The underexamined assumptions of the invisible hand: Monetary incentives as policy instruments

To alleviate overcrowding in pretrial detention facilities, the City of New York established a program offering substantial budgetary increments to those district attorneys' offices in the city that reduced the number of long-term detainee cases. The experience with this program suggests that the inherent assuptions underlying a monetary incentive strategy—the existence of capacity, the avoidability of goal displacement, and the efficacy of financial rewards—need to be carefully examined if implementation is to be successful.     

Public transportation policy making in France as an implementation problem

Public transportation policy is analyzed as the output of a complex social system of interdependencies and power relationships linking the central state bodies to various economic and political organizations. The interest groups structure the system by controlling the implementation process. The system works because of cheating—violating the public regulations, but the interest groups need state regulation to protect their privileges.The study of governmental projects is a particularly stimulating form of political analysis. Because it emphasizes both the process and the contents of the activities of public authorities, which is to say the goods and services produced by the State, such a study deals with problems having specific impact on and distinct meaning for individuals. It also allows one to avoid overly abstract speculation on the nature of the State by placing the discussion on a more scientifically fruitful level, that of the effective interactions and exchanges among institutions and groups.Our objective will be to demonstrate the importance of the implementation sequence of public policy, particularly in terms of its effects on the understanding of the definition of alternative solutions. We will concentrate on the way in which an ensemble of systems effects, induced by governmental action conditions both the perception of the problem to which this action is supposedly responding, and the elaboration of decisions to solve the problem. The method employed will be that of suggesting a form of analysis which will discern those fields of force and interaction processes with which decision makers, in this case public authorities, are confronted. The method employed should thus be useful in understanding the process of decision making.     

Do voters have a cue? Television advertisements as a source of information in citizen–initiated referendum campaigns

Abstract. In this article we examine the scope for campaign effects in citizen–initiated referendum (CIR) elections. Given the context of CIR elections, television effects can be seen to be even bigger and more important than in candidate elections. We use survey data on information demands made upon voters in CIR campaigns, and the information sources they use, in order to gauge the relative importance of various sources that voters rely upon in making voting decisions. We then examine the relative importance of television advertising as a source of information in CIR campaigns. We find that voters report using many sources of information, with few voters relying exclusively upon television advertisements. Rather than telling voters which way to vote, television campaigns may simply raise awareness of CIRs and so encourage voters to seek cues elsewhere, in particular from ballot guides where cues are more readily discerned.     

Public policy for dangerous inventions

This study explores the relationship between dangerous invention characteristics and US local, state, and federal government safety policy-making patterns and effectiveness. When an invention prototype appears and its existence is recognized, an initial policy direction is established quickly if the invention is treated by society as being similar to a previous way of doing things. In this case the invention's dangers will be regulated within the established legal and administrative framework. If an invention is perceived as being entirely new, its introduction tends to be followed by governmental inaction for years or even decades. When government finally responds it is likely to be at the federal level.     

Public policy evaluation in France

The future of public policy evaluation in France seems at once promising and uncertain. Although the signs of development are evident-increasing numbers of evaluations, aroused public and parliamentary interest, active administrative involvement-the process is not uniform, codified, or generally rigorous. The administration itself is the chief initiator of evaluations, possessing the greatest resources, yet only in a small minority of instances are the ideal conditions of evaluation met. Strong political pressure would almost certainly be essential to move the government toward the institutionalization of an effective appraisal system.     

Public choice theory and antitrust policy

We survey the pioneering contributions of Robert Tollison to the theory and practice of antitrust law enforcement. Inspired by his period of service during Ronald Reagan’s first administration as Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, Tollison was the first scholar to apply public choice reasoning to the question why antitrust frequently fails to achieve its stated goal of protecting consumers against unwarranted exercises of market power. In supplying evidence that the outcomes of antitrust processes are shaped more by special interests than by the public’s interest, he was instrumental in launching a wholly new research program.     

Public policy and health resource distribution

Despite federal health programs of the thirties, the Great Society programs and the establishment of health planning agencies in the sixties, health resources continue to accumulate in wealthier areas. According to a rational decision-making model public resources would be expected therefore to be directed toward those poorer areas with perceived needs. This paper explores the distribution of public and private health resources among towns of Connecticut. Using a rational decision-making model, the distribution of these resources is tested in a series of stepwise regression equations against the socioeconomic and health characteristics of the population. Private allocations of health resources (such as physician distribution) respond to socioeconomic factors while public resources do not show a clear pattern of overcoming the maldistribution effected by private actions. We find little evidence to support the hypothesis that Connecticut's town and state decision makers in health were following a rational model such as is the basis for health planning. Some other more complex model, such as a bureaucratic politics model, would explain better public policy decisions in health resource allocation.Research for this paper was carried out under Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Grant #5-R01-HS-00900. We wish to thank Berton Freedman for assistance with computer programming, and our former Yale Health Policy Project colleagues, George A. Silver, James Warner Bjorkman, and Christa Altenstetter for comments on an earlier draft. This earlier paper entitled Socio-Economic Indicators, Health Resources and Health Status: A Statistical Analysis and its Policy Implications was presented to the Statistics Section, American Public Health Association Meetings, November 16–20, 1975, Chicago, Illinois.     

Public policy analysis in Washington and Ottawa

Policy analysis in the U.S. and Canada tends to follow the methods of systems analysis and takes into account variables relating to substantive matters as well as political and administrative constraints that governments face in pursuing different alternatives.Comparative analysis of the political effectiveness of the two governments in implementing the results of analysis indicates that Canada has built-in constitutional advantages. Comparative assessment of bureaucratic skills in policy analysis and policy implementation suggests that the American system is relatively weaker in terms of implementation, but relatively stronger in terms of policy analytical skills. This is followed by an assessment of the attempts made by the U.S. government to improve its policymaking structures through the setting up of the Domestic Council and the reorganized OMB, and the Canadian attempts to improve its policymaking capabilities through a reorganized Cabinet committee system and the strengthening of the Privy Council Office.The final section suggests that analysis of values and norms should be an integral part of policy analysis. The scope of policy analysis should be extended to include long-term economic and political analyses.     

The policy movement as a policy problem

The policy movement is unified by a common interest in the improvement of policy decisions through scientific inquiry. The movement is differentiated, however, because this common interest is highly ambiguous and subject to interpretation from different perspectives. This paper applies a policy sciences perspective to the movement's disappointments over the last few decades, and in particular, the failure to realize earlier aspirations for rational, objective analysis on the more important and controversial policy issues. The paper offers a definition and diagnosis of the underlying problem, and suggests what can be done about it as a matter of individual and collective choice.     

Case-wise policy information systems: redefining poverty

Problem definition and program adaptation are difficult tasks in policy analysis. In the analysis of social welfare policy, for example, there are tendencies (1) to ignore many of the factors necessary to distinguish the truly needy, resulting in the misdirection of resources; (2) to focus on individual programs, resulting in unintended consequences arising from program interactions; and (3) to overlook evolutionary changes in the target populations, resulting in obsolete programs. Conventional techniques that simplify data by variables exacerbate these and related problems of analysis. Unconventional techniques that simplify by cases might help resolve them. This paper develops the rationale for case-wise policy information systems, using the measurement and definition of poverty as an example.     

Revisiting the governance of privacy: Contemporary policy instruments in global perspective

The repertoire of policy instruments within a particular policy sector varies by jurisdiction; some “tools of government” are associated with particular administrative and regulatory traditions and political cultures. It is less clear how the instruments associated with a particular policy sector may change over time, as economic, social, and technological conditions evolve. In the early 2000s, we surveyed and analyzed the global repertoire of policy instruments deployed to protect personal data. In this article, we explore how those instruments have changed as a result of 15 years of social, economic and technological transformations, during which the issue has assumed a far higher global profile, as one of the central policy questions associated with modern networked communications. We review the contemporary range of transnational, regulatory, self‐regulatory, and technical instruments according to the same framework, and conclude that the types of policy instrument have remained relatively stable, even though they are now deployed on a global scale. While the labels remain the same, however, the conceptual foundations for their legitimation and justification are shifting as greater emphases on accountability, risk, ethics, and the social/political value of privacy have gained purchase. Our analysis demonstrates both continuity and change within the governance of privacy, and displays how we would have tackled the same research project today. As a broader case study of regulation, it highlights the importance of going beyond technical and instrumental labels. Change or stability of policy instruments does not take place in isolation from the wider conceptualizations that shape their meaning, purpose, and effect.     

The birth,life, and death of policy instruments: 35 years of EU gender equality policy programmes

Policy instruments research is an essential part of studying European Union governance. A growing interest in processes of (de-)legalisation and patterns of instrument choice requires a more process- and context-oriented analysis of the EU’s instrument selection. Using a political sociology approach, the article analyses patterns of instrument choice in soft law policy programmes, by examining the life cycle of EU gender equality policy programmes from 1982 to the present day. Gender equality policy programmes offer an in-depth understanding of how the Commission upgrades and downgrades policy instruments. The analysis indicates that patterns of policy instrument choice are not necessarily inflexible once a policy instrument is selected. Instead, patterns vary while the instrument is (de-)legalised. Investigating gender equality policy programmes provides explanations for the shifts in the use of legislative instruments and their limitations.     

Public pensions and immigration policy in a democracy

The paper analyzes the link between the public pension system and the immigration policy. In a pay-as-you-go system, the incentives for immigration vary significantly between individuals at different lifetime periods. In the framework of an overlapping generations model, we show that the median voter's choice in general leads to inefficient levels of immigration. The median voter neglects the effects of the externalities within the pension system on other generations. An immigration policy that is not affected by the median voter's choice but instead is constitutionally determined will avoid welfare losses. The expected lifetime income of each generation can be increased by applying a rule of steady immigration.     

Regulating the computer: comparing policy instruments in Europe and the United States

Abstract. The introduction of information technology to governmental agencies has raised considerable concern for the erosion of personal privacy in most advanced democratic states. This article compares and tries to explain the choice of policy instrument in four key countries (Sweden, the United States, West Germany and the United Kingdom) to enforce the protection of personal data. Five options were available from the 'international repertoire' of solutions: voluntary control, subject control, licensing, a data commissioner and registration. The Swedes opted for licensing, the Americans rely on subject control, the Germans established a data commissioner and the British chose a registration scheme. In no state, however, were these decisions made from a synoptic analysis of all possible options. Nor did a process of policy diffusion occur. Rather, a combination of domestic constraints seemed to filter out unacceptable options and produce a bias in favour of the resulting policy instrument. In the United States and Sweden, this bias resulted from perceived constitutional imperatives; in West Germany and Britain, the position and power of the respective national bureaucracies produced stiff resistance, a conflictual policy process and resulting policy instruments with few, if any, precedents in their respective systems.     

Limited information and coordinated voting in multi-party elections under plurality rule: The role of campaigns

This essay bridges the logic of electoral coordination with the observation that many voters cannot recognize ex post viable candidates. When strategic voting is limited, behavioral factors of sincere voting play a large part in coordinating uninformed voters and inform the expectations of potentially strategic voters about the patterns of voting. Using the 2011 Canadian Election Survey, I found strong effects of the density of campaign contacts and the asymmetries in the campaigns spending and party identification on the predictability of the patterns of intra-district competition. A comparison of the effects of behavioral factors on the uninformed and informed voters confirms that the effect of centrifugal spending and party identification is conditional on the ability of voters to recognize the leaders of district competition.