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered

The debate on the relationship between institutions and economic development is discussed, focusing on two illustrations, i.e., the impact of democracy and political instability on economic growth. Various pitfalls of existing research are identified, like sensitivity of the outcomes to model specification, sample heterogeneity, measurement of political variables, and the treatment of the time dimension.     

Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues, from an empirical perspective, that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy. In this paper, a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the Congress, the President, and one agency (we use the U.S. Federal Reserve as an extended example) can dictate policy outcomes. The results of the paper include the “Congressional Dominance” theorem: If more than 2/3 of House members, and more than 2/3 of Senate members, agree on something, they get it. The theorem is obvious (the “proof” is in the U.S. Constitution), but often forgotten in the substantive literature. More realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of Congress are more diverse. Powers of the President to influence policy with, and without, appointments are also analyzed.     

The two freedoms,economic growth and development: An empirical study

Log-linear methods are applied to categorical data containing economic freedom, political freedom, the level of income, and the rate of economic growth for a panel of about 100 countries from 1975 to 1992. The main results are: given economic freedom, the rate of economic growth is independent of political freedom and the level of income; given the level of income, political freedom is independent of economic freedom and the growth rate. The analysis suggests the fundamental effects of economic freedom in fostering economic growth, and a high level of income as the condition of a high degree of political freedom.     

Tolerance and economic growth revisited: a note

Berggren and Elinder (BE) in this journal write on the relationship between the degree of tolerance in a nation and its rate of economic growth. They are disturbed to find in their cross sections that faster economic growth statistically goes together with intolerance of homosexuals. In this comment, we revisit the issue and demonstrate that the concern expressed by BE is unwarranted if we properly account for ??conditional convergence?? in the regressions for economic growth. Other things being equal, a country grows faster if it starts from a poorer initial position. In the BE dataset, China since the Deng reforms is a prime example. At about the same time, another group of countries managed to accelerate their economic growth after a long period of stagnation: the ex-communist countries in central and Eastern Europe. Many of these nations also grew exceptionally fast for a number of years, once freedom had been regained and the initial chaos overcome. With simple modeling of these historical initial conditions, we find no statistical pattern that associates bias against homosexuals with weaker economic growth. Our results are robust under alternative specifications.     

Optimal taxation and economic growth: a comment

Scully (Public Choice 115: 299–312, 2003) claims that for the United States in 1960–1990, the growth-maximizing size of the state was about 19% of GDP. However if an error in the model specification is corrected and if 2001 vintage data is used (instead of 1996 vintage data), estimates of the growth-maximizing size of the state range between 9% and 29% of GDP. Further, the method spuriously identifies a ‘growth maximizing tax rate’ even if no relationship exists between growth and the size of the state. The model cannot address reliably the question it attempts to answer.     

Elite economic forecasts,economic news,mass economic expectations,and voting intentions in Great Britain

Abstract In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on professional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood of elections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election–related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election–related cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorates.     

论信用及信用体系的现代构建

中华民族素来以诚信著称。然而在历史的变迁中 ,今日中国却陷入了信用危机中。本文面对这一现实 ,浅析了信用危机产生的原因和信用危机造成的危害 ,并从建立信用机制、完善法律法规、强化企业自律和加强道德教育几个方面论述了信用体系的现代构建。作者以为 ,只有建立起健全的信用体系 ,才能使社会朝着良性的方向发展     

Elite economic forecasts, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voting intentions in great britain

In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on professional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood of elections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election–related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election–related cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorates.